Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Wal-Mart is the country’s largest private employer, operating approximately 3,400 stores and employing more than one million people. In 2001, named plaintiffs filed a putative class action (Dukes) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, on behalf of all former and current female Wal-Mart employees. In 2011 the Supreme Court reversed certification of the nationwide class of current Wal-Mart employees under Rule 23(b)(2), finding that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate questions of law or fact common to the class. The district court then held that all class members who possessed right-to-sue letters from the EEOC could file suit on or before October 28, 2011. Six unnamed Dukes class members filed suit, alleging individual and putative class claims under Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of current and former female employees in Wal-Mart Region 43. . The district court dismissed the claims as time-barred. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The timely filing of a class-action complaint commences suit and tolls the statute of limitations for all members of the putative class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action; the suit is not barred by the earlier litigation. View "Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1982, Gacho was arrested, along with others, and confessed his involvement in two murders, signing a written statement. Gacho and Titone stood trial in Judge Maloney’s court. Gacho’s girlfriend was the star prosecution witness, having witnessed the key events. Her testimony largely aligned with Gacho’s confession, which was admitted at trial. The jury found Gacho guilty in 1984 and he was sentenced to death. Judge Maloney was corrupt; he has “the dubious distinction of being the only Illinois judge ever convicted of fixing a murder case.” Gacho claims that Maloney solicited a bribe from him but his family could not raise the money. Titone’s family paid Maloney $10,000 to fix his case, but he was convicted anyway. Gacho also claims that his trial lawyer, McDonnell, the son-in-law of Sam Giancana, longtime boss of the Chicago Outfit, was operating under an impermissible conflict of interest and was otherwise ineffective. The district court dismissed, without prejudice his most recent federal habeas petition for failure to exhaust state court remedies, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The district court issued a non-final, non-appealable order. Gacho may refile his petition after he exhausts state remedies. View "Gacho v. Butler" on Justia Law

Gonzalez-Koeneke worked, for 12 years, as a Rockford School District bus driver. She experienced problems with children on her bus and filed incident reports with Sharp and, later, went to West, the terminal manager. She was told that she did not know how to discipline the children and was later suspended for two days for failing to perform a proper pre-trip inspection of her bus. Gonzalez-Koeneke claims that her suspension was actually retaliation for having gone to West. Her union steward told her that Wilson (a District official) wanted her to quit, but Wilson issued a “Removal Form” that same day, resulting in suspension of her bus-driver permit for three years. Gonzalez-Koeneke was terminated based on her suspended permit. She filed suit pro se, alleging violation of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court dismissed with prejudice, noting its standing order that a dismissal is with prejudice unless a party requests an opportunity to amend in its response. Gonzalez-Koeneke moved to set aside the judgment and to amend her complaint. The district court denied the motion, stating that she had not explained how she would amend the complaint to cure the deficiencies identified in the order. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Gonzalez-Koeneke v. West" on Justia Law

Taylor was charged with conspiring to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute and conspiring to launder money. The government offered to dismiss the drug conspiracy count and recommend a two-year sentence if Taylor pled guilty to money laundering. Taylor did not accept the plea. After trial, the court granted judgment of acquittal on the money laundering count. The jury found Taylor guilty on the drug count. Taylor received the mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. His conviction became final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 2255’s limitation period in January 2012. Taylor filed a timely motion to vacate, arguing his attorneys provided ineffective assistance by failing to communicate his decision to accept the plea; failing to request a “cautionary tail” instruction; and failing to request a lesser included offense instruction. After a hearing, Taylor moved to amend to add a claim that his attorneys were ineffective for presenting a defense theory that essentially conceded guilt. The court allowed amendment and granted the motion to vacate on Taylor’s amended claim. The Eighth Circuit reversed with instructions to reimpose the sentence, finding that Taylor’s amended claim did not relate back to any original claim. View "Taylor v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2009, unknown assailants shot and killed Marty, who had sporadically provided intelligence to narcotics officers in Belvidere, Illinois, since 2006. Marty’s mother, Flint, filed 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims. The constitutional claims boil down to allegations that Marty was targeted and killed in retribution for his actions as a police informant, and that the defendants are liable for failing to protect him. The day defendants moved for summary judgment, about a month after discovery closed, Flint moved to reopen discovery and for the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate allegations that Officer Dammon and Berry (Marty’s primary police contacts) lied throughout discovery. The judge denied both motions. Flint’s response to the summary judgment motion did not comport with Local Rule 56.1, which guides how parties must marshal evidence at the summary judgment stage. Applying that rule, the district court deemed admitted most of defendants’ factual assertions, ignored additional facts raised in Flint’s response briefing, and granted summary judgment against her. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The judge acted within his discretion to deny Flint’s tardy motions and Flint’s procedural gaffe left an evidentiary record insufficient to survive summary judgment. View "Flint v. City of Belvidere" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted in Douglas County of first degree sexual assault. Appellant later filed a pro se complaint in Lancaster County under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against prosecutors, public defenders, and attorneys purportedly involved in the underlying criminal action. Appellant moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The district court, acting sua sponte, objected that venue was not proper in Lancaster County and, on that basis, also objected to the motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The court then denied Appellant’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, opining that if Appellant wished to proceed with the action in forma pauperis, he should make his request in Douglas County. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Iowa law does not permit denial of in forma pauperis based on a sua sponte objection to venue, the district court erred in denying Appellant in forma pauperis status on that basis. Remanded. View "Castonguay v. Retelsdorf" on Justia Law

Franklin claimed that Young, an assistant caseworker at the facility where Franklin was incarcerated, violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to protect him from sexual assault by another inmate by being deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk that he would be sexually assaulted by inmate Mosley. The district court denied Young’s motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity, holding that factual disputes prevented the court from determining whether Young violated Franklin’s rights. The Eighth Circuit dismissed an interlocutory appeal. A district court's summary judgment order denying qualified immunity may not be appealed “insofar as [it] determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a genuine issue of fact for trial.” Essentially, Young argued that the district court erred in finding a genuine dispute of material fact over whether he violated Franklin’s Eighth Amendment rights. By challenging the district court's finding on sufficiency of the evidence, Young was asking the court to engage in “the time-consuming task of reviewing a factual controversy about intent.” View "Franklin v. Young" on Justia Law

Officer Williams allegedly searched and seized Banks without probable cause, took $1,100 from him without including it in department records, and filed false reports, leading to a criminal prosecution against Banks for unlawful use of a weapon, a charge on which he was acquitted. Plaintiffs sued, in state court, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. An amended complaint against Williams, in his individual and official capacities, alleged that Williams’s actions were part of a pattern of unconstitutional conduct about which the St. Louis Police Board was deliberately indifferent. Williams and the Board were served. Williams and an attorney for the Board were notified of the potential default and a scheduled hearing. Only plaintiffs appeared. A$900,000 default judgment entered against Williams "in his personal and official capacities, jointly and severally." Plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought to enforce the judgment against city officials in state court. The federal district court declined to enter a declaratory judgment, finding that it lacked jurisdiction. The Eighth Circuit reversed. Refusal to honor the default judgment against Williams in his official capacity, not the state court denial of mandamus, was the source of the injury from which plaintiffs seek relief. Plaintiffs did not ask a federal court to overturn an injurious state-court judgment. Younger abstention is also inappropriate. View "Banks v. Slay" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, twenty graduates from medical schools outside of the United States, failed the Puerto Rico Medical Licensing Examination (the PRMLE), which made them ineligible to receive a medical license in Puerto Rico. Plaintiffs filed this 42 U.S.C. 1983 action requesting injunctive relief and damages, arguing that the Puerto Rico Board of Medical Licensure and Discipline and eight of its officers (collectively, Defendants), in their official and individual capacities, violated Plaintiffs’ due process and equal protection rights by imposing an arbitrary passing score in the PRMLE. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no plausible basis for a claim of relief in Plaintiffs’ claims. View "Mulero-Carrillo v. Roman-Hernandez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, once a standout high school basketball player, sued 942 U.S.C. 1983) Valley View Community School District, and the Illinois High School Association, raising claims of First Amendment retaliation, equal protection, substantive due process, unconstitutional policy, section 1983 conspiracy to violate constitutional rights, and indemnification under the Illinois Tort Immunity Act. He alleged that the District and IHSA singled him out for residency investigations, which rendered him ineligible to participate in basketball for 10 days, because his mother complained to the District. The district judge determined that plaintiff failed to comply with local Rule 56.1 and deemed admitted all of the defendants’ properly supported facts and disregarded plaintiff’s additional facts that lacked evidentiary support. Rule 56.1(a)(3) requires a party moving for summary judgment to include with that motion “a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue and that entitle the moving party to a judgment as a matter of law,” organized by numbered paragraphs and referring to supporting materials that substantiate the asserted facts. The district judge entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The defendants complied; plaintiff, in opposing summary judgment, was required to, but did not comply. View "Friend v. Valley View Cmty Unit Sch. Dist." on Justia Law