Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Commercial Law
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During the COVID-19 pandemic, K7 Design Group, Inc. (K7) offered to sell hand sanitizer to Walmart, Inc., doing business as Sam’s Club (Sam’s Club). K7 and Sam’s Club discussed and agreed upon the product, price, quantity, and delivery terms for various hand sanitizer products through email communications. K7 delivered over 1,000,000 units of hand sanitizer to Sam’s Club, which paid approximately $17.5 million. However, Sam’s Club did not collect or pay for the remaining hand sanitizer, leading to storage issues for K7.The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas held a jury trial, where the jury found in favor of K7 on its breach of contract claim and awarded $7,157,426.14 in damages. Sam’s Club’s motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial were denied by the district court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. Sam’s Club argued that K7 failed to present sufficient evidence of an obligation to pay for the products, the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence, and the district court abused its discretion in instructing the jury. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the communications between K7 and Sam’s Club constituted binding orders under Arkansas’s Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The court found that the evidence supported the jury’s verdict and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its jury instructions or in denying Sam’s Club’s motions. The court also affirmed the district court’s award of prejudgment interest and attorney fees and costs. View "K7 Design Group, Inc. v. Walmart, Inc." on Justia Law

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Anderson & Koch Ford, Inc., a Ford dealership in North Branch, Minnesota, operates under a Ford Sales and Service Agreement. In late 2022, Ford announced plans to establish a new dealership in Forest Lake, Minnesota, and to reassign half of Anderson & Koch’s designated sales area to the new dealership. Anderson & Koch filed a lawsuit in state court, alleging violations of the Minnesota Motor Vehicle Sale and Distribution Act (MVSDA), specifically sections 80E.13(k) and (p). Ford removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss the claims.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota partially granted Ford’s motion to dismiss, ruling that Anderson & Koch failed to state a claim under sections 80E.13(k) and (p) regarding the establishment of the new dealership. However, the court allowed Anderson & Koch to challenge the proposed change to its designated sales area under the same sections. Anderson & Koch then appealed the dismissal of its claims related to the new dealership.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court agreed that Anderson & Koch could not challenge the establishment of the new dealership under sections 80E.13(k) or (p) of the MVSDA. The court held that the establishment of a new dealership did not modify the existing franchise agreement, as required by section 80E.13(k), nor did it arbitrarily change the dealer’s area of sales effectiveness under section 80E.13(p). The court also noted that Anderson & Koch had dismissed its claims regarding the change to its sales area, leaving only the challenge to the new dealership on appeal. View "Anderson & Koch Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Company" on Justia Law

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Sysco Machinery Corporation, a Taiwanese company, accused DCS USA Corporation, a North Carolina company, of business torts related to their manufacturer-distributor relationship. Sysco alleged that after some of its employees left to form a competitor, Cymtek Solutions, Inc., DCS sold machines made by Cymtek using Sysco's confidential information. Sysco claimed these diverted contracts were worth millions of dollars.Sysco first filed suit in Taiwan, where it claims to have won a preliminary injunction against Cymtek. Sysco then filed a suit in the Eastern District of North Carolina, which it voluntarily dismissed, followed by a suit in the District of Massachusetts, which was dismissed. Finally, Sysco returned to the Eastern District of North Carolina, where it brought claims for trade secret misappropriation, copyright infringement, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. The district court dismissed all claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim and denied Sysco's post-judgment leave to amend its complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Sysco's trade secret misappropriation claim, finding that Sysco did not plausibly allege the existence of a valid trade secret or that DCS misappropriated it. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Sysco's other claims, noting that Sysco did not sufficiently develop its arguments for copyright infringement, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. Finally, the court upheld the district court's denial of Sysco's motion to alter or amend the judgment and for leave to amend the complaint, citing Sysco's repeated failure to state a claim and the potential prejudice to DCS. View "Sysco Machinery Corp. v. DCS USA Corp." on Justia Law

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Two brothers, Roland and Robert, ran an automotive business together under Guieb Inc. Their relationship deteriorated when Robert made decisions that Roland disagreed with, including using their company for his own benefit and allegedly stealing the trade name and most profitable shop for his personal companies. Roland sued Robert, alleging unfair and deceptive trade practices, unfair methods of competition, and deceptive trade practices under Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) §§ 480-2 and 481A-3. He also sought punitive damages for fraud, misrepresentation, nondisclosure, and breach of fiduciary duty.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit granted Robert’s motion for partial summary judgment (MPSJ) and dismissed Roland’s claims under count 12, finding no genuine issue of material fact. The court also granted Robert’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) on punitive damages, preventing the jury from considering them. Additionally, the court ruled that brotherhood did not establish a fiduciary duty, granting Robert’s MPSJ on that issue as well.The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) reversed the circuit court on three issues. It held that Roland’s unfair and deceptive trade practices claim should have gone to the jury, as there was evidence that Robert represented Guieb Inc. and Guieb Group as the same entity. The ICA also held that the jury should have considered punitive damages, given the evidence of Robert’s actions that could justify such damages. Lastly, the ICA found that brotherhood created a kinship fiduciary duty, which should have been considered by the jury.The Supreme Court of Hawaii agreed with the ICA that the jury should have considered Roland’s claims under count 12 and punitive damages. However, it disagreed that kinship created a fiduciary duty, affirming the circuit court’s MPSJ on that issue. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Guieb v. Guieb" on Justia Law

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The case involves Ma Shun Bell, who filed a lawsuit against the law firm Friedman, Framme & Thrush (FFT), formerly known as Weinstock, Friedman & Friedman, alleging unfair trade practices and abuse of process. Bell claimed that FFT, representing First Investors Servicing Corporation (FISC), pursued a deficiency debt from her despite knowing it was not lawfully recoverable due to procedural defects in the vehicle repossession process.In the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, Bell's second amended complaint was dismissed. The court ruled that the complaint failed to allege the elements of a Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) violation, that FFT was immune from suit under the Consumer Protection Procedures Act (CPPA) and the D.C. Automobile Financing and Repossession Act (AFRA) due to its role as litigation attorneys, and that the complaint did not articulate how FFT’s conduct violated the Debt Collection Law (DCL). Additionally, the court found that Bell’s claims were barred by res judicata based on a Small Claims Court judgment in favor of FISC, with which FFT was found to be in privity.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court concluded that Bell’s DCL cause of action could proceed, but her other causes of action were properly dismissed. The court held that the Superior Court erred in finding privity between FFT and FISC solely based on their attorney-client relationship and a contingency-fee arrangement. The court determined that the DCL claims were not barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel and that Bell had sufficiently alleged that FFT misrepresented the amount of the debt and charged excessive fees. The court affirmed the dismissal of the UCC, CPPA, and abuse of process claims but reversed the dismissal of the DCL claim, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Bell v. Weinstock, Friedman & Friedman, PA" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs alleged that an automobile manufacturer designed, manufactured, and sold defective vehicles, specifically Dodge "muscle" cars with defective rear differentials. They filed a complaint asserting state and federal causes of action based on fraud and breach of warranty. The District Court dismissed the fraud counts and some warranty counts, allowing plaintiffs to amend their complaint. After amending, the District Court dismissed the fraud counts again and some warranty counts, but allowed two warranty counts to proceed.The United States District Court for the District of Delaware initially dismissed the complaint without prejudice, allowing plaintiffs to amend it. After the plaintiffs amended their complaint, the District Court dismissed the fraud counts and some warranty counts with prejudice, but allowed two warranty counts to proceed. The plaintiffs then moved to certify the dismissal of their fraud counts for appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) or for final judgment under Rule 54(b). The District Court denied the request for certification under § 1292(b) but granted the request for final judgment under Rule 54(b) for the fraud counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the District Court's Rule 54(b) judgment was not final. The Court of Appeals held that the fraud and warranty counts constituted a single claim for purposes of Rule 54(b) because they were alternative theories of recovery based on the same factual situation. As a result, the judgment did not dispose of all the rights or liabilities of one or more of the parties. Consequently, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and instructed the District Court to vacate its order directing the entry of a partial final judgment. View "Diaz v. FCA US LLC" on Justia Law

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Kenneth Tilley sought financing from Malvern National Bank (MNB) for a real estate development project in 2009 and 2010, totaling $350,000. Tilley claimed MNB engaged in unfair dealings and sued for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, violations of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), tortious interference, negligence, and fraud. The case has been appealed multiple times, with the Arkansas Supreme Court previously reversing decisions related to Tilley's right to a jury trial.Initially, the Garland County Circuit Court struck Tilley's jury demand, which was reversed by the Arkansas Supreme Court. After remand, the circuit court reinstated a bench trial verdict, citing Act 13 of 2018, which was again reversed by the Supreme Court. On the third remand, MNB moved for summary judgment on all claims. The circuit court granted summary judgment, citing Tilley's reduction of collateral as a material alteration of the agreement, a rationale not argued by MNB. Tilley appealed this decision.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the circuit court did not violate the mandate by considering summary judgment. However, it was reversible error for the circuit court to grant summary judgment based on an unargued rationale. The Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment on Tilley's ADTPA, tortious interference, and negligence claims, finding no genuine issues of material fact. However, it reversed and remanded the summary judgment on Tilley's breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and fraud claims, determining that there were disputed material facts that required a jury trial. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Tilley v. Malvern National Bank" on Justia Law

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The case involves Andris Pukke, Peter Baker, and John Usher, who were found liable for violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Telemarketing Sales Rule, and a permanent injunction from a prior fraud case. They were involved in a real estate scam, selling lots in a development called "Sanctuary Belize" through deceptive practices. The district court issued an equitable monetary judgment of $120.2 million for consumer redress, imposed an asset freeze, and appointed a receiver.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland found the defendants liable after a bench trial and issued permanent injunctions against them. The court also held them in contempt for violating a prior judgment in a related case, ordering them to pay the same $120.2 million in consumer redress. The defendants appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, except for vacating the monetary judgment to the extent it relied on FTC Act Section 13(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision to maintain the receivership and asset freeze. The court held that the receivership and asset freeze were necessary to effectuate the injunctive relief and ensure that the defendants did not continue to profit from their deceptive practices. The court also found that the contempt judgment supported maintaining the receivership and asset freeze until the judgment was satisfied. The court emphasized the defendants' history of deceptive conduct and the need for a professional receiver to manage and distribute the assets to defrauded consumers. The judgment was affirmed. View "Federal Trade Commission v. Pukke" on Justia Law

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The City of Los Angeles contracted with PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) to modernize the billing system for the Department of Water and Power (LADWP). The rollout in 2013 resulted in billing errors, leading the City to sue PwC in 2015, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation. Concurrently, a class action was filed against the City by Antwon Jones, represented by attorney Jack Landskroner, for overbilling. Discovery revealed that the City’s special counsel had orchestrated the class action to settle claims favorably for the City while planning to recover costs from PwC.The Los Angeles County Superior Court found the City engaged in extensive discovery abuse to conceal its misconduct, including withholding documents and providing false testimony. The court imposed $2.5 million in monetary sanctions against the City under the Civil Discovery Act, specifically sections 2023.010 and 2023.030, which allow sanctions for discovery misuse.The California Court of Appeal reversed the sanctions, interpreting the Civil Discovery Act as not granting general authority to impose sanctions for discovery misconduct beyond specific discovery methods. The appellate court held that sections 2023.010 and 2023.030 do not independently authorize sanctions but must be read in conjunction with other provisions of the Act.The Supreme Court of California reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision, holding that the trial court did have the authority to impose monetary sanctions under sections 2023.010 and 2023.030 for the City’s pattern of discovery abuse. The Supreme Court clarified that these sections provide general authority to sanction discovery misuse, including systemic abuses not covered by specific discovery method provisions. View "City of Los Angeles v. Pricewaterhousecoopers, LLP" on Justia Law

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Taxinet Corporation sued Santiago Leon, alleging various claims stemming from a joint effort to secure a government concession for a taxi-hailing app in Mexico City. The district court granted summary judgment for Leon on all claims except for a Florida-law unjust enrichment claim, which went to trial along with Leon’s counterclaims for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation. The jury awarded Taxinet $300 million for unjust enrichment and Leon $15,000 for negligent misrepresentation. However, the district court granted Leon’s Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law, ruling that the damages award was based on inadmissible hearsay and was speculative.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially allowed testimony regarding a $2.4 billion valuation by Goldman Sachs, which was later deemed inadmissible hearsay. The court concluded that without this evidence, there was insufficient support for the jury’s $300 million award. The court also noted that the valuation was speculative and not directly tied to the benefit conferred by Taxinet in 2015.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s Rule 50(b) order, agreeing that the valuation evidence was inadmissible hearsay and that the remaining evidence was insufficient to support the $300 million award. However, the appellate court exercised its discretion to remand for a new trial on the unjust enrichment claim. The court found that Taxinet had presented enough evidence to show that it conferred a benefit on Leon, which he accepted, and that it would be inequitable for him to retain the benefit without payment. The court also noted that Taxinet could potentially present other evidence of damages in a new trial.The appellate court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment on Taxinet’s other claims, ruling that the alleged joint venture agreement was subject to Florida’s statute of frauds, as it could not be completed within a year. Thus, any claims based on the existence of the joint venture agreement were barred. View "Taxinet Corp. v. Leon" on Justia Law