Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Inmates, acting pro se, alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment by overcrowding and provision of inadequate mental-health services. The district court denied their “Motion for Class Certification and Appointment of Counsel” seeking to certify three classes: (1) “all prisoners who are now or in the future will be confined in the [Wisconsin Department of Corrections],” (2) all prisoners who are now or in the future will be confined at [Waupun Correctional Institution],” and (3) all prisoners with a serious mental illness or disability “who are now or in the future will be confined at” Waupun. The courts then rejected their claim that they “should be appointed counsel to represent the certified classes … pursuant to Rule 23(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” The court stated that the pro se plaintiffs could not adequately represent a class and that Rule 23(g), “is only implicated when a class is first certified under Rule 23(a)(4).” The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for leave to appeal. View "Howard v. Pollard" on Justia Law

Tate filed suit pro se, claiming that his former employer, which provides non‐emergency medical transportation, discriminated against him and then having retaliated against him for complaining about the discrimination, 42 U.S.C. 2000e; 42 U.S.C. 12101 (Americans with Disabilities Act). The court dismissed, without allowing amendment, citing 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which requires dismissal of a complaint seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis if it “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” The judge stated that Tate’s complaint contained “little more than conclusory legal jargon.’” The Seventh Circuit reversed. The plaintiff was not required to plead more elaborately, except with regard to his claim of disability discrimination. Tate used a complaint form supplied by the district court. The form does not require, nor permit, extensive factual detail; it provides six lines for listing facts. Plaintiff’s only seriously deficient allegation concerns the disability, which is not named or otherwise identified. The court dismissed the suit before expiration of the 21‐day period during which a plaintiff may file an amended complaint without the court’s approval. The judge should not only have complied with the rule; he should have told the plaintiff what is required to allege disability discrimination. View "Tate v. SCR Med. Transp., Inc" on Justia Law

In 2006, 12 U.S. Marshals waited in Khan’s apartment, then arrested her at gunpoint for making false statements to HUD. When she asked to use the bathroom, a marshal patted her down and watched her pull down her underwear, urinate, and cleanse herself according to a Muslim ritual. The marshals refused to allow her to cover her head; while attempting to secure her in the squad car, a marshal touched her breasts, apparently unintentionally. She was convicted and sentenced to probation. Khan wrote to the Marshals Office of Professional Responsibility describing the indignities to which she was subjected and complaining about the absence of any female agents. The Office stated she was not entitled to know the outcome of the investigation. Three years later, Khan learned that the Service had found no evidence of misconduct. The Service did not respond to a second letter. In 2013, Khan mailed an administrative claim, requesting damages. She had not previously requested damages. The Service replied that the claim was untimely under the Federal Tort Claims Act two-year limit on filing claims alleging misconduct by federal officers, 28 U.S.C. 2401(b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of her suit as time-barred, noting that it is also barred by state law. View "Khan v. United States" on Justia Law

Mitchell, physically a man, psychologically a woman, sought to compel her probation officers to alter conditions of her probation, by allowing her to reside with her family rather than in the men’s homeless shelter, allowing her to dress as a woman, and referring her to treatment programs for her gender dysphoria. The district court denied a preliminary injunction on grounds that she hadn’t complied with rules governing injunctive relief, that the requested injunctive relief was unrelated to the merits of her claims against prison doctors (the only claims that had survived screening of her complaint), and that she had failed to demonstrate either that she was likely to prevail on the underlying claims or would suffer irreparable harm if injunctive relief was denied. While the appeal was pending, Mitchell was returned to custody, after pleading guilty to theft, prostitution, and resisting an officer. The Seventh Circuit dismissed her appeal of denial of an injunction as moot. Mitchell still has claims pending against the doctors, unaffected by the denial of the preliminary injunction, and should she be released from jail during the litigation and again placed on probation she can renew her objections to the terms of her probation. View "Mitchell v. Wall" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Shawron Lounds appealed a district court's order granting summary judgment to her former employer Lincare, Inc. on her claims of a hostile work environment in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981 and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Lounds began working at that office as a customer-service representative in September 2011. She is African-American and, throughout the duration of her employment with Lincare, was the Wichita office’s only African-American employee. The record reflects Lounds recounting specific discussions with her co-workers and direct supervisors that Lounds alleged were racially and culturally insensitive, to the extent that she felt "bombarded" by them. Lounds notified her human resources department. Twenty days after she sent notice of her grievances to HR, she was disciplined for "excessive absenteeism." Lounds believed the discipline was in retaliation for her complaints regarding her co-workers. She would ultimately be fired a little over a year after she was hired. Lincare cited absenteeism as its grounds for termination. After the close of discovery and a full round of briefing, the district court granted summary judgment to Lincare. The court first determined that no reasonable jury could have found the alleged race-based harassment sufficiently severe or pervasive to sustain a hostile work environment claim under section 1981. It then opined, concerning the retaliation claim that “the alleged retaliatory actions against [Ms. Lounds] either were not ‘materially adverse’ or were not caused by [her] protected activity.” The Tenth Circuit reversed in part, finding Lounds carried her burden on summary judgment to create a jury question relating to whether the alleged harassment was sufficiently pervasive or severe. Further, the Court concluded the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Lincare on the hostile work environment claim. The Court concluded the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Lincare on the retaliation issue. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Lounds v. Lincare" on Justia Law

Six years after a San Jose police officer testified falsely against plaintiff during a preliminary hearing, the city agreed to pay plaintiff $150,000 and not to oppose any motion plaintiff might bring for a declaration of factual innocence of the criminal charges brought against him. The parties agreed that plaintiff’s counsel could seek an award of costs incurred and reasonable attorney’s fees under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act, 42 U.S.C. 1988. Plaintiff sought $1,448,397 in attorney fees and $75,255 in costs, based on “2,419.9 compensable attorney hours … utilizing reasonable hourly billing rates roughly 20% below established market rates[,] i.e[.,] ranging from $425 to $650 per hour,” plus $102,998.75, added for “fees-on-fees work.” Plaintiff also requested a 1.5 multiplier to the lodestar amount “to account for the significant risk counsel has taken in litigating this hotly[ ]contested matter on a wholly contingent basis, with little prospect of settlement until the eve of trial.” The court awarded compensation of $436,807.50, declined to apply the 1.5 multiplier, and awarded costs of $23,935.07. The court of appeals remanded, finding the lower court’s reasoning inadequate. View "Kerkeles v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to one count of sexual assault in the first degree and was sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment. Appellant later filed a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, alleging that defense counsel was ineffective on seven separate grounds. The circuit court denied the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant failed to assert that but for any alleged ineffectiveness on the part of counsel he would not have pleaded guilty and would have gone to trial; and (2) the circuit court did not clearly err in denying Appellant’s petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. View "Wood v. State" on Justia Law

Lori Yahna appealed from a summary judgment dismissing her complaint against Altru Health System for age discrimination and for wrongful termination of employment. In 1984, Yahna began working for the Grand Forks Clinic, the predecessor to Altru, as a licensed practical nurse. She received additional training in vascular technology to work with Dr. Rolf Paulson in the ultrasound department and by 1986 she was working solely as a vascular technologist. According to Yahna, she was the technical director of the vascular lab, she developed the vascular medicine practice at Altru. She initially worked full time as a vascular technologist with on-call responsibilities, but she received approval to work three days per week in 2001 with no on-call responsibility. According to Yahna, she became coordinator and technical director of the vascular lab in 2006. In February 2012, Altru created a new position for an education and quality assurance coordinator, and hired Derek Todd for that full-time position. According to Yahna, she did not apply for that position because it was full time. She claimed, however, she maintained her position as technical director of the vascular lab and understood she would still be doing quality assurance and reviewing other technologists' films. Yahna claimed Altru required her to work full time with on-call responsibilities in July 2012, and she was terminated on July 2, 2012, after she informed Altru "she would not be able to take call at this time." Yahna was forty-eight years old when she was terminated. The district court granted Altru's motion for summary judgment, concluding there were no disputed issues of material fact that Altru's employment policies and procedures did not abrogate Yahna's at-will employment status with Altru and that her termination did not constitute age discrimination. The court explained the provisions in Altru's employment policy manual unambiguously preserved the presumption of at-will employment and did not evidence an intent that the manual created a contractual right to employment. In rejecting Yahna's age discrimination claim, the court cited the requirements for a prima facie age discrimination claim and said that because Yahna refused to take required on-call responsibilities for an ultrasound technologist she failed to satisfactorily perform the duties of her position and she failed to establish employees outside her protected age class were treated more favorably than her. The court ruled Altru established it terminated Yahna because she refused to take on-call responsibilities for her job and granted summary judgment dismissing her complaint. On appeal, Yahna argued there were disputed issues of material fact on her claims that her termination constituted age discrimination and violated Altru's employment policies and procedures. Finding no error in the district court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Yahna v. Altru Health System" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the company managing the prison he was incarcerated in, and others, for multiple violations of his constitutional rights. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court’s denial of his motion for appointment of counsel to help litigate his civil rights claims against defendants. The district court denied the motion because it had no funding with which to compensate an appointed attorney, and it could find “no attorneys in the area willing or able to take the case pro bono.” Then the district court entered summary judgment against plaintiff. The court vacated and demanded, concluding that federal courts have inherent power to order counsel to accept an uncompensated appointment under the limited factual circumstances here. On remand, the district court must consider whether a compulsory appointment is warranted. View "Naranjo v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Three movants appealed the denial of their motion to intervene in State of Texas v. United States, where 26 states seek injunctive relief against the United States and several officials of DHS to prevent them from implementing a program entitled “Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents” (DAPA). Movants are aliens who have lived in the United States for more than ten years, currently live in the Rio Grande Valley, and have minor children who are United States citizens. Movants believe that they are likely to receive grants of deferred action if DAPA goes into effect. The court reversed the district court's order denying intervention because movants satisfy the requirements for intervention by right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2). The court remanded to the district court. View "State of Texas v. United States" on Justia Law