Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In 2006, Shelton pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm. His conviction became final in 2009, and four years later he moved to vacate his sentence, 28 U.S.C. 2255, alleging that the 2013 Supreme Court holding, Descamps v. United States, made his sentence invalid. The government did not file a response. Without notifying Shelton or asking him to show cause, the district court on its own initiative dismissed the motion as untimely. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Before acting on its own initiative, a district court “must accord the parties fair notice and an opportunity to present their positions.” The district court dismissed Shelton’s motion at the Rule 4(b) “screening” stage of the section 2255 proceedings, before the government had filed any response, but the notice requirement applies to section 2254 petitions and section 2255 motions and to sua sponte dismissals that occur during the Rule 4 screening process. View "Shelton v. United States" on Justia Law

Ohio state inmate Jackson continually violated the terms of his parole. Facing up to 26 years behind bars, he filed an unsuccessful federal habeas petition in 2013. Jackson filed two more habeas petitions in 2015, but the district court classified them as second or successive and transferred them to the Sixth Circuit. Jackson filed unsuccessful “motion[s] for relief from” the judgments asking the district court to reconsider the transfer orders. The Sixth Circuit vacated with instructions to dismiss, noting that Jackson appealed the denial of his motion for relief from the transfer order, not the transfer order itself. .When a district court transfers a second-or-successive habeas petition, the case travels from one court to another, so that the transferring court loses jurisdiction and the other court gains The district court lost jurisdiction over Jackson’s habeas petitions when each petition was physically transferred to the Sixth Circuit, so it lacked jurisdiction to consider Jackson’s motions. View "Jackson v. Sloan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Municipality of Carolina in the federal district court of Puerto Rico alleging gender-based employment discrimination and retaliation. Before trial, Carolina extended to Plaintiff what it labeled as an offer of judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 68. Later that day, Carolina informed the district court that no settlement had been reached. One half of an hour later, Plaintiff informed the court that she was accepting Carolina’s offer of judgment. The district court entered judgment for Plaintiff. Carolina appealed, arguing that because Plaintiff had rejected the offer of judgment prior to informing the court of her acceptance, the district court erred in entering judgment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that because even an express rejection of a Rule 68 offer of judgment does not terminate a Rule 68 offeree’s power to accept the offer within the fourteen-day period, the district court did not err in entering judgment for Plaintiff. View "Garayalde-Rijos v. Municipality of Carolina" on Justia Law

While Gevas was serving a life sentence in Galesburg, Illinois, his cellmate stabbed him in the neck with a pen. Gevas filed a complaint against three prison officials, alleging that they failed to protect him from the attack, 42 U.S.C. 1983. Gevas testified that, in the months before the pen-stabbing incident, he had repeatedly complained to prison officials about certain cellmates that he believed posed a danger to him. He had filed grievances and had discussed the matter with his prison counselor. The district court granted judgment as a matter of law to the officials on the ground that no reasonable jury could conclude that they were subjectively aware that Gevas was in danger. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Were a jury to credit Gevas’s testimony that he alerted each of the defendants to his cellmate’s threats to stab him, it could find that the defendants were aware of the danger posed to Gevas. View "Gevas v. McLaughlin" on Justia Law

In 1999, detainees at the Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center claimed that Center personnel abused detainees. Eight years into the certified class action, the court appointed a “Transitional Administrator” to run the Center in compliance with state and federal requirements. State law, effective in 2008, moved the Center’s management from the county’s political branches to the Circuit Court of Cook County, 55 ILCS 75/3(b), and required the Chief Judge to appoint a new head within 180 days. When the case was argued in 2011, the appointment had not been made. In 2009 the Transitional Administrator proposed reorganization, which would terminate about 225 union employees. The union for Center employees intervened. The district court rejected its position that the proposal would violate several statutes and authorized the implementation, stating that collective-bargaining rights must give way, as a matter of Illinois law, when necessary to effective management. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the judge did not find that overriding the right to bargain was essential to solve any constitutional problem at the Center or about the necessity for a particular remedy to cure any violation. The plan has been in effect for years, and restoring union members to their old positions is not possible. View "Doe v. Teamsters Local Union" on Justia Law

In 2004, Seneca and Tari Adams endured vicious beatings by Chicago police officers and prolonged detentions. Along with their sister, Sicara, they sued the city and the officers. The city admitted its liability to all three plaintiffs for false arrest, excessive force, and race discrimination; it also stipulated that it was liable to Seneca and Tari for malicious prosecution in violation of state law. The jury returned awards of $2.4 million to Seneca, $1 million to Tari, and $300,000 to Sicara. The district court entered an order reducing those amounts to $1.17 million for Seneca, $350,000 for Tari, and $125,000 for Sicara The court did not give the plaintiffs the option of a new trial in lieu of accepting the lower amount. Seneca and Tari appealed. The Seventh Circuit vacated for reinstatement of the jury’s verdict A true remittitur order gives the winning party a choice: he may either accept a specific reduced monetary award or he may opt for a new trial. These plaintiffs never agreed to the reduction in their award and were never offered the option of a new trial; they were entitled to appeal. View "Adams v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Shortly before Pettaway was to be released from federal prison, the government sought his commitment under 18 U.S.C. 4246 on grounds that he was mentally ill and dangerous. After a hearing, the district court committed Pettaway for hospitalization and treatment, finding by clear and convincing evidence that commitment was appropriate. The Eighth Circuit vacated, expressing no opinion as to the appropriateness of Pettaway’s commitment, but stating that the commitment order must do more than recite Pettaway’s mental diagnosis and the opinions of mental health professionals that Pettaway’s unconditional release would create the relevant risk of dangerousness. The court heard contrary evidence in the form of testimony from Pettaway and must give some indication as to what information in the record it relied upon– such as Pettaway’s behavioral or psychological history; results of formalized assessments; recent observations, treatment notes, or interview impressions of mental health professionals; or its impressions of Pettaway’s own testimony – in reaching its conclusion. View "United States v. Pettaway" on Justia Law

Plaintiff David Eldridge was a resident and condominium owner at the Whip-Poor-Will Condominium Complex in Hudson. The condominium complex was governed by two different entities: the Condominium Owners' Association (COA) and the Rolling Green at Whip-Poor-Will Townhouse Owners' Association (TOA). Each association had separate and distinct legal obligations as set forth in the Condominium Declaration. Plaintiff has several disabling impairments that impact his mobility. When a walkway had not been repaired as he requested, plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination against the COA with the New Hampshire Human Rights Commission (HRC). Shortly thereafter, the COA repaired the plaintiff's walkway. The HRC, which continued to investigate the matter despite the repair, determined that there was probable cause to support a finding of discrimination and notified the COA that it had scheduled a public hearing on the complaint. The COA subsequently removed the case to superior court and filed a motion to dismiss on numerous grounds. As relevant to this appeal, the COA argued that plaintiff's discrimination complaint should be dismissed because the HRC had not commenced proceedings within twenty-four months after the filing of the charge of discrimination, as required by statute. The Superior Court denied the COA's motion to dismiss, concluding that the twenty-four month limit specified in the statute was not jurisdictional. The COA then filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that: (1) the case was moot because the walkway had been repaired; (2) the COA was not an entity covered by the Human Rights Act; (3) the plaintiff's claim was time-barred; (4) there was no dispute that the COA had accommodated the plaintiff; and (5) the COA had no legal obligation or authority to replace the walkway because it was located in a Townhouse Limited Common Area. The Superior Court (Temple, J.) granted the COA's motion for summary judgment on the ground that, under the plain language of the Declaration, the COA lacked authority over plaintiff's walkway and, as such, plaintiff had pursued the wrong party in seeking an accommodation. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration in which he asserted, for the first time, that because the COA had arranged for the walkway to be repaired, it had authority to repair the walkway. The court denied plaintiff's motion, reaffirming its earlier determination that the TOA, not the COA, had sole control over the walkway, and refusing to consider both plaintiff's theory regarding the COA's "assumed" authority over the walkway and any "new evidence" in support thereof. This appeal and cross-appeal followed. The Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff's complaint was untimely under RSA 354-A:21, III, and as such, affirmed dismissal of his case. View "Eldridge v. Rolling Green at Whip-Poor-Will Condo. Owners Ass'n" on Justia Law

FRCP 4(c)(3) requires a court to order that service be made by a U.S. marshal or deputy marshal or by a person specially appointed if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. 1915. Plaintiff, a federal inmate, sued former warden Werlinger, for violations of his constitutional rights. The judge allowed him to proceed pro se and, in June 2014, directed the Marshals Service to serve Werlinger. The Marshals replied within days that Werlinger had retired and left no forwarding address. The court directed the Marshals to make another attempt by contacting the Federal Bureau of Prisons or conducting an Internet search of public records, stating that “reasonable efforts do not require the marshal to be a private investigator for civil litigants or to use software available only to law enforcement officers." Two days later, the Marshals replied: Was not able to locate using internet database searches. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal as premature. The “court should not have accepted the responses…. Not that the Service can be expected to do the impossible. If Werlinger changed his name to Siddhārtha Gautama and is now a monk of a Buddhist temple in Tibet, the Marshals Service probably couldn’t find him by efforts proportionate to the importance of finding … plaintiff would be out of luck … the statute of limitations shall be tolled … while the Marshals Service redoubles its efforts to FIND WERLINGER!” View "Williams v. Werlinger" on Justia Law

In February 2009, Santini was working at his family’s Harmony Township, New Jersey dairy farm, when a fight broke out. Santini and 10 others witnessed the fight. About 20 local and state police officers arrived after the fight ended. Santini, standing outside of the milk house, spoke with a Greenwich Township officer about what he had witnessed. According to Santini, State Trooper Fuhrmann yelled at Santini to take his hands out of his pockets. Santini maintains that he complied and explained that his hands were cold because he had been working all day milking cows. Fuhrmann responded: “I don’t care. Keep them where I [can] see them.” Santini continued to try to warm his hands and Fuhrmann continued to object. Santini told Fuhrmann that he was going to return to work because he had already told the other officers his story and began to walk away. Santini claims he was kicked, punched, and held on the ground, then was sprayed with pepper spray and handcuffed. His medical records from the incident reveal no lasting injuries. The Troopers’ story differs from Santini’s. The district court rejected Santini’s civil rights suit on summary judgment. The Third Circuit vacated, finding material issues of fact as to whether Santini’s constitutional rights were violated. View "Santini v. Fuentes" on Justia Law