Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Defendants Cpl. John Lee and Cpl. Derek Barker appealed the district court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment seeking qualified immunity from Plaintiffs’ unlawful entry and excessive force claims. The Fifth Circuit unanimously concluded that Lee and Barker are not entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiffs' unlawful entry claims. However, the court held that Lee is entitled to qualified immunity for any force employed from the moment he entered Plaintiffs' house. The court explained that, including the significant fact that the dog was deployed as a wholly duplicative means of detention, no precedent establishes under analogous circumstances how long a bite is too long. Thus, a jury could not find that every reasonable officer would have known that a K9-trained dog had to be released more quickly. Even if Officer Lee mistakenly permitted Dice to bite Plaintiff for a minute, qualified immunity shields him from suit as well as liability. View "Smith v. Lee" on Justia Law

This case was brought by a class of sex offenders (Appellants) civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) pursuant to the Minnesota Civil Commitment and Treatment Act: Sexually Dangerous Persons and Sexual Psychopathic Personalities, codified at Minnesota Statute Section 253D (MCTA). Appellants filed this action against various MSOP managers and officials, as well as the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services (collectively, Appellees). On remand after a second appeal to this Court, the district court granted judgment in favor of Appellees on all of Appellants’ claims. Appellants appeal, challenging the district court’s judgment.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Appellants contend that the district court erred by declining to address their treatment-related claims, alleging that the district court found them to be duplicative of previously decided counts. The court wrote that in making this finding, the district court did not dismiss or otherwise ignore any of the counts before it, which were all conditions-of-confinement and inadequate medical care claims. While Appellants attempted to “reanimate” these claims in a Fourth Amended Complaint, the district court denied the amendment, and Appellants do not challenge that decision on appeal. Accordingly, the court perceived no error in the district court’s treatment of Appellants’ treatment-related claims. Appellants additionally attacked the district court’s conclusion that the MSOP’s Behavioral Expectation Report policy is constitutional. But Appellants focused only on the impact of the policy on their treatment and fail to address the other legitimate government objectives it addresses—such as preserving institutional order at the MSOP. View "Kevin Karsjens v. Jodi Harpstead" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s decision ordering him to pay a $100 partial filing fee in his civil action. Plaintiff, an unemployed non-prisoner with approximately $1,000 in cash, filed a pro se complaint against the United States Department of Interior (DOI) asserting violations of federal contracting law and financial assistance law. Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), i.e., without prepaying fees or costs. A magistrate judge granted Plaintiff’s application in part and ordered Plaintiff to pay a partial filing fee totaling $100. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration. The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation, which recommended denying the motion to reconsider. The district court adopted the report and recommendation and ordered Plaintiff to pay the $100 partial filing fee within fourteen days. Plaintiff appealed. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that district courts may either make a plaintiff pay the full fee or waive the fee entirely but may not impose a partial fee.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The panel held that district courts have the authority to impose partial filing fees on non-prisoner civil litigators under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a)(1). The panel rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the holding in Olivares v. Marshall, 59 F.3d 109, 111 (9th Cir. 1995), was limited to IFP applications brought by prisoners. The panel also rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the Prison Litigation Reform Act superseded the holding in Olivares. View "JAY HYMAS V. USDOI" on Justia Law

While plaintiff-appellee Jesse Wise was a pretrial detainee at Creek County Jail in Oklahoma, Officer Don Caffey performed a knee strike on Wise when he was seated on the ground and handcuffed. Officer Caffey subsequently resigned his employment at Creek County Jail as a result of an investigation into the incident. Wise sued Officer Caffey and Creek County Sheriff Bret Bowling under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive-force and supervisory-liability claims against Officer Caffey and Sheriff Bowling, respectively. At the summary-judgment stage, the court held Officer Caffey’s knee strike was excessive as a matter of law and that he and Sheriff Bowling were not entitled to qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment as to Officer Caffey’s qualified-immunity defense because the “facts that the district court ruled a reasonable jury could find would suffice to show a legal violation.” View "Wise v. Caffey, et al." on Justia Law

The City of Los Angeles (the “City”) brought an action against Plaintiffs for abatement, unfair competition, and public nuisance regarding their ownership of a motel. Plaintiffs appealed from the district court’s dismissal of their first amended complaint for failure to state a claim. After the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (the “Sheriff’s Department”) seized $98,000 from Plaintiffs pursuant to a state court judgment, Plaintiffs brought this 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action alleging that the failure to provide pre-seizure notice violated their constitutional rights.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment dismissing. The panel concluded that the district court correctly held that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for violation of procedural due process. The panel considered the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), factors. First, the competing interests strongly weighed against a conclusion that Plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights were violated. The City as creditor had a clear interest in collecting the money judgment because it prevailed before the California trial court and on appeal, and Plaintiffs did not allege that the funds were exempt or were needed for subsistence. Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation under California’s procedures was small because the procedures required the clerk of the court only to transcribe the amount of the money judgment and take account of statutory defenses like the exemptions asserted by a judgment debtor. Finally, given the small risk of erroneous deprivation, the value of the substitute procedure proposed by Plaintiffs did not outweigh the strong interests of the City. View "NANUBHAI PATEL, ET AL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL" on Justia Law

In 2018, Plaintiff filed a federal Terry action against the City of Pasadena and several of its police officers seeking to recover for the death of Reginald Thomas, a father figure to Plaintiff. The Terry action, which included a section 1983 claim, was dismissed with prejudice for lack of Article III standing in 2019. Plaintiff then filed a nearly identical lawsuit in California state court, which the Defendants removed to federal court and successfully moved to dismiss based on issue preclusion.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s Section 1983 action brought against Defendants. The panel held that a plain reading of the first district court’s judgment established that Article III standing was actually litigated and decided, although erroneously. However, erroneous, unappealed judgments are still owed preclusive effect. The panel concluded that issue preclusion was available, and Plaintiff was bound by the prior standing determination. While issue preclusion was available, the panel held that the Defendants waived issue preclusion by removing the refiled case to federal court because a removing defendant voluntarily invokes and acquiesces to the federal courts and bears the burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction and Article III standing. Accordingly, the panel vacated and remanded to the second and current district court to determine, in the first instance, whether jurisdiction lies in the federal courts and whether Plaintiff adequately stated a claim if the Defendants pursue such an argument on remand. View "SHANE LOVE V. AARON VILLACANA, ET AL" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed IFP and dismissed his appeal failure to pay filing fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1911–14. The court barred Plaintiff from proceeding IFP in any civil action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury as defined by Section 1915(g).   The Fifth Circuit denied Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP and dismissed his appeal for failure to pay the required filing fees. The court held that that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP. He has accumulated more than three strikes and has failed to demonstrate imminent danger in this case. The court barred him from proceeding IFP in any civil action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury as defined by Section 1915(g). Alternatively, he may pay the appropriate fees. He may resume any claims dismissed under Section 1915(g), if he decides to pursue them, under the fee provisions of 28 U.S.C. Sections 1911–14. View "Prescott v. UTMB" on Justia Law

Petitioner is an alien who challenges Exxon Mobil Corporation’s hiring policy as discriminatory. Petitioner received deferred deportation and eligibility for temporary work authorization under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival program. While a student at North Carolina State University, Petitioner was recruited by ExxonMobil for an internship. Petitioner told ExxonMobil that he is not a United States citizen, but erroneously represented that he had permanent work authorization under federal law. Petitioner was hired on this basis. However, when he presented his paperwork, it showed he lacked permanent work authorization, and ExxonMobil rescinded its offer.Petitioner claims that ExxonMobil’s policy discriminates against aliens as prohibited by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981. ExxonMobil filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Section 1981 only protects against intentional discrimination, and Petitioner failed to allege that ExxonMobil intentionally discriminates against aliens. While ExxonMobil’s policy requiring that applicants have permanent work authorization will only exclude aliens, discriminatory impact is not enough. And, given ExxonMobil’s policy, Petitioner did not plausibly allege that ExxonMobil intended to discriminate against aliens. View "Aldo De Leon Resendiz v. Exxon Mobil Corporation" on Justia Law

Under Texas law, parties to municipal contracts must certify that they do not and will not boycott Israel for the duration of their contracts. The City of Houston offered A&R Engineering and Testing, Inc. a contract with an anti-boycott clause. A&R refused to sign and brought a Section 1983 suit against the City and the Texas Attorney General. The district court entered a preliminary injunction against the City and the Attorney General. The Attorney General appealed, arguing that A&R lacks standing.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to vacate the injunction and dismiss the suit against the Attorney General. The court explained that t, A&R has not shown that the Attorney General could interfere with the City’s contracts. Chapter Section 2271 merely provides a list of definitions and then a list of requirements. It doesn’t expressly provide a way for the Attorney General to enforce those requirements. The statute’s “textually unenforceable language” poses a traceability problem. Second, the Attorney General hasn’t taken any action to suggest he might enforce the provision even if he has such power. Plaintiffs must assert “an injury that is the result of a statute’s actual or threatened enforcement.” Finally, the City’s conduct severs any link between A&R’s economic injury and the Attorney General. View "A & R Engineering v. Scott" on Justia Law

In an action brought by Plaintiff and her five minor children alleging federal and state law claims arising out of Plaintiff’s arrest, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants—individual police officers and the City and County of San Francisco— on Plaintiff’s federal claims based on qualified immunity; remanded to the district court Plaintiff’s state law claims for false arrest and negligence; affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the remaining state law claims; and affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to recuse.   The panel first considered whether there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff under the three statutes cited by Defendants. The panel held that there was a jury question whether officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Some of the bases on which the defendants attempt to claim probable cause are not supported by the record. However, Plaintiff’s federal claims are still subject to qualified immunity. The court wrote that Plaintiff did not sufficiently show how her arrest violated a clearly established right to be free from an unlawful arrest when the undisputed evidence (under the probable cause analysis) presented before the district court does not show that every reasonable officer would be on notice that the actions taken by the defendants were unconstitutional. The panel vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Plaintiff’s state law false arrest and negligence claims, which were premised on a finding that probable cause existed as a matter of law. View "KIRSTIN JOHNSON, ET AL V. KIERSTIE BARR, ET AL" on Justia Law