Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Standley went to a D.C. public library to complete her homework and study for upcoming college exams. She sat in an area of the library reserved for children. Officer Edmonds-Leach asked Standley to move. Finding no seats in the adult area, Standley relocated to the young-adult area, although she was too old to sit there. The officer again asked Standley to move. Aan altercation ensued. The officer arrested Standley. Standley sued Officer Leach and the District of Columbia for the unconstitutional use of excessive force and common law torts. At trial, Standley and Officer Leach disputed the specifics of their encounter. Other than an inconclusive video, the only evidence was provided by Kellar, a librarian. The court allowed the defense to call Kellar for impeachment, although Kellar had not been identified before trial in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) and the defense had agreed not to call undisclosed witnesses. The D. C. Circuit reversed, finding that Kellar’s testimony was not confined to impeachment; that the outcome of the trial turned on the jury’s assessment of the credibility of Standley and Officer Edmonds-Leach; and that the testimony of the relatively disinterested witness likely influenced that outcome. View "Standley v. Edmonds-Leach" on Justia Law

A 1999 suit alleged that plaintiffs had been arrested on misdemeanor charges and were strip searched, without individualized suspicion, in violation of their federal and state constitutional rights. Nassau County conceded liability. The Second Circuit instructed the court to certify a class as to liability and to consider whether to certify a class as to damages. The district court certified both classes, granted summary judgment on liability, and held a bench trial on damages. In 2012, before the district court entered judgment, Nassau County moved to vacate the summary judgment and to dismiss the action based on the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, that “every detainee who will be admitted to the general population [of a jail] may be required to undergo a close visual inspection while undressed. The court granted the motion as to the federal claim, but determined that Florence did not warrant vacatur of the concession of liability with respect to the state claim, and awarded $11.5 million. While appeal was pending, Nassau County moved to stay enforcement pending appeal. The district court ruled that the obligation to deposit the funds with the court would be stayed for 180 days, or indefinitely, if Nassau County posted a bond. The Second Circuit stayed the requirement of deposit or bond. View "In re: Nassau Cnty Strip Search Cases" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was convicted of trafficking in heroin and cocaine and of unlawful possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from his apartment by police officers during the execution of an “anticipatory search warrant,” claiming that the officers had executed the search before the “triggering events” stated in the affidavit had occurred. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress and the resulting convictions, holding (1) where, as in this case, the Commonwealth applies for an anticipatory search warrant and the judicial authorization to execute the search is conditioned on the occurrence of a specific future event, the search is authorized by the warrant where there is equivalent compliance with that condition precedent; and (2) in this case, there was both equivalent compliance with the warrant’s triggering conditions, and compliance with those conditions provided probable cause to search Defendant’s residence. View "Commonwealth v. Colondres" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was not entitled to an instruction on self-defense; (2) the district court did not commit clear error by failing to instruct on second-degree intentional murder; (3) the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing arguments by vouching for the credibility of some witnesses, discussing facts not in evidence, and disparaging the defense, but the statements did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial; (4) the district court did not err in excluding evidence suggesting that a third party might have had a motive to commit the murder; (5) Defendant did not preserve his argument that the district court violated his confrontation rights by limiting cross-examination of a state witness; and (6) the presumed instructional error and the instances of prosecutorial misconduct did not cumulatively deny Defendant a fair trial. View "State v. Knox" on Justia Law

Henricks, an Ohio prisoner, had symptoms of acute appendicitis. The following day, upon the recommendation of Dr. Gonzalez, the prison medical director, Henricks was sent to an emergency room. Officer Maynard, who had accompanied Henricks, initially refused to remove Henricks’s restraints, causing a 45-minute delay. The surgery caused nerve damage to Henricks’s leg. Gonzalez refused to prescribe a medication (Neurontin) for the pain caused by that nerve damage, although other doctors indicated that Neurontin was necessary. Henricks filed a pro se complaint (42 U.S.C. 1983) regarding his medical care, naming Maynard and Gonzalez, who invoked qualified immunity. A magistrate concluded that Henricks had stated a colorable claim, but did not address qualified immunity. The defendants did not file an answer, but litigated discovery requests in the ensuing years. The district court subsequently granted Henricks’s motion to strike affirmative defenses of qualified immunity and failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act , finding that defendants had waived them by not asserting them in an answer and that permitting them to assert the defenses at so late would unduly prejudice Henricks. The Sixth Circuit concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the exhaustion requirement ruling and upheld the holding that defendants waived their qualified immunity defense. View "Henricks v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Prisoners on death row filed suit, challenging Missouri's execution protocol as violating the federal Controlled Substances Act and the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, and based on Eighth Amendment due process, ex post facto, and other claims. The district court sealed certain documents or docket entries, making them inaccessible to the public. There was no indication in the record why the entries were sealed, nor any explanation of what types of documents were sealed. Publisher Larry Flynt filed motions to intervene in both cases, under Federal Rule 24(b), and moved to unseal the records and entries. No party opposed Flynt's motions to intervene. One case had already been dismissed. In his motions, Flynt stated he had an interest in the sealed records as a publisher and as an advocate against the death penalty. Flynt claimed a heightened interest because Franklin, who had confessed to shooting Flynt, was a Missouri death row inmate and a plaintiff in both cases. Franklin was executed in November 2013; on that same day the district court denied Flynt's motion to intervene in one case as moot, and in the other, stating that "generalized interest" does not justify intervention. The Eighth Circuit reversed; for reasons of judicial efficiency, Rule 24(b) intervention is often preferable to filing a separate action. View "Flynt v. Lombardi" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of fleeing and evading in the second-degree, being a felon in possession of a handgun, and being a persistent felony offender in the first-degree. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err by denying Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence found incident to a Terry stop; (2) abused its discretion by imposing limitations upon Appellant’s hybrid counsel arrangement, but the error was harmless; (3) did not err by admitting evidence of other crimes; (4) did not err by permitting the Commonwealth to refer to Appellant’s his post-arrest silence; (5) properly denied Appellant’s motions for a continuance; and (6) did not err by imposing court costs. View "Nunn v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Taylor sued Nassau County, its police department, and officers and supervisors, alleging that officer Rogich used excessive force when he shot Taylor while apprehending him. After dismissals and partial summary judgment, the only defendant was Rogich. The district judge held that Rogich was not entitled to summary judgment on his claim of qualified immunity, because the claim depended on the resolution of disputed issues of fact and the jury’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses. At the close of the liability phase of the trial, the jury found that Rogich used excessive force that caused Taylor injury. Rogich moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that the plaintiff had provided no coherent version of events which a jury could have credited one way or the other. Rogich’s motion was denied because his assertion of qualified immunity depended on a view of the facts that was explicitly rejected by the jury” The Second Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction to decide an interlocutory appeal from a denial of a claim of qualified immunity to the extent that the denial involves only a question of evidence sufficiency. View "Taylor v. Rogich" on Justia Law

Paul Stavenjord, a Buddhist inmate, asked to receive a Kosher diet and to be permitted to purchase a prayer shawl. Prison officials at the Alaska Department of Corrections denied his requests. Stavenjord filed a complaint alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and various constitutional provisions. The superior court granted the Department's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Stavenjord had failed to demonstrate: (1) that a Kosher diet and prayer shawl were necessary for the practice of his religion; (2) that he was sincere in his requests for religious accommodation; and (3) that the Department's lack of accommodations substantially burdened the practice of his religion. Under Alaska's summary judgment standard, the initial burden falls on the moving party: the Department. Furthermore, religious necessity was not an element of RLUIPA. Because summary judgment was granted by placing the initial burden on the non-moving party and by focusing on Stavenjord's failure to make an evidentiary showing not required under RLUIPA, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Stavenjord v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

The Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign (SeaMAC), a non-profit organization opposed to United States support for Israel, submitted an advertisement to run on King County Metro buses in the Seattle metropolitan area that opposed the United States government’s financial support for Israel. King County initially accepted the ad but then revoked its approval, concluding that displaying the ad would likely result in violence disruptive to the bus system. SeaMAC sued the County under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging a violation of its First Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the County, concluding that Metro’s bus advertising program created a limited public forum and that the County’s decision to reject the ad was reasonable and viewpoint neutral. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) King County created a limited public forum when it opened the sides of Metro buses to advertising from outside speakers; and (2) the County’s exclusion of SeaMAC’s proposed ad was both reasonable and viewpoint neutral and thus did not violate the First Amendment. View "Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign v. King County" on Justia Law