Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Danielle Nicola suffered severe brain trauma after being struck by a car while crossing a street at night in Grand Junction, Colorado. She remained unconscious and died nineteen days after the accident. No conservator or guardian was appointed for her during the period between the accident and her death. Nearly two years after Danielle’s death, her father, John Nicola, acting as the personal representative of her estate, filed survival claims against the City of Grand Junction and Public Service Company of Colorado, alleging negligence and premises liability due to faulty street lighting and inadequate signage at the accident site.The District Court for Mesa County dismissed Nicola’s claims, determining they were untimely under section 13-81-103(1)(b), which requires survival claims for persons under disability to be brought within one year of their death. Nicola appealed, and the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, holding that subsection (1)(b) applied only when a person under disability had a legal representative and died after the expiration of the statute of limitations but less than two years after the representative was appointed. The Court of Appeals concluded that, since Danielle had no legal representative, the one-year limitation did not apply, and Nicola’s claims were timely under the general limitations provision for survival actions.The Supreme Court of Colorado granted certiorari and reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Supreme Court held that section 13-81-103(1)(b) applies regardless of whether a legal representative was appointed, and that the phrase “the expiration of the period of limitation in [subsection (1)(a)]” refers to the applicable statute of limitations or any extended period if a legal representative was appointed. Because Nicola filed the claims almost two years after Danielle’s death, the claims were barred by the one-year limitation in subsection (1)(b). The Supreme Court remanded the case for reinstatement of the district court’s dismissal and determination of attorney fees. View "City of Grand Junction & Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Nicola" on Justia Law

A quasi-municipal corporation sought to exercise eminent domain to condemn easements over two private roads owned by a community association. The entity seeking condemnation owns a parcel of land known as the Homestead Parcel and needed access across the association’s roads. The association opposed immediate possession and, prior to the scheduled possession hearing, requested limited and expedited prehearing discovery, arguing it was necessary to prepare its opposition.The District Court for Douglas County denied the association’s motion for discovery. The court reasoned that neither the relevant eminent domain statutes nor the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure permitted prehearing discovery in condemnation cases. It held that, because such proceedings do not require responsive pleadings, the case could never be “at issue” under the Rules, and therefore discovery was not permitted. The association then sought relief under Colorado Appellate Rule 21, which allows for extraordinary review.The Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc, exercised its original jurisdiction and reviewed the trial court’s interpretation of both the statutes and the Rules. The Supreme Court held that while the statutes do not explicitly provide for discovery, they also do not restrict it. The Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure—specifically Rules 26(d), 26(b)(2), and 16(b)(1)—grant trial courts discretion to authorize discovery, including before a case is formally “at issue,” if the court so directs. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred by finding it lacked authority to order discovery and by not recognizing its discretion under the Rules. The Supreme Court made the order to show cause absolute and remanded to the district court to exercise its discretion in ruling on the association’s discovery request. View "Arrowhead Colo. Metro. Dist. v. Roxborough Park Found." on Justia Law

E.B., an adult with cognitive impairment, blindness, and mobility limitations, regularly used a taxi service operated by MKBS, LLC for transportation. Jesus Manuel Ortiz was her regular driver for a period and was accused of sexually assaulting her during one trip. E.B.’s legal guardian, J.B., brought civil claims against both Ortiz and MKBS. While MKBS timely denied the allegations, Ortiz did not respond, leading to a clerk’s entry of default against him. J.B. did not seek a default judgment against Ortiz until nearly two years later, after the civil trial against MKBS.During the trial against MKBS in the Colorado District Court, Ortiz was permitted to testify as a witness, denying the assault. The jury found in favor of MKBS, determining Ortiz had not assaulted E.B. and that E.B. suffered no injuries or damages. Subsequently, J.B. moved for a default judgment against Ortiz, which the district court granted. Ortiz then moved to set aside the default, arguing excusable neglect, and the district court granted his motion. Ortiz, now represented, moved for entry of judgment in his favor, which the district court also granted, relying on the jury verdict from the MKBS trial. J.B. appealed, and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decisions.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by (1) allowing Ortiz to testify at MKBS’s trial despite his default, (2) setting aside the default judgment against Ortiz based on excusable neglect, and (3) entering judgment in Ortiz’s favor to avoid inconsistent outcomes given the jury’s findings. The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "J.B. v. MKBS, LLC" on Justia Law

This case centers on a car accident between an insured driver, Ortiz, and an uninsured motorist, Camacho, in Colorado. At the time of the collision, Camacho lacked insurance, drove with only a learner’s permit, and was unsupervised. Ortiz, insured by Progressive Direct Insurance Company, sought uninsured motorist (UM) benefits from Progressive after the accident. Progressive denied the claim, asserting Ortiz was more than 50% at fault. Ortiz then sued both Camacho for negligence and Progressive for breach of contract, insurance bad faith, and unreasonable delay and denial of benefits.Camacho did not respond to the lawsuit, leading the District Court for Garfield County to enter a clerk’s default against her. Progressive had been served but did not object at that time. Progressive’s answer to Ortiz’s complaint included general affirmative defenses but did not specifically assert comparative fault. After Ortiz moved for partial summary judgment, Progressive, for the first time, sought to participate in the liability and damages components of the default judgment hearing. The district court permitted Progressive to contest damages but barred it from contesting liability, finding Progressive had not timely or specifically pleaded its legitimate defenses as required under State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Brekke, 105 P.3d 177 (Colo. 2004). Progressive paid the damages awarded in the default judgment and then proceeded to trial on Ortiz’s bad faith claims, where Ortiz prevailed.On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision, holding Progressive failed to meet the Brekke standards for timely and particularized pleading of its legitimate defenses. The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed whether Brekke’s requirements should be reconsidered. The Court clarified that pleading with particularity under Rule 9(b) is only necessary if fraud or mistake is asserted, and otherwise, insurers must plead legitimate defenses specifically and as soon as practicable. The Court affirmed the appellate judgment, reaffirming Brekke and declining to overrule it. View "Progressive Direct Ins. Co. v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

The case concerns an individual who was injured after tripping over the base of a removed bus stop sign on a public sidewalk in Manitou Springs, Colorado, on August 26, 2021. The injured party promptly notified Manitou Springs of her injury as required by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), which mandates notice to the liable public entity within 182 days of discovering the injury. Manitou Springs did not disclose its lack of responsibility for the sidewalk until April 2023, well after the statutory period had expired, when it told the claimant that Colorado Springs was responsible under an intergovernmental agreement. The claimant then notified Colorado Springs forty days later, but this notice was well outside the 182-day window.After the claimant brought suit against both cities for premises liability and negligence, Colorado Springs moved to dismiss, arguing that the notice was untimely under the CGIA and that equitable defenses were unavailable. The District Court denied this motion, holding that the notice period should have started when the claimant learned of Colorado Springs’ potential liability, not on the date of injury. The District Court reasoned that the claimant could not have known about the intergovernmental agreement without disclosure from Manitou Springs and thus had acted diligently.The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the CGIA’s 182-day notice period is jurisdictional, cannot be tolled or waived, and begins when the injury is discovered, regardless of knowledge of the liable public entity. The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed this judgment, holding that strict compliance with the notice provision was required and that the notice period began on the date of injury. Because the claimant’s notice to Colorado Springs was untimely, dismissal was required. View "Mostellar v. City of Colo. Springs" on Justia Law

A group of shareholders brought a class action against a telecommunications company and its executives, alleging violations of securities laws related to the company’s merger with another entity. The plaintiffs claimed that the registration statement and prospectus for the merger contained false statements and omitted material facts about illegal billing practices known as “cramming,” which they argued were widespread, known to senior management, and impacted the company’s financial performance. The amended complaint incorporated allegations and statements made by confidential witnesses and public filings from related lawsuits, as well as affidavits from other cases, all supporting the claim of pervasive cramming practices.Initially, the Boulder County District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to plead material misrepresentations or omissions with particularity and denied leave to amend. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed in part but reversed the denial of leave to amend the omissions claim based on the cramming theory, instructing that any borrowed allegations must be pleaded as facts after reasonable inquiry as required by C.R.C.P. 11. After the plaintiff amended the complaint, the district court dismissed it again, concluding that the plaintiff’s counsel had not satisfied the requirement to conduct a reasonable inquiry, as the complaint relied on allegations from other lawsuits without direct verification from the original sources or witnesses.The Colorado Supreme Court, en banc, reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ reversal. The Supreme Court held that under C.R.C.P. 11(a), counsel must conduct a sufficient investigation to support allegations, at least on information and belief, but the extent of the required investigation is fact-dependent. Copying allegations from related complaints does not alone violate Rule 11 provided counsel’s inquiry is objectively reasonable in context. The Court found that the plaintiff’s counsel had met this standard and affirmed the judgment below. View "CenturyLink, Inc. v. Houser" on Justia Law

This case concerns requests made by two media organizations to the Colorado Department of Human Services (CDHS) for information about the number of child abuse or neglect reports made from three state-funded residential child care facilities (RCCFs) over a three-year period, and how many were screened for investigation. CDHS denied the requests, asserting that providing the facility-specific numbers would violate the confidentiality provisions of the Colorado Children's Code Records and Information Act, specifically section 19-1-307(1)(a), which protects the name, address, and other identifying information of any child, family, or informant in such reports. The media organizations declined CDHS's offer to provide aggregate numbers for all three facilities combined and sued for disclosure of the per-facility data under the Colorado Open Records Act (CORA).The Denver District Court agreed with CDHS, holding that subsection (1)(a) barred disclosure of the requested information, as it would necessarily identify the addresses involved in the reports. On appeal, a divided panel of the Colorado Court of Appeals found the statute ambiguous and, after considering legislative history and potential constitutional issues, determined that only information that constitutes "identifying information" is protected. The appellate court remanded the case to the district court to determine if the requested disclosures would reveal identifying information.On review, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that section 19-1-307(1)(a) is unambiguous and extends confidentiality to all names and addresses of children, families, or informants in reports of child abuse or neglect, as well as any other identifying information. However, the court found that CDHS failed to demonstrate that disclosing the requested six numbers would reveal protected information, as the RCCFs' addresses are already public. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and ordered disclosure of the six numbers. View "Brubaker v. Colo. Sun & Tegna" on Justia Law

After her criminal charge for false reporting was dismissed, Rebeca Hinds filed a civil complaint in county court against Corrine Foreman, alleging that Foreman knowingly made false and defamatory statements to law enforcement, which led to Hinds being charged. Foreman responded by filing a special motion to dismiss under Colorado's anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that her statements to police were protected as they related to a public issue and were made in an official proceeding. The county court found that while Hinds met her burden to show the statements’ falsity, she failed to provide sufficient evidence of actual malice. The court granted Foreman's motion to dismiss, entered a final judgment dismissing the case with prejudice, and awarded Foreman fees and costs.Hinds appealed the county court’s judgment to the Colorado Court of Appeals, relying on statutory provisions that appeared to authorize appeals of anti-SLAPP dismissals directly to that court. The Court of Appeals noted a jurisdictional issue because the Colorado Constitution and relevant statutes generally require appeals from county courts’ final judgments to be made to the district court or the Colorado Supreme Court, not the Court of Appeals. The division requested a determination of jurisdiction from the Supreme Court of Colorado.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that the statutes authorizing the Court of Appeals to review final judgments from county courts in anti-SLAPP cases are unconstitutional to the extent they conflict with article VI, section 17 of the Colorado Constitution. The court ruled that appellate review of a county court’s final judgment must be by the district court or the Supreme Court, not the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and granted Hinds leave to refile her appeal out of time in district court. View "Hinds v. Foreman" on Justia Law

Several newly elected members joined a school district’s board of education in late 2021. Their priority was to make Merit Academy a charter school within the district. After previous unsuccessful attempts, the board moved forward with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to streamline the process. The agenda for the January 26, 2022, meeting where the MOU was discussed did not clearly indicate this topic, being labeled only as "BOARD HOUSEKEEPING." The board approved the MOU at this meeting. Subsequent meetings in February and April further addressed the MOU, with the April meeting involving a detailed discussion and statements from each board member.After the January meeting, a community member, Erin O’Connell, filed suit alleging a violation of Colorado’s Open Meetings Law (COML) due to insufficient public notice. The District Court initially granted an injunction requiring the board to provide clearer agendas. Later, upon summary judgment, the District Court found that the board cured the COML violation at the April meeting, which was properly noticed and involved substantive reconsideration. The court held O’Connell was not a prevailing party and denied her request for attorney fees.On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed most of the district court’s rulings. It upheld the “cure doctrine,” allowing public bodies to remedy prior open meetings violations by holding a subsequent compliant meeting, provided it is not a mere “rubber stamp.” The Court of Appeals also found that the doctrine does not distinguish between intentional and unintentional violations and that the April meeting cured the earlier violation. It denied O’Connell costs and attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed that the cure doctrine is consistent with the COML and longstanding precedent, and applies regardless of the violation’s intent. However, it reversed regarding attorney fees, holding that because O’Connell proved a violation that was not cured until after suit was filed, she is the prevailing party and entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees. The case was remanded for determination and award of such fees. View "O'Connell v. Woodland Park Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

After a ranch was divided into two parcels, the owners of each parcel continued to share irrigation ditches and granted each other easements for water conveyance. In recent years, cooperation between the parties deteriorated, leading to disputes over water usage. The plaintiffs, who own one parcel, alleged that the defendant, owner of the other parcel, had diverted more water than entitled, causing excess runoff and flooding on their land. The plaintiffs claimed violations of Colorado statutes relating to waste of water, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and asserted trespass and nuisance claims. The parties also disputed the scope of the plaintiffs' easement in one of the ditches.The District Court for Water Division 5 found in favor of the plaintiffs on their statutory, trespass, and nuisance claims, concluding that the defendant had diverted excess water, wasted water in violation of statutes, and caused flooding. The court awarded nominal damages, attorney fees under section 37-84-125, and issued an injunction restricting the defendant's ability to divert water in excess of its decreed rights. The court also recognized plaintiffs' easement rights but declined to specify the extent of the easement in the Lower Gaskill Ditch, since that issue was not properly raised at trial.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a claim for a declaration of waste, that section 37-84-108 does not create a private right of action, and that sections 37-84-124 and -125 do not apply to injuries from excess irrigation runoff or flooding. The court ruled the water court lacked ancillary jurisdiction over the related trespass and nuisance claims and that the injunction must be vacated. The court affirmed the water court's refusal to address the scope of the Lower Gaskill Ditch easement, reversed the judgment on all waste, flooding, trespass, nuisance, and related injunctive claims, and remanded with instructions to dismiss those claims. View "Byers Peak Properties v. Byers Peak Land & Cattle, LLC" on Justia Law