Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

After being fired by his employer, Anheuser-Busch Companies, LLC, Intervenor filed suit in federal district court, alleging that his termination reflected racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII. Anheuser-Busch filed a motion seeking to compel arbitration of Intervenor’s district court claims, asserting that at the time when he was hired, Intervenor had agreed to be bound by the company’s Dispute Resolution Policy. Intervenor disagreed that he was required to arbitrate his claims. After Anheuser-Busch asked the district court to compel arbitration, Intervenor filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB, arguing that Defendant’s efforts to enforce its arbitration agreement contravened the collective bargaining agreement and constituted a unilateral change to the terms of Intervenor’s employment, in violation of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).   The Eleventh Circuit granted the petition for review of the Board’s order dismissing the complaint, vacated the decision of the Board, and remanded for consideration of whether enforcement of the Dispute Resolution Policy against Intervenor would violate the NLRA. The court held that the Board applied an erroneously narrow standard for determining whether Anheuser-Busch’s motion had an illegal objective. The court explained that on remand, the Board should instead determine whether the outcome sought by Anheuser-Busch’s motion— the compelled arbitration of Brown’s Title VII claims under the Dispute Resolution Policy—would violate the NLRA. If the Board decides that the answer to that question is “yes,” it should then order all relief that is appropriate based on Anheuser-Busch’s unlawful conduct. View "International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 947 v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged (1) Officer N. used excessive force when he tased Plaintiff at the scene of an automobile wreck, (2) Officer H. failed to intervene to prevent Officer N’s excessive force, and (3) the City of Madison, Alabama admitted the officers’ actions were the result of its municipal policy. Relying on body camera footage, Defendants Officer N., Officer H., and the City moved to dismiss. The district court granted their motions to dismiss. On appeal, Plaintiff argued the district court erred by (1) considering the officers’ body camera footage when ruling on Defendants’ motions to dismiss without converting them into summary judgment motions, (2) granting qualified immunity to Officer N., (3) dismissing Plaintiff’s failure-to-intervene claim against Officer H., and (4) dismissing his municipal liability claim against the City.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court properly considered the body camera footage, correctly ruled that Officer N. did not violate a constitutional right and thus Officer H. had no duty to intervene and accurately determined that Plaintiff’s claim against the City failed as a matter of law. The court explained Officer N.’s use of the taser was justified because of (1) Plaintiff’s repeated failure to comply with Officer N.’s commands, (2) Plaintiff’s unsafe driving that had just caused an automobile accident, (3) Plaintiff’s repeated efforts to get back in the vehicle, (4) Plaintiff’s physical resistance to Officer N.’s attempts to remove him from the vehicle, and (5) the tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving series of events. Thus, the court concluded that Officer N.’s single use of a taser in dart mode was objectively reasonable. View "Curtis Baker v. City of Madison, Alabama, et al." on Justia Law

The Restaurant Law Center and the Texas Restaurant Association (“Plaintiffs”) challenge a Department of Labor regulation that refines how the federal minimum wage applies to tipped employees. The district court denied Plaintiffs a preliminary injunction on the sole ground that they failed to establish irreparable harm from complying with the new rule.   The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Plaintiffs sufficiently showed irreparable harm in unrecoverable compliance costs. The court explained that the 30-minute limitation is a new constraint on the tip credit that both requires distinct recordkeeping and affects the existing 20-percent standard. Neither the district court nor the Department explained why this new requirement would not impose new costs. To the contrary, the rule itself confirms that employers who want to continue claiming the tip credit—like Plaintiffs’ members—will “incur ongoing management costs” to ensure employees do not spend more than 30 minutes continuously performing directly supporting work. The court found that the district court abused its discretion in finding no evidence of irreparable harm View "Restaurant Law Center v. LABR" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a long-term employee of Defendant St. Cecilia Catholic School. In her final year of employment, Defendant worked part-time as an art teacher and office administrator. Following her discharge, Defendant filed this action against St. Cecilia for age discrimination in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) The trial court granted St. Cecilia’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff’s suit was barred by the ministerial exception, a constitutional doctrine that precludes certain employment claims brought against a religious institution by its ministers.   The Second Appellate District reversed the judgment in favor of St. Cecilia and remanded for further proceedings. The court concluded that there are triable issues of material fact as to whether the ministerial exception applies in this case. Further, the court wrote that St. Cecilia did not waive the ministerial exception by failing to assert the defense in its answer. The evidence that Plaintiff promoted “Christ-like” behavior in her class does not establish, as a matter of law, that she performed vital religious duties for St. Cecilia or otherwise qualified as a minister. Because there are triable issues of material fact as to whether the ministerial exception applies to Plaintiff’s former job position as an art teacher and an office administrator, St. Cecilia was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s age discrimination suit. View "Atkins v. St. Cecilia Catholic School" on Justia Law

Plaintiff saw Defendant, an officer, pointing a firearm at her 12- and 14-year-old sons down the street from their family’s home. When Plaintiff approached to ask what happened, Defendant repeatedly ordered her to “get back.” After Plaintiff questioned the order, Defendant briefly pointed his taser at her. Plainitff then complied with his orders. Her sons were eventually cleared of any wrongdoing. Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action against Defendant, claiming he used excessive force. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendant on the claim after concluding he was entitled to qualified immunity. Defendant appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant was placed in a position where he had two possibly armed suspects detained in front of him and a third unknown individual approaching from behind, creating a potentially serious safety risk. Adding to the circumstances, when Defendant ordered Plaintiff to “get back,” she moved to the side, but she did not immediately comply by moving backward. Rather, she questioned the order and moved sideways. Ordered to get back a second time, she again questioned the order and remained where she was until after the taser was drawn. Accordingly, the court wrote that under the totality of the circumstances, Defendant momentarily pointing his taser at Plaintiff to gain control of the scene was not unreasonable. View "Casondra Pollreis v. Lamont Marzolf" on Justia Law

Greater Birmingham Ministries (“GBM”), an Alabamian non-profit organization dedicated to aiding low-income individuals, and several Alabamian felons (collectively “Appellants”) appealed the district court’s summary judgment denying their Equal Protection Clause challenge to Amendment 579 of the Alabama state constitution, their Ex Post Facto Clause, challenge to Amendment 579’s disenfranchisement provisions, and their National Voting Registration Act of 1993 (“NVRA”), challenge to the format of Alabama’s mail voting registration form.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that (1) Amendment 579 successfully dissipated any taint from the racially discriminatory motives behind the 1901 Alabama constitution; (2) Amendment 579 does not impose punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause; and (3) Alabama’s mail voting registration form complies with the NVRA. The court wrote that it rejects Appellants’ invitation to review the extent the Alabama legislature debated the “moral turpitude” language of Amendment 579. Further, the court explained that Section 20508(b)(2)(A) is a notice statute enacted for the convenience of voting registrants. Alabama’s mail-in voting form has provided sufficient notice by informing registrants that persons convicted of disqualifying felonies are not eligible to vote and providing an easily accessible link whereby voters convicted of felonies can determine their voter eligibility. Accordingly, Alabama has complied with the requirements of Section 20508(b)(2)(A). View "Treva Thompson, et al. v. Secretary of State for the State of Alabama, et al." on Justia Law

After the Acting General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board withdrew an unfair labor practice complaint that his predecessor had issued against a union, the aggrieved employer requested permission to appeal the complaint’s withdrawal to the Board. The Board denied the request, concluding that the Acting General Counsel’s decision was an unreviewable act of prosecutorial discretion. The employer then petitioned the Fifth Circuit for review of the Board’s order.   The Fifth Circuit denied the petition. The court concluded that it has jurisdiction over the petition for review, that Acting General Counsel’s designation was valid and that the Board permissibly determined that Acting General Counsel had discretion to withdraw the complaint against the Unions. The court explained that the Board’s own conclusion that the General Counsel has the discretion to withdraw unfair labor practice complaints in cases where a motion for summary judgment has been filed but no hearing has occurred, and the Board has neither issued a Notice to Show Cause nor transferred the case to itself fits squarely within the holding of UFCW. As such, it is a permissible interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) View "United Natural Foods v. NLRB" on Justia Law

In 2017, the County initiated an administrative tax foreclosure against BSI. The County Board of Revision (BOR) issued its final adjudication of foreclosure in June 2019. Because the County had opted for the alternative right of redemption, BSI had 28 days to pay the taxes before the County took title to the property. Days later, BSI filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition, which automatically stayed the BOR’s final judgment and 28-day redemption period. The bankruptcy court granted the County relief from the stay on January 17, 2020. The BOR determined that the statutory redemption period expired on January 21, 2020. On January 30, rather than sell the property, the County transferred it to its land bank (Ohio Rev. Code 323.78.1). When a county sells foreclosed property at auction, it may not keep proceeds beyond the taxes the former owner owed; if the county transfers the property to the land bank, “the land becomes ‘free and clear of all impositions and any other liens.’”BSI filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that a significant difference between the appraised value of the property and the amount that the County alleged BSI owed meant that the County’s action violated the Takings Clause. The district court dismissed the case under the two-year statute of limitations. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The limitations period began to run when the redemption period ended on January 21, 2020. If BSI paid its delinquent taxes during that period, the County would have been prohibited from taking the property. View "Beaver Street Investments, LLC v. Summit County, Ohio" on Justia Law

This case started more than fifty years ago when Minnie Liddell sued to desegregate the St. Louis public school system. The NAACP joined the lawsuit, and the State of Missouri (among others) became a defendant. The parties struck a deal that lasted until 1999 when they agreed to end Missouri’s remedial obligations. The Missouri Legislature ratified the parties’ settlement agreement and created a charter-school option. A group of charter schools complained to the Missouri Legislature, which altered the funding formula in 2006. The revised formula, part of Senate Bill 287, is what has led to the current dispute. The St. Louis Public School District and one of the plaintiffs asked the district court to enforce the settlement agreement by having Missouri reimburse it for the special-sales-tax revenue it had lost under the new funding formula. The district court sided with Missouri, and both sides appealed. Plaintiffs continued to believe that the St. Louis Public School District should receive all the special-sales-tax revenue. And Missouri argued that the desegregation-spending condition finds no support in the settlement agreement.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment but vacated the part requiring charter schools to spend those funds on “desegregation measures.” The court explained that there has been no “disproportionate adverse financial impact” on the St. Louis Public School District because it never had a right to keep all the special-sales-tax revenue for itself. Moreover, the court rejected the argument that allowing charter schools to spend their money as they see fit is inconsistent with the “purpose” of the settlement agreement. View "Deric Liddell v. State of Missouri" on Justia Law

Plaintiff spent more than twelve years in state prison because of his wrongful conviction for two murders. In 2015, the state district court granted the Harris County District Attorney’s motion to dismiss the charges against Plaintiff and Plaintiff was released from prison. Plaintiff filed a petition with the Texas Office of the Comptroller for compensation under the Tim Cole Act, which provides state compensation to individuals who have been wrongfully convicted of state crimes in state courts. His petition was denied because (1) it was not based on a finding that Plaintiff was “actually innocent,” (2) Plaintiff had not received a pardon, and (3) the district attorney had not filed a qualifying motion. While Plaintiff was pursuing compensation under the Tim Cole Act, he brought a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action in federal district court. The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants and dismissed the remainder of Plaintiff’s 1983 claims.   The Fifth Circuit previously certified a question to the Texas Supreme Court in this matter, asking whether the Tim Cole Act bars maintenance of a federal lawsuit involving the same subject matter that was filed before the claimant received compensation under the Tim Cole Act. Having received a response from the Texas Supreme Court in the affirmative, the Fifth Circuit affirmed. In light of this clarified meaning of Section 103.153(b) of the Tim Cole Act, the court analyzed the district court’s grant of Defendants summary judgment motion and found that Plaintiff’s federal lawsuit is barred by his acceptance of Tim Cole Act compensation. View "Brown v. City of Houston" on Justia Law