Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Colorado’s Attorney General and the Administrator of the Colorado Uniform Consumer Credit Code (“UCCC”) (collectively, “the State”) sought to enjoin the respondent corporate entities and individuals that made up the career school known as CollegeAmerica (collectively, “CollegeAmerica”) from engaging in conduct that the State believed to be in violation of Colorado law. Specifically, the State contended that several aspects of CollegeAmerica’s marketing and admissions operations constituted deceptive trade practices under the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (“CCPA”) and that CollegeAmerica’s institutional loan program, “EduPlan,” was unconscionable under the UCCC. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded, as did the division below, that the State’s CCPA civil penalty claims were equitable in nature and thus CollegeAmerica was not entitled to a jury trial on those claims. The Court further concluded the division erred in remanding this case for a new trial without first assessing whether CollegeAmerica had, in fact, had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of significant public impact and, if so, whether the evidence sufficiently established such an impact. Finally, the Court concluded the division correctly determined that CollegeAmerica’s EduPlan loans as a whole were not unconscionable, although the Supreme Court disagreed with the division’s conclusion that individualized evidence regarding the probability of repayment was necessary to establish unconscionability. View "Colorado v. Center for Excellence in Higher Education" on Justia Law

In 2006, Respondent Jerome Silvernagel took out a second mortgage on a home. He agreed to make monthly payments to pay down the principal and 10% annual interest, with any remaining balance due in 2036. Silvernagel alone signed the promissory note, agreeing to repay the underlying loan. But both he and Respondent Dan Wu signed the deed of trust securing payment of the note. The deed of trust contained an acceleration clause, giving the lender the power to declare the entire loan immediately due and payable upon default. When exercised, acceleration authorized the lender to foreclose on the property to satisfy the outstanding debt and any related fees. In 2012, a bankruptcy court discharged Silvernagel’s personal liability on the mortgage under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Silvernagel had stopped making payments on the note before the discharge and made no payments since. The discharge prohibited creditors from attempting to collect the debt from Silvernagel directly, but it did not extinguish “the right to enforce a valid lien, such as a mortgage or security interest, against the debtor’s property after the bankruptcy.” In 2019, US Bank allegedly threatened to foreclose on the property if Silvernagel did not make payments on his mortgage. Silvernagel and Wu (hereinafter collectively, “Silvernagel”) filed this case in response, requesting declaratory relief to prevent US Bank’s enforcement of the deed of trust. He argued that US Bank’s interest was extinguished by the six-year statute of limitations on debt collection. Alternatively, he asserted that the doctrine of laches prevented enforcement of the agreement. The trial court dismissed the case, determining that US Bank’s claim had not accrued (meaning that the six-year limitation period hadn’t even commenced). A division of the court of appeals reversed, holding that the statute of limitations began to run upon Silvernagel’s 2012 bankruptcy discharge, barring US Bank’s claim. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals: when there is no evidence that the lender accelerated payment on the mortgage agreement, a claim for any future payment doesn’t accrue until that payment is missed under the agreement’s original terms. View "US Bank, N.A. v. Silvernagel, et al." on Justia Law

This matter arose out of disputes between Antero Resources Corporation (“Antero”) and Airport Land Partners, Ltd (“Airport Land”) and other royalty owners (collectively, “Royalty Owners”) over whether Antero could deduct certain post-production costs from royalty payments under the applicable leases’ royalty clauses. Royalty Owners alleged that Antero has underpaid royalties in violation of their respective lease contracts. Royalty Owners filed individual breach-of-contract suits against Antero for dates between December 2016 and April 2017. Antero moved to dismiss the suits, arguing that the claims should have been brought before the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (“COGCC” or “the Commission”) in the first instance. Statutorily, COGCC lacked jurisdiction under section 34-60-118.5(5), C.R.S. (2022), to engage in contract interpretation to resolve a bona fide dispute between parties under an oil and gas lease. But in 2017, without any intervening change to explain the shift, two district courts changed course, asserting that COGCC had responsibility for resolving contract disputes on the theory either that the contract terms were unambiguous or that settled law compelled a certain interpretation. The Colorado Supreme Court returned to the longstanding statutory mandate that COGCC lacked jurisdiction to resolve bona fide disputes of contract interpretation and held that such a dispute exists where the parties disagree in good faith about the meaning or application of a relevant contract term. View "Antero Resources v. Airport Land Partners" on Justia Law

In 2019, plaintiff John Dewey Institute, Inc. (“JDI”) submitted a charter school application to the Douglas County Colorado School Board. Section 22-30.5-108 (“section 108”) of the Charter Schools Act created a four-step procedure in which a charter school applicant may potentially twice appeal an adverse decision of a local board of education to the State Board. The parties agreed that section 108 precluded judicial review of State Board decisions rendered after a second appeal under section 108(3)(d). They disagreed, however, as to whether this appeal-preclusion language also barred judicial review of final decisions of the State Board rendered after a first appeal under section 108(3)(a)—a scenario in which the State Board has affirmed the local board’s decision to deny a charter school application, thus rendering a second appeal unnecessary. Applying the plain language of section 108 and the statutory scheme as a whole, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that section 108(3)(d)’s appeal-preclusion language applied to all final decisions of the State Board rendered under section 108, including when, as here, the State Board affirmed the local board’s denial of a charter school application during an initial appeal, thereby ending the matter and rendering a second appeal unnecessary. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' ruling declaring that final decisions of the State Board rendered after a first appeal were subject to judicial review. This matter was remanded with instructions that the case be returned to the district court for the dismissal of JDI’s claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Colorado State Board of Education v. Brannberg" on Justia Law

Patricia and Lynette McMichael (“the McMichaels”) were the co-personal representatives for the estate of Charles McMichael (“Mr. McMichael”). The McMichaels alleged Mr. McMichael sustained injuries and died after falling on at least three occasions at a rehabilitation hospital owned by Encompass. Although Mr. McMichael was a resident and Encompass was a resident of Arapahoe County, and the alleged torts occurred at Encompass’s rehabilitation hospital in Arapahoe County, the McMichaels filed their lawsuit in Boulder County. After the McMichaels filed their complaint in May 2022, Encompass failed to file a timely response. The McMichaels moved for default judgment, which the trial court granted. Thirteen days after a response to the complaint was due, Encompass filed two separate pleadings with the court: (1) its attorneys’ entry of appearance; and (2) a motion to set aside the default judgment. In its motion, Encompass argued that the McMichaels’ counsel failed to confer with Encompass’s counsel before filing the motion for default judgment. Encompass contended the McMichaels’ lawyer had been actively engaged for months in communication with its lawyer about, among other things, the proper venue for the case. The issues this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was the trial court’s order: (1) vacating its prior default judgment against Encompass PAHS Rehabilitation Hospital, LLC d/b/a Encompass Health Rehabilitation Hospital of Littleton (“Encompass”); and (2) granting Encompass’s motion to change venue from Boulder County to Arapahoe County. To this the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion by choosing to hear this matter on the merits despite Encompass’s thirteen-day delay in responding to the complaint. Further, applying its holding in a companion case, Nelson v. Encompass PAHS Rehabilitation Hospital, LLC, 2023 CO 1, __ P.3d __, the Court concluded the trial court did not err in transferring venue from the Boulder County District Court to the Arapahoe County District Court. "Because the residence of a limited liability company (“LLC”), for venue purposes, is the residence of the LLC, rather than the residences of its members, the county designated in the complaint was not the proper county, and Encompass was entitled to a change of venue as a matter of right." View "McMichael v. Encompass PAHS Rehabilitation Hospital" on Justia Law

Respondent Floyd Nelson, a resident of Arapahoe County, Colorado alleged that he sustained injuries from a fall at a rehabilitation hospital owned by Encompass PAHS Rehabilitation, LLC d/b/a Encompass Health Rehabilitation Hospital of Littleton (“Encompass”), an LLC located in Arapahoe County. Nelson sued Encompass, asserting claims for negligence; medical negligence; and negligent hiring, supervision, retention, and training. Although Nelson was a resident of Arapahoe County, the LLC was located in Arapahoe County, and the alleged torts occurred in Arapahoe County, Nelson brought the action in Boulder County District Court. Encompass argued the trial court erred in looking to the residence of Encompass’s members in determining that venue was proper in Boulder County District Court and thus denying Encompass’s motion for change of venue. Nelson, analogizing to federal diversity cases, argued that the trial court properly looked to the residences of Encompass’s members in deciding where venue lied. In addressing this issue of first impression, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that the residence of an LLC for venue purposes under C.R.C.P. 98 was controlled by the residence of the LLC, not that of its members. View "Nelson v. Encompass PAHS Rehabilitation Hospital" on Justia Law

Walker Commercial, Inc. (“Walker”) filed a Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 106(a)(4) complaint seeking review of the decision of Marshall Brown, the Director of Water of the City of Aurora (“Director”), to levy a storm drain development fee against Walker’s real property. Walker filed its Rule 106(a)(4) complaint in district court thirty days after the Director’s final decision—two days past Rule 106(b)’s twenty-eight-day filing deadline. Walker contended that C.R.C.P. 6(b) allowed the district court to extend Rule 106(b)’s filing deadline upon a showing of excusable neglect. The Director disagreed, arguing that Rule 6(b) did not apply to Rule 106(b) because Rule 106(b)’s deadline established a limitation period that was jurisdictional and that must be strictly enforced. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed with the Director and concluded that Rule 6(b) does not apply to extend Rule 106(b)’s twenty-eight-day filing deadline. The Court concluded the district court properly dismissed Walker’s Rule 106(a)(4) amended complaint as untimely. Because the original complaint was untimely, the trial court also properly dismissed Walker’s additional Claim 3 raised in its amended complaint. View " Brown v. Walker Commercial" on Justia Law

Following his conviction and sentence for first degree murder, James Woo brought a civil replevin action seeking the return of certain property that was lawfully seized by the government as part of his criminal case. The trial court ruled, and the court of appeals agreed (on different grounds), that the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (“CGIA”) barred Woo’s claim. Woo argued on appeal that, if the CGIA precluded his replevin action, he was rendered remediless and the CGIA, as applied to him, violated his rights under the Due Process Clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Because the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that Woo had a remedy in his criminal case to recover any property lawfully seized, and because the Court further concluded that the remedy was constitutionally adequate, the CGIA’s bar of this replevin action did not violate his federal and state constitutional rights to procedural due process. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment, but on slightly different grounds. View "Woo v. El Paso County Sheriff" on Justia Law

The question this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether the court of appeals misapplied federal case law when it concluded that respondent Oklahoma Police Pension and Retirement System (“Oklahoma”) stated a plausible claim for relief under sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l(a)(2), 77o, notwithstanding petitioners’ assertions that the alleged misrepresentations at issue constituted immaterial “puffery” and amounted to claims based on hindsight, which were not actionable under federal law. Jagged Peak Energy Inc. (“Jagged”) was a Denver-based company that specializes in the exploration, development, and production of crude oil and natural gas. In January 2017, Jagged conducted an initial public offering (“IPO”), during which it sold over 31 million shares at a price to the public of $15.00 per share. Oklahoma, a governmental pension system that provides pension and disability benefits for municipal police officers in the state of Oklahoma, purchased Jagged shares “pursuant to and/or traceable to the [IPO].” According to Oklahoma, within a short time after its investment, facts came to light indicating that Jagged, the individual defendants, and the underwriter defendants (collectively, “defendants”) had negligently overstated Jagged’s ability to increase its oil and gas production. As a result, the price of Jagged shares saw several notable declines, and except for a brief surge, Jagged’s stock has traded well below its IPO price. Oklahoma filed a class action lawsuit in Denver District Court, alleging that defendants had made materially untrue statements and omissions in their offering documents. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded the appellate court's conclusion was consistent with applicable federal precedent, and therefore affirmed that court's judgment. View "Jagged Peak Energy v. Oklahoma Police Pension" on Justia Law

Abbey Dickerson appealed to the Judicial Department Personnel Board of Review (“Board”) after she was terminated by the Eighteenth Judicial District (“District”). As required by the Personnel Rules, the Board appointed an attorney (who happened to be a retired court of appeals judge) to serve as the hearing officer on her case. Following an evidentiary hearing, the hearing officer changed the disciplinary action to a ninety-day suspension without pay. The District then appealed to the Board, but the Board affirmed the hearing officer’s decision. Because the District remained concerned about Dickerson’s suitability to return to her position, however, it sought review of the Board’s final order by filing a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) claim in Denver district court. The question presented by this case for the Colorado Supreme Court asked whether the Board was either a “governmental body” or a “lower judicial body” within the meaning of C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4), such that its decision to affirm, modify, or reverse a disciplinary action could be challenged in district court. The Supreme Court held that the Personnel Rules precluded district court review of a final order by the Board. View "Colorado Judicial Dept. 18th Judicial District" on Justia Law