Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Eric Poemoceah, an Oklahoma resident and member of the Comanche Nation, participated in a protest against the Dakota Access Pipeline at the Standing Rock Reservation in North Dakota. On February 22, 2017, while attempting to negotiate with law enforcement officers for the peaceful exit of elders from the protest site, Poemoceah was tackled and arrested by officers, including Benjamin Swenson. He sustained injuries, including a pelvic fracture, and was charged with obstruction of a government function, a charge that was later dismissed.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota dismissed Poemoceah’s complaint with prejudice, granting the defendants' motions to dismiss. The court found that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the First and Fourth Amendment claims and dismissed the remaining claims as inadequately pled. Poemoceah’s request for leave to amend his complaint was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Poemoceah plausibly alleged a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against Swenson, as the facts suggested that Swenson's use of force was not objectively reasonable. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Poemoceah’s deliberate indifference to medical needs claim, First Amendment retaliation claim, supervisory liability claims, Monell claim against Morton County, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim under North Dakota law. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of Poemoceah’s motion to amend his complaint. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings on the Fourth Amendment claim against Swenson. View "Poemoceah v. Morton County" on Justia Law

Marc and Augustus Degenhardt alleged that Corpus Christi Police Lieutenant Phillip Bintliff unlawfully initiated a traffic stop and that Bintliff and Officer Armando Cisneros unlawfully searched and towed their vehicle, retaliating against them for engaging in protected speech. The incident occurred when Marc, driving a Dodge Challenger with Augustus as a passenger, was stopped by Bintliff, who accused Marc of reckless driving and racing another vehicle. During the stop, Cisneros arrived and observed an open box of White Claw Hard Seltzers in the car. The officers ordered the brothers out of the car, conducted a search, and impounded the vehicle, charging them with minor alcohol possession and issuing a reckless driving warning. The charges were later dropped.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed the suit, finding that the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle and that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity for the remaining claims. The Degenhardts appealed the dismissal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the Degenhardts had sufficiently alleged a Fourth Amendment violation regarding the initial traffic stop, as the complaint suggested that Bintliff lacked reasonable suspicion. However, the court agreed with the district court that the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle due to the visible alcohol. The court also found that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity for the claims related to the vehicle's impoundment and the alleged retaliation for protected speech.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings regarding the Fourth Amendment claim related to the traffic stop. View "Degenhardt v. Bintliff" on Justia Law

Seven plaintiffs, all members of the Air Force, challenged the Air Force’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate, arguing it violated their religious beliefs. They sought religious exemptions, which were denied, leading to administrative discharge proceedings. One plaintiff, Byron O. Starks, Jr., was separated from service, allegedly for a preexisting medical condition, though he claimed it was due to his refusal to get vaccinated.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana dismissed the case as moot after the Air Force rescinded the vaccine mandate. The court also dismissed Starks’s claims for lack of standing, citing his separation from service and failure to exhaust administrative remedies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the rescission of the mandate did not address all alleged harms, particularly the claim that the Air Force’s religious exemption process was a sham. The court held that Starks had standing because his separation caused ongoing harm, such as ineligibility for certain veteran benefits. The court also clarified that RFRA claims are not subject to the Mindes exhaustion requirement, allowing Starks to proceed without exhausting intraservice remedies.The Fifth Circuit determined that the claims of the six still-serving plaintiffs were not moot, as they alleged ongoing harm from the Air Force’s religious exemption process. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the plaintiffs to continue their challenge against the Air Force’s broader vaccination policies and religious accommodations process. View "Crocker v. Austin" on Justia Law

In this case, three plaintiffs—Christian Healthcare Centers, Sacred Heart of Jesus Parish, and St. Joseph Parish St. Johns—challenged aspects of Michigan’s antidiscrimination laws, alleging that these laws violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs argued that the laws chilled their speech and conduct, particularly regarding their religious beliefs and practices related to gender identity and sexual orientation.The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan dismissed each case for lack of standing. The court reasoned that none of the plaintiffs had shown that Michigan’s laws arguably proscribed their speech or conduct, nor had they demonstrated a credible threat of enforcement against them. Consequently, the district court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court agreed in part, finding that Michigan’s laws arguably forbade several of the plaintiffs’ pleaded activities. The court concluded that Christian Healthcare and Sacred Heart had plausibly established a credible threat of enforcement against them for some of the challenged provisions of Michigan’s laws. However, the court found that St. Joseph Parish had not plausibly established standing, as it failed to show a credible threat of enforcement.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the claims related to the Equal Accommodations Act (EAA) but reversed the dismissal of the claims related to the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA) for Christian Healthcare and Sacred Heart. The court remanded the cases to the district court to evaluate the plaintiffs’ requests for injunctive relief. The district court’s decisions were thus affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Christian Healthcare Centers v. Nessel" on Justia Law

Absolute Essence LLC sought to enter the medical marijuana market in Arkansas but was unable to secure a license. The company invested over a million dollars in the application process, including finding a location and addressing zoning issues. The Arkansas Medical Marijuana Commission outsourced the review process to Public Consulting Group, Inc., which scored 197 applications in two weeks. Absolute Essence received a low score and alleged that the scoring process was manipulated, with conflicts of interest among the scorers favoring larger, established players and resulting in racial disparities in license awards.The case was initially filed in state court, alleging tortious interference, fraud, racial discrimination, and civil conspiracy. The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, which dismissed the case for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court found that Absolute Essence's tortious interference claim failed because it did not establish a precise business expectancy with a specific third party. The fraud claim was dismissed due to a lack of justifiable reliance, as the company’s actions predated the involvement of the outside scorers. The race-discrimination claims were dismissed for failing to allege intentional discrimination, as the complaint only suggested a disparate impact without sufficient factual support. Finally, the civil conspiracy claim was dismissed because it could not stand without an underlying tort.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that Absolute Essence did not plead enough facts to support any of its claims. View "Absolute Essence LLC v. Public Consulting Group LLC" on Justia Law

The appellants, Meredith O'Neil, Jessica Svedine, Deanna Corby, and Roberto Silva, sued various officials from the Canton Police Department and the Town of Canton, Massachusetts, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the enforcement of Massachusetts witness intimidation statutes, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268 §§ 13A and 13B. They claimed that these statutes violated their First Amendment rights, fearing prosecution for their actions during a November 5, 2023 protest and alleging that their speech would be chilled for a planned protest on November 12, 2023. The appellants moved for emergency relief to enjoin the enforcement of these statutes.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied the emergency motion on November 10, 2023. The court assumed the plaintiffs had standing but found they did not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The court held that the statutes served compelling interests in protecting the administration of justice and were narrowly tailored. The court also found that the plaintiffs had not shown they faced a risk of irreparable harm, noting that the plaintiffs had other public forums to express their views. The balance of harms and public interest considerations also weighed against granting the injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and dismissed the appeal as moot. The court noted that the state court had dismissed the charges against the appellants for lack of probable cause, and no ongoing conduct remained for the court to enjoin. The court also found that the appellants' general allegations of future protests did not show a credible threat of prosecution, failing to establish standing for their pre-enforcement challenges. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings as appropriate. View "O'Neil v. Canton Police Department" on Justia Law

Kimberly Diei, a pharmacy student at the University of Tennessee Health Science Center, maintained social media accounts under a pseudonym where she posted about song lyrics, fashion, and sexuality. Her posts did not identify her as a student or affiliate her with the university. Despite this, the College of Pharmacy's Professional Conduct Committee investigated her social media activity following anonymous complaints. The Committee found her posts "sexual," "crude," and "vulgar," and ultimately voted to expel her. Diei appealed, and the Dean reversed the expulsion decision.Diei then filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, asserting violations of her First Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages for emotional distress. The district court dismissed her complaint, ruling that her claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were moot due to her graduation and that her remaining claims failed to state a claim for relief. The court also held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that Diei's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were moot but found that her claims for damages were still viable. The court held that Diei plausibly alleged a First Amendment violation, as her social media posts were unrelated to her studies, caused no disruption, and were made under a pseudonym. The court also found that the district court improperly relied on documents not properly before it when dismissing Diei's complaint. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of Diei's claims for damages and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that Diei's speech was protected by the First Amendment and that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage. View "Diei v. Boyd" on Justia Law

Jonathan Eugene Brunson, an inmate in North Carolina, filed a § 1983 action against the North Carolina Attorney General and other state officials, seeking various forms of relief. Brunson acknowledged that he had previously filed four § 1983 suits that were dismissed under Heck v. Humphrey, which bars federal courts from entertaining § 1983 suits for damages that would undermine the legality of a conviction unless the conviction has been invalidated. Despite these dismissals, Brunson moved to proceed in forma pauperis.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina initially granted Brunson’s request to proceed in forma pauperis but later vacated that order, citing the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (PLRA) three-strikes rule. The district court determined that Brunson’s prior dismissals under Heck counted as strikes for failure to state a claim. Consequently, Brunson prepaid the filing fee, but his § 1983 complaint was eventually dismissed for reasons not relevant to the current appeal. Brunson then appealed and applied to proceed on appeal without prepaying fees, arguing that Heck dismissals should not count as PLRA strikes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case to determine whether a dismissal under Heck constitutes a strike under the PLRA. The court held that a Heck dismissal is necessarily for failure to state a claim because it denies the existence of a cause of action unless the plaintiff can prove that the conviction or sentence has been invalidated. Therefore, such dismissals count as strikes under the PLRA. As Brunson had at least three prior Heck dismissals, the court denied his motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. View "Brunson v. Stein" on Justia Law

In 2020, the Springfield R-12 School District mandated "equity training" for its employees. Two employees, Brooke Henderson and Jennifer Lumley, attended the training and later sued the school district and several officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They claimed that the training compelled them to speak on matters of public concern and engaged in viewpoint discrimination, violating their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The training included interactive sessions and online modules that required participants to discuss prompts and select "correct" answers to questions about equity and diversity.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri granted summary judgment in favor of the school district, ruling that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not suffer an injury in fact. The court also deemed the lawsuit frivolous and awarded attorney’s fees to the school district. The plaintiffs appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal, agreeing that the plaintiffs did not establish an injury in fact. The court found that the plaintiffs' fear of punishment for their speech during the training was speculative and not objectively reasonable. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs' completion of online modules did not constitute a First Amendment injury. However, the Eighth Circuit reversed the award of attorney’s fees, determining that the plaintiffs' claims were not frivolous given the nuanced and unsettled nature of the constitutional issues involved. View "Henderson v. Springfield R-12 School District" on Justia Law

In the early morning, Javier Ambler II was driving without dimming his high beams, prompting a Texas sheriff’s deputy to signal him to stop. Ambler refused, leading to a high-speed chase involving multiple officers. The pursuit ended when Ambler crashed into trees in Austin, Texas. As officers attempted to arrest him, Ambler, who had congestive heart failure, repeatedly stated he could not breathe. Despite his pleas, Austin City Policeman Michael Nissen and other officers continued to restrain him. Ambler was eventually handcuffed but appeared limp and was later pronounced dead at a hospital. His family sued, alleging excessive force and bystander liability.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas denied Nissen’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, citing genuine disputes of material fact. The court found that the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, could support a finding that Nissen used excessive force and failed to intervene to prevent other officers from using excessive force.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of summary judgment because the appeal did not turn on a pure issue of law but rather on disputed facts. The court emphasized that factual disputes, such as whether Ambler was resisting arrest or posed a threat, were material to the plaintiffs’ claims and should be resolved by a jury. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ambler v. Nissen" on Justia Law