Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Three nonprofit organizations challenged two Arizona election law amendments: one allowing the cancellation of a voter’s registration if they move to another county (the “Cancellation Provision”) and another making it a felony to provide a voting mechanism to someone registered in another state (the “Felony Provision”). The plaintiffs argued these laws would jeopardize voting rights in Arizona.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona preliminarily enjoined the enforcement of both provisions, agreeing with the plaintiffs that the laws could harm voters and were likely unconstitutional. The defendants, including the Arizona Attorney General and the Yuma County Republican Committee, appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to challenge the Cancellation Provision because they only alleged a frustrated mission and diverted resources, failing to show direct harm to their core activities. The court emphasized that organizational standing requires more than just a diversion of resources; it requires a direct impact on the organization’s core activities.Regarding the Felony Provision, the court found that the plaintiffs had standing because they faced a realistic possibility of prosecution, which could chill their voter outreach activities. However, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their vagueness challenge. The court interpreted the phrase “mechanism for voting” narrowly, determining it referred only to unlawful acts of voting, not voter outreach or registration.The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "ARIZONA ALLIANCE FOR RETIRED AMERICANS V. MAYES" on Justia Law

The appellants, Meredith O'Neil, Jessica Svedine, Deanna Corby, and Roberto Silva, sued various officials from the Canton Police Department and the Town of Canton, Massachusetts, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the enforcement of Massachusetts witness intimidation statutes, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268 §§ 13A and 13B. They claimed that these statutes violated their First Amendment rights, fearing prosecution for their actions during a November 5, 2023 protest and alleging that their speech would be chilled for a planned protest on November 12, 2023. The appellants moved for emergency relief to enjoin the enforcement of these statutes.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied the emergency motion on November 10, 2023. The court assumed the plaintiffs had standing but found they did not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The court held that the statutes served compelling interests in protecting the administration of justice and were narrowly tailored. The court also found that the plaintiffs had not shown they faced a risk of irreparable harm, noting that the plaintiffs had other public forums to express their views. The balance of harms and public interest considerations also weighed against granting the injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and dismissed the appeal as moot. The court noted that the state court had dismissed the charges against the appellants for lack of probable cause, and no ongoing conduct remained for the court to enjoin. The court also found that the appellants' general allegations of future protests did not show a credible threat of prosecution, failing to establish standing for their pre-enforcement challenges. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings as appropriate. View "O'Neil v. Canton Police Department" on Justia Law

Kimberly Diei, a pharmacy student at the University of Tennessee Health Science Center, maintained social media accounts under a pseudonym where she posted about song lyrics, fashion, and sexuality. Her posts did not identify her as a student or affiliate her with the university. Despite this, the College of Pharmacy's Professional Conduct Committee investigated her social media activity following anonymous complaints. The Committee found her posts "sexual," "crude," and "vulgar," and ultimately voted to expel her. Diei appealed, and the Dean reversed the expulsion decision.Diei then filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, asserting violations of her First Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages for emotional distress. The district court dismissed her complaint, ruling that her claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were moot due to her graduation and that her remaining claims failed to state a claim for relief. The court also held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that Diei's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were moot but found that her claims for damages were still viable. The court held that Diei plausibly alleged a First Amendment violation, as her social media posts were unrelated to her studies, caused no disruption, and were made under a pseudonym. The court also found that the district court improperly relied on documents not properly before it when dismissing Diei's complaint. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of Diei's claims for damages and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that Diei's speech was protected by the First Amendment and that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage. View "Diei v. Boyd" on Justia Law

In 2020, the Springfield R-12 School District mandated "equity training" for its employees. Two employees, Brooke Henderson and Jennifer Lumley, attended the training and later sued the school district and several officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They claimed that the training compelled them to speak on matters of public concern and engaged in viewpoint discrimination, violating their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The training included interactive sessions and online modules that required participants to discuss prompts and select "correct" answers to questions about equity and diversity.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri granted summary judgment in favor of the school district, ruling that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not suffer an injury in fact. The court also deemed the lawsuit frivolous and awarded attorney’s fees to the school district. The plaintiffs appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal, agreeing that the plaintiffs did not establish an injury in fact. The court found that the plaintiffs' fear of punishment for their speech during the training was speculative and not objectively reasonable. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs' completion of online modules did not constitute a First Amendment injury. However, the Eighth Circuit reversed the award of attorney’s fees, determining that the plaintiffs' claims were not frivolous given the nuanced and unsettled nature of the constitutional issues involved. View "Henderson v. Springfield R-12 School District" on Justia Law

A group of 29 physicians challenged a proposed ballot initiative in Nebraska that sought to add a new section to the state constitution, protecting unborn children from abortion in the second and third trimesters, except in cases of medical emergency, sexual assault, or incest. The physicians argued that the initiative violated the single subject rule and would create voter confusion.The Nebraska Supreme Court had previously reviewed a similar initiative titled "Protect the Right to Abortion" and found it did not violate the single subject rule. The physicians conceded that if the first initiative was allowed, the second should be as well, given their structural similarities. They filed for a writ of mandamus to prevent the second initiative from appearing on the ballot, arguing it should be withheld based on the same principles applied to the first initiative.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the second initiative did not violate the single subject rule. The court applied the "natural and necessary" test and found that all parts of the initiative related to the same subject. The court also noted that arguments about potential voter confusion were not separate requirements for determining the legal sufficiency of the measure. Additionally, the court found that other arguments presented by the physicians were not ripe for review, as they were based on contingent future events.Ultimately, the Nebraska Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus, allowing the second initiative to appear on the ballot. The court dissolved the alternative writ and concluded that the Secretary of State did not have a duty to withhold the initiative from the general election ballot. View "State ex rel. Constance v. Evnen" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a registered voter in Auburn, New Hampshire, filed a complaint against the Governor, the Secretary of State, the State of New Hampshire, and officials from the Town of Auburn. He sought injunctive and declaratory relief regarding New Hampshire election laws, specifically challenging the use of electronic voting machines and other election-related statutes. The plaintiff alleged that he was denied the right to vote by hand on March 9, 2022, and claimed that various statutes were unconstitutional.The Superior Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court did not address the issue of standing, despite the defendants' arguments that the plaintiff lacked standing. The plaintiff appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and determined that the plaintiff had standing to bring his claims in Counts I and II, which related to his alleged denial of the right to vote by hand and the constitutionality of statutes allowing electronic voting machines. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of these counts to the extent they were based on the plaintiff's interpretation of Part II, Article 32 of the State Constitution. However, the court found that the plaintiff had standing to pursue his equal protection claim in Count II and remanded for further proceedings on that issue.For Counts III through VI, the court concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing as these claims raised generalized grievances rather than concrete, personal injuries. The court vacated the trial court's ruling on these counts and remanded with instructions to dismiss them for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The case was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's decision. View "Richard v. Governor" on Justia Law

A non-profit organization, Citizens for Constitutional Integrity, sued the Census Bureau, the Department of Commerce, and related officials, alleging that the Bureau failed to proportionately reduce the basis of representation for states in the 2020 Census as required by the Fourteenth Amendment's Reduction Clause. Citizens claimed this failure diluted the voting power of its members in New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. The organization sought relief under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and a writ of mandamus.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the case for lack of standing. The court found that Citizens could not demonstrate that its alleged vote dilution injury was traceable to the Bureau's actions. Specifically, the court noted that Citizens failed to show how the Bureau's failure to apply the Reduction Clause directly caused the loss of congressional representation for the states in question. The court also found the data scientist's declaration provided by Citizens unpersuasive, as it did not adequately account for the number of disenfranchised voters in the relevant states.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal. The appellate court held that Citizens did not establish traceability under Article III standards. The court found that Citizens failed to present a feasible alternative methodology for apportionment that would have resulted in a different allocation of seats for New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. The court also rejected Citizens's argument that it was entitled to a relaxed standing requirement for procedural-rights cases, concluding that the challenge was substantive rather than procedural. Consequently, the court affirmed the District Court's ruling that Citizens lacked standing to pursue its claims. View "Citizens for Constitutional Integrity v. Census Bureau" on Justia Law

In 2019, Joseph Srour was denied a permit to possess rifles and shotguns in his home by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) License Division. Srour subsequently filed a lawsuit seeking injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief, challenging the constitutionality of various provisions of the New York City Administrative Code and the Rules of the City of New York, particularly the requirement that an applicant have "good moral character" to be issued a permit.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted Srour's motion for summary judgment regarding the New York City Administrative Code, enjoining the enforcement of the "good moral character" and "good cause" requirements, and declaring them unconstitutional. The district court did not decide the amount of damages. The City of New York and the NYPD Police Commissioner filed an interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, seeking review of the district court's judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the case was moot because Srour had been granted the rifle and shotgun permit he sought. The court found that there was no reasonable expectation that the City would resume the challenged conduct, as Srour's permit was subject to automatic renewal unless he violated laws or was rearrested. Consequently, the court vacated the district court's judgment enjoining the enforcement of the "good moral character" requirement and declaring it unconstitutional, dismissed the appeal as moot, and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss Srour's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief as moot. View "Srour v. New York City" on Justia Law

In this case, several plaintiffs challenged Hawaii and California laws that restrict the carrying of firearms in various locations, arguing that these laws violate their Second Amendment rights. The laws in question generally prohibit carrying firearms in places such as parks, beaches, bars, restaurants that serve alcohol, financial institutions, and private property without explicit consent from the property owner.The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii granted a preliminary injunction against Hawaii's law, enjoining the enforcement of the firearm restrictions in parking lots shared by government and non-government buildings, financial institutions, public beaches, public parks, bars, and restaurants that serve alcohol. The court also enjoined the new default rule for private property open to the public. The United States District Court for the Central District of California similarly granted a preliminary injunction against California's law, enjoining the enforcement of firearm restrictions in hospitals, playgrounds, public transit, parks, athletic facilities, places of worship, financial institutions, and private property open to the public.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed these decisions. The court affirmed the preliminary injunctions in part and reversed them in part. The Ninth Circuit held that some places specified by the Hawaii and California laws likely fall within the national tradition of prohibiting firearms at sensitive places, such as bars and restaurants that serve alcohol, parks, and similar areas. However, the court found that other places, such as financial institutions and places of worship, do not fall within this tradition. The court also held that the new default rule prohibiting the carry of firearms onto private property without consent is likely unconstitutional in California but not in Hawaii.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunctions to the extent that they enjoin restrictions on firearms at financial institutions, parking lots adjacent to financial institutions, and parking lots shared by government and non-government buildings. The court reversed the preliminary injunctions to the extent that they enjoin restrictions on firearms at bars and restaurants that serve alcohol, beaches, parks, and similar areas, and the new default rule prohibiting the carry of firearms onto private property without consent in Hawaii. View "WOLFORD V. LOPEZ" on Justia Law

Kekai Watanabe, an inmate at the Federal Detention Center in Honolulu, was severely injured during a gang-related assault in July 2021. Despite his serious injuries, including a fractured coccyx and bone chips in surrounding tissue, the prison nurse only provided over-the-counter medication and refused to send him to a hospital. Watanabe was kept in solitary confinement for over two months and repeatedly requested medical attention, which was largely ignored. He was not properly diagnosed until February 2022 and had not seen a specialist by the time of the court proceedings.The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii initially allowed Watanabe’s claim against the nurse to proceed but later dismissed it, concluding that no Bivens remedy existed for his Eighth Amendment claim. Watanabe appealed the dismissal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Watanabe’s claim did not present a new Bivens context, as it was not meaningfully different from the Supreme Court’s decision in Carlson v. Green, where an implied damages action was recognized under the Eighth Amendment for deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs. The court found that Watanabe’s allegations were sufficiently similar to those in Carlson, thus allowing his Bivens claim to proceed.Additionally, the Ninth Circuit construed Watanabe’s request for injunctive relief related to his ongoing medical care as standalone claims for injunctive relief, not under Bivens. The court remanded the case to the district court to address whether Watanabe may amend his request for injunctive relief and to address any such claims in the first instance. View "WATANABE V. DERR" on Justia Law