Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Toll was in solitary confinement at Riverbend Maximum Security Institution when he allegedly threw liquid at a correctional officer. The commander decided to extract Toll from his cell. After the cell extraction team (Doss and Horton) removed Toll from his cell, Toll became unresponsive. A doctor pronounced him dead. Toll’s mother, Luna, sued Horton and Doss in their individual capacities for excessive force, and Bell, the warden, for failure to train (42 U.S.C. 1983). In 2013, the district court entered judgments in favor of the defendants. In 2014, the New York Times published an article about the cell extraction team, based on a letter written by a former team member. Based on this new evidence, Luna was granted a new trial. The court declined to award sanctions because the defendants did not act in bad faith in failing to produce the letter and granted summary judgment, rejecting the claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the order granting a new trial and reversed the summary judgment. Luna acted diligently in requesting discovery responses that should have included the letter, which was material, controlling evidence. Summary judgment was inappropriate because the court granted a completely new trial, requiring a new jury to examine anew all factual disputes; the court should have reviewed all material facts in a light most favorable to Luna. View "Luna v. Bell" on Justia Law

Appellant Thomas Guarino appealed a superior court order granting an “anti-SLAPP” (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) motion to strike his First Amended Complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The motion was filed by defendants County of Siskiyou (County), individual members of the Board of Supervisors Marcia Armstrong, Grace Bennett, Michael Kobseff, Ed Valenzuela, and Jim Cook (the Board), as well as County Administrator, Tom Odom (collectively, defendants). Guarino also appealed the trial court’s order sustaining demurrers without leave to amend that were filed on behalf of the County, the Board, and Odom. Guarino was appointed as Siskiyou County’s County Counsel for a term of four years, beginning November 2008. The County began an investigation into Guarino’s actions in 2011 in response to a complaint by Guarino’s subordinate, Paula Baca. The County retained an outside law firm (Cota Cole LLP) to conduct the investigation, the legality of which was questioned by Guarino. This law firm also investigated Guarino’s claim that Baca had violated her duty of loyalty to the County Counsel’s office. The investigation into Baca’s activities resulted in a written report in November 2011 “which entirely exonerated [Guarino] and informed him that it was provided ‘for the purpose of closing the above-referenced matter. Nothing in the investigation may or will be used for any disciplinary purpose and therefore, the investigation report, as indicated, will remain a confidential document.’ ” In December 2011, Guarino was appointed to a second term as county counsel to commence in November 2012. A subsequent investigation followed, which resulted in a September 7, 2012, report that also exonerated Guarino, while at the same time recommending the privatization of the County Counsel’s Office. Guarino filed his complaint arising from the investigations into his conduct arising from the Baca matter and leading up to the privatization of his post. Because the Court of Appeal affirmed the order granting the Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 motion, it did not decide whether the trial court erred in sustaining defendants’ demurrers. View "Guarino v. County of Siskiyou" on Justia Law

Appellant Thomas Guarino appealed a superior court order granting an “anti-SLAPP” (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) motion to strike his First Amended Complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. The motion was filed by defendants County of Siskiyou (County), individual members of the Board of Supervisors Marcia Armstrong, Grace Bennett, Michael Kobseff, Ed Valenzuela, and Jim Cook (the Board), as well as County Administrator, Tom Odom (collectively, defendants). Guarino also appealed the trial court’s order sustaining demurrers without leave to amend that were filed on behalf of the County, the Board, and Odom. Guarino was appointed as Siskiyou County’s County Counsel for a term of four years, beginning November 2008. The County began an investigation into Guarino’s actions in 2011 in response to a complaint by Guarino’s subordinate, Paula Baca. The County retained an outside law firm (Cota Cole LLP) to conduct the investigation, the legality of which was questioned by Guarino. This law firm also investigated Guarino’s claim that Baca had violated her duty of loyalty to the County Counsel’s office. The investigation into Baca’s activities resulted in a written report in November 2011 “which entirely exonerated [Guarino] and informed him that it was provided ‘for the purpose of closing the above-referenced matter. Nothing in the investigation may or will be used for any disciplinary purpose and therefore, the investigation report, as indicated, will remain a confidential document.’ ” In December 2011, Guarino was appointed to a second term as county counsel to commence in November 2012. A subsequent investigation followed, which resulted in a September 7, 2012, report that also exonerated Guarino, while at the same time recommending the privatization of the County Counsel’s Office. Guarino filed his complaint arising from the investigations into his conduct arising from the Baca matter and leading up to the privatization of his post. Because the Court of Appeal affirmed the order granting the Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 motion, it did not decide whether the trial court erred in sustaining defendants’ demurrers. View "Guarino v. County of Siskiyou" on Justia Law

Subject to the trial court’s discretion to permit late filing, a defendant must move to strike a cause of action under Cal. Code Civ. P. 425.16 - California’s anti-SLAPP statute - within sixty days of service of the earliest complaint that contains that cause of action.Within sixty days of the filing of a third amended complaint but not within sixty days of any earlier complaint, Defendants moved to strike that complaint under section 425.16. Specifically, Defendants sought to strike Plaintiffs’ claim alleged in the first and subsequent complaints that Defendants fraudulently settled an unlawful detainer action. The trial court denied the motion as untimely. The court of appeal affirmed, ruling that a defendant must file an anti-SLAPP motion within sixty days of service of the first complaint that pleads a cause of action coming within section 425.16(b)(1) unless the trial court in its discretion permits the motion to be filed at a later time. The court also concluded that Defendants’ motion was timely as to the new causes of action pleaded for the first time in the third amended complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeal property interpreted section 425.16(f). View "Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism" on Justia Law

Subject to the trial court’s discretion to permit late filing, a defendant must move to strike a cause of action under Cal. Code Civ. P. 425.16 - California’s anti-SLAPP statute - within sixty days of service of the earliest complaint that contains that cause of action.Within sixty days of the filing of a third amended complaint but not within sixty days of any earlier complaint, Defendants moved to strike that complaint under section 425.16. Specifically, Defendants sought to strike Plaintiffs’ claim alleged in the first and subsequent complaints that Defendants fraudulently settled an unlawful detainer action. The trial court denied the motion as untimely. The court of appeal affirmed, ruling that a defendant must file an anti-SLAPP motion within sixty days of service of the first complaint that pleads a cause of action coming within section 425.16(b)(1) unless the trial court in its discretion permits the motion to be filed at a later time. The court also concluded that Defendants’ motion was timely as to the new causes of action pleaded for the first time in the third amended complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeal property interpreted section 425.16(f). View "Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism" on Justia Law

A Wisconsin John Doe proceeding is conducted by a judge, to collect evidence and determine whether probable cause exists to issue a criminal complaint. During the time at issue, a proceeding could subpoena witnesses, take testimony under oath, and, issue search warrants; the proceeding could be conducted in secret so that the targets would be unaware of it. A Milwaukee judge commenced a proceeding to investigate alleged campaign‐finance violations and entered a secrecy order. The targets were not notified of the execution of search warrants for electronic records. Eventually a judge concluded that the targets of subpoenas had done nothing wrong--Wisconsin law did not prohibit coordination between campaign committees and outside groups to finance issue advocacy. The Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed. The court ordered that the proceedings be closed; a modified order required that all original documents relating to the proceeding be filed with the Clerk of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. All other copies were destroyed. MacIver filed suit on behalf of a putative class, alleging violations of the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2703(a)–(c), 2711(3), arguing that the proceeding did not constitute a “court of competent jurisdiction.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the action, citing the Act's provision that “good faith reliance on … a court warrant or order … is a complete defense” and the defense of qualified immunity. MacIver’s interpretation of the Act was not “clearly established” at the time defendants’ warrants were issued. View "John K. MacIver Institute for Public Policy, Inc. v. Schmitz" on Justia Law

The parents of nine minor children, individually and as guardians of the children, appealed a district court judgment determining the statutory damage cap for tort claims against a political subdivision was constitutional. In January 2015, a collision occurred between a Larimore Public School District bus and a BNSF Railway train. At the time, there were thirteen School District students riding home from school on the bus. One child died as a result of injuries sustained in the accident and the other children suffered serious injuries. The accident resulted in the potential for multiple damage claims in excess of the School District's aggregate statutory cap on liability under the codification of N.D.C.C. 32-12.1-03(2) in effect at the time of the accident, which limited the liability of political subdivisions "to a total of two hundred fifty thousand dollars per person and five hundred thousand dollars for injury to three or more persons during any single occurrence regardless of the number of political subdivisions, or employees of such political subdivisions, which are involved in that occurrence." The School District and its government self-insurance pool, the North Dakota Insurance Reserve Fund, brought this interpleader action and deposited five hundred thousand dollars with the district court to satisfy the damage cap for claims arising from the accident under the applicable language of N.D.C.C. 32-12.1-03(2). The parents and guardians for some of the children answered and counterclaimed, asserting the damage cap was unconstitutional. The parents argued the damage cap violated the open court, jury trial, equal protection, and special law provisions of the state constitution. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the damage cap did not violate those constitutional provisions, and affirmed the judgment. View "Larimore Public School District No. 44 v. Aamodt" on Justia Law

Paladino, a New Jersey State Prison inmate, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil rights action against prison employees alleging a number of constitutional claims. The district court granted summary judgment on many of his claims, finding that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995. The Third Circuit affirmed with respect to most of Paladino’s claims but vacated with respect to Paladino’s excessive force claim based on an alleged 2010 assault, finding a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether he exhausted that claim because there was a conflict between the prison’s records and Paladino’s deposition testimony. Some type of notice and an opportunity to respond are needed before a district court elects to decide factual disputes regarding exhaustion. View "Paladino v. Newsome" on Justia Law

Heryford, Trinity County, California's District Attorney, sued American Bankers and others, on behalf of the people under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL), alleging they had “engaged in deceptive marketing and sales practices.” Private parties may seek injunctive relief and restitution under the UCL; only a public prosecutor may pursue civil penalties. The complaint listed private law firms as “Special Assistant District Attorneys.” An agreement required the Firms to “provide all legal services that are reasonably necessary,” and to “conduct negotiations and provide representations at all hearings, depositions, trials, appeals, and other appearances” with authority to control the performance of their work “under the direction of the District Attorney,” stating that Heryford’s office did “not relinquish its constitutional or statutory authority or responsibility” and retained “sole and final authority to initiate and settle.” Heryford retained the Firms on a contingency-fee basis. American Bankers challenged the contingency-fee agreement as a violation of its federal due process rights that gave the Firms “a direct and substantial financial stake in the imposition of civil penalties and restitution,” which “compromise[d] the integrity and fairness of the prosecutorial motive and the public’s faith in the judicial process.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Heryford’s retention of private counsel to pursue civil penalties cannot be meaningfully distinguished from a private relator’s pursuit of civil penalties under the qui tam provisions of the False Claim Act, an arrangement that does not violate due process. View "American Bankers Management Co. v. Heryford" on Justia Law

Heryford, Trinity County, California's District Attorney, sued American Bankers and others, on behalf of the people under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL), alleging they had “engaged in deceptive marketing and sales practices.” Private parties may seek injunctive relief and restitution under the UCL; only a public prosecutor may pursue civil penalties. The complaint listed private law firms as “Special Assistant District Attorneys.” An agreement required the Firms to “provide all legal services that are reasonably necessary,” and to “conduct negotiations and provide representations at all hearings, depositions, trials, appeals, and other appearances” with authority to control the performance of their work “under the direction of the District Attorney,” stating that Heryford’s office did “not relinquish its constitutional or statutory authority or responsibility” and retained “sole and final authority to initiate and settle.” Heryford retained the Firms on a contingency-fee basis. American Bankers challenged the contingency-fee agreement as a violation of its federal due process rights that gave the Firms “a direct and substantial financial stake in the imposition of civil penalties and restitution,” which “compromise[d] the integrity and fairness of the prosecutorial motive and the public’s faith in the judicial process.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Heryford’s retention of private counsel to pursue civil penalties cannot be meaningfully distinguished from a private relator’s pursuit of civil penalties under the qui tam provisions of the False Claim Act, an arrangement that does not violate due process. View "American Bankers Management Co. v. Heryford" on Justia Law