Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Teachers who worked for Denver Public Schools (“DPS”), and Denver Classroom Teachers Association (collectively, “the teachers”), filed this suit, alleging that DPS invoked Senate Bill 10-191, which under certain circumstances allowed a school district to place a nonprobationary teacher on unpaid leave, to remove hundreds of teachers from their positions in violation of both due process of law and the contracts clause of the Colorado Constitution. School District No. 1 and members of the Colorado Board of Education (collectively, “the District”) moved to dismiss the suit, and the trial court granted that motion. A division of the court of appeals reversed, relying on the Colorado Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting predecessor statutes to the relevant (codified as the Teacher Employment, Compensation, and Dismissal Act of 1990 (“TECDA”)) and concluded due process violations occurred under those predecessor statutes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the TECDA did not create a contractual relationship or vest nonprobationary teachers who were placed on unpaid leave with a property interest in salary and benefits. View "Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Masters" on Justia Law

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals certified two questions of Colorado law to the Colorado Supreme Court. The questions stemmed from an action brought by teacher Linda Johnson against Denver School District No. 1 (“the District”) and the District’s Board of Education, in which Johnson argued that by placing her on unpaid leave, the District breached her contract and violated her due process rights. The federal district court concluded that because Johnson was placed on unpaid leave, rather than terminated, she was not deprived of a property interest. Johnson appealed that decision to the Tenth Circuit. After analyzing the statutory history and the current statutory language, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the provisions of section 22-63-202(2)(c.5) (CRS 2015) applied to all displaced nonprobationary teachers, not just nonprobationary teachers who were displaced because of a reduction in enrollment or an administrative decision to eliminate certain programs (the reasons stated in subparagraph (VII)). Furthermore, the Court held that nonprobationary teachers who placed on unpaid leave had no vested property interest in salary and benefits, meaning a nonprobationary teacher who is placed on unpaid leave under subparagraph (IV) is not deprived of a state property interest. View "Johnson v. Sch. Dist. No. 1" on Justia Law

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals certified two questions of Colorado law to the Colorado Supreme Court. The questions stemmed from an action brought by teacher Linda Johnson against Denver School District No. 1 (“the District”) and the District’s Board of Education, in which Johnson argued that by placing her on unpaid leave, the District breached her contract and violated her due process rights. The federal district court concluded that because Johnson was placed on unpaid leave, rather than terminated, she was not deprived of a property interest. Johnson appealed that decision to the Tenth Circuit. After analyzing the statutory history and the current statutory language, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the provisions of section 22-63-202(2)(c.5) (CRS 2015) applied to all displaced nonprobationary teachers, not just nonprobationary teachers who were displaced because of a reduction in enrollment or an administrative decision to eliminate certain programs (the reasons stated in subparagraph (VII)). Furthermore, the Court held that nonprobationary teachers who placed on unpaid leave had no vested property interest in salary and benefits, meaning a nonprobationary teacher who is placed on unpaid leave under subparagraph (IV) is not deprived of a state property interest. View "Johnson v. Sch. Dist. No. 1" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado certified a question of Colorado law to the Colorado Supreme Court. Defendant Ray Domenico Farms, Inc. grew organic vegetables. Plaintiffs were three year-round and four seasonal migrant workers who had been previously employed by Domenico Farms from as far back as 1992. All Plaintiffs were paid by the hour, and alleged they never received overtime pay during their employment with Domenico Farms. While agricultural workers were generally exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act’s (“FLSA”) overtime requirements, Plaintiffs alleged they performed nonagricultural tasks in weeks in which they worked more than forty hours, thus entitling them to overtime wages under FLSA for those weeks. The certified question from the federal court pertained to how far back in time a terminated employee’s unpaid wage claims could reach under the Colorado Wage Claim Act, sections 8-4-101 to -123, C.R.S. (2017). Specifically, the certified question asked whether the statute permitted a terminated employee to sue for wages or compensation that went unpaid at any time during the employee’s employment, even when the statute of limitations had run on the cause of action the employee could have brought for those unpaid wages under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-4-103(1)(a). The Supreme Court held that under the plain language of section 109, an employee could seek any wages or compensation that were unpaid at the time of termination; however, the right to seek such wages or compensation was subject to the statute of limitations. That statute of limitations begins to run when the wages or compensation first become due and payable and thus limits a terminated employee to claims for the two (or three) years immediately preceding termination. Thus, the Court answered the certified question in the negative. View "Hernandez v. Ray Domenico Farms, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants sought ex parte interviews with a number of non-party medical providers in this medical malpractice action. Because of this, an issue arose regarding the scope of the physician–patient privilege in medical-malpractice actions. Section 13-90-107(1)(d), C.R.S. (2017), prohibited certain medical providers from revealing, in testimony or otherwise, information about a patient gathered in the course of treating that patient. That prohibition, however, was not unlimited. The dispute, as presented to the Colorado Supreme Court, did not implicate the physician–patient relationship between Kelley Bailey (“Bailey”) and Defendants, meaning section 107(1)(d)(I) was inapplicable. Instead, the issue here was whether the non-party medical providers were “in consultation with” Defendants such that section 107(1)(d)(II) removed that typically privileged information from the protection of the physician–patient privilege. The Supreme Court held the non-party medical providers were not in consultation with Defendants for the purposes of section 107(1)(d)(II). However, the Court remanded this case to the trial court for consideration of whether the Baileys impliedly waived the physician–patient privilege for the non-party medical providers. On remand, if the trial court concluded that the Baileys did waive that privilege, it should reconsider whether there is any risk that: (1) ex parte interviews with the non-party medical providers would inadvertently reveal residually privileged information; or (2) Defendants would exert undue influence on the non-party medical providers in the course of any ex parte interviews. View "In re Bailey v. Hermacinski" on Justia Law

Petitioner Oakwood Holdings, LLC and respondent Mortgage Investments Enterprises LLC each claimed a right to the deed on a piece of foreclosed property. In 2014, Mortgage Investments purchased the property at a foreclosure sale. On or around the date of the foreclosure sale, Oakwood purchased junior liens on the property and then attempted to redeem pursuant to section 38-38-302, C.R.S. (2017). Mortgage Investments, however, did not provide redemption figures and instead, acting under a limited power of attorney granted by the prior property owner, attempted to pay off the amount due to Oakwood under the junior liens. Oakwood, however, refused the payment. Mortgage Investments then filed for a declaratory judgment action, seeking a declaration that its payoffs were valid and that Oakwood was not entitled to redeem the property. The parties ultimately filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment for Oakwood, Mortgage Investments appealed, and in a unanimous, published opinion, a division of the court of appeals reversed. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s judgment, concluding that under the plain language of the applicable redemption statutes, a junior lienor who complied with its obligations under section 38-38-302 by timely filing its notice of intent to redeem is entitled to redeem, and at that point, it has no duty to accept a tendered lien payoff from a certificate of purchase holder. Although a debtor-owner is sometimes entitled to cure, the statute is clear that he or she must do so before the foreclosure sale is complete, and Mortgage Investments gained no additional rights by obtaining the limited power of attorney from the debtor-prior owner after the sale in this case. Accordingly, once Oakwood complied with the statutory requirements to redeem, it was permitted to do so and had no obligation to accept what amounted to cure funds tendered by Mortgage Investments on behalf of the debtor-prior owner. View "Oakwood Holdings, LLC v. Mortgage Investments Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law

Caroline Burton and Brenda Olivar submitted claims for long-term disability benefits to insurance companies under employee-benefits plans set up by their employers (“the Plans”). The insurance companies denied Burton’s and Olivar’s claims. Burton and Olivar sued the Plans under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) for benefits due to them under the insurance policies. But neither served the Plans. Rather, they each served complaints on the United States Department of Labor Secretary, relying on an ERISA provision allowing such service when a plan hasn’t designated “an individual” as an agent for service of process. In both cases, the Labor Secretary never forwarded the complaint to the Plans’ designated agents for service of process, the Plans failed to answer, and Burton and Olivar obtained default judgments in their favor. Eventually, the Plans moved to set aside the default judgments for improper service, which the trial courts granted in both cases. Later, the Plans moved for summary judgment, arguing the insurers, which were obligated to make all eligibility determinations and payments under the Plans’ terms, were the only proper party defendants. The trial courts agreed, granting the Plans summary judgment. A division of the court of appeals affirmed. The issue presented to the Colorado Supreme Court for resolution centered on whether ERISA’s use of the term “individual” provided that service on the Labor Secretary was sufficient when a plan designates a corporation (instead of a natural person) as its administrator and agent for service of process. Finding no reversible error in the district court’s judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Burton v. Colorado Access & No." on Justia Law

Petitioners Smokebrush Foundation, Katherine Tudor, and Donald Herbert Goede, III (collectively, “Smokebrush”) owned property on which the non-profit foundation operated a wellness center in the City of Colorado Springs. Smokebrush sued the City, contending that Smokebrush’s property had been contaminated by pollutants from an adjacent property owned by the City. The City moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, claiming governmental immunity from suit under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (“CGIA”). Smokebrush responded that the City had waived immunity under the Act, section 24-10-106(1)(c) and section 24-10-106(1)(f). The district court agreed with Smokebrush and denied the City’s motion to dismiss. In a unanimous, published opinion, however, a division of the court of appeals reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the City’s motion. The Colorado Supreme Court granted Smokebrush’s petition for certiorari and affirmed in part and reversed in part the division’s judgment. With respect to Smokebrush’s claims regarding airborne asbestos released during the 2013 demolition activities, the Supreme Court concluded the City did not waive immunity under section 24-10-106(1)(c)’s dangerous condition of a public building exception. With respect to Smokebrush’s claims regarding the coal tar contamination, the Supreme Court concluded that under the plain language of section 24-10-106(1)(f), the City waived its immunity for such claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Smokebrush Foundation v. City of Colorado Springs" on Justia Law

In this dependency and neglect case, respondents were foster parents who intervened in the trial court proceedings and participated in a hearing on the guardian ad litem’s (“GAL”) motion to terminate the parent-child legal relationship between the mother and the child. The trial court denied the motion. Neither the Department nor the GAL appealed the trial court’s ruling. Instead, the foster parents appealed, seeking to reverse the trial court’s order. The narrow question before the Colorado Supreme Court was whether the foster parents had standing to appeal the trial court’s ruling. The court of appeals concluded they did. The Supreme Court granted the GAL’s petition for a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals’ decision and reversed: “although section 19-3-507(5)(a) permits foster parents to intervene in dependency and neglect proceedings following adjudication, foster parents here do not have a legally protected interest in the outcome of termination proceedings, and section 19-3-507(5)(a) does not automatically confer standing to them to appeal the juvenile court’s order denying the termination motion at issue, where neither the Department nor the GAL sought review of the trial court’s ruling.” View "Colorado in Interest of C.W.B., Jr." on Justia Law

Alliance for a Safe and Independent Woodmen Hills bought ads and social-media coverage in an election. Campaign Integrity Watchdog filed a complaint with the Colorado Secretary of State against Alliance, alleging that Alliance failed to comply with Colorado’s campaign-finance laws requiring political committees to report contributions and expenditures. An Administrative Law Judge, or ALJ, ultimately ordered Alliance to pay fines and register as a political committee. Alliance appealed the campaign-finance decision and defended itself in a related defamation suit, racking up hundreds of dollars in court costs and thousands in legal fees. Alliance didn’t report those legal expenses. Watchdog filed another campaign-finance complaint; the ALJ concluded that the legal expenses were not reportable as expenditures but were reportable as contributions. Nonetheless, it ruled that the contribution-reporting requirement was unconstitutional as applied to Alliance for its post-election legal expenses. Watchdog appealed the ALJ’s determinations regarding the reporting requirements, and the court of appeals asked the Colorado Supreme Court to take the appeal directly under C.A.R. 50. After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed the ALJ’s decision that the legal expenses were not expenditures but were contributions under Colorado law. However, the Court reversed the ALJ’s determination that the reporting requirement was unconstitutional as applied to Alliance for its legal expenses: “The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently upheld disclosure and reporting requirements for political committees that exist primarily to influence elections. It makes no difference here that the contributions were not used to directly influence an election - any contribution to a political committee that has the major purpose of influencing an election is deemed to be campaign related and thus justifies the burden of disclosure and reporting.” Accordingly, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the ALJ’s decision in part and reversed in part. View "Campaign Integrity Watchdog v. Alliance for a Safe and Independent" on Justia Law