Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

During jury selection in this civil case, plaintiff challenged a juror for cause. The trial court denied the challenge, and in response, plaintiff exercised one of his peremptory challenges to excuse the juror. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in denying plaintiff's challenge, reversed and remanded for a new trial without examining whether the error was harmless. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed and remanded. As the Court detailed in "Colorado v. Novotny," (320 P.3d 1194 (2014)), the automatic reversal rule in the criminal context rested on the assumption that impairment of the ability to shape the jury through peremptory challenges affected a "substantial right," and amounted to a due process violation. Such impairment was per se reversible and not subject to harmless error review. "[H]owever, subsequent developments in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence wiped away the foundations of that assumption, suggesting that an error regarding the ability to shape the jury is not a due process violation, and would affect a substantial right only if it substantially affected the outcome of the trial." The Court overruled Colorado cases to the contrary and held that allowing a civil litigant fewer peremptory challenges than authorized, or than available to and exercised by the opposing party, does not, by itself, require automatic reversal. Reviewing courts must determine whether the error substantially influenced the outcome of the case in accordance with the civil harmless error rule. View "Newman, LLC v. Roberts" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review stemmed from a medical malpractice action, and whether, as a matter of law, a known suicidal patient admitted to the secure mental health unit of a hospital and place under high risk precautions, could be subject to a comparative negligence defense when the patient attempted suicide while in the hospital's custody. P.W. sued Children's Hospital both individually and as conservator of his son K.W., who was in a minimally conscious state after an unsuccessful attempt to kill himself by hanging while at the Hospital. The trial court granted P.W.'s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the Hospital's comparative negligence and assumption of risk defenses. The trial court also issued an order preventing the Hospital from obtaining K.W.'s pre-incident mental health records. The Hospital petitioned the Supreme Court to review: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by precluding discovery of K.W.'s mental health records; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by precluding discovery of K.W.'s treating psychiatrist's records when they were a part of a continuing course of treatment that included Children's Hospital; and (3) whether the trial court erred in granting P.W. summary judgment dismissing the comparative negligence and assumption of risk defenses despite evidence K.W. could think rationally and protect himself from harm during the hospitalization. The Supreme Court concluded that the Hospital could not assert comparative negligence or assumption of risk as a matter of law, and that it did not need to address the trial court's discovery order. View "P.W. v. Children's Hospital" on Justia Law

After a two-day permanent orders hearing, the trial court felt it lacked insufficient information to allocate attorney's fees in this divorce action. Therefore, the court chose to issue the decree dissolving the marriage, along with permanent orders addressing parental responsibilities, child support, the division of marital property, and spousal maintenance, but postponed a determination on fees. The hearing on fees was approximately six months later. In the gap between the permanent orders hearing and the fees hearing, Wife's counsel requested additional documents regarding her Husband's financial circumstances. Husband objected and requested a protective order, which the trial court issued. The court ultimately ordered each party to pay their own fees and costs. Wife appealed this order, and the court of appeals reversed, reasoning that the trial court should have permitted additional discovery in order to ensure an equitable determination of fees. The Supreme Court, after review, disagreed with the court of appeals' conclusion, and instead held that for the purpose of deciding whether to award attorney's fees, a trial court should consider the parties' financial resources as of the date of the issuance of the decree of dissolution. The case was reversed and remanded to reinstate the trial court's protective order and the order instructing both sides to pay their own fees. View "In re Marriage of de Koning" on Justia Law

This case concerned the nature of transactions that petitioners, national litigation finance companies, made with tort plaintiffs seeking funds to pay personal expenses while waiting for their lawsuits to settle or go to trial. Plaintiffs usually agreed to pay the companies a sum of money from the future litigation proceeds. By the terms of the agreements, any money the companies give tort plaintiffs were not to be used to prosecute the legal claims. The specific issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the companies’ forwarding of expense money to tort plaintiffs constituted a “loan.” Petitioners contended they were “asset purchases,” but the Colorado Uniform Consumer Credit Code interprets these transactions as loans. The Supreme Court agreed with the UCCC: these transactions are loans. View "Oasis Legal Fin. Grp. v. Coffman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Meridian Service Metropolitan District (Meridian) appealed a district court order finding that Meridian sought to appropriate designated ground water that was subject to the jurisdiction of the Colorado Ground Water Commission. Meridian petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court to decide whether storm runoff could be classified as “designated ground water” subject to administration and adjudication by the Commission, or whether such water was in or tributary to a natural stream (vesting jurisdiction in the local water court). The Supreme Court concluded that because this case presented a question of whether the water at issue here met a statutory definition of “designated ground water,” the Commission had jurisdiction to make the initial determination. View "Meridian Serv. Metro. Dist. v. Ground Water Comm'n" on Justia Law

In 2011, In 2011, Regional Transportation District (“RTD”) filed a petition in condemnation against 750 West 48th Avenue, LLC (“Landowner”) to acquire approximately the approximately 1.6 acre property a light rail project. Landowner was leasing the property to a commercial waterproofing business ("Tenant"). Over the years, Landowner made several luxury improvements to the property, including adding a steam room, fitness room, atrium, ceramic and cherry-wood flooring, and marble and granite finishes. The parties stipulated to every condemnation issue except the property's reasonable market value. Landowner elected to litigate the property's value through a commission trial. RTD established the value at $1.8 million; Landowner thought the property was worth $2.57 million. Landowner's calculations focused solely on the cost of replacement; RTD based its estimation on a "superadequacy" theory, asserting that many of the luxury improvements that Landowner made to an industrial property would not fetch a price on the open market commensurate with the cost of replacement. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the interplay between the respective authorities of the supervising judge and the commission to make evidentiary rulings in eminent domain valuation hearings. Specifically, the Court considered: (1) whether a commission could alter a supervising judge's ruling in limine regarding admissibility, and (2) whether the supervising judge could instruct the commission to disregard as irrelevant evidence that the commission had previously admitted. The Supreme Court held that judicial evidentiary rulings controlled in valuation hearings. Thus, the Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment insofar as it approved the supervising judge instructing the commission to disregard previously admitted evidence as irrelevant. The Court reversed that portion of the appellate court's opinion permitting the commission to alter the judge's evidentiary ruling in limine. View "RTD v. 750 West 48th Ave., LLC" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Colorado Supreme Court was whether summary judgment was ever appropriate in dependency and neglect adjudications involving prospective harm. The Court of Appeals held a trial court could never grant summary judgment because reasonable minds could always draw differing inferences from the evidence. The Supreme Court, however, concluded that when the underlying material facts are undisputed, reasonable minds could reach one inference based on the specific facts of the case. Therefore, the Court held that trial courts must evaluate whether summary judgment is appropriate in a dependency and neglect adjudication involving prospective harm on a case-by-case basis. View "Colorado in Interest of S.N." on Justia Law

Petitioner and State Representative Debbie Benefield, and other current or former members of the Colorado House of Representatives, appealed the court of appeals' judgment which reversed the district court's order denying costs and attorney fees for the Colorado Republican Party. In 2006, the Party submitted an Open Records Act request to each petitioner seeking access to responses to a 2005 survey that contained various constituents' viewpoints on a variety of legal, political and social issues. When petitioners declined to make the surveys available, the Party sued to get access. The Party ultimately got 925 of 1584 surveys it requested. The Party then moved for costs and fees as the "prevailing applicant." The Supreme Court concluded that because section 24-72-204(5), "when properly construed," mandated an award in favor of any person who applied for and received a district court order requiring a custodian to permit inspection of a public record. Because the appellate court was correct in its interpretation, the Supreme Court affirmed its judgment. View "Benefield v. Colorado Republican Party" on Justia Law

The Colorado Supreme Court issues a rule to show cause to decide whether the district court in this case abused its discretion in holding that as a matter of law, section 12-36.5-104(10)(a), C.R.S. (2013) protected professional review committee records from subpoena or discovery and admissibility in "civil suits," but not administrative proceedings. Upon review, the Court held that the term "civil suit" included administrative proceedings of an adjudicatory nature. Accordingly, the Colorado Medical Board's records were protected from subpoena or discovery or were admissible in the administrative hearing in Dr. Polly Train's medical license. The Court reversed the district court's order requiring the Board produce the records in question. View "Colorado Medical Board v. Office of Administrative Courts" on Justia Law

Respondent Vasilios Haralampopoulos visited the emergency room with severe abdominal pain. After a CT scan revealed a large cystic mass in his liver, Petitioner Dr. Mauricio Waintrub examined Respondent, gave a differential diagnosis identifying four possible causes for his condition, and approved a fine-needle biopsy to determine the nature of the cyst. Petitioner Dr. Jason Kelly performed the procedure, during which Respondent suffered respiratory and cardiac arrest. Normal resuscitation efforts were unsuccessful, and it took over 30 minutes to revive Respondent's heart. Lack of oxygen to his brain left Respondent in a vegetative state. Ten days later, Respondent's family and friends met with doctors to determine why Respondent went into arrest and had such a poor reaction to resuscitation efforts. After the meeting, Respondent's then-roommate and ex-girlfriend Gulsans Akyol Hurd approached Dr. Kelly and asked him whether Respondent's prior cocaine use could have contributed to his injuries. Dr. Kelly responded that cocaine could have contributed to Respondent's resistance to normal resuscitation efforts, but he was not a cardiologist so he did not know. Respondent brought a medical malpractice suit against seven individuals, including Petitioners Dr. Kelly and Dr. Waintrub. Respondent filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude Hurd's statements to Dr. Kelly as inadmissible hearsay not covered by any hearsay exception. The trial court denied the motion in limine, finding that Hurd's statements were made for purposes of diagnosis and treatment under Rule 803(4), and that their probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Colorado Rule of Evidence 403. The court of appeals reversed, finding that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of Respondent's cocaine use. The court held that Hurd's statements to Dr. Kelly were not admissible under Rule 803(4) because the statements were made after Respondent was in a vegetative state and treatment was no longer possible, they were not made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in limiting the scope of Rule 803(4) to statements made for the purpose of prospective treatment. The Rule's plain language applies to "diagnosis or treatment," and while the term "treatment" has a prospective focus, the term "diagnosis" does not. "Here, Hurd's statements were made for the purpose of discovering the cause of Respondent's resistance to normal resuscitation efforts, and were thus admissible under Rule 803(4)." The case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Kelly v. Haralampopoulos" on Justia Law