Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

At the time this appeal was initiated, Jason Brooks was a Colorado-state inmate serving a lengthy prison sentence for securities fraud. Brooks had an extreme and incurable case of ulcerative colitis: even when his disease was well treated, Brooks suffered from frequent, unpredictable fecal incontinence. This case involved the Colorado Department of Corrections’s (“CDOC”) efforts, or lack thereof, to deal with the impact of Brooks’s condition on his ability to access the prison cafeteria. Specifically, the issues presented centered on whether the district court erred when it concluded: (1) Brooks’s Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claim for damages failed because the CDOC’s offer to provide Brooks with adult diapers was a reasonable accommodation of Brooks’s disability; and (2) Brooks’s Eighth Amendment claim against ADA Inmate Coordinator Julie Russell failed because the decision not to access the cafeteria with the use of adult diapers was Brooks’s alone. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined the district court erred in its treatment of Brooks’s ADA claim for damages. "A reasonable juror could conclude the offer of adult diapers was not a reasonable accommodation of Brooks’s disability. Thus, at least as to the question of the reasonableness of the proposed accommodation, the district court erred in granting CDOC summary judgment on Brooks’s ADA claim for damages." On the other hand, the Court concluded the district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Russell on Brooks’s Eighth Amendment claim: "the record is devoid of sufficient evidence for a jury to find Russell acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind—deliberate indifference to Brooks’s ability to access food—when she declined Brooks’s request for a movement pass." Accordingly, the Court dismissed in part, reversed in part, and remanded this matter to the district court for further proceedings. View "Brooks v. CDOC, et al." on Justia Law

Andrade owns a Hammond, Indiana apartment building. Hammond inspected and issued a notice that the building was unsafe. After a hearing, the Hammond Board of Public Works ruled in favor of Hammond. The Lake Superior Court reversed because Andrade did not have proper notice of the hearing. A year later, Hammond re-inspected and issued a new notice. The Board scheduled another hearing. Andrade received proper notice; he served the Chief of Inspection a subpoena requesting that he bring to the hearing all “regulations, ordinances, and/or statutes” that the Chief relied upon during the first hearing. Hammond did not comply with the subpoena. The Board ordered Andrade to remedy the unsafe conditions. The Lake Superior Court and the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed; the Indiana Supreme Court and U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the case.Andrade filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985, alleging that the defendants violated and conspired to violate Andrade’s due-process rights by making “intentional false representations of opinion testimony” before the Board, “fail[ing] to comply with a lawfully-issued subpoena without justification,” and pursuing an “unannounced policy to deny subsidized residential units in more desirable neighborhoods.” The district court dismissed Andrade’s complaint, citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; appellate review of state-court judgments is reserved exclusively to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Andrade’s claims concern the defendants’ actions separate from any state-court judgment. View "Andrade v. Hammond Board of Public Works" on Justia Law

FASORP brought suit against the NYU Defendants, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. In an Amended Complaint, FASORP pleads that its members have standing to challenge the Law Review's article-selection and editor-selection processes, as well as the Law School's faculty-hiring processes, all of which FASORP alleges violated Title VI and Title IX by impermissibly considering sex and race in its selection and hiring decisions.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint without prejudice and held that FASORP does not have standing to sue NYU because it has failed to demonstrate injuries to its members. In this case, even if FASORP's pleadings were found to sufficiently identify members who have suffered the requisite harm, FASORP fails to demonstrate that those members have experienced an invasion of a legally protected interest that is certainly impending or that there is a substantial risk that the harm will occur. The court explained that, without any "description of concrete plans" to apply for employment, submit an article, or of having submitted an article, that will or has been accepted for publication, FASORP's allegations exhibit the kind of "some day intentions" that cannot "support a finding of [] actual or imminent injury." View "Faculty, Alumni, and Students Opposed to Racial Preferences v. New York University" on Justia Law

Doe, a student at a public school in Virginia, had recently undergone a gender transition. Vlaming, Doe’s French teacher, refused to use male pronouns to refer to Doe. Vlaming argued that using male pronouns to refer to someone who was born a female violated his religious beliefs. Eventually, the superintendent placed Vlaming on administrative leave and recommended his dismissal. After a hearing, the School Board dismissed Vlaming for failure to comply with his superiors’ directives and violations of policies prohibiting discrimination and harassment. Vlaming sued, alleging statutory and constitutional violations and breach of contract. The Board removed the case to federal court, arguing the district court had removal jurisdiction because it had federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 1441(c), over whether Title IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender identity. The Board also argued that because Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681, was a “law providing for equal rights,” section 1443(2), the civil rights removal statute, authorized removal.The district court granted Vlaming’s motion for remand. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Because none of Vlaming’s state law claims necessarily raises a federal issue, federal question jurisdiction is lacking, and section 1441(c) does not provide a basis for removal. The Supreme Court has limited the meaning of a “law providing for equal rights” in section 1443 to only those concerning racial equality. View "Vlaming v. West Point School Board" on Justia Law

After Jeffrey West died shortly after he was released from the prison where he was being held as a pre-trial detainee, West's estate filed suit under federal and Alabama law against Escambia County and the Escambia County Sheriff, as well as multiple fictitious defendants, initially identified only as prison guards, medical professionals, doctors, and nurses. In this case, West had a staph infection, and after inconsistent medical attention that did not address his underlying symptoms, he died from complications related to the infection. The district court ultimately entered an order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) and dismissed all claims with prejudice. After the Estate moved to reopen and the district court agreed, the district court found that it had jurisdiction over the Estate's claims because it could reopen the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) but granted summary judgment to defendants because the Estate's claims were time-barred.The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order purporting to reopen the case because the parties' filing of the stipulation of dismissal left the district court without jurisdiction over the Estate's claims pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). Furthermore, the district court could not reopen the case under Rule 60(a). View "Estate of Jeffrey West v. DeFrancisco" on Justia Law

Trinh sued Fineman, who had been appointed by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County as a receiver in a case involving the dissolution of Trinh’s beauty school. She alleged that Fineman did not give her a proper accounting of the escrow account related to that case and accused him of theft. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, explaining that Trinh had not raised “any claims arising under federal law or [alleged] that the parties are citizens of different states.” The Third Circuit remanded to allow Trinh to amend her complaint. Her amended complaint asserted that Fineman, as the receiver, was “abusing his state power.”The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Although Trinh’s complaint arguably raised a section 1983 claim, Fineman, as a court-appointed receiver, is entitled to absolute, quasi-judicial immunity from suit when acting with the authority of the court. Erroneous, controversial, and even unfair decisions do not divest a judge of immunity. Fineman was duly appointed by the state court and the transcript of that court's hearing reflects that the judge was aware of, and approved of, all of his expenditures. View "Trinh v. Fineman" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, owners and operators of greyhound-racing businesses, filed suit against the Florida Attorney General, seeking a declaration that a newly enacted state law prohibiting gambling on greyhound racing is unlawful and an injunction to prevent her from enforcing it. The district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice based on lack of standing.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, holding that plaintiff's alleged injuries are not traceable to any conduct of the Attorney General—either in enforcing or threatening to enforce the law or otherwise—and that plaintiffs' injuries would not be redressable by relief from this court. Therefore, plaintiffs lack Article III standing to bring their claims against the Florida Attorney General. View "Support Working Animals, Inc. v. Governor of Florida" on Justia Law

Jim Bakker and Morningside filed suit against several out-of-state defendants in Missouri federal court, alleging that defendants, while acting in their official capacities, violated their First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In February 2020, as the Covid-19 pandemic was beginning in the United States, Jim Bakker and Morningside began advertising a product called Silver Solution on the Jim Bakker Show. Bakker and Morningside claimed that Silver Solution "has been proven by the government that it has the ability to kill every pathogen it has ever been tested on;" that it "has been tested on other strains of the coronavirus and has been able to eliminate it within 12 hours;" and that it is "patented, it works, we have tested it, it works on just about everything." Bakker and Morningside allege that defendants' investigations into Silver Solution violate their constitutional rights and that the state statutes defendants have acted under are unconstitutional.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction. Assuming defendants fell under Missouri's long-arm statute, the court concluded that asserting personal jurisdiction in this case violates due process where the only contact with Missouri were letters and emails directed at Morningside Church and Bakker, rather than the forum state. Therefore, after considering the five factor test for assessing the sufficiency of a defendant's contacts, the court concluded that Bakker and Morningside have not demonstrated that defendants' conduct connects them to the forum in a meaningful way. View "Morningside Church, Inc. v. Rutledge" on Justia Law

On various dates between March and July 2020, the Governor and Secretary of Health of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania entered orders to address the COVID-19 pandemic. Plaintiffs, Pennsylvania citizens, elected officials, and businesses, challenged three pairs of directives: stay-at-home orders, business closure orders, and orders setting congregation limits in secular settings. The district court concluded that the orders violated the U.S. Constitution. While the appeal was pending, circumstances changed: more than 60% of Pennsylvanians have received a COVID vaccine. An amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution and a concurrent resolution of the Commonwealth’s General Assembly now restricts the Governor’s authority to enter the same orders. In addition, the challenged orders have expired by their own terms. The Third Circuit vacated the judgment and dismissed an appeal as moot. No exception to the mootness doctrine applies View "County of Butler v. Governor of Pennsylvania" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's political retaliation claim related to disciplinary measures and his ultimate termination from the Sheriff's Office. The court concluded that there was no error in the district court's determination that collateral estoppel barred plaintiff from pursuing his political retaliation claim based on those issues he raised in his termination appeal; the district court could give the Iowa Civil Service Commission's determination preclusive effect; and plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case that his two-day suspension was political retaliation because he could not establish a causal connection between the suspension and his political campaign. View "Charleston v. McCarthy" on Justia Law