Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Kemp and seven codefendants were convicted of drug and gun crimes. The Eleventh Circuit consolidated their appeals and, in November 2013, affirmed their convictions and sentences. In April 2015, Kemp moved to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255. The district court dismissed Kemp’s motion as untimely because it was not filed within one year of “the date on which [his] judgment of conviction [became] final.” Kemp did not appeal. In 2018, Kemp sought to reopen his section 2255 proceedings, arguing that the one-year limitations period on his 2255 motion did not begin to run until his codefendants’ rehearing petitions were denied in May 2014. The Eleventh Circuit agreed that his section 2255 motion was timely but concluded that because Kemp alleged judicial mistake, his FRCP 60(b) motion fell under Rule 60(b)(1), with a one-year limitations period and was untimely.The Supreme Court affirmed. The term “mistake” in Rule 60(b)(1) includes a judge’s errors of law. Because Kemp’s motion alleged such a legal error, it was cognizable under Rule 60(b)(1) and untimely under Rule 60(c)’s one-year limitations period. The Court rejected Kemp’s arguments for limiting Rule 60(b)(1) to non-judicial, non-legal errors and applying Rule 60(b)(6), which allows a party to seek relief “within a reasonable time” for “any other reason that justifies relief,” but is available only when the other grounds for relief specified in Rules 60(b)(1)–(5) are inapplicable. View "Kemp v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his claims as barred by 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(g), colloquially known as the “three strikes” provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”).   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that Rule 11 provides courts with a “means to penalize the pursuit of frivolous suits that are removed to federal court.” And “[i]f a prisoner fails to pay a penalty imposed under Rule 11, the court may take other steps, such as revoking the privilege of litigating [IFP] or barring new suits altogether.” Courts may consider these measures where appropriate even where Section 1915(g) is inapplicable. Because Plaintiff did not bring this action in any court of the United States, the magistrate judge erred by determining that his claims were barred by Section 1915(g). Further, the record is devoid of any findings regarding exhaustion. The issue of exhaustion was in discovery by the parties when this appeal occurred. As Plaintiff suggested, the court held that remand is required to answer this question. View "Mitchell v. Goings, et al" on Justia Law

Faith Bible Chapel International operated a school, Faith Christian Academy (“Faith Christian”). Plaintiff Gregory Tucker, a former high school teacher and administrator/chaplain, alleged Faith Christian fired him in violation of Title VII (and Colorado common law) for opposing alleged race discrimination at the school. As a religious employer, Faith Christian generally had to comply with anti-discrimination employment laws. But under the affirmative “ministerial exception” defense, those anti-discrimination laws do not apply to employment disputes between a religious employer and its ministers. Here, Faith Christian defended against Tucker’s race discrimination claims by asserting that he was a “minister” for purposes of the exception. After permitting limited discovery on only the “ministerial exception,” the district court ruled that, because there are genuinely disputed material facts, a jury would have to resolve whether Tucker was a “minister.” Summary judgment for Faith Christian, therefore, was not warranted. Faith Christian immediately appealed that decision, seeking to invoke the Tenth Circuit's jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. The Tenth Circuit determined it did not have jurisdiction to hear the interlocutory appeal: the category of orders at issue here could be adequately reviewed at the conclusion of litigation. The appeal was thus dismissed. View "Tucker v. Faith Bible Chapel Int'l." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from traffic stops of Blaine and Samuel Shaw and Joshua Bosire that were prolonged for K-9 sweeps. Master Trooper Doug Schulte and Technical Trooper Brandon McMillan moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motions. The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, and reversed in part, finding material issues of fact remained as to whether Troopers Schulte and McMillan had an arguable reasonable suspicion to extend the stops. Thus, the Court found the Shaws and Bosire could proceed on their 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against Trooper Schulte and Trooper McMillan, respectively. However, the Court reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment on: (1) the scope of the Shaws’ claim; and (2) Bosire’s claim against Trooper Schulte. View "Shaw, et al. v. Schulte, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants Alan Dohner and William Gerber were, when their lawsuits were filed, general population inmates living in dormitory housing at Chuckawalla Valley State Prison (CVSP). They claimed they had the right to possess a personal television in their cells, rather than being limited to shared televisions located in common areas. They raised various claims flowing from the enforcement of the regulations that prohibited them from doing so. The trial court rejected all the claims, denying their request for a writ of habeas corpus without issuing an order to show cause and sustaining respondents’ demurrer to their claims for a writ of mandate and declaratory relief. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's rulings, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re Dohner" on Justia Law

A former faculty member appealed the district court’s judgment dismissing (A) claims against the university principally for violation of his right to due process, and for gender and national origin discrimination in violation of, respectively, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and (B) claims that documents issued by the United States Department of Education violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the  Spending Clause of the Constitution. The district court granted the university's motion for judgment on the pleadings finding that Title IX does not authorize a private right of action for discrimination in employment and that the complaint failed to state a claim for national-origin discrimination under Title VI. The court granted the United States Defendants' motion to dismiss the claims.   The Second Circuit vacated the judgment in part finding merit only in Plaintiff’s contention that Title IX allows a private right of action for a university's intentional gender-based discrimination against a faculty member. The court found that the complaint contained sufficient factual assertions to permit a plausible inference that Plaintiff was disciplined following irregular investigative procedures in circumstances permitting a plausible inference of bias on the basis of gender in violation of Title IX. Plaintiff’s Title VI claim, viewed within the same analytical framework as that applicable to his Title IX claim, lacks sufficient factual assertions to permit a plausible inference that Plaintiff was disciplined in whole or in part on the basis of his national origin in violation of Title VI. View "Vengalattore v. Cornell University" on Justia Law

After being terminated from a position with Sacramento County (the County), plaintiff-appellant Cynthia Vatalaro sued the County for unlawful retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5. Vatalaro alleged that, in violation of this statute, the County retaliated against her after she reported that she was working below her service classification. The County moved for summary judgment, contending Vatalaro could not show that she had a reasonable belief, or any belief at all, that the information she disclosed evidenced a violation of any law. The County added that, regardless, Vatalaro’s claim still failed because the County had a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for terminating her. The trial court, agreeing with the County on both these points, granted summary judgment in the County’s favor. On appeal, Vatalaro alleges that the trial court was wrong on both these issues. The Court of Appeal affirmed, though on a ground somewhat different than those raised at the trial level: "the relevant standard is not whether the County demonstrated it had such a [non-discriminatory] reason; it is instead whether the County 'demonstrate[d] by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged action would have occurred for legitimate, independent reasons even if the employee had not engaged in activities protected by Section 1102.5.'" View "Vatalaro v. County of Sacramento" on Justia Law

In federal court, Plaintiff Timothy Martin sued the Department of Corrections (DOC) and three DOC-employed medical providers, alleging Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and medical malpractice under state law. Following the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the federal district court certified three questions of Washington state law to the Washington Supreme Court, all relating to whether RCW 7.70.150’s requirement of a certificate of merit for medical malpractice suits against state agents was constitutional. The Washington Court held that RCW 7.70.150 was invalid on its face based on Putman v. Wenatchee Valley Med. Ctr., PS, 216 P.3d 374 (2009), and on statutory language that did not differentiate between private and public defendants. Because the Supreme Court answered certified question 1 in the affirmative, it did not reach the federal court's remaining questions. View "Martin v. Dep't of Corrections" on Justia Law

Universal Life Church Monastery permits anyone who feels called to become ordained as a minister—over the Internet, free of charge, in a matter of minutes. Tennessee law permits only those “regular” ministers—ministers whose ordination occurred “by a considered, deliberate, and responsible act”—“to solemnize the rite of matrimony.” Tenn. Code 36-3-301(a)(1)–(2). Since 2019, the law has explicitly clarified that “[p]ersons receiving online ordinations may not solemnize the rite.”Asserting that those restrictions violate the federal and Tennessee constitutions, ULC and its members sued several Tennessee officials, seeking an injunction and declaratory judgment. The officials claimed sovereign immunity and that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. The district court entered a preliminary injunction against several defendants. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. No plaintiff has standing to seek relief against Governor Lee, Attorney General Slatery, District Attorney General Helper, or County Clerks Crowell, Anderson, and Knowles. The plaintiffs have standing to sue District Attorneys General Dunaway, Pinkston, and Jones, and County Clerk Nabors. The court noted that county clerks have no discretion to inspect officiants’ credentials or to deny licenses on that basis; state law deems issuance of the licenses a ministerial duty. View "Universal Life Church Monastery Storehouse v. Nabors" on Justia Law

Under the 2020 Racial Justice Act, “[t]he state shall not seek or obtain a criminal conviction or seek, obtain, or impose a sentence on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin” (Pen. Code 745 (a)). The Act's discovery provision allows a defendant, “[u]pon a showing of good cause,” to obtain evidence from the prosecution relevant to a potential violation. Based on evidence presented at his preliminary hearing, Young argued that racial profiling in a traffic stop led to his arrest for possession of Ecstasy for sale. He cited statistics showing that, statewide, blacks are more likely to be searched during traffic stops than others. He sought discovery relating to charging decisions for the past five years concerning others who were charged with or could have been charged with possession of Ecstasy for sale and related drug offenses. The trial court denied the motion.The court of appeal vacated. Borrowing from the minimal threshold showing that is required to trigger an obligation to provide “Pitchess” discovery (Evid. Code 1043(b), Young may claim entitlement to discovery under the Act if he makes a plausible case, based on specific facts, that any of the enumerated violations of section 745(a) could or might have occurred. The court must engage in a discretionary weighing of the strength of Young’s factual showing, the potential probative value of the information he seeks, and the burdens of gathering the requested information. View "Young v. Superior Court of Solano County" on Justia Law