Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was sixty-one years old when his employment with the Kansas City Chiefs was terminated. Plaintiff was replaced by a younger worker. Plaintiff filed a petition in the circuit court alleging a single act of age discrimination on the day of his termination. In pretrial proceedings, the trial court denied Plaintiff’s request to have testimony presented to the jury from numerous nonparty former employees over age forty who were either fired or pressured to resign and their job duties were assumed by younger replacements. The jury ultimately returned a verdict in favor of the Chiefs. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the trial court (1) misapplied the legal standard for admission of evidence by so-called “me too” witnesses and abused its discretion in excluding “me too” evidence offered by the former employees; and (2) erred in excluding evidence concerning a discriminatory age-related statement allegedly made by a Chiefs executive and in quashing a deposition order issued to the Chiefs’ chairman and chief executive officer. Remanded. View "Cox v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc." on Justia Law

The jeopardy element of the tort for wrongful discharge against public policy and whether the administrative remedies available under the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 (STAA) were at issue in this case. This was one of three concomitant cases before the Washington Supreme Court concerning the "adequacy of alternative remedies" component of the jeopardy element that some of Washington cases seemingly embrace. The complaint here alleged that Anderson Hay & Grain Company terminated petitioner Charles Rose from his position as a semi-truck driver when he refused to falsify his drivetime records and drove in excess of the federally mandated drive-time limits. Rose had worked as a truck driver for over 30 years, the last 3 of which he worked as an employee for Anderson Hay. In March 2010, Rose sued under the STAA in federal court but his suit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because he failed to first file with the secretary of labor. Rose then filed a complaint in Kittitas County Superior Court, seeking remedy under the common law tort for wrongful discharge against public policy. The trial court dismissed his claim on summary judgment, holding that the existence of the federal administrative remedy under the STAA prevented Rose from establishing the jeopardy element of the tort. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the appellate court for reconsideration in light of "Piel v. City of Federal Way," (306 P.3d 879 (2013)). Like the statute at issue in Piel, the STAA contained a nonpreemption clause. On remand, the Court of Appeals distinguished Rose's case from Piel, and again affirmed the trial court's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court addressed the cases the Court of Appeals used as basis for its decision, and held that adequacy of alternative remedies component misapprehended the role of the common law and the purpose of this tort and had to be stricken from the jeopardy analysis. The Court "re-embraced" the formulation of the tort as initially articulated in those cases, and reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Rose v. Anderson Hay & Grain Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Erika Rickman brought this suit against her former employer, Premera Blue Cross, for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Rickman alleged she was terminated in retaliation for raising concerns about potential violations of the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, and its Washington counterpart, the Uniform Health Care Information Act (UHCIA). The trial court dismissed Rickman's suit on Premera's motion for summary judgment, concluding Rickman could not satisfy the jeopardy element of the tort because Premera's internal reporting system provided an adequate alternative means to promote the public policy. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Washington Supreme Court granted review of this case and two others in order to resolve confusion with respect to the jeopardy element of the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Consistent with its decisions in the other two cases, the Court held that nothing in Premera' s internal reporting system, nor in HIPAA or UHCIA, precluded Rickman's claim of wrongful discharge. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals but remanded for that court to address Premera's alternate argument for upholding the trial court's order of dismissal. View "Rickman v. Premera Blue Cross" on Justia Law

Respondent Gregg Becker began working for Rockwood Clinic PS, an acquired subsidiary of Community Health Systems (CHS) 1 as its chief financial officer (CFO) in February 2011. As a publicly traded company, CJ-IS is required to file reports with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). As Rockwood's CFO, Becker was required by state and federal law to ensure that Rockwood's reports did not mislead the public, which also required his personal verification that the reports did not contain any inaccurate material facts or material omissions. In October 2011, Becker submitted to CHS' financial department an "EBIDTA," calculation. Becker was not told that when CHS acquired Rockwood, it represented to creditors that the acquisition would incur a $4 million operating loss. To cover the discrepancy, CHS' financial supervisors allegedly directed Becker to correct his EBIDTA to reflect the targeted $4 million loss. CHS did not provide a basis for its low calculation. Becker refused, fearing that the projection would mislead creditors and investors in violation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The CEO made clear that Becker's refusal to do so put his position in jeopardy; Becker felt compelled to resign unless CHS responded to his concerns. CHS and Rockwood accepted Becker's resignation. CHS filed a CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Becker's complaint for wrongful termination, contending that the jeopardy element of the tort had not been met because there were adequate alternative means to protect the public policy of honesty in corporate financial reporting. The Court of Appeals accepted review and determined that the jeopardy element had been satisfied because the alternative administrative enforcement mechanisms of SOX were inadequate and therefore did not foreclose common law tort remedies for employees. The Supreme Court's holding in "Rose v. Anderson Hay" instructed that alternative statutory remedies were to be analyzed for exclusivity, rather than adequacy. Under that formulation, neither SOX nor Dodd-Frank precluded Becker from recovery. The Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Community CHS' CR 12(b)(6) motion, and affirmed the Court of Appeals in upholding that decision upon certified interlocutory review. View "Becker v. Comm'y Health Sys., Inc.." on Justia Law

Fans of the musical group Insane Clown Posse, who call themselves “Juggalos,” frequently display, on person or property, insignia representative of the band. In 2011, the National Gang Intelligence Center—an informational center operating under the Federal Bureau of Investigation—released a congressionally-mandated report on gang activity that included a section on Juggalos. The report identified Juggalos as a “hybrid gang” and relayed information about criminal activity committed by Juggalo subsets. Juggalos allege that they subsequently suffered violations of their First and Fifth Amendment constitutional rights at the hands of state and local law enforcement officers who were motivated to commit the injuries in question due to the identification of Juggalos as a criminal gang. They filed suit against the Department of Justice and FBI under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act. The SIxth Circuit reversed dismissal for lack of standing. The Juggalos sufficiently alleged that the reputational harm and chill was caused by the 2011 Report and, where reputational harm and chill will likely be alleviated by the relief sought, redressability exists. View "Parsons v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law

Christine B., the mother of student "A.F.," filed suit claiming that the Espanola Public Schools failed to address appropriately her daughter's disabilities in the educational program it formulated for her. Before any hearing could be held, Christine sought to mediate her dispute. In the end, the parties signed a settlement agreement. As a result of the settlement, Christine B. asked the administrative agency to dismiss her Individuals with Disability Education Act (IDEA) claims with prejudice. Despite the satisfactory result she received through mediation, Christine B. filed suit again, though not pursuant to IDEA, but under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The allegations in her federal court complaint and those in her original IDEA administrative complaint were nearly identical: both alleged that A.F. suffered from the same disabilities and both contended that the school district failed to take her disabilities into account in her educational program. Agreeing with the school district that Christine B. failed to exhaust available administrative remedies, the district court dismissed her lawsuit. Christine B. appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. View "A.F. v. Espanola Public Schools" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Lieutenant with the Corrections Department, filed suit alleging violations of both 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the California Whistleblower Protection Act, California Government Code 8547, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, finding that plaintiff was collaterally estopped from relitigating the whistleblower retaliation issue because it had been litigated during the State Personnel Board proceedings. The court reversed because, pursuant to State Board of Chiropractic Examiners v. Superior Court, the State Personnel Board’s decision does not have preclusive effect under theories of res judicata and collateral estoppel and thus does not prevent plaintiff from litigating his whistleblower retaliation damages claim in the district court. View "Wabakken v. CA Dep't of Corr. & Rehab." on Justia Law

Respondents Jason Rodgers and James Hazel brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim against the Summit County Board of County Commissioners alleging the County violated the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution when it denied them a certificate of occupancy to their newly built home. The trial court issued partial directed verdicts against respondents on three of the four allegedly discriminatory actions they named in their complaint. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed, concluding C.R.C.P. 50 did not permit partial directed verdicts, and that the trial court improperly considered the County' actions as separate issues rather than a pattern of conduct. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's ruling, finding that because Rule 50 is close to the summary judgment rule (C.R.C.P. 56) which permits partial judgments, the two rules should be interpreted in tandem. The Court could find "no convincing justification . . . for permitting partial summary judgments but not partial directed verdicts." The Court also disagreed with the court of appeals' additional rationale that the trial court misunderstood the nature of respondents' claim, as respondents requested the trial court to consider the four allegedly discriminatory actions as separate acts, rather than a pattern of conduct. View "Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Summit Cty. v. Rodgers" on Justia Law

Before 2003 Doe pled guilty to two simple assaults in Pennsylvania. In 2003, he pled guilty in federal court to distribution and possession with intent to distribute at least five grams of crack cocaine. His sentence as a career offender occurred under precedent categorically designating his prior convictions as crimes of violence. He did not appeal his 262-month sentence. In 2004 the government moved to reduce Doe’s sentence for “substantial assistance” in a different criminal investigation. While that Rule 35 motion was pending, Doe filed a section 2255 motion arguing that his assault convictions were not crimes of violence. The 2008 Supreme Court decision, Begay, held that a DUI conviction is not a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because it does not involve “purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.” The career-offender Sentencing Guideline was similar to the ACCA. In 2009, the district court granted Doe Rule 35 relief; counsel withdrew the 2255 motion. The Third Circuit then held that courts must inquire into the part of the statute to which the defendant actually pled guilty to determine whether the career-offender enhancement applies. In 2012 Doe filed a section 2255 motion, again raising his Begay argument. The statute of limitations on Doe’s Begay argument expired in 2009, when he withdrew his 2008 motion. The court concluded that there was no basis to toll the limitations period because Doe’s 2008 counsel was not deficient. The Third Circuit remanded. The court noted that while Doe has been released from prison, his case is not moot; proceeded under an assumption that the 2255 motion was not a second or successive motion over which the district court lacked jurisdiction; held that Doe had not procedurally defaulted his claim; and held that claims of Begay error are cognizable on collateral review. View "United States v. Doe" on Justia Law

Following a police pursuit, Murray shot Jermell through the windshield and side window of Jermell’s vehicle. Jermell died from the gunshot wounds. Jermell’s mother sued Murray, another officer (Caudell), Chief of Police Gunderman, and the City of Morrilton, alleging excessive force, supervisory liability, and municipal liability under the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1983, and claims under Arkansas law. Murray, Caudell, Gunderman, and the city moved for summary judgment. The district court granted Caudell’s motion, denied the city’s motion, granted Defendants’ motion as it pertained to Thompson’s duplicative official-capacity claims against Murray and Gunderman, and denied Murray’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Murray and Gunderman filed an interlocutory appeal. The Eighth Circuit dismissed Murray’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and dismissed Gunderman’s claim for want of a reviewable order because the district court did not address or rule on Thompson’s claims against Gunderman in his individual capacity. View "Thompson v. Murray" on Justia Law