Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In October 2021, L.O. petitioned for a restraining order against Defendant pursuant to section 527.6. The petition alleged that Defendant had been harassing L.O. because she is transgender by, among other things, posting disturbing YouTube videos about her, using a cell phone to film her, and committing an assault against her. The court granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) pending an evidentiary hearing. Following the hearing at which L.O. and Defendant testified, the trial court found that L.O.’s testimony was “credible” and that Defendant had demonstrated “that he does, in general, have animus towards transgender people.” Accordingly, the court issued a five-year restraining order in favor of L.O. in accordance with section 527.6. The same day that the restraining order was issued on behalf of L.O., the City petitioned for a workplace violence restraining order against Defendant on behalf of five City employees pursuant to section 527.8. Defendant contends that both restraining orders were erroneously issued.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court wrote that it agreed with respondents that Defendant had forfeited his contentions by failing to comply with the applicable rules of appellate procedure. The court explained that Defendant’s briefs do not properly cite the record and are replete with unsupported legal and factual assertions. Because Defendant failed to appropriately cite the record, he forfeited any argument that the challenged orders were erroneously issued. Moreover, the court wrote that Defendant’s briefs do not set forth all the evidence upon which both restraining orders are based. View "L.O. v. Kilrain" on Justia Law

Defendant asserts that he is required by his religious faith to abstain from psychiatric medication. Defendant raised a religious objection to being involuntarily medicated without identifying a particular source of law. The district court denied the objection, concluding that: (1) the Government had a compelling interest in prosecuting Defendant’s crime, which was not outweighed by Defendant’s religious liberty interests; and (2) the Government satisfied the four Sell factors. Defendant appealed.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded. The court explained that Defendant faces a pending civil-confinement hearing in North Carolina. Moreover, he asserts that his religious belief as a Jehovah’s Witness prevents him from taking medication. He further asserts that forcible medication would violate his “constitutionally protected liberty.” The Government does not dispute that Defendant’s religious faith can qualify as a “special factor” under Sell. See Red Br. at 13–15; cf. Ramirez v. Collier, 595 U.S. 411, 426 (2022). Defendant’s religious beliefs, combined with his lengthy detention and his potential civil confinement, thus lessen the Government’s interests under the first Sell factor. The court emphasized that it holds only that religious liberty can constitute a “special circumstance” under Sell and that Defendant properly raised a religious objection to forcible medication here. That well-taken special circumstance, combined with other factors identified above, necessitates the district court’s reevaluation of the Government’s efforts to forcibly medicate him. View "USA v. Harris" on Justia Law

This case presents the questions of what Defendant must prove to establish affirmative defenses to pay-discrimination claims under federal and state laws: the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) and New York Labor Law Section 194(1). Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Culinary Institute of America, violated these equal-pay laws by compensating her less than a male colleague. The Culinary Institute responded that a “factor other than sex”—its sex-neutral compensation plan, which incorporates a collective bargaining agreement—justifies the pay disparity. Plaintiff argued that the compensation plan cannot qualify as a “factor other than sex” because it creates a pay disparity unconnected to differences between her job and her colleague’s job. The district court did not consider the divergent requirements imposed by the EPA and Section 194(1) when assessing Plaintiff’s claims and the Culinary Institute’s defense.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded insofar as the district court granted summary judgment for Defendant on the Section 194(1) claim. The court explained that Plaintiff’s position that a “factor other than sex” must be job-related is incorrect as to the EPA. The plain meaning of the EPA indicates the opposite. The court held that to establish the EPA’s “factor other than sex” defense, a defendant must prove only that the pay disparity in question results from a differential based on any factor except for sex. But Plaintiff’s position is correct as to New York Labor Law Section 194(1). A recent amendment to Section 194(1) explicitly added a job-relatedness requirement. View "Eisenhauer v. Culinary Institute of America" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, then an Assistant Athletic Director at Louisiana State University (“LSU”)— internally reported Head Football Coach Les Miles for sexually harassing students. LSU retained outside counsel—Taylor, Porter, Brooks & Phillips LLP (“Taylor Porter”)—to investigate the matter, culminating in a formal report dated May 15, 2013 (the “Taylor Porter Report”). Matters were privately settled, and Miles stayed on as head coach until 2016. Lewis alleges that Defendants, members of LSU’s Board of Supervisors (the “Board”), leadership, and athletics department, along with lawyers at Taylor Porter (“Taylor Porter Defendants” and, collectively, “Defendants”), engaged in a concerted effort to illegally conceal the Taylor Porter Report and Miles’s wrong-doings. Plaintiff also alleged workplace retaliation for having reported Miles. She brings both employment and civil RICO claims. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s RICO-related allegations as time-barred and inadequately pleaded as to causation.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court considered when Plaintiff was first made aware of her injuries. It matters not when she discovered Defendants’ “enterprise racketeering scheme”—she alleges that this happened in March 2021 with the release of the Husch Blackwell Report. Plaintiff’s allegations make clear that she was made aware of her injuries much earlier. She was subject to overt retaliation after “Miles was cleared of any wrongdoing” by the Taylor Porter Report in 2013. Plaintiff alleged numerous harmful workplace interactions from that point forward. Given that Plaintiff filed her original complaint on April 8, 2021, her claims for injuries that were discovered—or that should have been discovered—before April 8, 2017, are time-barred. View "Lewis v. Danos" on Justia Law

Plaintifff Pattyann Larsen filed employment discrimination and other claims against her former employer shortly after her debts had been discharged by the federal bankruptcy court, but she had failed to list those claims as assets in her bankruptcy case. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that the bankruptcy trustee—not plaintiff— was the real party in interest. The court then denied plaintiff’s motion to substitute the bankruptcy trustee as plaintiff and dismissed the case based on its conclusion that plaintiff’s attempt to pursue this action in her own name was not an “honest and understandable mistake.” The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying substitution. THe Oregon Supreme Court reversed: under ORCP 26 A, a motion to substitute the real party in interest as the plaintiff, if granted, would require plaintiff to amend the complaint under ORCP 23 A. “We have interpreted the standard specified in that rule—leave to amend ‘shall be freely given when justice so requires’—to mean that leave to amend should be granted absent any unfair prejudice to the nonmoving party. The text, context, and legislative history of ORCP 26 A confirm that the standards governing leave to amend the pleadings under ORCP 23 A also apply in deciding whether to allow substitution of the real party in interest under ORCP 26 A.” Defendant did not contend that it would be unfairly prejudiced if the bankruptcy trustee were to be substituted as the plaintiff in this case. The Supreme Court concluded that, because the trial court applied the wrong legal standard, it abused its discretion in denying substitution and dismissing this case. View "Larsen v. Selmet, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff became a firefighter for the City of Sanford, Florida, in 1999. At the age of 47, Plaintiff took disability retirement on November 1, 2018. When Plaintiff retired, she continued to receive free health insurance through the City. Under a policy in effect when Plaintiff first joined the fire department, employees retiring for qualifying disability reasons, such as Plaintiff’s Parkinson’s disease, received free health insurance until the age of 65. But, unbeknownst to Plaintiff, the City changed its benefits plan in 2003. Under the new plan, disability retirees such as Plaintiff are entitled to the health insurance subsidy for only twenty-four months after retiring. Her complaint alleged various claims, including violations of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Florida Civil Rights Act. The district court entered judgment for the City.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because Plaintiff cannot establish that the City committed any discriminatory acts against her while she could perform the essential functions of a job that she held or desired to hold, her Title I claim fails. For the same reason, so do her claims under the Rehab Act and the Florida Civil Rights Act. Further, the court held that the City’s s benefits plan does not run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. Disabled persons are not a suspect class, and government-paid health insurance is not a recognized fundamental right. Thus under rational basis review, the City’s benefits plan advances the legitimate governmental purpose of conserving funds. View "Karyn D. Stanley v. City of Sanford, Florida" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a California state prisoner, moved to recall the mandate and reinstate his 2017 appeal of the dismissal of his civil rights action against state agencies and Salinas Valley Prison medical staff and officials.   The Ninth Circuit denied the motion to reinstate the appeal but directed that his filing fees be refunded. The panel first determined that Plaintiff’s motion to recall the mandate, filed 661 days after the mandate became effective, was untimely. The panel next held that the extraordinary remedy of recalling the mandate and ordering reinstatement to prevent injustice or address exceptional circumstances was not necessary given that Plaintiff did not dispute that he had three strikes, was ineligible to proceed IFP under Section 1915(b)’s payment plan, and had not timely paid the filing fee. The appeal therefore was properly dismissed. The panel held that Section 1915 neither permits nor requires the collection of fees from a prisoner who is ineligible for IFP status because he has struck out under Section 1915(g). Plaintiff purported IFP appeal therefore was barred by 1915(g), and the district court was without authority to collect the filing fees from Plaintiff’s prison account. View "LEON MEYERS V. EDWARD BIRDSONG, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked as a hospital nurse for St. Vincent’s Health System. After St. Vincent’s fired her, Plaintiff sued, alleging race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court granted summary judgment for St. Vincent’s, and Plaintiff appealed.On appeal, Plaintiff claimed she presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment as to all her claims. She also claimed that the district court erred in applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to a “mixed-motive” retaliation claim.The Eleventh Circuit held that Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim failed because there was no evidence of severe or pervasive harassment; Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) did nothing to undermine the application of McDonnell Douglas to retaliation claims because but for causation still applies; Plainitff's retaliation claim cannot survive; and disparate-treatment claim fails because there is no evidence that race played a role in her termination. View "Cynthia Diane Yelling v. St. Vincent's Health System" on Justia Law

Parolees sued the Missouri Department of Corrections (MDOC), claiming that its parole revocation system violated the Due Process Clause. Recognizing the system’s flaws, MDOC rewrote its policies and consented to summary judgment. Later, MDOC moved to dismiss for failure to join a required party—the Missouri Public Defender Commission (Commission). The district court denied MDOC’s motion and held a hearing to determine whether MDOC’s revised policies satisfied due process. Finding additional problems, the district court issued a remedy order instructing MDOC to make changes.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court explained that the state must hold a revocation hearing “within a reasonable time after the parolee is taken into custody.” The court wrote that MDOC has a policy requiring a revocation hearing within 30 days, but it does not always follow that policy. The district court ordered MDOC to follow its 30-day policy. The court wrote that because it has held that longer delays may be reasonable in some cases, the remedy is not tailored to the violation and was an abuse of discretion. View "Stephanie Gasca v. Anne Precythe" on Justia Law

Appellant suffers from various mental health conditions. Appellant’s delusions led her to believe that the federal government— specifically, former President Barack Obama—was conspiring with hip-hop mogul Jay-Z and other members of the music industry to harm Appellant and her family. To send a message to these government conspirators, Appellant threw a Molotov cocktail into the lobby of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services field office in Oakland Park, Florida. Appellant was indicted and the parties jointly requested an evaluation of whether she was competent to stand trial. The court determined, based on medical evaluation, that Appellant was “presently not competent to stand trial” and therefore ordered her committed to the custody of the Attorney General for hospitalization and treatment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 4241(d). Appellant contends that the district court lacked statutory authority to order her indefinite civil commitment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 4246.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed.  The court explained that Section 4241(d) sets forth two time periods during which a criminal defendant is committed to the custody of the Attorney General. The court explained that Appellant was never rendered competent to stand trial. Second, the court noted that Appellant’s criminal charges were still pending when the dangerousness certificate was filed on December 17, 2020. Third, Appellant does not argue that her three months of additional confinement between September and December 2020 was of unreasonable duration. Accordingly, Appellant remained in the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to  4241(d) on December 17, 2020, and was therefore properly subject to indefinite-civil-commitment proceedings under 4246. View "Sealed Appellee v. Sealed Appellant" on Justia Law