Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The petitioners challenged a New York City rule regarding the transport of firearms, citing the Second Amendment, and seeking declaratory relief against enforcement of the rule insofar as it prevented their transport of firearms to a second home or shooting range outside of the city. The Second Circuit rejected their claim. After the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the State of New York amended its firearm licensing statute and the City amended the rule so that the petitioners may now transport firearms to a second home or shooting range outside of the city.The Supreme Court vacated. The petitioners’ claim for declaratory relief with respect to the old rule is moot but they claimed that the new rule may still infringe their rights; they may not be allowed to stop for coffee, gas, food, or restroom breaks on the way to their second homes or shooting ranges outside of the city. The Court declined to address the argument, citing its practice of vacating and remanding where the mootness is attributable to a change in the legal framework governing the case, and where the plaintiff may have some residual claim under the new framework that was understandably not asserted previously. On remand, the Second Circuit and the district court may consider the new arguments and whether the petitioners still add a claim for damages with respect to the old rule. View "New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Kaleb Basey, who was convicted of federal crimes, filed a federal civil rights lawsuit in January 2016 against several Alaska state troopers based on their actions during his investigation and arrest. In September, Basey submitted two public records requests to the Alaska State Troopers seeking various documents relating to the investigation of his case, including two troopers' disciplinary records. Basey's requests were promptly denied on the ground that the information pertained to pending litigation. Asking for reconsideration, Basey's request was again denied, again citing the pending litigation. Acting pro se, Basey appealed, and his appeal reached the Alaska Supreme Court. In 2017, the Supreme Court reversed a superior court's dismissal order, holding that neither disclosure exception the State used as grounds for resisting Basey's request had applied. Basey moved to compel production of the requested records in January 2018. The State responded by agreeing to produce certain records, denying the existence of others, and asserting that the requested disciplinary records were private personnel records exempt from disclosure. In a seonc trip to the Alaska Supreme Court, the issue before the Court was whether state employee disciplinary records were confidential “personnel records” under the State Personnel Act and therefore not subject to disclosure under the Alaska Public Records Act. To this, the Court concluded that, with one express statutory exception not relevant to this case, the answer was “yes.” View "Basey v. Alaska Dept. of Pub.Safety" on Justia Law

After Cody Franklin died in police custody, his father, as administrator of his estate, sued the police officers who struggled with Franklin the night he died, and against the municipalities who employed them. The elder Franklin asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for excessive force, and claims under state law for battery and wrongful death. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the municipalities and all but two of the officers. Those officers filed an interlocutory appeal, arguing they were entitled to qualified immunity on all claims. After review, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the officers with respect to the federal claims, and remanded. With respect to the state claims, the Court remanded for further proceedings, including a determination whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. View "Franklin v. Franklin County, Arkansas" on Justia Law

Mayle, a self-proclaimed Satanist, is a follower of The Law of Thelema, a set of beliefs developed in the early 1900s by Aleister Crowley. As part of this religion, Mayle participates in what he calls “sex magick rituals” that he believes violate Illinois laws forbidding adultery and fornication. He claims that he reasonably fears prosecution for practicing his beliefs. He also says that he wants to marry more than one person at the same time and that if he were to do so, he would violate an Illinois law against bigamy. Mayle’s first challenge to the laws was dismissed. Mayle did not appeal, but the next year he filed another suit challenging the same statutes.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the second suit, first rejecting a challenge to the district court’s grant of a two-day extension to allow Mayle to file a notice of appeal. Mayle’s bigamy claim was precluded by the 2017 final judgment on the merits. Mayle lacked standing to challenge the state’s adultery and fornication laws because he still showed no reasonable fear of prosecution; those laws are no longer enforced. View "Mayle v. Illinois" on Justia Law

On April 3, 2020, 20 immigration detainees filed a habeas petition (28 U.S.C. 2241), seeking immediate release, claiming that due to underlying health conditions, their continued detention during the COVID-19 pandemic puts them at imminent risk of death or serious injury. The district court found that the petitioners face irreparable harm and are likely to succeed on the merits, that the government would “face very little potential harm” from their immediate release, and that “the public interest strongly encourages Petitioners’ release.” Without waiting for a response from the government, the court granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) requiring the release. The government moved for reconsideration, submitting a declaration describing conditions at the facilities, with details of the petitioners’ criminal histories. The court denied reconsideration, stating that the government had failed to demonstrate a change in controlling law, provide previously unavailable evidence, or show a clear error of law or the need to prevent manifest injustice. The court extended the release period until the COVID-19 state of emergency is lifted but attached conditions to the petitioners’ release. The government reports that 19 petitioners were released; none have been re-detained.The Third Circuit granted an immediate appeal, stating that the order cannot evade prompt appellate review simply by virtue of the label “TRO.” A purportedly non-appealable TRO that goes beyond preservation of the status quo and mandates affirmative relief may be immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1). View "Hope v. Warden Pike County Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Christopher Barnett appealed the dismissal with prejudice his federal civil-rights claims for failure to state a claim and dismissing with prejudice his state-law claims because they did not survive the restrictions imposed by the Oklahoma Citizens Participation Act (OCPA), Okla. Stat. tit. 12, sections 1430–40 . Defendants cross-appealed the district court’s denial of attorney fees under the OCPA, contending that an award of attorney fees was mandatory. Barnett’s complaint bases his claims on an incident on January 4, 2018, related to a hearing in Oklahoma state court on an open-records case he had brought against Tulsa Community College. According to Barnett, two lawyers in the firm of Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable, Golden & Nelson, P.C., (Hall Estill) falsely reported to the office of the state attorney general (AG) that Barnett had made a threat. The AG’s office then relayed this report to the county sheriff. When Barnett arrived at the courtroom for the hearing, the state-court judge instructed him to speak with a deputy sheriff. After Barnett denied making any threat, the deputy told him to stay inside the courtroom until he received permission to leave. At some point the AG’s office arrived with its own security detail. When the proceedings began, the state-court judge discussed the report in open court. Barnett filed suit in state court the next day against Hall Estill, and Tulsa University (TU), alleging federal civil-rights claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state tort claims because he had been unlawfully seized when he was forbidden to leave the courtroom, had been cast in a false light by the public airing of the alleged threat, and had been retaliated against by Defendants for his exercise of his rights to free speech and access to the courts. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the federal-law claims, agreeing with the district court that the complaint did not adequately allege that any of the Defendants acted under color of state law. But the Court reversed judgment on the state-law claims and remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss the claims without prejudice or remand them to the state court. View "Barnett v. Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable" on Justia Law

In this gerrymandering action, brought exclusively under the North Carolina Constitution against certain state legislators, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not err in remanding because the Legislative Defendants do not have an enforcement role within the meaning of the Refusal Clause of 28 U.S.C. 1443(2). Consequently, the court need not address whether the Legislative Defendants refused to act or whether they asserted a colorable conflict with federal law. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award fees and costs, because the legislators removed within the statutorily mandated time limit and adhered to the district court's expedited briefing schedule. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Common Cause v. Lewis" on Justia Law

In 1997, Frederic Sannmann pleaded guilty to felony robbery which rendered him ineligible to own firearms. In 2003, he successfully moved to set aside his conviction for most purposes: by statute, this relief did not restore Sannmann's right to own firearms. In 2011, Sannmann successfully moved, with the prosecutor's concurrence, to set aside the earlier set-aside order, to withdraw his 1997 felony guilty plea, and to instead plead guilty to misdemeanor theft nunc pro tunc to the date of his original plea. Sannmann immediately notified the California Department of Justice (DOJ) of these changes and the DOJ eventually updated its records accordingly. However, six years later, when Sannmann tried to buy a shotgun from a gun store, the DOJ blocked the purchase based on Sannmann's original 1997 felony conviction. Sannmann filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking an order directing the DOJ to release any holds on his ability to purchase firearms based on the 1997 felony conviction. The trial court believed it lacked the authority to determine the validity of the 2011 set-aside order entered by another superior court judge. Thus, finding Sannmann's record in the criminal case disclosed only a misdemeanor conviction (by virtue of the 2011 set-aside order), the court entered judgment for Sannmann and ordered the DOJ to release its hold on Sannmann's purchase. On appeal, the DOJ contended the trial court erred by awarding mandamus relief based on the 2011 set-aside order because the 2011 order was an unauthorized act in excess of the superior court's jurisdiction. The DOJ did not otherwise seek to invalidate the 2011 set-aside order. On the narrow issue before it, the Court of Appeal agreed the trial court erred by granting mandamus relief based on the 2011 set-aside order and reversed the judgment. View "Sannmann v. Dept. of Justice" on Justia Law

The First Circuit dismissed this interlocutory appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction and remanded the matter to the district court, holding that Appellant's challenge to the district court's denial of summary judgment was not a final, appealable order.Plaintiff, an inmate at Souza Baranowski Correctional Center (SBCC), brought this lawsuit alleging that Appellant, an SBCC prison official, and other SBCC officials failed to protect him from a substantial risk of serious harm in violation of his constitutional rights. Appellant and the remaining defendants filed for summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity. The district court granted summary judgment to all SBCC officials except Appellant. Appellant filed a timely interlocutory appeal, alleging that the district court erred because the undisputed material facts showed Appellant was not deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff. The First Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that Appellant's challenge rested on factual, rather than legal, grounds, and therefore, this Court lacked appellate jurisdiction. View "Norton v. Rodrigues" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals upholding the trial court's grant of summary judgment without addressing its legal merit, holding that the trial court's recital in its final summary judgment order that it considered "the pleadings, evidence, and arguments of counsel" included a late-filed response and attached evidence.Plaintiff sued Defendant alleging that she had been sexually assaulted at work. Defendant moved for summary judgment, presenting traditional and no evidence grounds. The trial court granted the motion. On remand from the Supreme Court, the court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Plaintiff failed to file a timely response to the no-evidence motion and that the trial court did not consider the late-filed response. The court of appeals declined to consider the evidence that Defendant had attached to its combined motion because no timely response pointed out a fact issue raised by that evidence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court's recital that it considered the "evidence and arguments of counsel," without limitation, was an "affirmative indication" that the trial court considered Plaintiff's response and the evidence attached to it; and (2) therefore, the court of appeals should have considered that evidence as well in its review of the trial court's summary judgment. View "B.C. v. Stake N Shake Operations, Inc." on Justia Law