Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The District of Columbia and the State of Maryland sued the President in his official capacity, alleging violations of the Constitution’s Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses. The district court granted a motion to amend the complaint to add the President as a defendant in his individual capacity. The President, in that capacity, moved to dismiss the action, asserting absolute immunity. Approximately seven months passed without a ruling on that motion. The President in his individual capacity filed an interlocutory appeal. A Fourth Circuit panel concluded that the district court had effectively denied immunity to the President in his individual capacity so that the panel had jurisdiction to consider the interlocutory appeal. “[E]xercising that jurisdiction,” the panel held that Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss.Acting en banc, the Fourth Circuit vacated the panel opinion and dismissed the interlocutory appeal. The district court neither expressly nor implicitly refused to rule on immunity but stated in writing that it intended to rule on the President’s individual capacity motion. A district court has wide discretion to prioritize its docket and the deferral did not result in a delay “beyond reasonable limits.” During the seven months, the district court managed the many other aspects of this litigation and issued opinions on the President’s motion to dismiss in his official capacity and a motion to certify an interlocutory appeal of the court’s rulings. View "District of Columbia v. Trump" on Justia Law

The District of Columbia and the State of Maryland sued the President in his official capacity, alleging violations of the U.S. Constitution’s Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses. The district court dismissed claims concerning Trump Organization operations outside the District, for lack of standing, but denied the President’s motion with respect to alleged violations at the Washington, D.C. Trump International Hotel. After the denial of a motion for certification to take an interlocutory appeal (28 U.S.C. 1292(b)), the President petitioned for mandamus relief. A Fourth Circuit panel reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint.The Fourth Circuit, en banc, vacated the panel opinion. The court accorded the President “great deference,” but stated that Congress and the Supreme Court have severely limited its ability to grant the extraordinary relief sought. The President has not established a right to a writ of mandamus. The district court promptly ruled on the request for certification in a detailed opinion that applied the correct legal standards. The court’s action was not arbitrary nor based on passion or prejudice; it “was in its nature a judicial act.” The President does not contend that the court denied certification for nonlegal reasons or in bad faith. Reasonable jurists can disagree in good faith on the merits of the claims. Rejecting a separation of powers argument, the court stated that the President has not explained how requests pertaining to spending at a private restaurant and hotel threaten any Executive Branch prerogative. Even if obeying the law were an official executive duty, such a duty would not be “discretionary,” but a “ministerial” act. View "In re: Donald Trump" on Justia Law

The Michigan Department of Health and Human Services contracts out most of its fostering and adoption services to private child-placing agencies (CPAs), which perform home evaluations of prospective adoptive and foster parent(s). One CPA, St. Vincent Catholic Charities, shares the religious teachings of the Roman Catholic Church regarding same-sex marriage. It “cannot provide a written recommendation ... endorsing a family situation that would conflict with [its] religious beliefs” so St. Vincent refers out home evaluations for same-sex or unmarried couples to other CPAs. In 2015, Michigan codified this practice. M.C.L. 722.124e(1)(g) provides that “[t]o the fullest extent permitted by state and federal law," a CPA shall not be required to provide any services if those services conflict with, or provide any services under circumstances that conflict with," the CPA’s "sincerely held religious beliefs.”The Dumonts alleged that they were a same-sex couple interested in fostering and adoption, but that St. Vincent refused to assist them with the licensing process because of their sexual orientation. Michigan settled that suit by agreeing to enforce, against CPAs, a policy prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. St. Vincent then claimed that the state violated its First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by directing it to perform its duties in a manner that violates its sincerely held religious beliefs. The district court denied the Dumonts’ motions, seeking intervention. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to permissive intervention. Citing FRCP 24(b)(3), the court held that the Dumonts’ motion was timely, that it presented a common question of law, and that there is little risk of undue delay or prejudice to the existing parties. View "Buck v. Gordon" on Justia Law

In June 2014, Rodney, Thomas, and Susan Brossart, as plaintiffs, filed a lawsuit in North Dakota federal district court against Nelson County, North Dakota, and the sheriff and a deputy sheriff of Nelson County, as defendants. The Brossarts alleged claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law. The federal district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court subsequently entered judgment against the Brossarts awarding defendants $8,153.08 in costs. The Brossarts did not appeal the judgment awarding costs to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Defendants thereafter filed the federal judgment to the Nelson County clerk's office. Defendants' attorney served three sets of interrogatories in aid of execution of judgment, one for each of the three named plaintiffs, on the Brossarts’ attorney. Each set of interrogatories contained 73 identical questions. Subparts to the main questions contained in the interrogatories were separately numbered. The Brossarts’ were not personally served the interrogatories. However, on appeal the Brossarts acknowledge they were informed of the filing of the federal judgment. Because they believed the federal judgment was procedurally and substantively defective, the Brossarts refused to respond to the interrogatories. Additionally, there is nothing in the record indicating the Brossarts’ attorney represented them in the state court action prior to February 19. After the Brossarts’ attorney sent the February 19 letter, the parties’ attorneys continued to communicate regarding the interrogatories. Defendants moved to compel answers, but the Brossarts moved for relief from judgment, arguing the federal judgment was invalid and unenforceable because they were not provided proper notice the federal judgment had been filed. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the federal judgment was entitled to full faith and credit, and the Brossarts did not raise any viable defense as to why the federal judgment was invalid or unenforceable. The Brossarts correctly asserted they were not initially provided notice of the filing of the foreign judgment pursuant to N.D.C.C. 28-20.1-03(2), but the Court found their justification for refusing to answer the interrogatories and their basis for their motion for relief from judgment were completely without merit. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the Brossarts’ claims were frivolous and awarding attorney’s fees. View "Brossart, et al. v. Janke, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant W. Clark Aposhian filed an interlocutory appeal of a district court’s denial of his motion for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded plaintiff did not show a likelihood of success on the merits of his challenge to a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) rule classifying bump stocks as machine guns under the National Firearms Act (NFA). Aposhian purchased a Slide Fire bump stock before the Final Rule was promulgated. He filed suit against various governmental officers and agencies challenging the Final Rule as unconstitutional and in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), arguing that the Final Rule contradicted an unambiguous statute, 26 U.S.C. 5845(b), and mistakenly extended its statutory definition of “machinegun” to cover bump stocks. The government argued the statute was unambiguous but that the Final Rule was merely interpretive and, as so, reflected the best interpretation of the statutory text. For its part, the district court did not specifically opine on whether the statute was ambiguous or not. The Tenth Circuit concurred plaintiff failed to demonstrate the threatened injury to him outweighed the harm that the preliminary injunction might cause to the government, or that the injunction would not adversely affect the public interest. Accordingly, denial of the injunction was affirmed. View "Aposhian v. Barr" on Justia Law

Sineneng-Smith operated a California immigration consulting firm, assisting clients to file applications for a labor certification program that once provided a path for aliens to adjust to lawful permanent resident status. Sineneng-Smith knew that her clients could not meet the long-passed statutory application-filing deadline but nonetheless charged each client over $6,000, netting more than $3.3 million. Sineneng-Smith was indicted under 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (B)(i), which make it a felony to “encourag[e] or induc[e] an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such coming to, entry, or residence is or will be in violation of law,” An enhanced penalty applies if the crime is “for the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain,” Appealing her convictions to the Ninth Circuit, Sineneng-Smith asserted a First Amendment right to file administrative applications on her clients’ behalf. The court invited amici to brief issues framed by the panel, then held that section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) is unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment.A unanimous Supreme Court vacated. “The Ninth Circuit panel’s drastic departure from the principle of party presentation constituted an abuse of discretion.” No extraordinary circumstances justified the court's takeover of the appeal. Sineneng-Smith, represented by competent counsel, had raised a vagueness argument and First Amendment arguments concerning her own conduct, not that of others. Electing not to address the party-presented controversy, the panel projected that section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) might cover protected speech, including abstract advocacy and legal advice. A court is not "hidebound" by counsel’s precise arguments, but the Ninth Circuit’s "radical transformation of this case" went too far. View "United States v. Sineneng-Smith" on Justia Law

In 2017, Texas enacted a law that forbids its governmental entities from contracting with companies who engage in economic boycotts of Israel. Plaintiffs, who support the Palestinian side of the conflict, filed two actions seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in federal district court, alleging that requiring "No Boycott of Israel" clauses in Texas government contracts violates the First Amendment. The district court then preliminarily enjoined the enforcement of the clauses in all contracts with Texas governmental entities.The Fifth Circuit held that the appeal is moot because, twelve days after the district court's ruling, Texas enacted final legislation that exempts sole proprietors from the "No Boycott of Israel" certification requirement. Because plaintiffs are no longer affected by the legislation, the court held that they lacked a personal stake in the outcome of this litigation. Accordingly, the court vacated the preliminary injunction order and remanded the case to the district court to enter an appropriate judgment dismissing the complaints. View "Amawi v. Paxton" on Justia Law

This case and its companion, Yakutat Land Corp. v. Langer, 2020 CO 30, __ P.3d __, arose out of a contentious zoning dispute involving the propriety of constructing a gravity-based mountain roller coaster in a part of the Estes Valley, Colorado in which “significant view sheds, woodlands, rock outcroppings, ridgelines, other sensitive environmental areas and low-density residential development comprise the predominant land use pattern.” The issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether the Larimer County Board of County Commissioners (the “BOCC”) misconstrued applicable law and abused its discretion in finding that defendant Yakutat Land Corporation’s mountain coaster project was properly classified as a Park and Recreation Facility, rather than as an Outdoor Commercial Recreation or Entertainment Establishment. The Supreme Court concluded the BOCC correctly construed the applicable code provisions, and, applying the deferential standard of review mandated here, it further concluded that the BOCC did not abuse its discretion in classifying the mountain coaster project as a Park and Recreation Facility. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Langer v. Board of County Commissioners" on Justia Law

This case and its companion, Langer v. Board of Larimer County Commissioners, 2020 CO 31, __ P.3d __, arose out of a contentious zoning dispute involving the propriety of constructing a gravity-based mountain roller coaster in a part of the Estes Valley, Colorado in which “significant view sheds, woodlands, rock outcroppings, ridgelines, other sensitive environmental areas and low-density residential development comprise the predominant land use pattern.” The issue presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether the local authorities tasked with making and reviewing zoning determinations abused their discretion in interpreting and applying the Estes Valley Development Code (the “Code”) when they determined that the proposed mountain coaster could be constructed. Applying a deferential standard of review for an action brought pursuant to C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4), the Court concluded that they did not. Furthermore, the Court determined the constitutionality of the Code could not be appropriately raised or considered in a suit brought exclusively as a Rule 106 claim: "Rule 106 proceedings are reserved for challenges to the judicial and quasi-judicial actions of government actors. In other words, these claims challenge the application of a law in a particular instance, not the law itself." View "Yakutat Land Corp. v. Langer" on Justia Law

The petitioners challenged a New York City rule regarding the transport of firearms, citing the Second Amendment, and seeking declaratory relief against enforcement of the rule insofar as it prevented their transport of firearms to a second home or shooting range outside of the city. The Second Circuit rejected their claim. After the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the State of New York amended its firearm licensing statute and the City amended the rule so that the petitioners may now transport firearms to a second home or shooting range outside of the city.The Supreme Court vacated. The petitioners’ claim for declaratory relief with respect to the old rule is moot but they claimed that the new rule may still infringe their rights; they may not be allowed to stop for coffee, gas, food, or restroom breaks on the way to their second homes or shooting ranges outside of the city. The Court declined to address the argument, citing its practice of vacating and remanding where the mootness is attributable to a change in the legal framework governing the case, and where the plaintiff may have some residual claim under the new framework that was understandably not asserted previously. On remand, the Second Circuit and the district court may consider the new arguments and whether the petitioners still add a claim for damages with respect to the old rule. View "New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. City of New York" on Justia Law