Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

FRCP 4(c)(3) requires a court to order that service be made by a U.S. marshal or deputy marshal or by a person specially appointed if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. 1915. Plaintiff, a federal inmate, sued former warden Werlinger, for violations of his constitutional rights. The judge allowed him to proceed pro se and, in June 2014, directed the Marshals Service to serve Werlinger. The Marshals replied within days that Werlinger had retired and left no forwarding address. The court directed the Marshals to make another attempt by contacting the Federal Bureau of Prisons or conducting an Internet search of public records, stating that “reasonable efforts do not require the marshal to be a private investigator for civil litigants or to use software available only to law enforcement officers." Two days later, the Marshals replied: Was not able to locate using internet database searches. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal as premature. The “court should not have accepted the responses…. Not that the Service can be expected to do the impossible. If Werlinger changed his name to Siddhārtha Gautama and is now a monk of a Buddhist temple in Tibet, the Marshals Service probably couldn’t find him by efforts proportionate to the importance of finding … plaintiff would be out of luck … the statute of limitations shall be tolled … while the Marshals Service redoubles its efforts to FIND WERLINGER!” View "Williams v. Werlinger" on Justia Law

In February 2009, Santini was working at his family’s Harmony Township, New Jersey dairy farm, when a fight broke out. Santini and 10 others witnessed the fight. About 20 local and state police officers arrived after the fight ended. Santini, standing outside of the milk house, spoke with a Greenwich Township officer about what he had witnessed. According to Santini, State Trooper Fuhrmann yelled at Santini to take his hands out of his pockets. Santini maintains that he complied and explained that his hands were cold because he had been working all day milking cows. Fuhrmann responded: “I don’t care. Keep them where I [can] see them.” Santini continued to try to warm his hands and Fuhrmann continued to object. Santini told Fuhrmann that he was going to return to work because he had already told the other officers his story and began to walk away. Santini claims he was kicked, punched, and held on the ground, then was sprayed with pepper spray and handcuffed. His medical records from the incident reveal no lasting injuries. The Troopers’ story differs from Santini’s. The district court rejected Santini’s civil rights suit on summary judgment. The Third Circuit vacated, finding material issues of fact as to whether Santini’s constitutional rights were violated. View "Santini v. Fuentes" on Justia Law

In February 2009, Santini was working at his family’s Harmony Township, New Jersey dairy farm, when a fight broke out. Santini and 10 others witnessed the fight. About 20 local and state police officers arrived after the fight ended. Santini, standing outside of the milk house, spoke with a Greenwich Township officer about what he had witnessed. According to Santini, State Trooper Fuhrmann yelled at Santini to take his hands out of his pockets. Santini maintains that he complied and explained that his hands were cold because he had been working all day milking cows. Fuhrmann responded: “I don’t care. Keep them where I [can] see them.” Santini continued to try to warm his hands and Fuhrmann continued to object. Santini told Fuhrmann that he was going to return to work because he had already told the other officers his story and began to walk away. Santini claims he was kicked, punched, and held on the ground, then was sprayed with pepper spray and handcuffed. His medical records from the incident reveal no lasting injuries. The Troopers’ story differs from Santini’s. The district court rejected Santini’s civil rights suit on summary judgment. The Third Circuit vacated, finding material issues of fact as to whether Santini’s constitutional rights were violated. View "Santini v. Fuentes" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are commercial trucking companies, their national trade association, and a putative class of commercial truckers. Plaintiff filed suit against the Thruway Authority under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the Thruway Authority charges excessive tolls in violation of the Commerce Clause because it diverts excessive highway tolls to fund maintenance and improvements of unrelated projects. The district court dismissed the suit under Rule 12(b)(7) for failure to join the State of New York as a necessary party under Rule 19. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that the district court abused its discretion because the State of New York is not a necessary party under Rule 19(a). View "Am. Trucking Ass'n v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are commercial trucking companies, their national trade association, and a putative class of commercial truckers. Plaintiff filed suit against the Thruway Authority under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the Thruway Authority charges excessive tolls in violation of the Commerce Clause because it diverts excessive highway tolls to fund maintenance and improvements of unrelated projects. The district court dismissed the suit under Rule 12(b)(7) for failure to join the State of New York as a necessary party under Rule 19. The court reversed and remanded, concluding that the district court abused its discretion because the State of New York is not a necessary party under Rule 19(a). View "Am. Trucking Ass'n v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth." on Justia Law

Based on allegations of felonious assault on an officer, Cleveland police arrested plaintiffs at home in the early morning when plaintiffs were wearing only boxer shorts. Police refused to retrieve additional clothing, issuing them jumpsuits after they arrived at the police station. Plaintiffs have repeatedly changed their stories. In their second lawsuit, plaintiffs, who are homosexual, allege that officers repeatedly struck them and violated their equal protection rights by forcing them to remain in their boxer shorts, and that these actions constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress. When the officers moved for summary judgment, plaintiffs filed affidavits based upon “personal knowledge and belief,” identifying, for the first time, which officer allegedly committed each act. The court struck the affidavits, explaining that it did not know which statements were based on personal knowledge, as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and which were based only upon belief; without those affidavits, the record did not contain sufficient evidence to permit plaintiffs’ claims to survive. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in striking the affidavits and that, construing the remaining record in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Ondo v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

Attacked by a fellow prisoner while being transported from a court hearing to an Illinois jail, Robinson, pro se, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that guards were deliberately indifferent to his safety in failing to protect him. On December 30, 26 days after the court entered final judgment dismissing the suit, Robinson moved to extend the 28-day deadline for filing a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) to alter or amend the judgment. Rule 6(b)(2) prohibits extending the time for filing a Rule 59(e) motion, Robinson missed the deadline. A month later the judge issued an order construing the motion as a Rule 59(e) motion and gave Robinson another 30 days to supplement it, since the motion stated no grounds for relief but just asked for more time. Two weeks after the 30-day deadline the judge denied the ‘Rule 59(e) motion.’ Robinson filed another such motion 12 days later. The judge construed it as a Rule 60(b) motion because the deadline for filing a Rule 59(e) motion had passed. Rule 60(b) lists six grounds for relief from judgment, including “any other reason.” The judge denied Robinson’s Rule 60(b) motion. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal, stating no relief was available. View "Robinson v. Sweeny" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's wrongful termination claims because the court concluded that an affidavit attached as an exhibit to a complaint is not a "written instrument" that is deemed part of the complaint under Rule 10(c); affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's remaining claims for lack of standing and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion for leave to amend his complaint, a motion which was first made following the entry of the final judgment. View "Smith v. Hogan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is the mother of Karl Grimes, a juvenile who was allegedly beaten to death at a detention facility. Plaintiff claimed that the District showed deliberate indifference to, and reckless disregard for, her son’s safety, and that the District was negligent in hiring, training, and supervising its employees at the detention center in violation of District of Columbia tort law, the Eighth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment, and denied as moot plaintiff’s cross-motion to strike the summary judgment motion and to disqualify the Attorney General of the District of Columbia based on an asserted conflict of interest. The court concluded that the district court should resolve a motion to disqualify counsel before it turns to the merits of any dispositive motion because a claim of counsel’s conflict of interest calls into question the integrity of the process in which the allegedly conflicted counsel participates. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court erred in the sequence in which it rendered its decisions. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment and its denial of the motion to disqualify, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Grimes v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

Stephens visited the Oaklawn Club for gambling. After winning, playing slot machines, Stephens cashed out and left the casino. He returned later that evening and purchased another ticket for use in the slot machines. He was approached by uniformed security personnel and Jessup, a uniformed Hot Springs police officer. They accused Stephens of stealing the cashed-out ticket and detained Stephens while employees reviewed surveillance footage. Stephens alleges that Jessup threatened to “take him to jail immediately” if he did not return the money. Jessup recited Miranda warnings, escorted Stephens to his vehicle, and retrieved the money. An Arkansas state court granted Oaklawn summary judgment. Neither Jessup nor Amtote was a party to that action. Stephens then filed a federal suit against Jessup and Amtote, alleging the same causes of action against these new defendants. The court dismissed, citing issue preclusion. The Eighth Circuit reversed in part, finding that Stephens did not perfect an appeal with respect to Amtote. The court expressed no view on the merits of the Jessup claims, stating that the record is not clear that Stephens is trying to relitigate an issue that was previously decided or that Jessup and Oaklawn represent the same legal right. View "Stephens v. Jessup" on Justia Law