Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The property owners (doing business as Re-Mart Investment), and St. Maron Properties— brought Section 1983 claims against the City under the Takings Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause, as well as state law tort and statutory claims. The district court dismissed the state law claims as barred by sovereign immunity. It also dismissed the Section 1983 claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to satisfy the requirements for municipal liability under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the state law claims. But reversed the dismissal of the Section 1983 claims. The court explained that under Monell, a Section 1983 plaintiff may not proceed against a municipality unless the injury was caused by an official policy of the municipality. But here, the property owners allege that city officials violated their rights at the specific direction of the Mayor and the City Council. That is enough to establish liability under Monell. Accordingly, the court held that the property owners are entitled to proceed against the City on their federal claims. View "St. Maron v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

Defendants, game wardens with the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, appealed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against them.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and rendered judgment for Defendants. The court concluded that Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Defendant violated his constitutional rights. The court explained that because Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants knowingly withheld relevant, material information from the grand jury, he has not shown that the independent intermediary’s deliberations or decisions were tainted. Accordingly, the independent-intermediary doctrine defeats Plaintiff’s allegations that there was no probable cause to prosecute him and insulates Defendants from liability. The court wrote that this conclusion applies with equal force to Plaintiff’s claims for both retaliatory prosecution and prosecution without probable cause. View "Trevino v. Iden" on Justia Law

This False Claims Act case involves Medicare reimbursements to Stone County Hospital (SCH), a critical access hospital in Wiggins, Mississippi. At trial, the Government proved that Appellants (a corporate management company, company owner, corporate executives, and SCH) defrauded Medicare out of millions over the span of twelve years by overbilling for the owner’s and his wife’s compensation despite little or no reimbursable work. The district court’s judgment in favor of the Government included an order barring Appellants from dissipating their assets. Almost two years later, the district court issued a temporary enforcement order that specifically barred Appellants from selling a piece of real property. Appellants separately appealed the enforcement of this post-judgment injunction.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court explained that Appellants’ arguments on appeal fail to undercut the jury’s verdict. But the Government’s dilatory conduct over the protracted procedural history of this case gives pause, even if the Government largely prevails today. When Appellants interposed the statute of limitations because of the Government’s dawdling, the Government maintained its claims were timely. It does the same on appeal. But the Government’s own sealed extension request memoranda, which remains sealed to this day, demonstrate otherwise. Further, the court explained that contrary to Appellants’ frequent reference to “nonparties” in their briefing, Defendants in fact own, or control the property in question, albeit through indirect corporate entities. At the end of the day, the only ownership interests beyond Defendants in any of the relevant entities are held by trusts for Defendants’ children. View "Aldridge v. Corporate Management" on Justia Law

The Satanic Temple and one of its members sued the Texas Health and Human Services Commission (“THHSC”), its Executive Commissioner, and the Planned Parenthood Center for Choice, Inc., seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against several Texas abortion laws.Plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and a preliminary injunction against the Commissioner; the district court denied the motion. The Satanic Temple appealed.While the appeal was pending, the litigation continued in district court. Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the suit without prejudice but without leave to replead.On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court had jurisdiction to proceed on the merits of the case. An appeal from a grant or denial of a preliminary injunction does not divest the district court of jurisdiction or restrain it from taking other steps in the litigation. The district court, therefore, had jurisdiction to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims despite the pending appeal. Thus, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Satanic Temple v. TX Hlth and Human" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s judgment granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants County of Suffolk, Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office Division Chief Edward Heilig, and Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office Special Investigations Bureau Chief Joseph Carroll. Plaintiff was a Clerk Typist in the District Attorney’s Office from 2008 until her employment in the Special Investigations Bureau was terminated in 2015. She alleged that defendants discriminated against her based on her disability and retaliated against her for seeking an accommodation for that disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law Section 296, and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on her reasonable accommodation and retaliation claims.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment as to Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim and vacated the district court’s judgment with respect to the reasonable accommodation and retaliation claims. The court agreed with Plaintiff that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on her reasonable accommodation and retaliation claims. The court explained that construing the evidence most favorably to Plaintiff, a rational jury could find that archiving was not an essential function of Plaintiff’s position and that defendants failed to provide a reasonable workplace accommodation for her disability. The court similarly concluded that disputed issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. View "Tafolla v. Heilig" on Justia Law

Plaintiff painted two large murals directly onto the walls inside a building on the campus of Defendant-Appellee Vermont Law School, Inc. The work stirred controversy, which eventually prompted the law school to erect a wall of acoustic panels around the murals to permanently conceal them from public view. Kerson brought suit against the law school, alleging that obscuring his work behind a permanent barrier violated his rights under the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”), which creates a cause of action for artists to prevent the modification and, in certain instances, destruction of works of visual art.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that merely ensconcing a work of art behind a barrier neither modifies nor destroys the work, as contemplated by VARA, and thus does not implicate VARA’s protections. The court explained that this case presents weighty concerns that pin an artist’s moral right to maintain the integrity of an artwork against a private entity’s control over the art in its possession. On the facts presented here, the court resolved this tension by hewing to the statutory text, which reflects Congress’s conscientious balancing of the competing interests at stake.  Because mere concealment of the Murals neither “modifies” nor “destroys” them, the Law School has not violated any of VARA’s prohibitions. As such, VARA does not entitle Plaintiff to an order directing the Law School to take the barrier down and continue to display the Murals. View "Kerson v. Vermont Law School, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2022, New Jersey passed a law, N.J. Stat. 2C:58-33(a), that empowers only the state’s Attorney General to sue gun-industry members whose “unlawful … or unreasonable” conduct “contribute[s] to a public nuisance in [New Jersey] through the sale, manufacturing, distribution, importing, or marketing of a gun-related product.” It requires industry members to “establish, implement, and enforce reasonable controls” on these activities. The Attorney General has not attempted to enforce the law. Four months after the law was passed, the Foundation, a trade group of gun makers, retailers, and other industry members, filed suit, claiming that the law is preempted by the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. 7901–7903, and violates due process, the First and Second Amendments, and the dormant Commerce Clause. The Foundation moved for a preliminary injunction, attaching declarations that gunmakers “will continually be at risk of litigation and potential liability unless [they] cease[] doing business.” They gave no factual detail.The Third Circuit held that the challenges must be dismissed. “Pre-enforcement challenges are unusual,” the plaintiff must show that the stakes are high and close at hand. This suit “falls far short of even the “normal” pre-enforcement challenge.” A brand-new civil tort statute, without more, does not justify a federal court’s intervention. View "National Shooting Sports Foundation v. Attorney General New Jersey" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is the former Chief Financial Officer of the Cypress Bayou Casino. The Casino is owned by the Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana. The Chitimacha Tribe is one of four federally recognized Indian tribes in Louisiana. According to the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint, the Chitimacha tribal council authorized Spivey (as CFO of the Casino) to make a $3,900 bonus payment to the then-newly elected chairman of the tribal council. Plaintiff claimed that several members of the tribal council turned around and reported the bonus payment to federal and state law enforcement. Plaintiff initially sued the Tribe, the Casino, and four tribal council members in federal court under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983 and 1985 and Louisiana tort law. The district court, over Plaintiff’s objections, again adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations, denied Plaintiff’s remand motion, and dismissed all Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded to state court. The court first wrote that when a district court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a removed case, it must remand. The court held, in accordance with the statute’s plain text and the great weight of authority from across the country, that Section 1447(c) means what it says, admits of no exceptions, and requires remand even when the district court thinks it futile. Moreover, the court held that such a dismissal should be made without prejudice. View "Spivey v. Chitimacha Tribe" on Justia Law

On a  Mesa Airlines flight from Birmingham to Dallas Fort Worth International Airport, a flight attendant grew concerned about two passengers, Plaintiffs.  She alerted the pilot, who, despite the reassurance of security officers, delayed takeoff until the flight was canceled. The passengers were told the delay was for maintenance issues, and all passengers, including the two in question (Plaintiffs), were rebooked onto a new flight that reached DFW. After learning the real reason behind the cancellation, Plaintiffs sued Mesa under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The airline countered that it had immunity under 49 U.S.C. Section 44902(b) and 49 U.S.C. Section 44941(a).     Given the unusual facts that all passengers had their flight canceled, the primary issue on appeal whether such conduct constitutes disparate treatment under Section 1981, whether a Section 1981 claim can exist without a “breach” of contract, and whether Section 44902(b) grants immunity to airlines for allegedly discriminatory decisions, thereby negating Section 1981’s application against airlines in this context.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. The court held that Section 1981 prohibits discrimination in contracting. Section 44902(b) provides immunity to airlines in their decision to remove passengers they feel are “inimical to safety.” There is a straightforward way to reconcile these two statutes: If a passenger’s protected status is the but-for cause of the airline’s decision to remove them (such that the passenger has made out a Section 1981 claim), then Section 44902(b) does not grant immunity to the airline because the decision is not based on a fear that the passenger was inimical to safety. View "Abdallah v. Mesa Air Group" on Justia Law

This case arises from the September 2017 fatal police shooting of Ruben Galindo Chavez (who used the surname “Galindo”) during an encounter with officers of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department. The action was initiated by plaintiff Azucena Zamorano Aleman — Galindo’s girlfriend and the mother of his child — both as the administrator of Galindo’s estate and in her individual capacity. Plaintiff asserted five causes of actions, including a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court awarded summary judgment to the defendants on each of the plaintiff’s claims. The court therein determined that — because it was objectively reasonable for Officer Guerra to shoot Galindo, in that Galindo posed an immediate threat to Guerra and others — Guerra is entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim. For the same reason, the court awarded summary judgment to Guerra and the City on the assault and battery, wrongful death, and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. Citing a lack of sufficient evidence, the court also awarded summary judgment to the City on the negligent training claim.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment award to the City on the negligent training claim. The court vacated the award of qualified immunity to Officer Guerra on the Fourth Amendment claim, as well as the related summary judgment awards to Guerra and the City on the balance of the state law claims. Rather than directing the entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiff on any of those claims, the court remanded for further proceedings as to all of them View "Azucena Zamorano Aleman v. City of Charlotte" on Justia Law