Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

While Respondent was employed as a truck driver at Greatwide Dedicated Transport II, LLC (“Greatwide”), he witnessed certain drivers receive additional driving assignments in violation of 49 C.F.R. Section 395.3, which regulates the maximum driving time for property-carrying vehicles. After collecting evidence related to the violations, Respondent submitted anonymous letters to management reporting his findings. Soon thereafter, Respondent revealed to management personnel that he was the author of the letters. The following month, Respondent was assigned to deliver two trailers filled with merchandise to two Nordstrom store locations in Manhattan, New York and Paramus, New Jersey. However, when Respondent returned from this assignment, he was suspended for—what Greatwide claimed to be—violations of company policy. Greatwide subsequently terminated and dismissed Respondent without a more explicit explanation. Respondent promptly filed a whistleblower complaint with the U.S. Department of Labor’s (“DOL”) Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”). Following several lengthy delays, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) ruled in Respondent’s favor, ordering Greatwide to pay both back pay and emotional distress damages. The Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) affirmed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the ARB’s conclusion that Respondent engaged in protected activity, that his activity was a contributing factor in his termination, and that Greatwide failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent would have been terminated absent his protected conduct. Nor was Greatwide prejudiced by the proceeding’s delays. Finally, the court declined to enforce the alleged settlement agreement because the company failed to challenge the ALJ’s decision before the ARB. View "Greatwide Dedicated Transport II, LLC v. United States Department of Labor" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, Plaintiff challenged the district court’s award of summary judgment to defendant Liberty University, Inc. (“Liberty”) on Palmer’s claim of age discrimination, pursued under provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the “ADEA”)  (the “Statutory Ruling”). On the other hand, Liberty, by cross-appeal, challenged an earlier award of summary judgment that was made to Plaintiff, in which the court ruled that Plaintiff was not a “minister” for purposes of the First Amendment’s so-called “ministerial exception” (the “Constitutional Ruling”).   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the Statutory Ruling, dismissed Liberty’s cross-appeal, and vacated the Constitutional Ruling. The court explained that it agreed with the district court that Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence of age-based discrimination to overcome Liberty’s summary judgment motion on that issue. Accordingly, the court was satisfied to affirm the Statutory Ruling in favor of Liberty. Moreover, in light of that disposition — and pursuant to the constitutional avoidance doctrine — the court refrained from resolving whether Plaintiff was a minister for purposes of the First Amendment’s ministerial exception. As a result, the court wrote it was obliged to dismiss Liberty’s cross-appeal and vacate the Constitutional Ruling. View "Eva Palmer v. Liberty University, Incorporated" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that Isanti County, Minnesota (the “County”) violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when it unlawfully prosecuted him under the County’s solid waste ordinance (the “Solid Waste Ordinance”). Plaintiff also asserted Minnesota state law claims for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings as to the federal claims in favor of the County and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction on the remaining state law claims.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that while Plaintiff’s opening brief lists 21 cases, which Plaintiff contends constitute proof the County used the Solid Waste Ordinance to wrongly prosecute property owners, none of these cases are properly before the court as they were not included in the complaint. Plaintiff’s complaint contains insufficient factual allegations to sustain a municipal liability claim. Accordingly, the court held that without a constitutional violation, there can be no Section 1983 liability. View "Keith Kiefer v. Isanti County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Alessandra Rogers worked for Chaves County in its jail. Several years into her employment, Rogers drafted a petition that criticized treatment of employees in the jail. The petition was signed by 45 current and former jail employees and was submitted to the county commissioners. Roughly a month after the petition was submitted, county employees searched the jail. During the search, employees found illegal drugs and weapons in a bag under Rogers’ desk. Rogers admitted that the bag was hers and that it contained the drugs and weapons. The county put Rogers on paid administrative leave. When the period of administrative leave ended, the county denied Rogers’ request for a promotion and imposed an unpaid five-day suspension. Rogers later quit. Rogers attributed the search to retaliation for her role in drafting the petition, claiming that the retaliation violated the First Amendment. But the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The court reasoned that even if the defendants had retaliated for Rogers’ role in drafting the petition, liability wouldn’t exist because the petition hadn’t involved a public concern. The Tenth Circuit concurred with the district court and affirmed. View "Rogers v. Riggs, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) Law Enforcement Ranger in Idaho, challenged adverse employment actions taken against him by the Department of the Interior and BLM officials. He sued Defendants, alleging a violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due process.   In an interlocutory appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Defendants’ motion to dismiss an action alleging due process violations and seeking damages pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The panel held that Plaintiff had no claim for money damages under Bivens. Here, Plaintiff’s claims arose in a different context than what the Court has recognized. Congress has also already provided a remedy in this context under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Because this case involves an alternative remedial structure, this case exists in a novel context outside the preexisting Bivens framework. Extending Bivens here would risk impermissible intrusion into the functioning of both the Legislative and Executive Branches. View "DAVID HARPER V. MICHAEL NEDD, ET AL" on Justia Law

The County of Marin (“the County”), at the onset of the pandemic in March 2020, took action to limit the spread of COVID-19 and protect its vulnerable citizens by issuing a public health order that placed certain restrictions on allowable activities. The County continually modified its original health order based on data and increased knowledge of how the virus spreads. During the time that a modified version of the health order was in effect, the County learned of aviation activities by Seaplane Adventures, LLC (“Seaplane”) that violated the applicable health order and began a dialogue with Seaplane regarding its failure to comply with the County’s health order. Seaplane ultimately ceased its operations that were in violation of the County’s health order and filed the suit before us today. Seaplane appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the County.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The panel held that regardless of what the relevant comparison category was for comparing whether the County’s actions were rooted in a rational basis, given that a deadly virus was tearing into the most vulnerable throughout the County, country, and world, the actions of the County met the rational basis standard as it took actions to mitigate the damage of the COVID-19 virus. To the extent that Seaplane was alleging differential treatment between Seaplane and other air carriers providing recreational flights in violation of the health order, the rational basis for the County’s action was also abundantly clear: it simply did not know of the other violators. View "SEAPLANE ADVENTURES, LLC V. COUNTY OF MARIN" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an attorney, filed a civil rights action against two Orangeburg County, South Carolina sheriff’s deputies (collectively, the “Defendants”). As a pro se plaintiff, Plaintiff received repeated notice of the requirement to inform the court of any change in her address immediately. After Plaintiff failed to provide an updated address, she did not receive the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation filed in her case. Accordingly, she missed deadlines to file objections to the Report and Recommendation and to note an appeal of the district court’s summary judgment order. The district court granted Plaintiff’s motion to reopen the time to note an appeal, giving her fourteen days to do so. Yet, by the time Plaintiff re-filed her notice of appeal as permitted by the district court below, her appeal was already pending in the Fourth Circuit. At issue in this appeal is what it means to “receive notice” for purposes of a Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6) motion to reopen the time to note an appeal to the Fourth Circuit.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the decision and remanded the case to the district court to consider whether the circumstances warrant the exercise of discretion to reopen the time for Plaintiff’s appeal. The court found that because Plaintiff did not receive actual notice of the entry of judgment in her case, the first of Rule 4(a)(6)’s three statutory requirements for reopening the time for appeal has been met. Further, the court found that the remaining requirements 4 of Rule 4(a)(6) have been satisfied as well. View "Melodie Shuler v. Orangeburg County Sheriff's Department" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the Austin Independent School District (“AISD”) on behalf of her minor son, A.H., alleging that AISD violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983by employing an individual assigned to help A.H. accommodate his disabilities, but who instead verbally harassed him and threw a trash can at him, hitting him and causing injury. After the incident, the parties settled all of A.H.’s Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) claims outside of court but agreed that Plaintiff still had the right to file a separate action containing A.H.’s claims arising under Section 504, the ADA, and Section 1983. Heston then brought these claims in a suit filed in 2018. The district court dismissed the suit without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s (“IDEA”) administrative remedies.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded it to the district court for further consideration in light of Luna Perez v. Sturgis Pub. Schs., 143 S. Ct. 859 (2023). Since Plaintiff appealed and the Parties’ briefed the case, the Supreme Court decided Luna Perez, concluding that the IDEA does not require administrative exhaustion “where a plaintiff brings a suit under another federal law for compensatory damages.” This constitutes a “modification in controlling legal principles . . . rendering a previous determination inconsistent with the prevailing doctrine.” View "Heston v. Austin Indep" on Justia Law

In the winter of 2020, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) determined that the threat posed by the novel SARS-CoV-2 virus constituted a public health emergency. The CDC published the rule at issue—the Requirement for Persons to Wear Masks While on Conveyances and at Transportation Hubs, 86 Fed. Reg. 8025-01 (Feb. 3, 2021) (“Mandate”). Plaintiffs initiated this litigation, arguing that the Mandate was unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC Section 706(2) (APA), and unconstitutional under non-delegation and separation-of-powers tenets.   The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and instructed the district court to dismiss the case as moot. The court explained that it found Plaintiffs’ contention that there is a reasonable expectation that the CDC will issue another nationwide mask mandate for all conveyances and transportation hubs to be speculative. Conjectures of future harms like these do not establish a reasonable expectation that a mask mandate from the CDC will reissue. Further, the court reasoned that there is no “reasonable expectation or a demonstrated probability that the same controversy will recur involving the same complaining party.” View "Health Freedom Defense Fund, et al v. President of the United States, et al" on Justia Law

Sterling Hotels sued a state elevator inspector (Defendant), asserting several claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Sterling first argued that Defendant violated its right to due process when he sealed Wyndham’s elevators without giving Sterling notice or an opportunity to object. Further, Sterling argued that Defendant engaged in an unconstitutional regulatory taking when he sealed the elevators. Defendant moved to dismiss, in part on qualified immunity grounds. The district court declined to address Defendant’s entitlement to immunity, and Defendant appealed.   The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court explained that when a deprivation of property “occurs pursuant to an established state procedure”—as Defendant acknowledges it did here—the state must provide adequate notice and an opportunity to respond before the deprivation. Here, Defendant sealed the elevators without providing any advance notice that the elevators should descend to the basement. Thus, Sterling alleged, Defendant failed to provide it with any opportunity to respond to that requirement. That is sufficient to state a due-process claim against Defendant. Further, Defendant’s potential individual liability for a regulatory takings claim was not clearly established when he sealed the elevators. That means Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. View "Sterling Hotels, LLC v. Scott McKay" on Justia Law