Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The Bureau of Prisons terminated Kannikal on September 3, 1999. In 2001, Kannikal filed a formal complaint with the EEOC, but he did not receive an administrative hearing until 2006. Kannikal’s case was then held in abeyance because it was considered part of a pending class action complaint. In 2007, the Department of Justice informed Kannikal that his case would no longer be held in abeyance. Kannikal asked the EEOC about his case status in 2008 and 2009, but never received a response. He filed suit on March 28, 2012. The district court dismissed, citing 28 U.S.C. 2401(a), which provides that “every civil action commenced against the United States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues.” The court held that Kannikal’s cause of action accrued on October 17, 2001, 180 days after he filed his EEOC complaint, and expired six years later. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that section 2401’s six-year limitations period does not apply to suits brought under Title VII. View "Kannikal v. Att'y Gen. of the United States" on Justia Law

In 1999, Christeson was convicted of three counts of capital murder and sentenced to death. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed Christeson’s conviction and sentence and denial of his post-conviction motion for relief. Under the one-year limitations period imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U. S. C. 244(d)(1), Christeson’s federal habeas petition was due on April 10, 2005. Nine months before that deadline, the court appointed attorneys Horwitz and Butts to represent Christeson, 18 U. S. C. 599(a)(2). The attorneys subsequently acknowledged that they failed to meet with Christeson until six weeks after his petition was due. There is no evidence that they communicated with him at all. They finally filed the petition 117 days late. The district court dismissed; the Eighth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. Christeson, who has severe cognitive disabilities, relied entirely on his attorneys, and may not have known of the dismissal. About seven years later, the attorneys contacted attorneys Merrigan and Perkovich to discuss Christeson’s case. Christeson’s only hope for merits review was to move under FRCP60(b) to reopen final judgment on the ground that AEDPA’s statute of limitations should have been equitably tolled. Horwitz and Butts would not file that motion, premised on their own malfeasance. In 2014, Merrigan and Perkovich unsuccessfully moved to substitute counsel. The Eighth Circuit dismissed, reasoning that they were not authorized to file on Christeson’s behalf. The Missouri Supreme Court set an October 29, 2014 execution date. The district court denied a second motion as untimely, stating that Horwitz and Butts had not “abandoned” Christeson, and reasoning that allowing the motion would permit “‘abusive’” delays in capital cases. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court stayed execution and reversed, stating that the denials contravened its 2012 decision, Martel v. Clair, concerning the “interests of justice” standard, and noting the obvious conflict of interest with respect to the original attorneys. View "Christeson v. Roper" on Justia Law

Swanigan was arrested and jailed for more than 50 hours by Chicago police officers who mistakenly thought he was a serial bank robber. Following his release, Swanigan sued individual officers and the city alleging constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state-law claims. Swanigan’s “Monell” policy-or-practice claim against the city became a separate lawsuit, which was stayed while the suit against the individual officers proceeded. A jury awarded $60,000 in damages. Swanigan moved to lift the stay and to amend his complaint in light of the jury’s verdict. The judge interpreted the motion as a waiver of all but two of Swanigan’s Monell theories and held that the remaining claims were not justiciable, based on the city’s promise to indemnify its officers and to pay nominal damages of $1 for any Monell liability. The judge dismissed the Monell suit. The Seventh Circuit remanded: the judge wrongly assumed that Swanigan was waiving all but two Monell theories and, under FRCP15(a)(1)(B), Swanigan was entitled to amend his complaint within 21 days of a responsive pleading, which would have been the next step after the stay was lifted. A sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim, a merits adjudication was improper. View "Swanigan v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 1990, Magee was hired as a professor at Hamline University School of Law. She became tenured in 1994. In 2009, Magee was charged with felony state tax violations. While her case was pending, Hamline placed her on a leave of absence and relieved her of teaching responsibilities. In 2011, a jury found Magee guilty of four misdemeanor counts of failure to file state tax returns. The convictions were upheld on appeal. After the dean initiated her termination, a faculty committee voted in favor of discharge. Magee was terminated on July 21, 2011. Magee filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. In 2013, Magee served a second lawsuit, alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981, which “offers relief when racial discrimination blocks the creation of a contractual relationship, as well as when racial discrimination impairs an existing contractual relationship,” The district court dismissed. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that because Magee’s section 1983 claim in Magee I and the section 1981 claim “arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions,” the section 1981 claim should have been raised in Magee I and was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.. View "Magee v. Hamline Univ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621-634. Plaintiff alleged discrimination and retaliation under the Act, but defendant never answered or defended the suit. After the district court entered a default judgment against defendant, defendant filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. The court concluded that evidence adduced at a default judgment "prove-up" hearing cannot cure a deficient complaint. In this case, plaintiff's complaint contained very few factual allegations, but his testimony at the damages hearing provided evidence on the elements of his claim that were absent from his pleadings. Accordingly, the court vacated the entry of default judgment and remanded. View "Wooten v. McDonald Transit Assoc, Inc." on Justia Law

DeCoteau was convicted of gross sexual imposition in 1996. His 2012 habeas petition had six claims. The district court dismissed, finding four claims time-barred, one procedurally barred, and the other without merit, but granted a certificate of appealability as to whether the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act limitations period applies on a claim-by-claim basis. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. AEDPA’s one-year limitations period applies to “an application” for habeas corpus, running from the latest of: the date on which judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or expiration of the time for seeking review; the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by state action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed; the date on which a newly-recognized constitutional right was initially recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or the date on which the factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). The court rejected DeCoteau’s argument that the word “application” focuses on the date of the latest claim within the entire application, allowing review of all claims if one is timely. View "DeCoteau v. Schweitzer" on Justia Law

EEOC sued CRST in its own name, under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, alleging that CRST subjected Starke and 270 similarly situated female employees to a hostile work environment, in its Driver Training Program. For two years, EEOC failed to identify the women comprising the putative class; the court ordered EEOC to make all class members available for deposition or risk a discovery sanction. EEOC filed updated lists of allegedly aggrieved individuals, but failed to make all of them available for deposition before the deadline. The court barred EEOC from pursuing relief for any individual not made available for deposition before the deadline. EEOC then listed 155 individuals for whom it was still pursuing relief and 99 individuals, allegedly sexually harassed, but for whom EEOC was not pursuing relief based on the order. Following remand, the court dismissed, but for one claim, which settled for $50,000, and awarded CRST $92,842.21 in costs, $4,004,371.65 in attorneys' fees, and $463,071.25 in out-of-pocket expenses. The Eighth Circuit held that CRST is not entitled to attorneys' fees for claims dismissed based on EEOC's failure to satisfy pre-suit obligations and a purported pattern-or-practice claim. On remand, the court must individually assess each claim for which it granted summary judgment on the merits and explain why it deems each to be frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc." on Justia Law

Morjal sued Chicago and individual police officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging unlawful search and seizure, excessive force, conspiracy, false imprisonment, assault and malicious prosecution. Morjal accepted an offer of judgment under FRCP 68(a), which provided that the “Defendants offer to allow judgment to be taken against them … [$10,001.00] … plus reasonable attorney’s fees and costs accrued to date.” The parties were unable to reach agreement as to the amount of attorneys’ fees. Morjal sought $22,190.50. After contentious litigation the district court awarded $17,205.50. Morjal then sought additional attorneys’ fees of $16,773.00 for time spent in litigating the fee petition. The defendants responded that Morjal was bound by the terms of the offer of judgment, which limited fees to those “accrued to date.” The district court concluded that, in some instances opposition to fees was “overly aggressive” and “arbitrary with no objective standard provided,” but awarded only $2,000 “to compensate for time spent responding to challenges to the fees that were unsupported and improper.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed; the court had authority to award fees under section 1988, and did so only as to conduct of the defendants that fell outside the provisions of the offer of judgment. View "Morjal v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

At issue in these two cases was the applicable scope of Ky. Rev. Stat. 15.520, which sets forth specific procedural rights for police officers who are accused of misconduct and face the disciplinary processes administratively conducted by the police agency that employs them. Appellants in both cases were police officers who were subjected to administrative disciplinary actions that were initiated as a result of allegations that arose from within the police department itself. Both officers requested an administrative review procedure consistent with section 15.520. The requests were denied. Each Appellant sought review of the disciplinary actions in circuit court. The circuit courts concluded that the officers were not entitled to an administrative hearing subject to the due process provisions of section 15.520. The appeals courts affirmed, determining that section 15.520 applies only when the disciplinary action was initiated by a “citizens complaint.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 15.520 applies to both disciplinary proceedings generated by citizen complaints and those initiated by intra-departmental actions. Remanded.View "Pearce v. Univ. of Louisville" on Justia Law

The Board of Supervisors of Pittsylvania County, Virginia met twice per month. At the beginning of each meeting, a member of the Board opened the proceedings with an invocation, usually explicitly Christian in nature, and asked the audience to stand for the prayers. Hudson is a non-Christian resident of Pittsylvania County who has attended nearly every Board meeting and alleges that the Christian prayers made her and other non-Christian citizens of Pittsylvania County feel unwelcome. Hudson filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging violation of the Establishment Clause. The district court entered summary judgment for Hudson and permanently enjoined Pittsylvania “from repeatedly opening its meetings with prayers associated with any one religion,” and struck the case from the active docket while retaining jurisdiction. Hudson sought attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $59,679.92.1. A magistrate judge recommended an award of $53,229.92 and the district court adopted the recommendation. Pittsylvania filed a notice of appeal and a motion to stay the proceedings pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Town of Greece v. Galloway (2014), 175 days after the court entered its order. The Fourth Circuit dismissed the merits appeal as untimely and affirmed the award of fees.View "Hudson v. Pittsylvania Cnty, Va." on Justia Law