Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The Fifth Circuit treated the petition for rehearing en banc as a petition for panel rehearing; granted the petition for panel rehearing; and withdrew its prior opinion in this case.Plaintiffs, two Planned Parenthood entities and three Jane Does, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the Louisiana Department of Health is unlawfully declining to act on Planned Parenthood's application for a license to provide abortion services in Louisiana. The district court denied the Department's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1); the Department filed an interlocutory appeal; and plaintiffs moved to dismiss.The court denied the motion to dismiss the appeal because the Department asserted sovereign immunity in the district court. Therefore, the court has jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal. The court further concluded that at least one of the plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief is a valid invocation of federal jurisdiction under Ex parte Young. In this case, because plaintiffs' requested injunction to "promptly rule" on the license application satisfies the requirements of Ex parte Young, the court concluded that plaintiffs have survived the Department's Rule 12(b)(1) motion and the case may proceed. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Planned Parenthood Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Phillips" on Justia Law

A circuit court denied Brittany Spiers leave to amend her complaint, and granted a motion to dismiss brought by Oak Grove Credit, LLC (OGC), and other companies, including, Columbia Credit, LLC, Pine Belt Credit, LLC, and “John Does Business 1-5” (collectively, “the Creditor Companies”). Spiers worked for OGC, a creditor business located just outside Hattiesburg, Mississippi, until February 2019. At that time, OGC terminated Spiers for reasons Spiers alleged were discriminatory. According to Spiers, OGC terminated her because of her gender and her pregnancy. Specifically, Spiers alleged that her supervisor raised concerns about her pregnancy in regards to work and childcare and even called her pregnancy a “disease.” Spiers also alleged that her supervisor declined to hire another person because that person was pregnant. In February 2020, Spiers filed her complaint primarily alleging pregnancy and sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Even though Spiers only worked for OGC, she brought her lawsuit collectively against OGC and the Creditor Companies because she alleged that these companies “constitute an integrated enterprise/joint employer in relation to Spiers as employees from each location are fluid and work for and between the sister companies.” Alternatively, Spiers alleged that “the Defendant’s actions constitute the torts of negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, termination in violation of public policy, gross negligence, and negligent supervision.” OGC and the Creditor Companies removed the case to federal district court, which issued an order as to Spiers’s Title VII claim, finding that Spiers “did not plead sufficient facts for the Court to infer that Defendants meet Title VII’s definition of an employer.” The district court “dismiss[ed] Plaintiff’s Title VII claims without prejudice.” The district court, however, “declin[ed] to exercise pendent jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims and remand[ed] the case [back] to the Circuit Court of Lamar County, Mississippi.” Upon remand to the circuit court, Spiers filed a motion for leave to amend her complaint. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the state circuit court's order dismissing the state-law claims, but reversed to the extent that the order denied Spiers leave to amend her complaint. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Spiers v. Oak Grove Credit, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

On remand from the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit concluded that unresolved questions of state law must be certified to the Texas Supreme Court. The court certified the following questions of state law to the Supreme Court of Texas: Whether Texas law authorizes the Attorney General, Texas Medical Board, the Texas Board of Nursing, the Texas Board of Pharmacy, or the Texas Health and Human Services Commission, directly or indirectly, to take disciplinary or adverse action of any sort against individuals or entities that violate the Texas Heartbeat Act, given the enforcement authority granted by various provisions of the Texas Occupations Code, the Texas Administrative Code, and the Texas Health and Safety Code and given the restrictions on public enforcement in sections 171.005, 171.207 and 171.208(a) of the Texas Health and Safety Code. View "Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson" on Justia Law

A patient sued a hospital after learning that a hospital employee intentionally disclosed the patient’s health information in violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). The patient alleged the disclosure breached the hospital’s contractual obligations to him. The superior court instructed the jury to return a verdict for the hospital if the jury found that the employee was not acting in the course and scope of employment when she disclosed the patient’s information. The jury so found, leading to judgment in the hospital’s favor. The Alaska Supreme Court found the jury instruction erroneously applied the rule of vicarious liability to excuse liability for breach of contract. "A party that breaches its contractual obligations is liable for breach regardless of whether the breach is caused by an employee acting outside the scope of employment, unless the terms of the contract excuse liability for that reason." The Court therefore reversed judgment and remanded for further proceedings, in particular to determine whether a contract existed between the patient and hospital and, if so, the contract’s terms governing patient health information. View "Guy v. Providence Health & Services Washington" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Scott Paine appealed a superior court decision granting judgment on the pleadings for his employment discrimination claim against defendant, Ride-Away, Inc. Plaintiff suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) for many years, which substantially limited a major life activity. He was employed by defendant at its facility in Londonderry, New Hampshire as an automotive detailer in May 2018. In July 2018, his physician prescribed cannabis to help treat his PTSD, and plaintiff enrolled in New Hampshire’s therapeutic cannabis program. Plaintiff submitted a written request to defendant for an exception from its drug testing policy as a reasonable accommodation for his disability. Plaintiff explained that he was not requesting permission to use cannabis during work hours or to possess cannabis on defendant’s premises. Plaintiff was informed that he could no longer work for the company if he used cannabis. After plaintiff notified defendant that he was going to treat his PTSD with cannabis, his employment was terminated in September 2018. Plaintiff sued for employment discrimination, based on defendant’s failure to make reasonable accommodation for his disability. Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that, because marijuana use was both illegal and criminalized under federal law, the requested accommodation was facially unreasonable. After a hearing, the trial court granted defendant’s motion. The sole question before the New Hampshire Supreme Court was whether the court erred in ruling that the use of therapeutic cannabis prescribed in accordance with New Hampshire law could not, as a matter of law, be a reasonable accommodation for an employee’s disability under RSA chapter 354-A. The Supreme Court held the trial court erred in determining that the use of therapeutic cannabis prescribed in accordance with RSA chapter 126-X could not, as a matter of law, be a reasonable accommodation for an employee’s disability under RSA chapter 354-A. "[P]laintiff’s disability is PTSD, not the illegal use of or addiction to a controlled substance." Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Paine v. Ride-Away, Inc." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in sealing and ordering redaction of voluminous documents related to litigation challenging Louisiana's abortion laws without a proper legal basis, and therefore vacated the district court's sealing orders. The sealed or redacted documents include a transcript of proceedings held in open court, a famous Pennsylvania grand jury report that is available as a book on www.amazon.com and that was adapted as a motion picture, an arrest report from a police department's public website, articles from The New York Times and Rolling Stone, and an obituary from a public website. The court concluded that the district court misapprehended the nature and extent of the public's right to judicial records; on remand, the district court shall not seal or order redaction of any publicly available documents or information; the district court also used the wrong legal standard for sealing documents; and the district court erred by failing to evaluate all of the documents individually. The court issued a limited remand for the district court to evaluate the sealing orders under the proper legal standard within 30 days of the issuance of this opinion. View "June Medical Services, LLC v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellee Camille Sturdivant sued her former coach on a high school dance team, Carley Fine, invoking 42 U.S.C. 1983, and alleging race discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Fine moved for summary judgment, urging qualified immunity based on the absence of: (1) an act under color of state law; and (2) a denial of equal protection. The district court denied the motion, concluding that a reasonable factfinder could infer that Fine had acted as head coach and “intentionally deprived [Camille] of educational benefits based on [her] race.” Fine appealed, presenting two alternative arguments for qualified immunity: (1) She did not act under color of state law because she was no longer employed as the head coach when she allegedly violated Camille’s rights; and (2) She did not violate a clearly established constitutional right. The Tenth Circuit determined it lacked jurisdiction to consider Fines first argument; the Court's jurisdiction in an interlocutory appeal did not extend to the applicability of section 1983. Thus, this portion of the appeal was dismissed. The Court did have jurisdiction on Fine's section argument, and found that a reasonable factfinder could find the violation of a clearly established right to equal protection. So the Court affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity. View "Sturdivant v. Fine, et al." on Justia Law

Deborah Laufer was qualified as disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and was a self-described ADA “tester.” In that capacity, she visited the Elk Run Inn’s online reservation system (“ORS”) to determine whether it complied with the ADA, though she had no intention to stay there. Laufer sued Randall and Cynthia Looper, the owners of the Elk Run Inn, alleging that the ORS lacked information about accessibility in violation of an ADA regulation. The district court dismissed Laufer’s complaint without prejudice for lack of Article III standing because she failed to allege that she suffered a concrete and particularized injury. Finding no reversible error in the district court's judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal. View "Laufer v. Looper, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Patricia Crowe appealed a Superior Court order granting summary judgment to defendant Appalachian Stitching Company, LLC (Appalachian), on Crowe’s claim that Appalachian violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and RSA chapter 354-A by refusing to accommodate her sciatica. Crowe worked at Appalachian as an assembler, which required her to have the ability to bend, lift and turn freely. After a trip to the emergency room, Crowe returned to work and informed her supervisor she had been diagnosed with sciatica. Crowe requested the ability to sit until her pain subsided and she could resume standing. Appalachian requested a doctor’s note explaining her condition; she obliged with the emergency room discharge instructions that stated, “NO LIFTING, BENDING OR STOOPING FOR 1 WEEK.” After reviewing the discharge instructions, Appalachian sent Crowe home until she was released to work by her doctor. On June 1, 2017, after Crowe missed work for eight days without providing an update on her condition, Appalachian determined that she had voluntarily quit. The trial court granted summary judgment to Appalachian on the ground that Crowe had not established she was a “qualified individual” under the ADA or RSA chapter 354-A. On appeal, Crowe argued that she could have performed the essential functions of her job if Appalachian had not sent her home and, instead, continued to allow her to sit as requested. The New Hampshire Supreme Court found that an employer, did not need to provide futile or ineffective accommodations. "Once Crowe was on leave, Appalachian was entitled to rely on the doctor’s evaluation that Crowe was unable to return to work. ... although a request for leave can, in some circumstances, trigger an employer’s obligation to make reasonable accommodations under the ADA, Crowe’s doctor’s inquiry about the availability of FMLA was not such a request." Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court correctly determined that Appalachian was entitled to summary judgment on Crowe’s ADA and RSA chapter 354-A claims. View "Crowe v. Appalachian Stitching Company, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jamie Herrmann appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant Salt Lake City Corporation (“the City”) on her claims for failure to accommodate her disability, disability discrimination, and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Herrmann began working for the City in 2002 and successfully held different positions in the Salt Lake City Justice courts for nine years. Starting in 2011, Herrmann began working as an in-court clerk, which required her to spend more time in court than her previous positions. Herrmann was diagnosed with PTSD, stemming from a nearly decade-long abusive marriage. Her presence in the courtroom during domestic violence cases frequently triggered her anxiety, causing severe migraines that could last for several days at a time and resulting in a significant downturn in her productivity. Herrmann raised three claims under the ADA: (1) failure to provide reasonable accommodations, (2) disability discrimination, and (3) retaliation. The Tenth Circuit found Herrmann presented some evidence supporting a conclusion that she could not be accommodated within her existing position. Therefore, the district court erred in holding that Herrmann did not meet her prima facie case. As the district court did not address the other elements of Herrmann’s prima facie case the City challenged, judgment was reversed and the case remanded to provide the district court with that opportunity. View "Herrmann v. Salt Lake City Corporation" on Justia Law