Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In these consolidated appeals, Plaintiff challenged the district court’s award of summary judgment to defendant Liberty University, Inc. (“Liberty”) on Palmer’s claim of age discrimination, pursued under provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the “ADEA”)(the “Statutory Ruling”). On the other hand, Liberty, by cross-appeal, challenged an earlier award of summary judgment that was made to Plaintiff, in which the court ruled that Plaintiff was not a “minister” for purposes of the First Amendment’s so-called “ministerial exception” (the “Constitutional Ruling”).   The Fourth Circuit dismissed Liberty’s cross-appeal and vacated the Constitutional Ruling. The court agreed with the district court that Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence of age-based discrimination to overcome Liberty’s summary judgment motion on that issue. The court reasoned that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that age was the but-for cause of her 2018 nonrenewal. Plaintiff was not meeting Liberty’s legitimate expectations at the time of her nonrenewal in that she repeatedly failed to develop a digital art skillset. And Plaintiff has failed to contend with the fact that the comments she characterizes as evidence of age discrimination — the retirement comments plus the resistant-to-change comment — were made subsequent to the Chair and the Dean having resolved not to renew her teaching contract for the 2018-19 school year. Accordingly, the court was satisfied to affirm the Statutory Ruling in favor of Liberty. Moreover, in light of that disposition — and pursuant to the constitutional avoidance doctrine — the court refrained from resolving whether Plaintiff was a minister for purposes of the First Amendment’s ministerial exception. View "Eva Palmer v. Liberty University, Incorporated" on Justia Law

On August 31, 2012, in San Bernardino County Superior Court, Appellant entered a no-contest plea to one count of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. He was placed on three years formal probation. Shortly after being placed on probation, Appellant was deported. He later illegally reentered the country. In 2014, his probation was reinstated, and on June 25, 2015, the sentencing court transferred probation supervision and jurisdiction from San Bernardino County to Los Angeles County, where Appellant permanently resided, pursuant to section 1203.9. On April 6, 2021, Appellant filed a motion in Los Angeles County Superior Court to vacate his plea pursuant to section 1473.7. By then, he had already completed his probationary sentence. On August 23, 2021, the trial court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to hear Appellant’s motion and directed him to refile the motion in San Bernardino County Superior Court.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that Appellant should have filed his motion to withdraw his plea in the county where he was prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced. The question was whether the phrase “full jurisdiction” is meant to remove the authority of the original sentencing court from everything associated with the case or whether “full jurisdiction” refers only to matters relating to the probationary sentence. The court held that section 1203.9 was enacted solely to effectuate more streamlined and effective supervision of probationers statewide by ensuring that the court of their county of residence is empowered to supervise and adjudicate issues arising as a result of the probationary grant. View "P. v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Project Veritas sued the Oregon Attorney General, Ellen Rosenblum, and the District Attorney of Multnomah County, Oregon, Michael Schmidt (collectively, Oregon), challenging section 165.540 as an unconstitutional restriction of protected speech. Oregon moved to dismiss the complaint. The district court partially granted the motion, and the parties agreed to dismiss the remaining claims with prejudice. Project Veritas appealed.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The law provides two exceptions relevant to this appeal: (1) section 165.540(1)(c) does not apply to a person who records a conversation during a felony that endangers human life, and (2) section 165.540(1)(c) allows a person to record a conversation in which a law enforcement officer is a participant if the recording is made while the officer is performing official duties and meets other criteria. Applying Animal Legal Def. Fund. v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018), the panel held that section 165.540(1)(c) regulates protected speech (unannounced audiovisual recording) and is content-based because it distinguishes between particular topics by restricting some subject matters (e.g., a state executive officer’s official activities) and not others (e.g., a police officer’s official activities). The panel further determined that section 165.540(1)(c) burdens more speech than is necessary to achieve its stated interest, and there were other ways for Oregon to achieve its interests of protecting conversational privacy. Because section 165.540(1)(c) is not a valid time, place, or manner restriction, it cannot be saved by striking the two exceptions at issue here. View "PROJECT VERITAS, ET AL V. MICHAEL SCHMIDT, ET AL" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff twice lost out on a promotion, she sued Union Pacific for discrimination. The question is whether a dispute over the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement required dismissal. Union Pacific to sought dismissal under the Railway Labor Act, see 45 U.S.C. Section 151, et seq., which requires disputes over the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement to go to arbitration. The district court granted the motion to dismiss.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the parties agree that this case does not involve an attempt to “form” or “secure” a collective-bargaining agreement, so it does not fall into the major-dispute category. In a failure-to-promote case like this one, Plaintiff must establish that (1) she “was a member of a protected group; (2) she was qualified and applied for a promotion to a position for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) she was not promoted; and (4) similarly situated employees, not part of the protected group, were promoted instead.” The sticking point is whether she actually applied for either promotion: she says she did, but Union Pacific disagreed. Whether faxed resumes count as applications under the collective-bargaining agreement is something she will have to prove to establish her prima-facie case. Perhaps the best evidence of its importance was the prominent role it played at trial, especially in the questioning by Plaintiff’s attorney. In these circumstances, the issue is one for the National Railroad Adjustment Board to decide. View "Nancy Avina v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

While Respondent was employed as a truck driver at Greatwide Dedicated Transport II, LLC (“Greatwide”), he witnessed certain drivers receive additional driving assignments in violation of 49 C.F.R. Section 395.3, which regulates the maximum driving time for property-carrying vehicles. After collecting evidence related to the violations, Respondent submitted anonymous letters to management reporting his findings. Soon thereafter, Respondent revealed to management personnel that he was the author of the letters. The following month, Respondent was assigned to deliver two trailers filled with merchandise to two Nordstrom store locations in Manhattan, New York and Paramus, New Jersey. However, when Respondent returned from this assignment, he was suspended for—what Greatwide claimed to be—violations of company policy. Greatwide subsequently terminated and dismissed Respondent without a more explicit explanation. Respondent promptly filed a whistleblower complaint with the U.S. Department of Labor’s (“DOL”) Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”). Following several lengthy delays, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) ruled in Respondent’s favor, ordering Greatwide to pay both back pay and emotional distress damages. The Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) affirmed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the ARB’s conclusion that Respondent engaged in protected activity, that his activity was a contributing factor in his termination, and that Greatwide failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent would have been terminated absent his protected conduct. Nor was Greatwide prejudiced by the proceeding’s delays. Finally, the court declined to enforce the alleged settlement agreement because the company failed to challenge the ALJ’s decision before the ARB. View "Greatwide Dedicated Transport II, LLC v. United States Department of Labor" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, Plaintiff challenged the district court’s award of summary judgment to defendant Liberty University, Inc. (“Liberty”) on Palmer’s claim of age discrimination, pursued under provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the “ADEA”)  (the “Statutory Ruling”). On the other hand, Liberty, by cross-appeal, challenged an earlier award of summary judgment that was made to Plaintiff, in which the court ruled that Plaintiff was not a “minister” for purposes of the First Amendment’s so-called “ministerial exception” (the “Constitutional Ruling”).   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the Statutory Ruling, dismissed Liberty’s cross-appeal, and vacated the Constitutional Ruling. The court explained that it agreed with the district court that Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence of age-based discrimination to overcome Liberty’s summary judgment motion on that issue. Accordingly, the court was satisfied to affirm the Statutory Ruling in favor of Liberty. Moreover, in light of that disposition — and pursuant to the constitutional avoidance doctrine — the court refrained from resolving whether Plaintiff was a minister for purposes of the First Amendment’s ministerial exception. As a result, the court wrote it was obliged to dismiss Liberty’s cross-appeal and vacate the Constitutional Ruling. View "Eva Palmer v. Liberty University, Incorporated" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that Isanti County, Minnesota (the “County”) violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when it unlawfully prosecuted him under the County’s solid waste ordinance (the “Solid Waste Ordinance”). Plaintiff also asserted Minnesota state law claims for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings as to the federal claims in favor of the County and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction on the remaining state law claims.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that while Plaintiff’s opening brief lists 21 cases, which Plaintiff contends constitute proof the County used the Solid Waste Ordinance to wrongly prosecute property owners, none of these cases are properly before the court as they were not included in the complaint. Plaintiff’s complaint contains insufficient factual allegations to sustain a municipal liability claim. Accordingly, the court held that without a constitutional violation, there can be no Section 1983 liability. View "Keith Kiefer v. Isanti County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Alessandra Rogers worked for Chaves County in its jail. Several years into her employment, Rogers drafted a petition that criticized treatment of employees in the jail. The petition was signed by 45 current and former jail employees and was submitted to the county commissioners. Roughly a month after the petition was submitted, county employees searched the jail. During the search, employees found illegal drugs and weapons in a bag under Rogers’ desk. Rogers admitted that the bag was hers and that it contained the drugs and weapons. The county put Rogers on paid administrative leave. When the period of administrative leave ended, the county denied Rogers’ request for a promotion and imposed an unpaid five-day suspension. Rogers later quit. Rogers attributed the search to retaliation for her role in drafting the petition, claiming that the retaliation violated the First Amendment. But the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The court reasoned that even if the defendants had retaliated for Rogers’ role in drafting the petition, liability wouldn’t exist because the petition hadn’t involved a public concern. The Tenth Circuit concurred with the district court and affirmed. View "Rogers v. Riggs, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) Law Enforcement Ranger in Idaho, challenged adverse employment actions taken against him by the Department of the Interior and BLM officials. He sued Defendants, alleging a violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due process.   In an interlocutory appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Defendants’ motion to dismiss an action alleging due process violations and seeking damages pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The panel held that Plaintiff had no claim for money damages under Bivens. Here, Plaintiff’s claims arose in a different context than what the Court has recognized. Congress has also already provided a remedy in this context under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Because this case involves an alternative remedial structure, this case exists in a novel context outside the preexisting Bivens framework. Extending Bivens here would risk impermissible intrusion into the functioning of both the Legislative and Executive Branches. View "DAVID HARPER V. MICHAEL NEDD, ET AL" on Justia Law

The County of Marin (“the County”), at the onset of the pandemic in March 2020, took action to limit the spread of COVID-19 and protect its vulnerable citizens by issuing a public health order that placed certain restrictions on allowable activities. The County continually modified its original health order based on data and increased knowledge of how the virus spreads. During the time that a modified version of the health order was in effect, the County learned of aviation activities by Seaplane Adventures, LLC (“Seaplane”) that violated the applicable health order and began a dialogue with Seaplane regarding its failure to comply with the County’s health order. Seaplane ultimately ceased its operations that were in violation of the County’s health order and filed the suit before us today. Seaplane appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the County.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The panel held that regardless of what the relevant comparison category was for comparing whether the County’s actions were rooted in a rational basis, given that a deadly virus was tearing into the most vulnerable throughout the County, country, and world, the actions of the County met the rational basis standard as it took actions to mitigate the damage of the COVID-19 virus. To the extent that Seaplane was alleging differential treatment between Seaplane and other air carriers providing recreational flights in violation of the health order, the rational basis for the County’s action was also abundantly clear: it simply did not know of the other violators. View "SEAPLANE ADVENTURES, LLC V. COUNTY OF MARIN" on Justia Law