Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The Colorado Supreme Court granted review in this case to consider whether a district court erred in dismissing a a petition for allocation of parental responsibilities (“APR”) filed by Steven Cook (“Stepfather”) for lack of standing. The Court reaffirmed that neither exclusive physical care nor parental consent was required for a nonparent to establish standing to petition for an APR under section 14-10-123(1)(c), C.R.S. (2021), of Colorado’s Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act (“UDMA”). Thus, the Court vacated the district court’s order dismissing Stepfather’s APR petition and its award of attorney fees against Stepfather pursuant to section 13-17-102, C.R.S. (2021), and remanded for further proceedings. View "Parental Responsibilities of: E.K." on Justia Law

The plaintiff in this product liability case obtained a money judgment to compensate him for personal injuries he sustained in a car accident. The judgment debtor, the manufacturer of plaintiff’s car, appealed, and a division of the court of appeals reversed the judgment. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the division’s judgment on different grounds and remanded the matter for a new trial. On remand, plaintiff prevailed again, obtaining a new money judgment. The parties agreed that the nine percent interest rate applied from the date of the accident until the date of the appealed judgment (the first judgment). But the parties disagreed on the applicable interest rate between entry of that judgment and satisfaction of the final judgment (the second judgment). The Colorado Supreme Court held that whenever the judgment debtor appeals the judgment, the interest rate switches from nine percent to a market-based rate. "The outcome of the appeal is of no consequence; the filing of any appeal of the judgment by the judgment debtor triggers the shift in interest rate." Further, the Court held that the market-based postjudgment interest on the sum to be paid had to be calculated from the date of the appealed judgment. Thus, the market-based postjudgment interest rate applied from the date of the appealed judgment (the first judgment) through the date the final judgment (the second judgment) is satisfied. View "Ford Motor Company v. Walker" on Justia Law

The four truckers who initiated this action regularly drove more than forty hours per week for their employer, JP Trucking, Inc., a Colorado transport company. The question they presented for the Colorado Supreme Courts review concerned whether they were entitled to overtime pay for hours exceeding forty hours per week or twelve hours per day. The Court surmised the answer depended on the meaning of a state regulation that exempted “interstate drivers” from overtime compensation. The truck drivers and JP Trucking both urged the Supreme Court to declare that the term “interstate drivers” was unambiguous: the truck drivers argued the term referred to drivers whose work predominantly took them across state lines; JP Trucking argued that “interstate drivers” were drivers involved in the transportation of goods in interstate commerce, even if their work never took them across state lines. A division of the Colorado court of appeals determined that “interstate drivers” was unambiguous from JP Trucking’s understanding of the term. The Supreme Court concluded the term was ambiguous, and consistent with a different appellate court division, held that “interstate drivers” refers to drivers whose work takes them across state lines, regardless of how often. Hence, the state exemption from overtime compensation was triggered the first time a driver crosses state lines during a work trip. The case was remanded for further proceedings, namely to allow the appeals court to consider JP Trucking’s remaining contentions regarding the calculation of damages. View "Gomez v. JP Trucking" on Justia Law

Petitioner Lisa French went to respondents Centura Health Corporation and Catholic Health Initiatives Colorado d/b/a St. Anthony North Health Campus (collectively, “Centura”) for surgery. Upon reviewing French’s insurance information prior to surgery, Centura advised her that she would personally be responsible for $1,336.90 of the amounts to be billed. After the surgery, however, Centura determined that it had misread French’s insurance card and that she was, in fact, an out-of-network patient. Centura then billed French $229,112.13 and ultimately sued her to collect. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to review: (1) whether here, Centura’s database used by listing rates for specific medical services and supplies, was incorporated by reference into hospital services agreements (“HSAs”) that French had signed; and (2) if so, whether the price term in the HSAs was sufficiently unambiguous to render the HSAs enforceable. The Court concluded that because French neither had knowledge of nor assented to the chargemaster, which was not referenced in the HSA or disclosed to her, the chargemaster was not incorporated by reference into the HSA. Accordingly, the HSA left its price term open, and therefore, the jury appropriately determined that term. The Court reverse the judgment of the division below, and did not decide whether the price that French was to pay was unambiguous, even if the HSA incorporated the chargemaster. View "French v. Centura Health" on Justia Law

The Department of Human Services for Arapahoe County (“the Department”) sued Monica Velarde and Michael Moore to enforce a final order it had issued against them to recover Medicaid overpayments. But the Department did so only after undertaking extensive efforts on its own to recoup the fraudulently obtained benefits. The district court dismissed the Department’s suit, finding that section 24-4-106(4), C.R.S. (2021), which was part of the State Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), required an agency seeking judicial enforcement of one of its final orders to do so within thirty-five days of the order’s effective date. The Colorado Supreme Court determined district court and the court of appeals incorrectly relied on an inapplicable statutory deadline in ruling that the complaint was untimely filed. Each court was called upon to determine whether a thirty-five-day deadline governing proceedings initiated by an adversely affected or aggrieved person seeking judicial review of an agency’s action also applied to proceedings initiated by an agency seeking judicial enforcement of one of its final orders. Both courts answered yes. The Supreme Court, however, answered no. Judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Arapahoe County v. Velarde & Moore" on Justia Law

When members of the Public Employees’ Retirement Association (“PERA”) apply for retirement, they can choose between three options for benefit distribution. Generally, a retiree’s option choice is final. Pursuant to section 24-51-802(3.8), C.R.S. (2021), if a retiree chose either option 2 or 3 at retirement and the retiree’s then-spouse was named cobeneficiary, “the court shall have the jurisdiction to order or allow [the] retiree . . . to remove the spouse that was named cobeneficiary . . . in which case an option 1 benefit shall become payable.” In this case, the Colorado Supreme Court considered whether section 24-51-802(3.8) empowered a divorcing retiree to unilaterally remove a former spouse as named cobeneficiary and convert to option 1 retirement benefits. Assuming without deciding that this issue was adequately preserved for appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court answered this question in the negative. Instead, applying the statute’s plain language, the Court held that section 24-51-802(3.8) vested the trial court, not the retiree, with the authority to remove the former spouse as cobeneficiary and facilitate a conversion to option 1. Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, albeit on different grounds. View "In re Marriage of Mack" on Justia Law

The federal district court for the District of Colorado certified a question of law to the Colorado Supreme Court. In July 2020, Alexis Skillett was involved in a car accident. At the time of the accident, Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company (“Allstate”) insured Skillett under a policy that included underinsured motorist coverage. Skillett settled with the at-fault driver and his insurer and also filed a claim with Allstate for underinsured motorist benefits. Allstate assigned one of its employees, Collin Draine, to handle Skillett’s claim. Draine concluded Skillett was not entitled to underinsured motorist benefits. Skillett filed suit in Denver District Court, naming both Allstate and Draine as defendants. Her claims against Allstate included breach of contract, statutory bad faith, and common law bad faith. As to Draine, she alleged that he had personally violated section 10-3-1116, which creates a cause of action for insureds whose insurance benefits have been unreasonably delayed or denied. The certified question asked the Supreme Court whether an employee of an insurance company who adjusts an insured’s claim in the course of employment could, for that reason, be liable personally for statutory bad faith under Colorado Revised Statutes Sections 10-3-1115 and -1116. Given the plain statutory language, the Supreme Court answered that question in the negative: "An action for unreasonably delayed or denied insurance benefits under Colorado law may be brought against an insurer, not against an individual adjuster acting solely as an employee of the insurer." View "Skillet v. Allstate" on Justia Law

After tripping over a deviation in a sidewalk in the City of Boulder (“City”), Joy Maphis sued the City for her injuries under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (“CGIA”). The City moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that it was immune from suit as the sidewalk did not constitute a “dangerous condition” under section 24-10-106(1)(d)(1), C.R.S. (2021), of the CGIA. The district court denied the City’s motion based on its finding that the deviation was “difficult to detect” and was larger than what the City classified as a “hazard” warranting repair. The City appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, concluding that the undisputed evidence failed to establish that the sidewalk presented the type of dangerous condition for which the City had waived its immunity from suit. After its review, the Colorado Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that Maphis failed to establish a waiver of immunity. Reviewing de novo the legal question of whether the sidewalk constituted a dangerous condition under the CGIA, the Court held that Maphis’s evidence did not establish that the sidewalk deviation presented a risk that “exceeded the bounds of reason.” Accordingly, the Court affirmed the court of appeals and held that the City retained its immunity from suit under the CGIA. View "Maphis v. City of Boulder" on Justia Law

In August 2016, Plaintiff Maribel Ronquillo was in an automobile collision. According to her complaint, Ronquillo was rear-ended by defendant Jesse Williams, who was operating a vehicle owned by an EcoClean employee and towing an EcoClean trailer. Ronquillo suffered serious physical injuries and incurred around $250,000 in medical expenses. At the time of the accident, Ronquillo did not have health insurance, so she entered into a medical finance lien agreement with Injury Finance. Under the terms of that agreement, Injury Finance purchased Ronquillo’s accounts receivable from her healthcare providers at a predetermined, discounted contractual rate, which allowed Ronquillo to receive prompt medical care. Ronquillo remained contractually obligated to repay Injury Finance for “all charges billed by the [medical] [p]roviders” regardless of the result of any litigation. Ronquillo and her husband filed suit alleging negligence and loss of consortium against Williams and asserting a respondeat superior claim against EcoClean. As part of discovery, Defendants subpoenaed Injury Finance, seeking information and documents pertaining to Injury Finance’s accounts receivable purchase rates, provider contracts, and business operations and methodologies. When Injury Finance did not respond to the subpoena, Defendants filed a motion to compel production, which the district court granted. Defendants also filed a “motion for determination of a question of law pursuant to C.R.C.P. 56(h) that Injury Finance . . . is not a collateral source[]” subject to the pre-verdict evidentiary component of the collateral source rule. This interlocutory appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court raised the narrow question of whether a medical finance company was a collateral source for purposes of the pre-verdict evidentiary component of Colorado’s collateral source rule. The Supreme Court agreed with the district court that Injury Finance was not a collateral source, "Collateral sources must confer a 'benefit,' as defined in section 10-1-135(2)(a), C.R.S. (2021), onto the injured party. ... Ronquillo has not received a benefit from Injury Finance for purposes of the collateral source rule because her arrangement with Injury Finance does not reduce her financial obligations." The Court expressed no opinion on whether the disputed evidence could be excluded under other evidentiary rules such as CRE 401 and 403. View "Ronquillo v. EcoClean" on Justia Law

In 2005, Alexander Rudnicki suffered serious injuries when OB-GYN Peter Bianco, D.O., negligently performed an operative vaginal delivery using a vacuum extractor to assist in the delivery. Alexander suffered injuries to his brain as a result of the trauma to his scalp and skull caused by the vacuum extraction. Alexander required ongoing physical, occupational, and speech therapy; he was intellectually disabled and enrolled in special education at school; and he was not likely to be able to live independently in the future. In 2014, Alexander’s parents, Francis and Pamela Rudnicki, in both their individual capacities and as parents, filed a complaint against Dr. Bianco and the hospital where Alexander was born, alleging, among other things, professional negligence by Dr. Bianco. Dr. Bianco moved to dismiss, asserting that Alexander’s parents did not bring their individual claims against him within the applicable statute of limitations. The district court agreed and dismissed the parents' individual claims, and the case proceeded to trial with Alexander as the sole plaintiff. A jury ultimately found Dr. Bianco had acted negligently and awarded Alexander damages, including, among other things, sums for past and future medical expenses until Alexander reached the age of twenty-two. Dr. Bianco filed a post-trial motion to reduce this verdict, arguing that under Colorado common law, only Alexander’s parents could recover Alexander’s pre-majority medical expenses and, therefore, the court was required to deduct from the verdict the medical expenses incurred prior to Alexander’s eighteenth birthday. The district court ultimately agreed with Dr. Bianco and vacated the entirety of the jury’s award for past medical expenses, as well as sixty percent of the award for future medical expenses, concluding that the claim for pre-majority medical expenses belonged solely to Alexander’s parents, but their claim for such expenses had been dismissed as time-barred. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to decide whether to adhere to a common law rule under which only a minor plaintiff’s parents may recover tort damages for medical expenses incurred by their unemancipated minor child. The Supreme Court concluded the traditional rationales for the common law rule no longer applied, and that "the realities of today’s health care economy compel us to abandon that rule. Accordingly, we conclude that in cases involving an unemancipated minor child, either the child or their parents may recover the child’s pre-majority medical expenses, but double recovery is not permitted." View "Rudnicki v. Bianco" on Justia Law