Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Jamie Herrmann appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant Salt Lake City Corporation (“the City”) on her claims for failure to accommodate her disability, disability discrimination, and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Herrmann began working for the City in 2002 and successfully held different positions in the Salt Lake City Justice courts for nine years. Starting in 2011, Herrmann began working as an in-court clerk, which required her to spend more time in court than her previous positions. Herrmann was diagnosed with PTSD, stemming from a nearly decade-long abusive marriage. Her presence in the courtroom during domestic violence cases frequently triggered her anxiety, causing severe migraines that could last for several days at a time and resulting in a significant downturn in her productivity. Herrmann raised three claims under the ADA: (1) failure to provide reasonable accommodations, (2) disability discrimination, and (3) retaliation. The Tenth Circuit found Herrmann presented some evidence supporting a conclusion that she could not be accommodated within her existing position. Therefore, the district court erred in holding that Herrmann did not meet her prima facie case. As the district court did not address the other elements of Herrmann’s prima facie case the City challenged, judgment was reversed and the case remanded to provide the district court with that opportunity. View "Herrmann v. Salt Lake City Corporation" on Justia Law

This case, involving a dispute about the effect of provisions in the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act on the contraceptive mandate found in the Affordable Care Act, became moot with issuance of the Supreme Court's decision in Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020).The Fifth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs no longer have a cognizable injury and the underlying dispute is moot. The court also concluded that Nevada did not cause the case to become moot; it was moot after the ruling in Little Sisters, and vacatur serves public interests in that it vacates a permanent injunction that Nevada never had proper opportunity to litigate the merits of before the district court; and, regardless, plaintiffs conceded Nevada was entitled to vacatur at oral argument. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss as moot. View "DeOtte v. Nevada" on Justia Law

McCall, who pleaded guilty to a conspiracy charge involving heroin possession and distribution in 2015 and was sentenced to 235 months’ imprisonment, moved for compassionate release. He cited as“extraordinary and compelling circumstances” warranting his release: the COVID-19 pandemic, his rehabilitation efforts, and the Sixth Circuit’s 2019 decision, “Havis” that “attempted” controlled substance offenses do not qualify as predicate offenses for the purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines’ career-offender enhancement and a subsequent holding applying the decision to convictions for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances. He argued that his prior convictions for drug trafficking and assault no longer qualify as predicate offenses for career-offender status, that he has rehabilitated himself, and that the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors favored granting compassionate release. The government argued that McCall raised “generalized fears of contracting COVID-19, without more,” that post-sentence legal developments are not extraordinary, and that McCall poses a danger to the community.The district court denied McCall’s motion in a form order. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The district court suggested that it thought itself unable to rely on nonretroactive changes in sentencing law and abused its discretion by not considering the disparity in McCall’s sentence post-Havis along with his efforts at rehabilitation and the presence of COVID-19. View "United States v. McCall" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of a federal district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff's federal claims and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims, holding that the doctrine of res judicata did not prevent Plaintiff from bringing the state law claims in state court.Plaintiff sued the City of Wichita and one of its police officers in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, alleging federal civil rights violations and state law tort claims. The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims. Plaintiff refiled her state law claims in Sedgwick County District Court, which held that Plaintiff's state law claims were barred by res judicata. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that when a federal court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims and dismisses those claims without prejudice, there has been no final judgment on those state law claims, and res judicata does not preclude a litigant from bringing those claims in state court. View "Herington v. City of Wichita" on Justia Law

Santiago, a severely disabled Chicago resident, would leave her van parked on the street near her home for extended periods of time. In 2018, pursuant to the Chicago Municipal Code, her van was towed, impounded, and destroyed. She sued the city on her own behalf and on behalf of others similarly situated, challenging the constitutionality of various aspects of the ordinance. The district court granted, in part, her motion to certify her suit as a class action. With respect to the “Tow Class,” the court concluded that Santiago “is asserting only a facial challenge: the ordinance is unconstitutional because it fails to require adequate notice before a vehicle has been towed.” Concerning the Vehicle Disposal Class, the court rejected Chicago’s assertion that state law requires the class to show prejudice from the city’s failure to strictly follow its ordinance.The Seventh Circuit vacated. The class certification order does not fully demonstrate the “rigorous analysis” required by FRCP 23 and constituted an abuse of discretion. Considering whether questions of law or fact common to class members predominate begins with the elements of the underlying cause of action. The district court did not discuss any of the elements of the underlying causes of action or what the causes of action are. View "Santiago v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Arroyo, who uses a wheelchair for mobility, sued the owner of a California liquor store under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12181, and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act. The district court granted Arroyo summary judgment on his ADA claim. Any violation of the ADA is automatically a violation of the Unruh Act, CAL. CIV. CODE 51(f), but the district court concluded that “compelling reasons” existed under 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(4) to decline supplemental jurisdiction and dismiss Arroyo’s Unruh Act claim. Recent changes in California law had made it more difficult to file Unruh Act claims in state court, resulting in a wholesale shifting of such cases to the federal courts.The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. The extraordinary situation created by the unique confluence of California rules involved here, which has led to systemic changes in where such cases are filed, presents “exceptional circumstances” that authorize consideration, on a case-by-case basis, of whether the “‘principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity which underlie the pendent jurisdiction doctrine’” warrant declining supplemental jurisdiction. However, because the district court effectively completed its adjudication of this entire case—including the Unruh Act claim—before it considered the question of supplemental jurisdiction, the interests in judicial economy, convenience, comity, and fairness at that point all overwhelmingly favored retaining jurisdiction and entering the foreordained judgment on the Unruh Act claim. View "Arroyo v. Rosas" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's federal claims seeking to hold private parties liable as state actors under 42 U.S.C. 1983, holding that the district court did not err in granting Defendants' Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.In this case arising from eviction proceedings, Plaintiff brought this suit against Management Administration Services Corporation and its administrator, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments related to a search of her apartment, violations of due process related to rent-adjustment negotiations and eviction proceedings, and pendant claims for emotional distress. In response to Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff argued that Defendants were performing a function traditionally and exclusively reserved to the state. The district court dismissed the complaint. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to ground a plausible conclusion that the function Defendants performed was, by tradition, an exclusive prerogative of the state. View "Cruz-Arce v. Management Administration Services Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Viktorya Reznik appealed the district court’s dismissal of her Title VII retaliation action against her former employer, Defendant-Appellee inContact, Inc. (inContact). From January 2018 to May 2019, Reznik worked as a Director of Project Management for inContact, a Utah-based corporation offering cloud-based services to companies using call centers. In April 2019, Reznik received internal complaints about racial slurs in the workplace from two native Filipino employees who worked in the company’s Manila, Philippines office. They claimed that an inContact manager, Scott Mendenhall, had repeatedly subjected them and other native Filipino employees to racial slurs, calling them “monkeys” and “not human.” Mendenhall worked in the same Salt Lake County facility as Reznik. Weeks after Reznik reported the harassment to company management, she was terminated as "not a good culture fit" and "not a good fit." Following Reznik’s termination and administrative exhaustion, she filed her Title VII complaint in federal district court. inContact moved to dismiss and the district court granted the motion. According to the district court, Reznik failed to state a claim because she did not show an objectively reasonable belief that she opposed conduct unlawful under Title VII. Finding Reznik's belief she was opposing conduct unlawful under Title VII was objectively reasonable, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal. View "Reznik v. inContact" on Justia Law

The Community Hospital of the Monterey Peninsula (the Hospital) terminated the employment of registered nurse Kimberly Wilkin (Wilkin) after discovering she had violated the Hospital’s policies governing the handling and documentation of patient medications. Wilkin sued the Hospital, alleging her discharge constituted disability discrimination, retaliation, and otherwise violated the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA); resulted in the unlawful denial of medical leave and retaliation in violation of the Moore- Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act (CFRA); and constituted a wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Over a year after Wilkin filed her complaint, the Hospital moved for summary judgment, producing undisputed evidence, including Wilkin’s deposition testimony, showing she had violated policies governing the handling of medication, and, for over a year before she was discharged, had been regularly counseled for her chronic absenteeism and other issues. The trial court concluded the Hospital carried its burden of producing evidence showing its decision was based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. After Wilkin did not produce any evidence showing the Hospital’s reasons were fabricated or otherwise pretextual, the trial court concluded a reasonable trier of fact could not find in favor of Wilkin on any of her claims and granted summary judgment in favor of the Hospital. To this, the Court of Appeal affirmed. "As all of Wilkin’s claims depended on there being a triable issue of fact regarding the lawfulness of her discharge, and our record does not show such a triable issue of fact exists, summary judgment was properly granted." View "Wilkin v. Community Hospital of the Monterey Peninsula" on Justia Law

Carver, a corrections officer at the Stiles Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), sued three of her former coworkers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging they had sexually assaulted her at the Stiles Unit. The complaint specified that Carver was suing these defendants in their official capacities. Carver also brought section 1983 claims against TDCJ and the Stiles Unit. The court dismissed TDCJ on sovereign-immunity grounds and also dismissed Carver’s claims against the Stiles Unit. None of the individual defendants responded to their summonses or defended the suit in any way. The clerk entered a default. The court ordered the individual defendants to “show cause” why a default judgment should not be granted.Without giving Carver notice or an opportunity to respond, the court subsequently dismissed her claims against the individual defendants with prejudice. The court reasoned that, because Carver had sued the three in their official capacities for money damages, the suits were prima facie barred by sovereign immunity. The Fifth Circuit reversed. Both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Fifth Circuit precedents preclude the dismissal of the complaint sua sponte and with prejudice. The Rules give plaintiffs a variety of ways to fix a defective complaint. View "Carver v. Atwood" on Justia Law