Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff is a U.S. citizen and a U.S. national, as that term is defined in 22 U.S.C. Section 6023(15). He claims to be the “rightful owner of an 82.5% interest in certain commercial waterfront real property in the Port of Santiago de Cuba,” identified by the Cuban government as La Marítima and Terminal Naviera. According to the complaints, the knowing and intentional conduct of Carnival and Royal Caribbean constitutes trafficking under Section 6023(13)(A). As a result, Plaintiff—who provided the cruise lines with written notice by certified mail of his intent to commence an action under Title III—claims that he is entitled to damages under Section 6082.   The Eleventh Circuit granted the petition for panel rehearing and vacated our prior opinion. The court held that Plaintiff has standing to assert his Title III claims, but that those claims fail on the merits. The court explained that the Cuban government confiscated La Marítima prior to March 12, 1996, and because Plaintiff acquired his interest in the property through inheritance after that date, his claims failed. The court, therefore, affirmed the district court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings in favor of Carnival and Royal Caribbean. View "Javier Garcia-Bengochea v. Carnival Corporation" on Justia Law

The City of Costa Mesa (“City”) began amending its zoning code to reduce the number and concentration of sober living homes in its residential neighborhoods. Two of its new ordinances—Ordinances 14-13 and 15-11 (“Ordinances”)—made it unlawful to operate sober living homes without a permit. Appellants SoCal Recovery, LLC (“SoCal”) and RAW Recovery, LLC (“RAW”) (together, “Appellants”) operate sober living homes in Costa Mesa, California, for persons recovering from drug and alcohol addiction. Appellants alleged that two new City ordinances and the City’s enforcement practices discriminated against them on the basis of disability under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). Granting the City’s motions for summary judgment, the district court found that Appellants did not establish that residents in their sober living homes were actually disabled, or that the City regarded their residents as disabled.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment. The panel held that Appellants and other sober living home operators can satisfy the “actual disability” prong of the ADA, FHA, or FEHA on a collective basis by demonstrating that they serve or intend to serve individuals with actual disabilities; they need not provide individualized evidence of the actual disability of their residents. Rather, they can meet their burden by proffering admissible evidence that they have policies and procedures to ensure that they serve or will serve those with actual disabilities and that they adhere or will adhere to such policies and procedures. prong of the disability definition. View "SOCAL RECOVERY, LLC, ET AL V. CITY OF COSTA MESA, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff a deaf man, sought an interpreter to communicate with Novant Health Huntersville Medical Center during his wife’s childbirth there. After Novant Health failed to provide him with a live interpreter or a functioning Video Remote Interpreting device, Plaintiff filed this disability discrimination lawsuit. The district court dismissed his claim.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment finding that the district court applied an incorrect standard of law. The court held that under the proper standard, Plaintiff has plausibly pled enough under the Rehabilitation Act to survive a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal motion. The court explained that Patients often arrive at hospitals in pain, unconscious, or feeling intense stress. In these situations, which can be not only confusing but overwhelming, a patient’s companion, often a spouse or a family member, may be the only advocate available. Plaintiff, a hearing-impaired individual, was unable to communicate his wife’s complicated medical history to her doctors during childbirth, despite repeated requests for some effective means of doing so. The situation was a highrisk one for the couple, and the medical event one of the highest urgency and meaning. To have that single advocate barred from communication with a hospital and its staff is to leave the patient stranded. View "Neil Basta v. Novant Health Incorporated" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an attorney, sued the Minnesota Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility, the Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board, associated government officials, and lawyers and other private defendants alleging, among other claims, they violated his constitutional rights by pursuing an ethics complaint against him. The district court granted the state defendants' motion to dismiss under Younger v. Harris and found that Plaintiff waived his abuse-of-process claim against the private defendants. The court also held that Plaintiff lacked standing to seek sanctions based on the private defendants' alleged violations of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct.Finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in any of its determinations, the Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Herbert Igbanugo v. Minnesota OLPR" on Justia Law

In 2011, plaintiff R. Kemp was convicted, released from prison, and placed on parole. In 2020, Amazon.com, Inc. (Amazon) offered Kemp a job in Sacramento. Defendant Accurate Background LLC (Accurate) provided a background report to Amazon revealing Kemp’s criminal conviction. Amazon then withdrew its job offer. Because Kemp’s 2011 conviction predated the 2020 report by more than seven years, he filed a complaint alleging Accurate: (1) violated the California Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA); (2) violated the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (CCRAA); and (3) derivatively violated the state’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL). Accurate filed a demurrer: Kemp’s parole ended in 2014, which predated the 2020 report by less than seven years. Accurate argued under the ICRAA and the CCRAA, “the term ‘parole’ refers to the end of the parole period,” thus barring liability. Alternatively, Accurate argued the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) preempted the state ICRAA, and therefore Kemp’s ICRAA claim was barred as a matter of law. The trial court overruled Accurate’s demurrer, in part, finding “the plain meaning of ‘from the date of . . . parole’ refers to the start date of conditional release.” The court sustained Accurate’s demurrer, in part, finding “the FCRA preempts the ICRAA claim.” Accurate and Kemp both filed petitions for extraordinary writ relief to the Court of Appeal. The Court held the phrase "from the date of parole" referred to the start date of parole, and the FCRA did not preempt Kemp’s ICRAA claim. Thus, the appellate court directed the trial court to vacate its prior order, which partially sustained Accurate’s demurrer, and to issue a new order overruling the demurrer in its entirety. View "Kemp v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted discretionary review to consider whether the Commonwealth Court erred when it applied the plurality’s analysis in Easton Area School District v. Miller, 232 A.3d 716 (Pa. 2020) (Easton Area II) and ordered redaction and disclosure of the school bus surveillance video it determined to be an education record subject to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). In 2016, Valerie Hawkins, on behalf of Fox 43 News (collectively, Requester), submitted a Right-to-Know Law (RTKL) request to Central Dauphin School District (the District), seeking a copy of school bus surveillance video which captured an incident between a 17-year-old member of a District high school basketball team (the student), and a parent of another player (the adult), who allegedly grabbed the student’s wrist during their interaction. The incident occurred in a parking lot outside the high school’s gymnasium, while the players and school staff were boarding the school bus following a basketball game. The adult involved received a summary citation for harassment related to the incident. Requester attached a copy of the citation notice from the magisterial district court record to the record request; the notice identified the adult and student by name as the defendant and victim, respectively. Karen McConnell, the District’s open records officer, denied the request for access to the video, explaining it was an education record containing “personally identifiable information directly related to a student or students,” which, according to the District, protected the video from release under FERPA, and consequently precluded its disclosure under the RTKL as well. The Supreme Court concluded the Commonwealth Court did not err when it applied the analysis articulated in Easton Area II and ordered the mandatory redaction and disclosure of a school bus surveillance video it determined to be an education record subject to FERPA. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court's order with instructions to the District to reasonably redact the students’ personally identifiable information prior to disclosure. View "Central Dauphin Sch. Dist. v. Hawkins, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs L.E., B.B., A.Z., and C.S., are students who have respiratory disabilities (“Students”). They appealed the denial of their motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The Students sued Defendants, the Superintendent of the Cobb County School District, individual members of the Cobb County School Board, and the Cobb County School District (collectively, “CCSD”), in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Students claim that CCSD’s refusal to provide reasonable accommodations for access to in-person schooling constitutes a violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504”).   The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded for analysis under the correct scope: access to the benefits provided by in-person schooling. The court held this claim presents a live controversy that survives mootness and the district court erred in its review of the Students’ discrimination claims. The Students argue that CCSD ignored those recommendations and continues to disregard CDC guidance in this respect. Therefore, this remains a live controversy. A judgment in their favor would grant the Students meaningful relief by requiring CCSD to follow the guidance on accommodating students with disabilities under the ADA and Section 504 as it is updated—a practice the Students claim CCSD refuses to do. Thus, this claim remains a live controversy. Further, the court wrote that the district court erred in holding the Students must show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits on a disparate treatment claim. View "L.E., et al v. Superintendent of Cobb County School District, et al" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 clearly established Defendant Utah Highway Patrolman Blaine Robbins violated Heather Leyva’s Fourteenth and Fourth Amendment rights by pulling her over without reasonable suspicion to do so and by sending her flirtatious texts about the administration of a commercial towing relationship between her employer and the Utah Highway Patrol. Leyva served as the liaison between the Utah Highway Patrol (“UHP”) and West Coast Towing (“WCT”)—one of three towing companies in the Heavy Duty Towing Rotation (“HDTR”). Over time their professional relationship developed into a personal one. Defendant texted Leyva one night asking about work-related matters. In response to one question, Leyva told Defendant to “standby” because she was on the freeway. Defendant asked where and said he would pull her over. Defendant spotted her, turned on his lights, and initiated an apparent traffic stop. Leyva pulled over, not knowing Defendant was the driver of the patrol car, and got her identification ready. Defendant claimed he pulled Leyva over as “a joke between friends.” A month later, Leyva reported to her boss she felt Defendant was sexually harassing her. Her boss contacted UHP to report Leyva’s complaints of sexual harassment. As a result, UHP conducted an investigation. Relevant to the issues on appeal, the investigation found Defendant did not improperly administer the HDTR but concluded his conduct revealed his desire to further his personal relationship with Leyva. It also determined that Defendant lacked reasonable suspicion when he stopped Leyva. The district court found that Defendant did not violate clearly established law. Defendant did not dispute for purposes of this appeal that he violated Leyva’s constitutional rights. He argued only that the district court correctly determined the law was not clearly established for either alleged violation. Plaintiff alleged, and the district court found, that a jury could find Defendant violated Leyva’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Tenth Circuit concluded the district court erred by granting summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims insofar as they related to Defendant’s traffic stop of Leyva. But the Court agreed with the district court that Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights arising in connection with the administration of HDTR, were not clearly established at the time of the violation. View "Shepherd v. Robbins" on Justia Law

Appellants J.K. and Mr. Electric (jointly “Mr. Electric”) challenged the district court’s grant of summary judgment in this 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action in favor of Defendants-Appellees, and the Washington State Department of Labor and Industries (together “the Department”). Two Mr. Electric employees provided the Department with copious amounts of Mr. Electric’s data, particularly printouts of cell site location information that provided GPS coordinates for company vehicles which showed all movement of electricians in the field. The Department used the data to write citations and assess administrative fines against Mr. Electric for violations of Washington’s electrical code stemming from improper supervision of journeymen electricians in Clark County.   Appellants argued that Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), and Wilson v. United States, 13 F.4th 961 (9th Cir. 2021), foreclosed the Department’s use of Appellants’ location information because, when read together, the cases extinguished the applicability of the private search exception to the Fourth Amendment to location information.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Appellees. The panel noted that although Carpenter held that the third-party doctrine does not apply as an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement when the government seeks cell site location information, the private search exception is an altogether separate exception to the Fourth Amendment. View "JAMES KLEISER, ET AL V. BENJAMIN CHAVEZ, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Religious Sisters of Mercy, Sacred Heart Mercy Health Care Center, SMP Health System, and the University of Mary (collectively, “RSM plaintiffs”) filed suit, alleging that the Department of Health and Human Services (‘HHS’) had violated, among other things, the APA, the First Amendment, and the RFRA. Additionally, the Catholic Benefits Association (CBA); Diocese of Fargo (Diocese); Catholic Charities North Dakota (“Plaintiffs”) filed suit, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to the RFRA against HHS’s and the EEOC’s interpretation and enforcement of the relevant statutes to the extent they required the CBA plaintiffs to “provide, perform, pay for, cover, or facilitate access to health services for gender transition.”   The district court held that the RFRA entitles Plaintiffs to permanent injunctive relief. On appeal, HHS and the EEOC (collectively, “the government”) challenge the district court’s grant of declaratory and permanent injunctive relief to Plaintiffs.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court first held that the CBA lacks associational standing to sue on behalf of unnamed members. However, the court held that Plaintiffs have satisfied the elements necessary to establish standing to challenge the government’s interpretation of Section 1557. Moreover, the court wrote that contrary to the government’s position, we conclude that the district court correctly determined that the CBA plaintiffs face a “credible threat” of enforcement from the EEOC. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court correctly held that “intrusion upon the Catholic Plaintiffs’ exercise of religion is sufficient to show irreparable harm.” View "The Religious Sisters of Mercy v. Xavier Becerra" on Justia Law