Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute between ex-spouses Amanda Wynell Conners and Andrew Brian Conners over child support payments. The mother filed a motion for contempt of court, alleging that the father had not made the required payments. The district court issued a citation to show cause, and after unsuccessful attempts to personally serve the father, the mother requested permission to serve the contempt materials via email.The district court allowed the email service, which the father contested, arguing that it was inconsistent with the Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 107, which governs contempt proceedings in civil cases. The father then petitioned the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado, challenging the district court's decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado held that the Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 107, as amended in 1995, does not permit a party to serve process for indirect contempt by email. The court further held that substituted service under Rule 4(f) is not permitted in contempt proceedings. The court made the rule to show cause absolute and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court clarified that Rule 107 governs all contempt proceedings, whether punitive or remedial, that arise out of an underlying case that is civil in nature. The court also held that email service does not satisfy Rule 107(c)’s requirements for physical service directly on the specific individual accused of contempt without any intermediate intervention. View "In Re the Marriage of Conners" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over water rights associated with the Green Mountain Reservoir in Colorado. The City of Golden (Golden) opposed the implementation of an administrative protocol (the Protocol) developed by the United States and other parties, arguing that it would injure its rights upstream of the reservoir. The water court granted the United States' motion for summary judgment, ruling that the Protocol is consistent with the Blue River Decree, a series of decrees and stipulations governing water rights in the area. Golden appealed this decision.Previously, the water court had ruled that an assessment of injury was not required in this case, as the United States was merely requesting confirmation that the Protocol was consistent with the existing Blue River Decree. The court also rejected Golden's claims that the Protocol contradicted language in the Blue River Decree requiring the "fair" and "equitable" treatment of all parties with interests in the Colorado-Big Thompson Project (CBT), a complex water diversion project.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado affirmed the water court's ruling. It held that the Protocol is consistent with the Blue River Decree and does not violate the prior appropriation doctrine, a principle of water law that gives priority to those who first used the water. The court also rejected Golden's procedural arguments regarding the water court's denial of its motion for reconsideration. View "City of Golden v. City of Aurora" on Justia Law

In this toxic tort action, the plaintiffs claimed they were exposed to a carcinogen emitted from a plant operated by the defendants, Terumo BCT, Inc. and Terumo BCT Sterilization Services, Inc. To support their claim, the plaintiffs' counsel provided an expert with a spreadsheet detailing where each plaintiff lived and worked and when. The defendants demanded that the plaintiffs produce not only the spreadsheet but also any communications between the plaintiffs and their counsel that contained the information used to create the spreadsheet. The plaintiffs objected, arguing that such communications were privileged and beyond the scope of disclosures required by C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2). The district court granted the defendants' request and ordered the plaintiffs to produce the information.The plaintiffs sought relief under C.A.R. 21, arguing that the district court erred in finding that the attorney-client privilege does not apply to protect a client’s confidential communications of facts to trial counsel and that the disclosure of the spreadsheet to the expert did not waive the privilege. The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado agreed with the plaintiffs, concluding that the district court erred in both respects. The court held that the attorney-client privilege does apply to protect a client’s confidential communications of facts to trial counsel and that the disclosure of the spreadsheet to the expert did not waive the privilege. The court made its rule to show cause absolute and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "In Re Jordan v. Terumo BCT" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the interpretation of Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), which allows trial courts to certify a ruling on a subset of claims as "final" for appeal purposes when there is "no just reason for delay." The dispute arose from a business relationship between Daniel Wolf and Michael J. Brenneman and Jeffrey B. Selby. After Wolf was acquitted of theft charges, he sued Brenneman and Selby for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, civil conspiracy, false imprisonment, and defamation. The trial court dismissed the first four claims, granting immunity to the defendants, and certified the dismissal for appeal under Rule 54(b).The court of appeals, following its previous decision in Allison v. Engel, ruled that the trial court had abused its discretion by certifying the claims under Rule 54(b) without demonstrating that a delay in appeal would cause hardship or injustice. The Allison decision had significantly narrowed the applicability of Rule 54(b), asserting that a trial court should only certify an issue for appeal under that rule if it could show that a delay in appeal would cause hardship or injustice that could only be alleviated by an immediate appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado disagreed with the court of appeals' interpretation of Rule 54(b). It emphasized that Rule 54(b) grants trial courts discretion to certify a ruling as final for appeal purposes when there is no just reason for delay. The Supreme Court overruled the court of appeals' decision in Allison v. Engel, stating that it had inappropriately narrowed the applicability of Rule 54(b). The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case back to the court of appeals to determine whether the trial court had abused its discretion by certifying Wolf's claims as final under Rule 54(b). View "Wolf v. Brenneman" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the dissolution of a marriage between Barbara Henderson Green and Jeffry Howard Green. The couple was married in Connecticut in 1982 and lived in Nebraska for most of their marriage. In 2018, Mrs. Green moved to Colorado to assist their pregnant daughter, while Mr. Green remained in Nebraska. The Greens purchased two houses in Denver, one for themselves and one for their daughter. Mr. Green financially supported Mrs. Green from Nebraska and listed one of the Denver houses as an asset on his personal financial statements. In 2021, Mr. Green took out a loan secured by a mortgage on their Denver house, stating that his Nebraska home was his former residence and the Denver house was his primary residence. However, he continued to live in Nebraska. In 2022, both Mr. and Mrs. Green filed for divorce in separate jurisdictions—Mrs. Green in Colorado and Mr. Green in Nebraska.The Colorado trial court found that Mr. Green had the requisite minimum contacts to be subject to general personal jurisdiction in Colorado. This decision was largely based on Mr. Green's assertion that the Denver house was his primary residence when he applied for a loan. The court concluded that Mr. Green's continuing financial obligations in Colorado meant that he could reasonably anticipate being haled into court there, and thus it denied his motion to dismiss.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reviewed the case and held that for a court to exercise general personal jurisdiction over an individual, the individual must be domiciled within the state. The court found that Mr. Green was not domiciled in Colorado and therefore was not subject to general personal jurisdiction there. The court made the rule to show cause absolute and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re the Marriage of Green" on Justia Law

In November 2015, Mark Kinslow hit Daniala Mohammadi with his car while she was riding her bicycle. Mohammadi, who was a minor at the time of the accident, sued Kinslow in December 2019, more than two years but less than three years after she turned eighteen. Kinslow moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that the statute of limitations had expired two years after Mohammadi’s eighteenth birthday. Mohammadi countered that the usual three-year statute of limitations for motor vehicle accidents had not started to run until her eighteenth birthday.The trial court granted Kinslow’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Mohammadi was required to bring her claim either within three years of the incident, or within two years after she turned eighteen. The court of appeals reversed this decision, agreeing with Mohammadi and concluding that it was bound by decisions of the Supreme Court of Colorado providing that statutes of limitations are “tolled” for claims by a minor plaintiff until the minor turns eighteen.The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado reversed the court of appeals' decision. The court concluded that the plain language of section 13-81-103(1)(c), C.R.S. (2023), gives a plaintiff who turns eighteen within the three-year limitation period for a motor vehicle accident a statute of limitations that is the longer of (1) the full three years normally accorded an accident victim, or (2) two years from their eighteenth birthday. For Mohammadi, this meant that she was required to bring her claim by January 1, 2019—two years after she turned eighteen. Because her suit was filed after that date, it was untimely. The court remanded the case with instructions to dismiss. View "Kinslow v. Mohammadi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado has ruled that the notice-prejudice rule applies to occurrence-based, first-party homeowners’ property insurance policies. This rule allows insurance companies to deny coverage based on late notice of a claim only if they can prove they were prejudiced by the delay. The court reached this conclusion after exploring the differences between occurrence policies and claims-made policies, asserting that applying the rule to the former was consistent with precedent. The court's decision was based on three policy considerations: the adhesive nature of insurance contracts, the public policy of compensating victims, and the unfairness of granting the insurer a windfall due to a technicality. This case involved two homeowners, Karyn Gregory and Lisa and Sylvan Runkel, who had filed claims for hail damage to their homes. The insurance companies denied their claims on the grounds that they were filed too late. The court reversed the judgments of the lower courts and remanded the cases for further proceedings, with instructions to allow the insurers an opportunity to establish prejudice from the late notice. View "Gregory v. Safeco Insurance Company of America" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Colorado considered a petition from GHP Horwath, P.C., Nadine Pietrowski, Bohn Aguilar, LLC, Michael G. Bohn, and Armando Y. Aguilar, asking the court to permanently enjoin Nina H. Kazazian from proceeding pro se in Colorado state courts. Over the past eleven years, Kazazian, a pro se litigant and former attorney, had initiated at least ten lawsuits and twice as many appeals, most of which were found to be duplicative, meritless, or frivolous. Her actions led to her disbarment and multiple sanctions. The court noted that while every person has the right to access Colorado courts, this right is not absolute and may be curtailed when a pro se party persistently disrupts judicial administration by filing meritless and duplicative claims. The court found that Kazazian's actions placed a strain on judicial resources and were harmful to the public interest. Therefore, the court granted the petitioners' requested relief and ordered that Kazazian be permanently enjoined from proceeding pro se in Colorado state courts. View "GHP Horwath, P.C. v. Kazazian" on Justia Law

In a dispute between Adams County and the City and County of Denver over the use of a noise-modeling system instead of a noise-monitoring system at Denver International Airport, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that Adams County's breach-of-contract claim, brought in 2018, was barred by the statute of limitations. The court found that the claim accrued no later than 1995, when Adams County became aware of Denver's breach of their contract by using a noise-modeling system. The court concluded that under Colorado law, a breach-of-contract claim accrues at the time the breach is discovered or should have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence. The court dismissed the argument that the claim only accrued when Adams County became aware of the full extent of its damages and had certainty of harm and incentive to sue in 2014. View "City & County of Denver v. Board of County Commissioners" on Justia Law

The Washington County Department of Human Services (“WCDHS”) and the Board of County Commissioners of Washington County (“the Board”)—collectively, Washington County, contended a Colorado district court erred when it failed to adhere to Colorado v. Madera, 112 P.3d 688 (Colo. 2005) in granting Father’s request for an in camera review of documents that were allegedly protected by the attorney-client privilege. The district court and Father countered that Madera was inapposite and that the challenged ruling was free of error because it is consistent with the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in Alcon v. Spicer, 113 P.3d 735 (Colo. 2005). The issue this case presented was whether Madera or Alcon, issued six days apart in the spring of 2005, controlled in this case. Here, in response to a subpoena duces tecum served by Father, Washington County provided a privilege log listing documents allegedly protected by the attorney-client privilege. After reviewing the log, Father insisted the privilege did not apply, and the parties were unable to resolve their dispute informally. Consequently, Father asked the district court to conduct an in camera inspection of the documents identified in the log. Because the log provided vague descriptions of the withheld documents, the district court could not assess Washington County’s claim of privilege. It thus granted Father’s request for an in camera review. In doing so, the district court neither made Madera’s required findings nor employed Madera’s analytical framework. Washington County argued the district court’s failure to conform to Madera rendered the in camera order faulty. But the district court and Father responded that Madera didn't apply. Instead, they maintained, Alcon applied. The Supreme Court concluded the district court correctly followed Alcon, not Madera, in this case. And the Court further concluded that, consistent with Alcon, the court correctly granted Father’s request for an in camera review because Washington County’s log did not permit an assessment of the claim of privilege. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In Re Colorado in interest of children and concerning J.L.M. and J.P." on Justia Law