Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Dr. Erfan Ibrahim was a Muslim man of Pakistani descent who served as an executive at Alliance for Sustainable Energy until he was fired. Alliance attributed the firing to Dr. Ibrahim’s inappropriate comments to two women; Dr. Ibrahim disagrees, attributing the firing to discrimination based on his race, religion, and gender. Summary judgment was entered in favor of Alliance, rejecting Dr. Ibrahim's allegation that Alliance decided not to fire another executive accused of sexual harassment. The district court rejected the comparison, pointing to differences between the conduct of Dr. Ibrahim and the other executive. The Tenth Circuit concluded these differences involved matters for the factfinder. So judgment was reversed on the claim of race discrimination. View "Ibrahim v. Alliance for Sustainable Nrg." on Justia Law

After an employee brought a wage and hour class action against her employer and prior to certification, the parties settled. The employer paid a sum to the employee and she dismissed the class claims without prejudice, with court approval. Then the employer brought a malicious prosecution action against the employee and her counsel. The employee and her counsel each moved to strike the action under the anti-SLAPP law, which the trial court denied on the basis that the employer established a prima facie showing of prevailing on its malicious prosecution cause of action.The Court of Appeal concluded that, because the prior action resolved by settlement, the employer is unable to establish that the action terminated in its favor as a matter of law. The court explained that the class claims are not severable from the individual claims for the purposes of the favorable termination analysis. Furthermore, the entire action terminated by settlement – a termination which was not favorable to the employer as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for determination of one unadjudicated anti-SLAPP issue, and whether the employee and her counsel are entitled to an award of attorney fees. View "Citizens of Humanity, LLC v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Joan Unrein became legally blind and could no longer drive herself to work, a 120 mile round trip. She asked her employer, Colorado Plains Medical Center, to allow her to work a flexible schedule dependent on her ability to secure rides. The Medical Center permitted this arrangement for a while, but it became a problem because Unrein’s physical presence at the hospital was unpredictable. The flexible schedule arrangement ended in 2016, and was never reinstated. After Unrein was terminated, she sued the Medical Center for failure to accommodate her disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act. After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of the Medical Center because it concluded Unrein’s accommodation request was unreasonable since a physical presence at the hospital on a set and predictable schedule was an essential job function of her position. Unrein appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that Unrein’s physical presence at the hospital on a set and predictable schedule was essential to her job, and the ADA did not require an employer to accommodate employees’ non-work related barriers created by personal lifestyle choices. View "Unrein v. PHC-Fort Morgan" on Justia Law

After plaintiff filed suit in federal court against the City and three police officers for arresting and strip searching her, a federal jury unanimously found that the police acted reasonably and the verdict defeated plaintiff's federal claims. The state law claims were also later dismissed by a United States District Judge. Plaintiff then filed a second lawsuit in state court against the City and the three officers, alleging negligence and other state law claims based on the strip search.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court concluded that Hernandez v. City of Pomona (2009) 46 Cal.4th 501, which barred civil rights plaintiffs who lost in federal court from pursuing equivalent state law claims in a second suit in state court, is controlling in this case. The court explained that, although Hernandez involves a fatal shooting rather than a strip search, the difference between Hernandez and this case is nominal. Therefore, plaintiff cannot sue a second time because her first suit definitively settled her dispute: she lost and cannot now try to prove defendants acted unreasonably. View "Shuler v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit vacated the district court's grant of defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim as time-barred. The court held that plaintiff's disability discrimination claim arises under the Affordable Care Act for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1658(a), which grants a four-year catchall statute of limitations period for all Acts of Congress enacted after December 1, 1990, and thus the district court erred in applying a three-year statute of limitations period. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Vega-Ruiz v. Northwell Health" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Court of Appeal in this case centered on whether Alicia Clark exhausted her administrative remedies under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) prior to filing suit against her former employer, Arthroscopic & Laser Surgery Center of San Diego, L.P. (ALSC). Clark filed an administrative complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) alleging ALSC committed various acts of employment discrimination against her. While Clark’s DFEH Complaint contained an inaccuracy as to ALSC’s legal name, it clearly and unequivocally reflected Clark’s intent to name ALSC as a respondent. Specifically, Clark’s DFEH Complaint named, as respondents, “Oasis Surgery Center LLC,” and “Oasis Surgery Center, LP,” which are variants of ALSC’s registered business name, “Oasis Surgery Center.” In addition, Clark’s DFEH Complaint referenced the names of her managers, supervisors, and coworkers. The same day that Clark filed her DFEH Complaint, the DFEH issued a right-to-sue notice and Clark filed this action against “Oasis Surgery Center LLC,” and “Oasis Surgery Center, LP.” One week after filing her DFEH Complaint and the initial complaint in this action, Clark filed an amended complaint in this action, properly naming ALSC as a defendant. Notwithstanding that Clark’s DFEH Complaint clearly identified her former employer as the intended respondent, the trial court granted ALSC’s motion for summary judgment as to all of Clark’s FEHA claims brought against it because Clark “named the wrong entity in her DFEH [C]omplaint, and . . . never corrected that omission.” Clark then filed a petition for writ of mandate to the Court of Appeal, requesting that it vacate the trial court’s order granting ALSC’s motion for summary judgment. After considering the text and purpose of the relevant statutory exhaustion requirement, administrative regulations, and applicable case law, the Court of Appeal concluded Clark exhausted her administrative remedies against ALSC. "This is particularly true in a case such as this, in which the plaintiff’s error could not possibly have hampered any administrative investigation or prejudiced the defendant in any judicial proceedings." Accordingly, Clark’s writ petition was granted and the trial court directed to vacate its order granting ALSC’s motion for summary judgment. View "Clark v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Rosario Contreras-Velazquez (Velazquez) sued her former employer, Family Health Centers of San Diego, Inc. (Family Health), alleging disability discrimination and related causes of action after she suffered a work-related injury and Family Health terminated her employment. A jury found Family Health not liable, but the trial court ordered a new trial as to three of Velazquez’s causes of action after finding the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict—a ruling, the Court of Appeal affirmed in a prior appeal. After retrial, a jury found in favor of Velazquez. The jury awarded her $915,645 in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive damages. However, the trial court granted in part a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and reduced the punitive damages award to $1,831,290 (a 2:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages). The court reasoned a punitive damages award equal to twice the compensatory damages award was the maximum amount permissible under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Family Health appealed, contending certain special verdict findings returned by the first jury estopped Velazquez from prevailing at the retrial under the issue preclusion doctrine. Family Health also appealed the JNOV order on the basis that the reduced punitive damages award remained grossly excessive in violation of Family Health’s due process rights. The Court of Appeal concluded the first jury’s special verdict findings did not constitute a final adjudication of any issue and, therefore, the trial court correctly ruled that the issue preclusion doctrine did not require entry of judgment in Family Health’s favor. Further, the Court concluded the trial court properly reduced the punitive damages award to an amount equal to twice the compensatory damages award—and no further. Therefore, both the judgment and the JNOV order were affirmed. View "Contreras-Velazquez v. Family Health Centers of San Diego, Inc." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint against the New York Times. Plaintiff alleged defamation based on the Times's print and online articles about gender bias, favoritism, and groping at the Justice Department. The article details a Times investigation into a series of complaints, using records derived from an EEOC complaint and a sex discrimination and retaliation suit. One of the declarations described an incident between plaintiff and an intern. Plaintiff alleged that the language from this declaration was false and defamatory per se and that the fair report privilege did not apply.The court concluded that the district court performed the proper choice-of-law analysis, applying New York law to the conflict; correctly reasoned that New York was the state with the most significant interests in the litigation and applied New York's fair report privilege; and then properly dismissed plaintiff's complaint as barred by the fair report privilege because the alleged defamatory statement was attributed to an official proceeding. View "Kinsey v. New York Times Co." on Justia Law

Uzuegbunam, a Georgia Gwinnett College student, talked with interested students and handed out religious literature on campus until a campus police officer informed him that campus policy prohibited distributing religious materials outside two areas designated for that purpose. Speaking about religion or distributing religious materials in those areas required a permit. Uzuegbunam obtained a permit and tried to speak in a free speech zone. A campus officer again asked him to stop, saying that people had complained. Campus policy prohibited using the free speech zone to say anything that “disturbs the peace and/or comfort of person(s).” Uzuegbunam complied. Another student decided not to speak about religion because of these events. The students sought injunctive relief and nominal damages. College officials discontinued the challenged policies. The Eleventh Circuit held that the students’ plea for nominal damages could not establish standing, absent a request for compensatory damages.The Supreme Court reversed. A request for nominal damages satisfies the redressability element necessary for Article III standing where a plaintiff’s claim is based on a completed violation of a legal right. To establish Article III standing, the Constitution requires a plaintiff to identify an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and to seek a remedy likely to redress that injury. Under common law, a party whose rights are invaded can recover nominal damages without furnishing evidence of actual damages, without a plea for compensatory damages. Nominal damages are not purely symbolic. One dollar may not provide full redress, but the partial remedy satisfies the redressability requirement and constitutes relief on the merits. In addition to redressability, the plaintiff must establish the other elements of standing and satisfy other relevant requirements, such as pleading a cognizable cause of action. View "Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski" on Justia Law

The church holds weekly in-person worship services attended by approximately 80 people. Its pastor suspended these services after he received a March 31, 2020 “Cease and Desist Notice” from the county health department that threatened penalties under Illinois Executive Order 2020-10, issued March 20, 2020, if the church continued to host in-person gatherings of ten or more people. The Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction, citing the First Amendment and the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act and alleging violations of their due process rights and that the Order exceeded the governor’s powers.On May 29, months before plaintiffs filed their appellate brief, the governor issued Executive Order 2020-38, which removed the mandate. All subsequent pandemic-related executive orders have expressly exempted religious gatherings from mandatory restrictions.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction. While intervening Supreme Court decisions offer a greater prospect for success on the merits of the First Amendment claim than previously expected, they have also indicated that equitable considerations weigh against granting a preliminary injunction at this time. The prospect of irreparable injury to the plaintiffs is very low; the public interest weighs substantially against injunctive relief. The federal procedural due process claim was not presented to the district court. The Eleventh Amendment bars relief against the governor; it may also bar relief against the local defendants. All of the state-law claims are poor candidates for a federal court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. View "Cassell v. Snyders" on Justia Law