Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The Fifth Circuit reversed and vacated the district court's order denying vacatur of sealing orders. The court held that the decision denying vacatur of the sealing orders is appealable under the collateral order doctrine, because the decision is conclusive; the decision addresses important and unsettled questions of law concerning the Louisiana Public Records Law and appellants' First Amendment and common law rights to access settlement agreement information contained in a sealed court recording and sealed minutes, particularly where a minor's privacy interests are involved; the subject of the decision is completely separable from the merits of the litigation; and the decision would be effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment.On the merits, the court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying appellants' motion for vacatur by relying on erroneous conclusions of law and misapplying the law to the facts. In this case, the settlement agreement involves public officials or parties of a public nature and matters of legitimate public concern, and it does not appear that the district court weighed as a factor in favor of disclosure the presumption of the public's right of access. View "Bradley v. Ackal" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, current and former inmates of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC), have been diagnosed with hepatitis C. They filed suit against IDOC, Wexford (which provides inmate health services) and doctors more than 10 years ago after fruitless efforts to receive treatment for their disease while incarcerated. Their 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint alleges that the diagnostic and treatment protocols for IDOC inmates with hepatitis C violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.The Seventh Circuit reversed the grant of class certification and vacated a preliminary injunction. After discussing numerosity and commonality of facts and issues, the court noted that the district court failed to name a class representative or explain its omission, leaving no way to assess the adequacy of representation. On the assumption that the court would have accepted the proposed representatives, the record does not reveal whether they would be adequate. The lack of a named representative also makes it impossible to find typicality--that the “claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” The individual plaintiffs have not shown that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm absent the preliminary injunction, so it was error to grant injunctive relief. View "Orr v. Shicker" on Justia Law

Aliens who lived in the U.S. committed drug crimes and were ordered removed. Neither moved to reopen his removal proceedings within 90 days, 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). Each later unsuccessfully asked the Board of Immigration Appeals to reopen their removal proceedings, arguing equitable tolling. Both had become eligible for discretionary relief based on judicial and Board decisions years after their removal. The Fifth Circuit denied their requests for review, holding that under the Limited Review Provision, 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(D), it could consider only only “constitutional claims or questions of law.”The Supreme Court vacated. The Provision’s phrase “questions of law” includes the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts. The Fifth Circuit had jurisdiction to consider claims of due diligence for equitable tolling purposes. A strong presumption favors judicial review of administrative action and a contrary interpretation of “questions of law” would result in a barrier to meaningful judicial review. The Provision’s statutory context, history, and precedent contradict the government’s claim that “questions of law” excludes the application of the law to settled facts. Congress has consolidated virtually all review of removal orders in one proceeding in the courts of appeals; the statutory history suggests it sought an “adequate substitute” for habeas review. If “questions of law” in the Provision does not include the misapplication of a legal standard to undisputed facts, then review would not include an element that was traditionally reviewable in habeas proceedings. View "Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr" on Justia Law

ESN, an African-American-owned television-network operator, sought to have cable television conglomerate Comcast carry its channels. Comcast refused, citing lack of demand, bandwidth constraints, and a preference for different programming. ESN alleged that Comcast violated 42 U.S.C. 1981, which guarantees “[a]ll persons . . . the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit, holding that ESN needed only to plead facts plausibly showing that race played “some role” in the decision-making process.The Supreme Court vacated. A section 1981 plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the plaintiff’s race was a but-for cause of its injury; that burden remains constant over the life of the lawsuit. The statute’s text suggests but-for causation and does not suggest that the test should be different in the face of a motion to dismiss. When the “motivating factor” test was added to Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress also amended section 1981 without mentioning “motivating factors.” The burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas provides no support for the reading ESN seeks. The court of appeals should determine how ESN’s amended complaint fares under the proper standard. View "Comcast Corp. v. National Association of African-American Owned Media" on Justia Law

Bennett was assigned to Cook County Jail Division 10, which houses detainees who need canes, crutches, or walkers. He filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12131–34, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.794, alleging that Division 10 lacks grab bars and other necessary fixtures. Bennett claims that he fell and was injured. He unsuccessfully sought to represent a class. The court reasoned that the appropriate accommodation of any detainee’s situation depends on personal characteristics, so common questions do not predominate under FRCP 23(b)(3). Bennett proposed an alternative class to avoid person-specific questions, contending that Division 10, which was constructed in 1992, violates 28 C.F.R. 42.522(b)'s requirement that as of “1988 … construction[] or alteration of buildings” must comply with the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards. The Standards require accessible toilets to have grab bars nearby and accessible showers to have mounted seats. The district court rejected this proposal, reasoning that to determine whether the Structural Standards control, thereby mooting the reasonable accommodation inquiry, would require a ruling on the merits, which would “run[] afoul of the rule against one-way intervention.”The Seventh Circuit vacated. The "view that a class cannot be certified unless the plaintiff has already prevailed on the central legal issue is a formula for one-way intervention rather than a means to avoid it." Bennett proposes a class that will win if the Standards apply and were violated, to detainees’ detriment and otherwise will lose. View "Bennett v. Dart" on Justia Law

Petitioner Christynne Lili Wrene Wood contacted the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) to report alleged gender discrimination by her Crunch fitness club, which was owned and operated by CFG Jamacha, LLC and John Romeo (collectively, Crunch). After an investigation, DFEH filed a lawsuit against Crunch alleging unlawful discrimination on the basis of gender identity or expression (Wood intervened as a plaintiff in the lawsuit). During discovery, Crunch requested that Wood produce all communications with DFEH relating to Crunch. As relevant here, Wood refused to produce one such communication, a prelitigation email she sent to DFEH lawyers regarding her DFEH complaint, on the grounds of attorney-client privilege. Crunch moved to compel production of the email, and the trial court granted the motion. Wood petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate, arguing the trial court erred by overruling her objection based on the attorney-client privilege and compelling production of the email. The Court summarily denied the petition. The California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the matter back to the appellate court with directions "to vacate [our] order denying mandate and to issue an order directing the superior court to show cause why the relief sought in the petition should not be granted." The Court of Appeal issued the order to show cause as directed, and these proceedings followed. After further review, the Court concluded Wood did not show the attorney-client privilege applied to the email at issue. "DFEH lawyers have an attorney-client relationship with the State of California. Wood has not shown DFEH lawyers formed an attorney-client relationship with her. As such, any communications between Wood and DFEH lawyers were not made in the course of an attorney-client relationship and were not privileged." Therefore, the petition for mandamus relief was denied. View "Wood v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Donald and Lauretta Bauer purchased land from Donald’s parents and executed promissory notes and a mortgage. When Donald’s parents died, their interest in the notes transferred to Donald's siblings, who sought foreclosure. A state court entered a foreclosure judgment and a deficiency judgment. No judicial sale occurred. The Bauers tried to redeem the property by satisfying the judgment. The foreclosure plaintiffs issued citations to discover assets and sought additional interest. The state court found that the Bauers owed an additional $33,782.96 in interest. The Bauers paid; the plaintiffs filed a satisfaction of judgment. The Bauers then sued, alleging tampering with evidence and abuse of process by seeking to extort money through the issuance of citations to discover assets. The state appellate court upheld the dismissal of the case.The Bauers filed a federal suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the defendants, including the state-court judge, conspired to introduce a forged document into evidence during the foreclosure trial and that the judge and the clerk allowed the plaintiffs to issue baseless citations to discover assets. The district court dismissed the case under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which precludes federal district-court jurisdiction “over cases brought by state-court losers challenging state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting the Bauers’ argument that they did not seek to set aside the state court’s order or judgment but only mean to challenge the “collection practices” of the defendants and their collusion. Any finding in favor of the Bauers would require the federal court to contradict the state court’s orders. View "Bauer v. Koester" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals reversing the circuit court's decision determining that it had personal jurisdiction over Defendant and entering a judgment in favor of Plaintiff, holding that the factors weighed against the constitutional reasonableness of causing Defendant to defend this suit in Maryland.This case was filed by Defendant's stepson, who was a North Carolina resident, against Defendant, who was also a North Carolina resident. Plaintiff ultimately obtained a default judgment against Defendant in the amount of $99,856.84. The court of special appeals reversed the circuit court's decision with respect to the finding of personal jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant's act of filing a sole lawsuit through counsel did not rise to the level of a "persistent course of conduct" to justify the assertion of personal jurisdiction over her in this matter. View "Pinner v. Pinner" on Justia Law

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of Colorado law to the state Supreme Court. Plaintiff Franklin Gale was terminated from his job as a deputy sheriff with the Denver Sheriff’s Department. At the time of his termination, he was serving as chief of the Downtown Detention Center, and the Denver Department of Safety had concluded that he had violated several internal regulations and certain Career Service Rules. Gale sought review of his termination before the Denver Career Service Board. After a hearing officer and then the full Board affirmed Gale’s termination, he filed a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) claim for judicial review in the Denver District Court, naming the City and County of Denver (the “City”), among others, as defendants. In addition, Gale filed a separate action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983 against the City, among others, in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado (the “federal action”). In the federal action, Gale sought money damages for the City’s alleged violations of his First Amendment rights to free speech and free association. The Denver District Court ultimately affirmed the Career Service Board’s order upholding Gale’s termination, and the City thereafter sought and obtained leave to amend its answer in the federal action to assert a defense of claim preclusion. The City then moved for summary judgment in the federal action based on this defense. As asked by the federal appeals court, the issue presented questioned whether Colorado crafted an exception to the doctrine of res judicata such that a prior action under Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 106(a)(4) could not preclude 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims brought in federal court, even through such claims could have been brought in the prior state action. The Supreme Court answered the question "no." View "Gale v. City & County of Denver" on Justia Law

E.B. has been diagnosed with schizophrenia. The Contra Costa County public guardian sought the appointment of a conservator. The court denied E.B.’s objection to compelled testimony. At a trial, E.B. was called as one of three witnesses. He appealed from an order appointing the Public Guardian as his conservator and determining that his current placement in a mental health rehabilitation facility was the least restrictive and most appropriate placement. (Welf. & Inst. Code 5350, 5358(c)(1)). E.B. argued that he had a right to refuse to testify under the equal protection clause, because that right has been statutorily granted in proceedings to extend the commitment of persons found not guilty by reason of insanity, and he is entitled to the same protection.The court of appeal affirmed. LPS conservatees are similarly situated with NGI’s and with individuals subject to other involuntary civil commitments for purposes of the right against compelled testimony but the error was harmless. Even if the jurors had not observed E.B.’s demeanor on the stand, they would have known his diagnosis; that he was on three medications for his mental illness, one of which required white blood cell count monitoring; that he had been recently hospitalized for his mental illness; that when living on his own he had engaged in aberrant behavior; and that he resisted treatment and had limited insight into his mental health condition. View "Conservatorship of E.B." on Justia Law