Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

O’Neal was convicted of aggravated battery of a police officer after an altercation during a traffic stop. While incarcerated and while his appeal was pending, O’Neal filed a pro se lawsuit that asserted 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against the officers. Under "Heck," O’Neal’s section 1983 suit was barred unless his conviction was reversed or expunged. Heck-barred suits are usually stayed or dismissed without prejudice, but after O’Neal failed to comply with briefing deadlines, the court ordered O’Neal to show cause why his case should not be dismissed. O’Neal didn’t respond. The court dismissed his claims with prejudice for failure to prosecute. Months later, O’Neal’s conviction was overturned on appeal. Ten months later, O’Neal returned to court, with counsel, with a “Motion to Reinstate the Case and for Leave to File an Amended Complaint" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. His motion nowhere mentioned Rule 60(b), the mechanism for obtaining relief from judgment. The defendants' response, maintained that O’Neal was not entitled to Rule 60(b) relief. O’Neal’s reply brief attempted to articulate why Rule 60(b) relief was warranted.The court denied O’Neal’s Rule 15 motion, explaining that he could not file an amended complaint in a terminated case, and held that the Rule 60(b) argument was waived. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. O’Neal waived any argument under Rule 60(b) and, because the case was terminated on the merits, the court was right to deny his Rule 15 motion. View "O'Neal v. Reilly" on Justia Law

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) established the three-strikes rule, which generally prevents a prisoner from bringing suit in forma pauperis (IFP) if he has had three or more prior suits dismissed on the grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). Colorado inmate Lomax sued prison officials to challenge his expulsion from the facility’s sex-offender treatment program and moved for IFP status. He had already brought three unsuccessful legal actions during his time in prison. The district court and Tenth Circuit rejected Lomax’s argument that two of the dismissals should not count as strikes because they were without prejudice.The Supreme Court affirmed. Section 1915(g)’s three-strikes provision refers to any dismissal for failure to state a claim, whether with prejudice or without. A Section 1915(g) strike-call hinges exclusively on the basis for the dismissal, regardless of the decision’s prejudicial effect. Courts can and sometimes do dismiss frivolous actions without prejudice. View "Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed one of Defendant's convictions for robbery but affirmed the judgment of conviction in all other respects after adopting factors to guide the Court in deciding whether to consider an error's harmlessness despite the State's failure to argue it, holding that the district court's error in denying Defendant's motion to suppress was harmless.Defendant was found guilty of two counts of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, murder with the use of a deadly weapon, and other crimes. The jury sentenced Defendant to death. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made during an interview with detectives before his arrest. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court did err by denying Defendant's motion to suppress. The Court then adopted three factors to help determine whether the Court should consider an error's harmlessness when the State has not argued harmlessness in a death penalty case. After weighing those factors, the Court held (1) sua sponte harmless error review was appropriate in this matter, and the complained-of error was harmless; (2) one of the convictions for robbery was not supported by sufficient evidence; and (3) no other issue warranted relief. View "Belcher v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against UTSMC, seeking recovery for UTSMC's alleged discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of UTSMC's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss because UTSMC is an arm of the State of Texas and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court applied the Clark factors and held that UTSMC is entitled to arm-of-the-state status where statutes and legal authorities favor treating UTSMC as an arm of Texas; Texas law authorizes state treasury funds to be allocated to UTSMC from the permanent health fund for higher education and a judgment against UTSMC would interfere with Texas's fiscal autonomy; UTSMC does not operate with a level of local autonomy to consider it independent from Texas; because of UT System's statewide presence, components of the UT System shall not be confined to specific geographical areas; and the UT System has the power of eminent domain, and the land it acquires becomes property of the state. View "Daniel v. University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for two counts of first degree murder, two counts of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, and one count of possession of a deadly weapon by a prohibited person, holding that Defendant's assignments of error either were without merit or were not adequately preserved for appellate review.On appeal, Defendant argued that two of the district court's jury instructions were incorrect, that the affidavit relied upon by law enforcement to obtain a warrant to collect a sample of Defendant's DNA was insufficient to support probable cause, and that the identification of Defendant by one of the State's witnesses was unreliable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant either waived his right to assert the allege errors on appeal or that his arguments on appeal were without merit. View "State v. Pope" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jorge Corona was a backseat passenger in a car pulled over for a routine traffic stop by Clovis Police Officer Brent Aguilar. Plaintiff was arrested when he did not produce identification in response to the officer's demand for ID. Defendant Aguilar charged Plaintiff with: (1) resisting, evading, or obstructing an officer; and (2) concealing his identity. The district attorney’s office dismissed the concealing-identity charge, and a jury later acquitted Plaintiff of the charge against him for resisting, evading, or obstructing an officer. Plaintiff subsequently sued the arresting officers, Defendant Aguilar and police officer Travis Loomis; the City of Clovis; and the Clovis Police Department for, among other things, alleged constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983. As relevant here, Plaintiff alleged Defendant Aguilar violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful arrest by arresting him without probable cause. Defendant Aguilar moved for partial summary judgment on Plaintiff’s unlawful-arrest claim based on qualified immunity, but the district court denied his motion. The Tenth Circuit disagreed with Officer Aguilar's contention that the district court erred in denying him qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit determined the officer arrested plaintiff without probable cause. "Additionally, clearly established law would have put a reasonable officer in Defendant Aguilar’s position on notice that his conduct violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful arrest. Defendant Aguilar is therefore not entitled to qualified immunity." View "Corona v. City of Clovis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Cody Cox sued Defendant Don Wilson, a deputy in the Clear Creek County Sheriff’s Department, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Cox alleged that when Wilson shot him in his vehicle while stopped on Interstate 70, Wilson violated the constitutional prohibition against the use of excessive force by law-enforcement officers. Plaintiff appealed when the jury returned a verdict in favor of the deputy, arguing the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury to consider whether Wilson unreasonably created the need for the use of force by his own reckless conduct. The Tenth Circuit determined that although the district court incorrectly stated the Supreme Court had recently abrogated the Tenth Circuit's precedents requiring such an instruction in appropriate circumstances, the evidence in this case did not support the instruction. "No law, certainly no law clearly established at the time of the incident, suggests that Wilson acted unreasonably up to and including the time that he exited his vehicle and approached Cox’s vehicle." Therefore, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Deputy Wilson. View "Cox v. Wilson" on Justia Law

In August 2017, Kansas law enforcement officers, after a traffic chase, pulled over Matthew Holmes for suspected vehicular burglary. The officers were from the City of Newton Police Department (“NPD”), McPherson County Sheriff’s Office (“MCSO”), and Harvey County Sheriff’s Office (“HCSO”). After Holmes stopped and exited the car, officers wrestled him to the ground. McPherson County Sheriff’s Deputy Chris Somers shot Holmes in the back. He later died from the gunshot wound. Holmes' estate sued, alleging constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983 ad a state law claim. The district court granted in part and denied in part Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motions. In particular, it denied each sheriff’s motion to dismiss based on Eleventh Amendment immunity because, “with respect to local law enforcement activities, sheriffs are not arms of the state but rather of the county that they serve.” The Tenth Circuit determined the district court did not err in denying the sheriffs' motions, and therefore affirmed. View "Couser v. Gay" on Justia Law

Petitioner Board of Education of Gallup-McKinley County Schools (Gallup) successfully obtained summary judgment on certain Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) claims made by Mavis Yazzie in the administrative action below. Subsequently, Gallup sought attorneys’ fees from Yazzie and her counsel, the Native American Disability Law Center (NADLC). The question presented for the Tenth Circuit's review was whether the controlling provision of the New Mexico Administrative Code (NMAC) permitted Gallup to pursue attorneys’ fees within 30 days of the final decision relating to any party in the administrative action, or did the NMAC limit Gallup to seeking fees within 30 days of obtaining summary judgment, which Gallup failed to do. The Tenth Circuit concluded the plain meaning of the regulatory language permitted petitions for attorneys’ fees made within 30 days of the final decision in the administrative action regardless of whether that decision related to the party seeking fees. Accordingly, Gallup’s petition was timely. The Court therefore reversed the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Board of Education of Gallup v. Native American Disability Law" on Justia Law

James, a pretrial detainee at the St. Clair County Jail, was assaulted by another inmate and suffered severe facial injuries. James filed a pro se civil-rights lawsuit against Hale, the jail infirmary's administrator, accusing her of inadequately treating his medical needs. He later acquired counsel. Significant discovery followed, including the production of jail infirmary and outside medical records that contradicted allegations in his complaint. James obtained leave to file an amended complaint, but the factual section simply repeated the allegations in the original version. In a subsequent deposition, James contradicted those factual assertions.When Hale moved for summary judgment, James responded by swearing out an affidavit incorporating by reference the allegations in the amended complaint. The magistrate disregarded the affidavit and an affidavit submitted by James’s mother and recommended that the court grant the motion. The district judge excluded the affidavits under the sham-affidavit rule and entered summary judgment for Hale. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. James’s affidavit was a sham and an improper attempt to convert the complaint's allegations into sworn testimony to avert summary judgment. The exclusion of his mother’s affidavit was harmless error because she added nothing of substance. The constitutional claim lacks factual support, so summary judgment in Hale’s favor was proper. View "James v. Hale" on Justia Law