Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In case no. 1120010, CVS Caremark Corporation; American International Group, Inc.; National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA; AIG Technical Services, Inc.; and American International Specialty Lines Insurance Company appealed a trial court order certifying as a class action the fraud claims asserted by plaintiffs John Lauriello; James O. Finney, Jr.; Sam Johnson; and the City of Birmingham Retirement and Relief System. In case no. 1120114, the plaintiffs cross-appealed the same class-certification order, alleging that, though class treatment was appropriate, the trial court erred in certifying the class as an "opt-out" class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., rather than a "mandatory" class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P. Finding no reversible error in either case, the Supreme Court affirmed in both.View "John Lauriello et al. v. CVS Caremark Corporation et al. " on Justia Law

The purported class action against Apple alleged: violations of Business and Professions Code sections 17200, 17500; breach of express warranty; violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civ. Code 1792); negligence; negligent misrepresentation; and unjust enrichment. The complaint alleges that Apple falsely represented the iPhone 3G to be “twice as fast” as the previous version of the iPhone and that the problems with the iPhone 3G are not related to the ATTM network, but with the device itself.” The lawsuit was preceded by federal litigation, raising similar but not identical claims. In 2009, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) transferred the actions to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The district court dismissed, for failure to join AT&T Mobility—the cellular network carrier for the iPhone 3G—as a necessary party under Code of Civil Procedure section 389, subdivision (a). Based on that decision, the California trial court dismissed. The appeals court reversed, finding that ATTM is not a necessary party.View "Van Zant v. Apple, Inc." on Justia Law

Named plaintiffs, former FedEx drivers, represented two classes of plaintiffs comprising approximately 363 individuals who were full-time delivery drivers for FedEx in Oregon at any time between 1999 and 2009. Plaintiff class members worked for FedEx's two operating divisions, FedEx Ground and FedEx Home Delivery. FedEx contended its drivers were independent contractors under Oregon law. Plaintiffs contended they were employees. In a consolidated appeal, plaintiffs claimed that "FedEx improperly classified its drivers as independent contractors, thereby forcing them to incur business expenses and depriving them of benefits otherwise owed to employees" under Oregon law. The Ninth Circuit agreed with plaintiffs, and reversed the Multidistrict Litigation Court's grant of summary judgment to FedEx Ground, its denial of plaintiff FedEx drivers' motion for partial summary judgment, and its certification of plaintiffs' classes insofar as they sought prospective relief. View "Slayman, et al v. FedEx Ground Package System" on Justia Law

The named plaintiffs represented a class comprising approximately 2300 individuals who were full-time delivery drivers for FedEx in California between 2000 and 2007. FedEx contended its drivers were independent contractors under California law. Plaintiffs contended they were employees. This appeal involved a class action originally filed in the California Superior Court in December 2005 on behalf of a class of California FedEx drivers, asserting claims for employment expenses and unpaid wages under the California Labor Code on the ground that FedEx had improperly classified the drivers as independent contractors. Plaintiffs also brought claims under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), which similarly turned on the drivers' employment status. FedEx removed to the Northern District of California based on diversity. Between 2003 and 2009, similar cases were filed against FedEx in approximately forty states. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated these FedEx cases for multidistrict litigation ("MDL") proceedings in the District Court for the Northern District of Indiana ("the MDL Court"). Plaintiffs moved for class certification. The MDL Court certified a class for plaintiffs' claims under California law. It declined to certify plaintiffs' proposed national FMLA class. Plaintiffs in all the MDL cases moved for partial summary judgment, seeking to establish their status as employees as a matter of law. In this case, FedEx cross-moved for summary judgment. The MDL Court denied nearly all of the MDL plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment and granted nearly all of FedEx's motions, holding that plaintiffs were independent contractors as a matter of law in each state where employment status was governed by common-law agency principles. The MDL Court remanded this case to the district court to resolve the drivers' claims under the FMLA. Those claims were settled, and the district court entered final judgment. Plaintiffs appealed, challenging the MDL Court's grant of summary judgment to FedEx on the employment status issue. FedEx conditionally cross-appealed, arguing that if we reverse the MDL Court's grant of summary judgment to FedEx, we should also reverse the MDL Court's class certification decision. Upon review, the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs were employees as a matter of law under California's right-to-control test. Accordingly, the Court reversed both the MDL Court's grant of summary judgment to FedEx and its denial of plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to enter summary judgment for plaintiffs on the question of employment status. View "Alexander, et al v. FedEx Ground Package System" on Justia Law

Lucky filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the Superior Court's decision to decline to appoint a temporary judge for the purpose of ruling on motions for preliminary and final approval of a settlement. The court concluded that the California Constitution, the California Rules of Court, and public policy concerns preclude the appointment of a temporary judge for purposes of approving the settlement of a pre-certification class action. When the class had not yet been certified, the putative class representative has no authority to consent to a temporary judge on behalf of the absent putative class members. Therefore, the court denied the writ petition.View "Luckey v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Illinois insurance regulators permitted WellPoint to acquire RightCHOICE health insurance. WellPoint caused RightCHOICE Insurance to withdraw from the Illinois market. WellPoint offered the policyholders costlier UniCare policies as substitutes. Those who chose not to pay the higher premiums had to shop for policies from different insurers, which generally declined to cover pre-existing conditions. Former RightCHOICE policyholders filed a purported class action. The district court declined to certify a class and entered judgment against plaintiffs on the merits. No one appealed. Absent certification as a class action, the judgment bound only the named plaintiffs. Their law firm found other former policyholders and sued in state court. Defendants removed the suit under 28 U.S.C. 1453 (Class Action Fairness Act); the proposed class had at least 100 members, the amount in controversy exceeded $5 million, and at least one class member had citizenship different from at least one defendant. Plaintiffs sought remand under section 1332(d)(4), which says that the court shall “decline to exercise” jurisdiction if at least two-thirds of the class’s members are citizens of the state in which the suit began and at least one defendant from which “significant relief” is sought is a citizen of the same state. The district court declined remand, declined to certify a class, and again rejected the case on the merits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that “Counsel should thank their lucky stars that the district court did not sanction them under 28 U.S.C. 1927 for filing a second suit rather than pursuing the first through appeal." View "Phillips v. Wellpoint Inc." on Justia Law

A group of employees filed class and collective actions against Tyson Foods, Inc., seeking unpaid wages for time spent on pre- and post-shift activities. After the employees obtained a sizeable verdict and fee award, Tyson unsuccessfully moved for judgment as a matter of law. On appeal, Tyson: (1) challenged the judgment and denial of the motion for judgment as a matter of law; and (2) argued the fee award was excessive. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded, after review, that plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence of undercompensation and the district court acted within its discretion in setting the fee award. View "Garcia, et al v. Tyson Foods, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Richard Salzer received medical care at an SSM Healthcare of Oklahoma (SSM) facility for injuries he sustained in an accident. At the time of his treatment, he had a health insurance plan (the "Plan"). Salzer entered into a contract with SSM to receive its services (the "Hospital Services Agreement"), under which he "authorized disclosure of [his] medical information for billing purposes and authorized [his] health insurance company to pay." SSM had an existing contract with Salzer's health insurance company (the "Provider Agreement") which required SSM to submit covered medical charges to Salzer's insurance company and accept discounted payment from the insurer. Although the Provider Agreement prohibited SSM from seeking payment for a covered charge from Salzer, SSM sought the non-discounted amount directly from him. Salzer sued SSM alleging breach of contract and other state law claims based on SSM's attempt to collect payment for medical care from Salzer instead of his health insurance company. SSM removed the case to federal district court. Salzer challenged the district court's denial of his motion to remand based on its determination that his claims were completely preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "Salzer v. SSM Health Care of Oklahoma" on Justia Law

Eight African-American Secret Service agents were certified by the district court to sue the Secretary on behalf of a class comprising of all similarly situated agents who were denied promotions to the GS-14 and GS-15 level. The government sought interlocutory review of the class certification order under Rule 23(f). The court concluded that none of the district court's rulings in support of its order certifying the plaintiff class is foreclosed by controlling precedent and the unsettled questions are not likely to evade end-of-the-case review. Accordingly, the court declined to review the district court's order. View "In re: Jeh Johnson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Mellon, seeking to represent a class of Arkansas homeowners facing non-judicial foreclosures by Mellon. After plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion to remand to state court and then granted Mellon's motion to dismiss, the district court awarded Mellon costs despite Mellon's failure to file a verified affidavit substantiating the costs. The court concluded that 28 U.S.C. 1453(c)(1)'s one-year removal limitation is inapplicable in this case based on 28 U.S.C. 1453(b). Therefore, Mellon was not required to remove this class action within one year of plaintiff's original complaint. Because the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, the only named plaintiff was a citizen of Arkansas at the time of commencement and removal, and no defendant is a citizen of Arkansas, this class action falls within the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 1332(a). Plaintiff's challenge to the district court's dismissal of his complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) was foreclosed by the court's decision in Rivera v. JPMorgan Chase Bank. Finally, the district court legally erred in awarding costs to Mellon where Mellon provided no affidavit substantiating the costs. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of plaintiff's motion to remand and dismiss the case, but reversed the award of costs and remanded with instructions. View "Reece v. Bank of New York Mellon" on Justia Law