Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging a mobile home park's policy requiring all occupants to provide documentation evidencing legal status in the United States to renew their leases as violating the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment for the mobile home park, holding that plaintiffs have made a prima facie case that the policy disparately impacted Latinos in violation of the FHA, satisfying step one of the disparate impact analysis, and that the district court therefore erred in concluding otherwise. The court also held that the district court seriously misconstrued the robust causality requirement described in Tex. Dep't of Housing & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2513 (2015), and erroneously rejected plaintiffs' prima facie claim that the policy disparately impacted Latinos. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Giron de Reyes v. Waples Mobile Home Park LP" on Justia Law

Brown, a federal prisoner. filed his “Kemmerer” complaint, alleging that prison officials had injured him by placing him in restraints; he successfully moved to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which waives fees if the prisoner demonstrates that he cannot afford the fees. Under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), the “three strikes rule,” a prisoner cannot proceed IFP if he has on three or more prior occasions, brought an action that was dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim. Brown later filed his “Sage” complaint, alleging that prison employees were deliberately indifferent to his serious mental health issues. Brown again sought to proceed IFP. Brown subsequently filed an explanation that he had been informed that he had three strikes and would invoke section 1915(g)’s “imminent danger” exception. The court denied Brown’s motion in Sage, concluding that he did not qualify for the exception, and vacated its Kemmerer IFP decision. Brown then filed his third Bivens action, claiming that a prison physician assistant denied him treatment for burns after he spilled hot water on himself. The court again held he did not meet the exception and dismissed the case. In consolidated appeals, the Third Circuit reversed, concluding that it must use its own precedent to evaluate whether prior cases are strikes, rather than that of the Circuit from which the potential strikes emanated. Brown's third "strike" did not qualify because the case was closed for failure to state a claim without having actually been filed in the district court. View "Brown v. Sage" on Justia Law

In this case, the issue presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review was whether the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission (Commission) appropriately issued fines and suspensions without holding hearings. The Commission sent notices of proposed suspension to the dealers. The notice also informed the dealers of their right to request a hearing. Each dealer acted pro se and requested a hearing in writing. Each provided explanations for the alleged violations but did not deny the allegations. The Commission denied the requests for hearings and issued an order of suspension/final administrative decision letter to each dealer. The Commission ruled that each dealer had “failed to identify any disputed material fact(s), legal issue(s) and/or specific mitigating circumstances to be resolved at a hearing,” and interpreted the dealers’ responses as admissions. The Appellate Division panel consolidated the appeals and affirmed the Commission’s imposition of suspensions and fines, determining that the Commission could decide cases “without a trial-type hearing when there are no disputed adjudicative facts.” The panel found that the fines challenged by the dealers were authorized by N.J.S.A. 39:10-20, and the Commission could impose fines under the statute on a case-by-case basis. The New Jersey Supreme Court found that if the reasons given by the dealers presented a colorable dispute of facts or at least the presence of mitigating evidence, the Commission was required to provide an in-person hearing pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:10-20. "An in-person hearing must be held prior to a license suspension or revocation when the target of the enforcement action requests it." View "Allstars Auto Group, Inc. v. New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission" on Justia Law

Unbeknownst to Burton, her license was suspended. Zion Officer Meyers spotted her driving, verified that there was an active warrant for her arrest, and activated his emergency lights. Burton saw his lights but claims she was afraid to pull over because, in 2008, Officer Richardt pulled Burton over, and, while she was handcuffed, used a taser on her. The Department sustained Burton's allegations of unnecessary force. Burton sued, obtaining a settlement. Instead of stopping, Burton drove toward her home, following all traffic laws, wanting friendly witnesses. The officers knew that Burton was heading home. Richardt, the officer involved in the 2008 incident, joined the pursuit. Burton stopped near her friend, with his pit bull. Meyers approached Burton’s driver’s side door. Burton exited through the passenger door because, she alleged, the other door was not functioning. Richardt ran and brought Burton to the ground by incorrectly executing a “straight-arm take-down.” The dog bit Richardt's leg but immediately released without causing damage. Sergeant Arrington placed his knee on Burton’s back as he handcuffed her then dragged her away.Burton sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983,. The court excluded evidence regarding the 2008 incident. The jury found in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The fact that Burton had been previously subjected to excessive force was not propensity evidence and could not be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 404. The court must weigh the probative value against the potential prejudice, considering ways in which prejudice can be mitigated. Excessive force amounts to whether the officers’ force, given the facts and circumstances known to them at the time, was reasonable. View "Burton v. City of Zion" on Justia Law

On January 7, 2018, John Doe, a minor, by and through his mother S.C., filed the underlying action against the Montgomery County Board of Education, seeking compensatory damages and punitive damages arising from an alleged assault on Doe by a school employee at the elementary school Doe attended, as a result of which Doe was injured. The complaint asserted a single count of negligence against the Board and other unidentified fictitiously named defendants. Specifically, Doe alleged the Board breached its duty "to not place him in harm or specifically harm him" and that the Board failed to properly train and supervise the employee allegedly responsible for the assault. The Board petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Montgomery Circuit Court to dismiss Does' lawsuit, on sovereign immunity grounds. Finding the Board was an entity of the State, it enjoyed immunity from Doe's action under section 14 of the Alabama Constitution. Accordingly, the Board has demonstrated a clear legal right to a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to dismiss the lawsuit against it, and issued the writ. View "Ex parte Montgomery County Board of Education." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a pro se 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against prison officials, alleging that he was denied access to rehabilitative programs and services, including sex offender treatment. The district court dismissed the suit and plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration. The magistrate judge then sua sponte deemed plaintiff's motion withdrawn, and plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's dismissal of the suit.The Fifth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case and thus could not reach the merits. The court considered defendant's motion for reconsideration still pending before the district court because the magistrate judge's withdrawal of the motion was ultra vires and without legal consequence. Therefore, plaintiff's motion for reconsideration remained pending in the district court. The panel held the appeal in abbeyance and issued a limited remand to allow the district court to rule on plaintiff's motion. View "Lawson v. Stephens" on Justia Law

Wexford provides medical care to Illinois inmates. Beard experienced chronic ankle pain. In 2010 he consulted with his prison’s doctors, wanting surgery. The doctors ordered conservative treatment. When Beard’s pain persisted, the doctors considered referring Beard for surgical evaluation, which required Wexford’s approval. Wexford rejected requests for surgical evaluation but authorized Beard to see a podiatrist in 2012 and an orthopedist in 2015. Beard sued Wexford in 2011, claiming deliberate indifference to his serious medical need. A jury awarded Beard $10,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. The judge concluded that the punitive-damages award violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive or arbitrary punishment and reduced the award to $50,000. The Seventh Circuit vacated. While the Supreme Court has cautioned that “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages ... will satisfy due process,” the district court had nine single digits from which to choose and decided that the Seventh Amendment did not require it to offer Beard the option of a new trial before it entered judgment on the reduced award. The decision was arbitrary and constituted a procedural misstep. The court remanded to give Beard the choice between a reduced punitive-damages award and a new trial limited to damages. View "Beard v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

The warrant application was supported by statements from “Doe,” that for the previous six months she regularly bought heroin from T (Doe only knew him by sight and street name) in a house, which she identified while driving with the police. A judge questioned Doe under oath and issued the warrant. Executing the warrant, officers found Walker in a house that looked like a drug house. Walker stated that she had a gun but could not remember where it was. The search took 90-120 minutes. Officers left without drugs or evidence of T’s whereabouts. Walker sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted defendants summary judgment; more than 16 months passed before the judge released her opinion. Walker appealed that day. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first noting that under Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii), a judgment is deemed to be entered on the earlier of the Rule 58 judgment or 150 days after a dispositive order is entered. “Deferring the opinion until after the time allowed by Rule. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii) is never appropriate, as it can spell disaster for a litigant not versed in the appellate rules.” Addressing the merits, the court stated that Walker’s goal was to have a jury decide whether the state judge should have issued the warrant but with the benefit of “great deference” the state judge’s probable-cause evaluation must prevail. Nothing was concealed from the judge and, under the circumstances, a two-hour search was not unreasonable. View "Walker v. Weatherspoon" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action brought by for-hire drivers challenging a Seattle ordinance that establishes a multistep collective bargaining process between "driver-coordinators," such as Uber and Lyft, and for-hire drivers who contract with those companies. The panel held that the drivers' claims under the National Labor Relations Act were unripe because they failed to allege an injury in fact that was concrete and particularized. In this case, even assuming arguendo that the disclosure of drivers' personal information to the union under the ordinance was imminent, the disclosure was neither a concrete nor a particularized injury. Furthermore, no contract or agreement was imminent. The court also held that the drivers' First Amendment claims were unripe for the same reasons. View "Clark v. City of Seattle" on Justia Law

Wheelchair-using detainees sued Cook County, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, based on purportedly inaccessible ramps and bathroom facilities at six county courthouses. The district court certified a class for purposes of injunctive relief. The named plaintiffs also sought damages individually for the same alleged violations. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the equitable claims and entered a permanent injunction, finding that the defendants had violated the ADA. Relying largely on the same findings, the court granted the plaintiffs partial summary judgment on liability in their personal damage actions, then submitted the question of individual damage awards to a jury. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part. The district court improperly relied on its own findings of fact when it granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs on their damage claims. When equitable and legal claims are joined in a single suit, common questions of fact should be tried first to a jury unless there are extraordinary circumstances or an unequivocal waiver by all parties of their jury trial rights. The court upheld the class certification. View "Lacy v. Cook County, Illinois" on Justia Law