Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Kekai Watanabe, an inmate at the Federal Detention Center in Honolulu, was severely injured during a gang-related assault in July 2021. Despite his serious injuries, including a fractured coccyx and bone chips in surrounding tissue, the prison nurse only provided over-the-counter medication and refused to send him to a hospital. Watanabe was kept in solitary confinement for over two months and repeatedly requested medical attention, which was largely ignored. He was not properly diagnosed until February 2022 and had not seen a specialist by the time of the court proceedings.The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii initially allowed Watanabe’s claim against the nurse to proceed but later dismissed it, concluding that no Bivens remedy existed for his Eighth Amendment claim. Watanabe appealed the dismissal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Watanabe’s claim did not present a new Bivens context, as it was not meaningfully different from the Supreme Court’s decision in Carlson v. Green, where an implied damages action was recognized under the Eighth Amendment for deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs. The court found that Watanabe’s allegations were sufficiently similar to those in Carlson, thus allowing his Bivens claim to proceed.Additionally, the Ninth Circuit construed Watanabe’s request for injunctive relief related to his ongoing medical care as standalone claims for injunctive relief, not under Bivens. The court remanded the case to the district court to address whether Watanabe may amend his request for injunctive relief and to address any such claims in the first instance. View "WATANABE V. DERR" on Justia Law

Two students receiving special education services filed a class action lawsuit against the Kanawha County Board of Education, alleging that the Board denied them and other similarly situated students a free appropriate public education (FAPE) as guaranteed by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The lawsuit also claimed violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The district court certified a class of all Kanawha County Schools students with disabilities who need behavior supports and have experienced disciplinary removals from any classroom.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia granted the plaintiffs' motion to certify the class, reasoning that the plaintiffs had presented expert evidence of disproportionate rates of suspension for students with disabilities and a detailed qualitative analysis of student records. The court found that these factors revealed a cohesive pattern indicating the absence of an effective system for developing and implementing behavioral supports for students with disabilities. The Board appealed, arguing that the certification of the plaintiff class was inconsistent with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(2).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s certification order. The Fourth Circuit held that the certified class failed to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality prerequisite. The court found that the plaintiffs did not identify a common contention central to the validity of all class members’ claims. The court noted that the claims were highly diverse and individualized, involving different practices at different stages of the special education process. The absence of a common contention foreclosed class treatment. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "G.T. v. The Board of Education of the County of Kanawha" on Justia Law

During a night of civil unrest in Des Moines, Iowa, police and Polk County deputies arrested 14 individuals. The arrestees claimed their Fourth Amendment rights were violated and sued 53 defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court issued a comprehensive opinion with around 800 rulings on various motions for summary judgment and qualified immunity, leading to multiple appeals.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa denied qualified immunity to several officers and granted summary judgment to some plaintiffs. The Des Moines defendants appealed these decisions, arguing they had probable cause to arrest anyone in the vicinity of the protests for misdemeanors such as participation in a riot, unlawful assembly, and failure to disperse. The district court found that the officers lacked probable cause or arguable probable cause for these arrests, as they did not provide specific evidence linking the plaintiffs to violent behavior or failure to disperse.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's decisions de novo. The court affirmed the denial of qualified immunity to Officers Herman, Holtan, and McCarthy on Klingenberg's unlawful arrest claim, and dismissed Officer Lawler's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court also dismissed appeals from Captain Hardy and other officers regarding Lard's and DeBrossard's unlawful arrest claims and Lard's excessive force claim. The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the Patton group on their unlawful arrest claims and denied qualified immunity to the Des Moines defendants on the plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claims. Additionally, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the plaintiffs on their phone seizure claims against Officer Youngblut and denied him qualified immunity.The court reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to Deputy Smith on Timberlake's unlawful arrest claim, finding no clearly established duty for Smith to ensure the lawfulness of the arrest before taking custody. Finally, the court affirmed the grant of qualified immunity to Officer Holtan and Deputy Callahan on Dunn's and Fugate's unlawful arrest claims, concluding they had arguable probable cause under Iowa's failure to disperse statute. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these rulings. View "Dunn v. Does" on Justia Law

A federal inmate, Mitchell Garraway, filed a Bivens action against three prison officials, alleging they were deliberately indifferent to his safety, violating his Eighth Amendment rights. Garraway claimed that despite informing the officials of his cellmate's violent behavior and requesting a cell change, they refused, resulting in an assault by his cellmate. The officials moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing no Bivens remedy exists for failure to protect an inmate from prisoner violence. The district court denied this motion, and after the Supreme Court's decision in Egbert v. Boule, the officials sought reconsideration, which was also denied. They then filed an interlocutory appeal.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California initially denied the officials' motion for judgment on the pleadings, agreeing with Garraway that his case did not differ meaningfully from Farmer v. Brennan. After the Supreme Court's decision in Egbert, the officials filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied by the district court, reaffirming that Farmer remained intact post-Egbert. The officials then filed an interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and dismissed the interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that district court orders extending Bivens, absent a denial of qualified immunity, are not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. The court emphasized that delaying review of such orders does not threaten significant public interests and that any improper judicial intrusion into the legislative function can be effectively rectified upon review of a final judgment. The court concluded that the next logical step in the litigation would be for the federal-officer defendant to claim qualified immunity, the denial of which would be immediately appealable. View "GARRAWAY V. CIUFO" on Justia Law

In the early morning of December 21, 2019, Corey Spiller went to assist his girlfriend, Dashanelle Moore, after her minor car accident on a Houston expressway. While conversing with officers at the scene, Sergeant Jared Lindsay arrived and directed Moore to a nearby truck stop for further procedures, instructing Spiller to follow in his car. When Spiller questioned the officers about Moore, Lindsay became enraged, seized Spiller by the neck, and slammed him onto a parked car, leading to a scuffle where Spiller was tased and arrested. The charges against Spiller were later dropped.Spiller filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Lindsay, Harris County, Harris County Constable Precinct 7, and Chief Constable May Walker, alleging excessive force, false arrest, bystander liability, retaliation, and ADA violations. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed claims against Harris County, Precinct 7, and Walker for failure to state a claim and granted summary judgment for Lindsay on the basis of qualified immunity. Spiller appealed, challenging the summary judgment on his Fourth Amendment excessive force, false arrest, First Amendment retaliation, and bystander liability claims against Lindsay, and the dismissal of his Monell claim against Harris County.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court’s summary judgment for Lindsay on the excessive force claim, finding genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Lindsay's use of force was excessive and whether Spiller's actions justified such force. The court affirmed the district court’s rulings on the false arrest and First Amendment retaliation claims, concluding that Lindsay had probable cause for Spiller’s arrest. The court also upheld the dismissal of Spiller’s Monell claim against Harris County for failing to allege specific facts linking his injury to a county policy or custom. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Spiller v. Harris County" on Justia Law

A 28-year-old man, Steven Mitchell Qualls, died in police custody from a methamphetamine overdose. Qualls had been taken to a hospital for chest pains and agitation but was arrested for public intoxication after refusing to leave. He was booked into the Jasper City Jail, where his condition worsened. Despite showing signs of severe distress, including vomiting black liquid and screaming in pain, officers did not seek medical help. Qualls died approximately 33 hours after being booked.Qualls’s mother, Frances E. Sims, sued the City of Jasper and several police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to Qualls’s serious medical needs in violation of the 14th Amendment. The district court dismissed claims against one officer and the city but denied summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds for the remaining officers. Sims then moved to bifurcate the trial into separate liability and damages phases, arguing that evidence of Qualls’s past behavior would unfairly prejudice the jury. The district court denied the motion, and the jury found for the defendants. Sims’s motion for a new trial was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to bifurcate the trial. The court reasoned that the evidence of Qualls’s past behavior was relevant to the officers’ defense, as it could show they did not recognize the severity of his condition. The court also found that standard trial practices, such as objections and limiting instructions, could mitigate any potential prejudice. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment and the denial of a new trial. View "Sims v. City of Jasper" on Justia Law

Fernando Nunez, Jr., an inmate in Pennsylvania, filed a lawsuit against officials of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Nunez, a devout Muslim, claimed that the DOC violated his religious rights by denying him accommodations to consummate his marriage and have ongoing conjugal visits, engage in congregate prayer with visitors, and undergo a religious circumcision.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment in favor of the DOC. The court concluded that the DOC had compelling interests in denying Nunez's requests and that there were no less restrictive alternatives available. The court relied on affidavits from DOC officials, which cited concerns about safety, security, health, and resource constraints. The court found that Nunez failed to disprove that the DOC's policies were the least restrictive means of furthering these interests.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and found that the District Court did not properly hold the DOC to its burden under RLUIPA. The Third Circuit concluded that the DOC failed to provide sufficient evidence to support its claims of compelling interests and did not adequately consider less restrictive alternatives. The court emphasized that RLUIPA requires a rigorous and fact-intensive inquiry and that the DOC's "mere say-so" was insufficient to meet this standard. The Third Circuit vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the DOC to supplement the record to meet its burden under RLUIPA. View "Nunez v. Wolf" on Justia Law

The case involves Kimberly Marroquin, who sued Los Angeles Police Officer DiMaggio Rico and the City of Los Angeles under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force and negligence after being injured by a less-lethal projectile during a crowd control situation following a Lakers game. Marroquin claimed that the injury caused her substantial physical and emotional harm. The jury found in favor of Marroquin on her excessive force and negligence claims but awarded inconsistent damages: $1.00 against Officer Rico and $1,500,000.00 against the City.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted a new trial limited to damages under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A), citing a miscarriage of justice due to the jury's improper apportionment of damages. The court also denied the defendants' motion for relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2), which was based on newly discovered surveillance footage. The court found that the defendants failed to show reasonable diligence in discovering this evidence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's post-trial orders. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial limited to damages, rejecting the defendants' argument that the liability and damages issues were so interwoven that a damages-only trial violated their Seventh Amendment rights. The court found that the liability issues were distinct and separable from the damages issues and that the jury's confusion was likely due to an improper instruction on the verdict form.The Ninth Circuit also upheld the district court's denial of the Rule 60(b)(2) motion, agreeing that there is no exception to the requirement of reasonable diligence, even if the newly discovered evidence is conclusive. The court affirmed the district court's decisions, maintaining the new trial limited to damages and the denial of relief from judgment based on the newly discovered evidence. View "MARROQUIN V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Moses Lugo and Cheryl Seaton, who use motorized wheelchairs, sued the City of Troy, New York, under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA). They alleged that the city failed to maintain accessible pedestrian pathways. After discovery, Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, while the City of Troy moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing or, alternatively, for summary judgment. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding the factual allegations insufficient to establish standing, without considering the full summary-judgment record.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed the complaint based on the pleadings, concluding that the allegations were too generic to establish standing for city-wide remedies and that the specific obstacles mentioned had been remedied, thus mooting those claims. The court did not evaluate whether the evidence from discovery could establish standing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court found that the district court erred by resolving the standing issue based solely on the pleadings rather than the full summary-judgment record. The appellate court held that the district court should have considered the evidence developed during discovery to determine whether Plaintiffs had standing. Consequently, the Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to evaluate the standing issue based on the complete evidentiary record and to determine if summary judgment is warranted or if Plaintiffs should be allowed to amend their complaint. View "Lugo v. The City of Troy, New York" on Justia Law

The case involves a long-standing litigation concerning the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office and the conditions at Orleans Parish Prison. Plaintiffs, including detainees and the United States, argued that the jail provided constitutionally inadequate housing and medical care. In 2013, a district court approved a consent decree to address these issues, which included a plan to construct a mental health annex, known as Phase III. Despite years of delays, the district court ordered the construction to proceed. No party appealed these orders at the time.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana oversaw the case initially. In 2016, the parties entered a stipulated order to develop a plan for appropriate housing for prisoners with mental health issues. The Compliance Director later proposed the construction of Phase III, which was agreed upon by the former Sheriff and the City. However, the City later sought to explore alternatives, leading to further court orders in 2019 to proceed with Phase III. The City’s subsequent motion to halt the project was denied, and this decision was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Anderson v. City of New Orleans.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is currently reviewing the case. The new Sheriff, Susan Hutson, moved to terminate all orders concerning Phase III, arguing that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) prohibits the construction of a new jail facility. The district court denied this motion, and the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that it could review the denial of the motion but not the underlying orders, as the Sheriff’s motion was not a proper procedural mechanism under the PLRA to challenge the 2019 Orders and Stipulated Order. The appeal was dismissed, and the construction of Phase III continues. View "Anderson v. Hutson" on Justia Law