Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Jina Garcia received treatment from St. Anthony North Hospital, operated by Centura Health Corporation, following a motor vehicle accident. Garcia informed the hospital that she had Medicare and Medicaid coverage and that her automobile insurance carrier was Progressive Insurance. Centura asserted a hospital lien against Garcia for $2,170.35 without billing Medicare first. Garcia filed a class action lawsuit against Centura, alleging violations of the hospital lien statute by filing liens before billing Medicare, seeking damages of twice the amount of the asserted liens.The District Court of the City and County of Denver certified a class and ordered Garcia to respond to substantial discovery requests from Centura. Garcia objected, arguing the requests were irrelevant, overbroad, and violated her privacy. The district court required Garcia to provide much of the requested discovery. Garcia sought relief from the Colorado Supreme Court, which issued an order to show cause and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to determine the relevance and proportionality of the discovery requests.The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the case again and concluded that the district court abused its discretion in ordering Garcia to respond to the discovery requests. The court found that the discovery sought by Centura was not relevant to the claims or defenses in the case and was not proportional to the needs of the case. The court emphasized that the principal factual issues were whether Centura asserted liens without billing Medicare and the amount of those liens. The court made its order to show cause absolute and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Garcia v. Centura Health Corp." on Justia Law

Five elderly African elephants, Missy, Kimba, Lucky, LouLou, and Jambo, reside at the Cheyenne Mountain Zoo. The Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. (NRP) filed a Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on behalf of the elephants, seeking their transfer to a suitable elephant sanctuary. NRP argued that the elephants were unlawfully confined and had a right to bodily liberty due to their cognitive and social complexities. The petition included affidavits from animal biologists supporting the elephants' autonomy and complex needs.The El Paso County District Court dismissed the petition, ruling that Colorado's habeas corpus statute only applies to persons, not nonhuman animals. The court accepted NRP's allegations as true but concluded that the elephants lacked standing to seek habeas relief. The court also determined that NRP did not have proper next friend status to bring the petition on the elephants' behalf. Additionally, the court found that NRP failed to make a prima facie case that the elephants were unlawfully confined, as the zoo was operating within legal standards.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the habeas corpus statute in Colorado applies only to persons, defined as human beings, and does not extend to nonhuman animals. The court rejected NRP's argument to rely on common law for broader habeas corpus rights, emphasizing that the statute explicitly limits relief to persons. The court also noted that recognizing nonhuman animals as persons would have significant legal and societal implications. Consequently, the elephants did not have standing to bring a habeas corpus claim, and the district court's dismissal was upheld. View "Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Cheyenne Mountain Zoological Soc'y" on Justia Law

Marcus A. Fear was involved in a rear-end collision in 2018, resulting in injuries and medical treatment. He held an underinsured motorist (UIM) policy with GEICO and settled with the tortfeasor's insurer for $25,000. Fear sought additional compensation from GEICO, which offered $2,500 and later $4,004, but Fear did not accept these offers. He then sued GEICO for statutory bad faith under section 10-3-1115, alleging unreasonable delay in payment of his UIM claim.The case proceeded to a bench trial where experts disagreed on GEICO's handling of the claim. The district court found that $3,961 of Fear's non-economic damages were undisputed and ruled that GEICO violated section 10-3-1115. GEICO appealed, and the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that non-economic damages are inherently subjective and that admitting GEICO's claim evaluation as evidence of undisputed benefits violated CRE 408.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and agreed with the lower court that CRE 408 bars the admission of internal settlement evaluations to show undisputed benefits owed. However, it noted that such evaluations might be admissible for other purposes, such as establishing an insurer's good or bad faith. The court also concluded that non-economic damages could be undisputed or not subject to reasonable dispute in some cases, contrary to the appellate court's ruling that they are always reasonably disputable.Ultimately, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment, finding that Fear did not provide admissible evidence to show that any portion of his non-economic damages was undisputed or not subject to reasonable dispute. View "Fear v. GEICO Cas. Co." on Justia Law

Matt Roane was involved in litigation with the Archuleta County Board of Commissioners when he submitted a Colorado Open Records Act (CORA) request to Archuleta County Clerk and Recorder, Kristy Archuleta, seeking a recording of a recent Board meeting. Archuleta denied the request, claiming it circumvented the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. Roane had not sought any records through discovery in his civil action against the Board. Roane then sued Archuleta, alleging a violation of CORA.The district court granted Roane's motion to show cause, rejecting Archuleta's argument that the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure prohibited Roane from obtaining evidence outside of discovery procedures. The court ordered Archuleta to produce the recording. Archuleta appealed, arguing that the district court allowed Roane to bypass discovery rules. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order, holding that CORA allows litigants to inspect public records even if they are relevant to pending litigation.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that a litigant may obtain records under CORA even if those records are relevant to pending litigation and the litigant has not made document requests under the Rules of Civil Procedure. The court emphasized that CORA and the Rules of Civil Procedure are distinct legal regimes and that CORA does not limit inspection rights simply because the requester is involved in litigation with the public entity. The court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Archuleta v. Roane" on Justia Law

Naomi Bermudez, a tenant in a federally subsidized housing complex managed by Mercy Housing Management Group Inc., faced eviction after Mercy Housing alleged she violated her lease by having an unauthorized guest who stayed beyond the allowed period, repaired vehicles on the property, and harassed another resident. Bermudez denied these allegations and requested a jury trial to resolve the factual disputes.The Denver County Court denied Bermudez's request for a jury trial, stating that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial in civil matters in Colorado. Bermudez then filed a petition with the Supreme Court of Colorado, arguing that she was entitled to a jury trial under the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure and the statutory framework governing forcible entry and detainer (FED) actions.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that Bermudez is entitled to a jury trial on the factual disputes in the FED-possession action. The court found that the right to a jury trial in such cases is rooted in the statutory framework and the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically C.R.C.P. 338(a), which provides for a jury trial in actions for the recovery of specific real property. The court also determined that the FED statute and C.R.C.P. 338(a) are compatible and that the statutory right to a jury trial applies to factual disputes in FED-possession actions.The court acknowledged concerns about the potential burden on the county courts but concluded that the limited nature of the jury-trial right would not prove unworkable. The court reversed the county court's denial of Bermudez's jury demand, made absolute the order to show cause, and remanded the case with instructions for the county court to schedule a jury trial on the factual issues related to the possession dispute. View "Mercy Housing Management Group Inc. v. Bermudez" on Justia Law

Autumn Scardina requested a cake from Masterpiece Cakeshop to celebrate her gender transition. The shop, owned by Jack Phillips, refused to make the cake, citing the message as the reason. Scardina filed a discrimination claim with the Colorado Civil Rights Division, which found probable cause of discrimination. The Colorado Civil Rights Commission took jurisdiction but later dismissed the case as part of a confidential settlement in a federal lawsuit filed by Phillips, without Scardina's participation.The district court took up Scardina's case after the Commission's dismissal and found that Phillips had violated Colorado's Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA), imposing a fine. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. Phillips then appealed to the Supreme Court of Colorado.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that the district court should not have heard Scardina's case. The court concluded that Scardina did not exhaust her administrative remedies as required by CADA. Specifically, the court found that Scardina should have appealed the Commission's decision to close the administrative adjudication without issuing the required order. The court vacated the lower courts' decisions and dismissed the case, stating that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter. View "In re Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between ex-spouses Amanda Wynell Conners and Andrew Brian Conners over child support payments. The mother filed a motion for contempt of court, alleging that the father had not made the required payments. The district court issued a citation to show cause, and after unsuccessful attempts to personally serve the father, the mother requested permission to serve the contempt materials via email.The district court allowed the email service, which the father contested, arguing that it was inconsistent with the Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 107, which governs contempt proceedings in civil cases. The father then petitioned the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, challenging the district court's decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado held that the Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 107, as amended in 1995, does not permit a party to serve process for indirect contempt by email. The court further held that substituted service under Rule 4(f) is not permitted in contempt proceedings. The court made the rule to show cause absolute and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court clarified that Rule 107 governs all contempt proceedings, whether punitive or remedial, that arise out of an underlying case that is civil in nature. The court also held that email service does not satisfy Rule 107(c)’s requirements for physical service directly on the specific individual accused of contempt without any intermediate intervention. View "In Re the Marriage of Conners" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over water rights associated with the Green Mountain Reservoir in Colorado. The City of Golden (Golden) opposed the implementation of an administrative protocol (the Protocol) developed by the United States and other parties, arguing that it would injure its rights upstream of the reservoir. The water court granted the United States' motion for summary judgment, ruling that the Protocol is consistent with the Blue River Decree, a series of decrees and stipulations governing water rights in the area. Golden appealed this decision.Previously, the water court had ruled that an assessment of injury was not required in this case, as the United States was merely requesting confirmation that the Protocol was consistent with the existing Blue River Decree. The court also rejected Golden's claims that the Protocol contradicted language in the Blue River Decree requiring the "fair" and "equitable" treatment of all parties with interests in the Colorado-Big Thompson Project (CBT), a complex water diversion project.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed the water court's ruling. It held that the Protocol is consistent with the Blue River Decree and does not violate the prior appropriation doctrine, a principle of water law that gives priority to those who first used the water. The court also rejected Golden's procedural arguments regarding the water court's denial of its motion for reconsideration. View "City of Golden v. City of Aurora" on Justia Law

In this toxic tort action, the plaintiffs claimed they were exposed to a carcinogen emitted from a plant operated by the defendants, Terumo BCT, Inc. and Terumo BCT Sterilization Services, Inc. To support their claim, the plaintiffs' counsel provided an expert with a spreadsheet detailing where each plaintiff lived and worked and when. The defendants demanded that the plaintiffs produce not only the spreadsheet but also any communications between the plaintiffs and their counsel that contained the information used to create the spreadsheet. The plaintiffs objected, arguing that such communications were privileged and beyond the scope of disclosures required by C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2). The district court granted the defendants' request and ordered the plaintiffs to produce the information.The plaintiffs sought relief under C.A.R. 21, arguing that the district court erred in finding that the attorney-client privilege does not apply to protect a client’s confidential communications of facts to trial counsel and that the disclosure of the spreadsheet to the expert did not waive the privilege. The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado agreed with the plaintiffs, concluding that the district court erred in both respects. The court held that the attorney-client privilege does apply to protect a client’s confidential communications of facts to trial counsel and that the disclosure of the spreadsheet to the expert did not waive the privilege. The court made its rule to show cause absolute and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "In Re Jordan v. Terumo BCT" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the interpretation of Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), which allows trial courts to certify a ruling on a subset of claims as "final" for appeal purposes when there is "no just reason for delay." The dispute arose from a business relationship between Daniel Wolf and Michael J. Brenneman and Jeffrey B. Selby. After Wolf was acquitted of theft charges, he sued Brenneman and Selby for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, civil conspiracy, false imprisonment, and defamation. The trial court dismissed the first four claims, granting immunity to the defendants, and certified the dismissal for appeal under Rule 54(b).The court of appeals, following its previous decision in Allison v. Engel, ruled that the trial court had abused its discretion by certifying the claims under Rule 54(b) without demonstrating that a delay in appeal would cause hardship or injustice. The Allison decision had significantly narrowed the applicability of Rule 54(b), asserting that a trial court should only certify an issue for appeal under that rule if it could show that a delay in appeal would cause hardship or injustice that could only be alleviated by an immediate appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado disagreed with the court of appeals' interpretation of Rule 54(b). It emphasized that Rule 54(b) grants trial courts discretion to certify a ruling as final for appeal purposes when there is no just reason for delay. The Supreme Court overruled the court of appeals' decision in Allison v. Engel, stating that it had inappropriately narrowed the applicability of Rule 54(b). The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case back to the court of appeals to determine whether the trial court had abused its discretion by certifying Wolf's claims as final under Rule 54(b). View "Wolf v. Brenneman" on Justia Law