Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Appellant pled guilty to one count of sexual assault in the first degree and was sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment. Appellant later filed a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1, alleging that defense counsel was ineffective on seven separate grounds. The circuit court denied the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant failed to assert that but for any alleged ineffectiveness on the part of counsel he would not have pleaded guilty and would have gone to trial; and (2) the circuit court did not clearly err in denying Appellant’s petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. View "Wood v. State" on Justia Law

Lori Yahna appealed from a summary judgment dismissing her complaint against Altru Health System for age discrimination and for wrongful termination of employment. In 1984, Yahna began working for the Grand Forks Clinic, the predecessor to Altru, as a licensed practical nurse. She received additional training in vascular technology to work with Dr. Rolf Paulson in the ultrasound department and by 1986 she was working solely as a vascular technologist. According to Yahna, she was the technical director of the vascular lab, she developed the vascular medicine practice at Altru. She initially worked full time as a vascular technologist with on-call responsibilities, but she received approval to work three days per week in 2001 with no on-call responsibility. According to Yahna, she became coordinator and technical director of the vascular lab in 2006. In February 2012, Altru created a new position for an education and quality assurance coordinator, and hired Derek Todd for that full-time position. According to Yahna, she did not apply for that position because it was full time. She claimed, however, she maintained her position as technical director of the vascular lab and understood she would still be doing quality assurance and reviewing other technologists' films. Yahna claimed Altru required her to work full time with on-call responsibilities in July 2012, and she was terminated on July 2, 2012, after she informed Altru "she would not be able to take call at this time." Yahna was forty-eight years old when she was terminated. The district court granted Altru's motion for summary judgment, concluding there were no disputed issues of material fact that Altru's employment policies and procedures did not abrogate Yahna's at-will employment status with Altru and that her termination did not constitute age discrimination. The court explained the provisions in Altru's employment policy manual unambiguously preserved the presumption of at-will employment and did not evidence an intent that the manual created a contractual right to employment. In rejecting Yahna's age discrimination claim, the court cited the requirements for a prima facie age discrimination claim and said that because Yahna refused to take required on-call responsibilities for an ultrasound technologist she failed to satisfactorily perform the duties of her position and she failed to establish employees outside her protected age class were treated more favorably than her. The court ruled Altru established it terminated Yahna because she refused to take on-call responsibilities for her job and granted summary judgment dismissing her complaint. On appeal, Yahna argued there were disputed issues of material fact on her claims that her termination constituted age discrimination and violated Altru's employment policies and procedures. Finding no error in the district court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Yahna v. Altru Health System" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the company managing the prison he was incarcerated in, and others, for multiple violations of his constitutional rights. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court’s denial of his motion for appointment of counsel to help litigate his civil rights claims against defendants. The district court denied the motion because it had no funding with which to compensate an appointed attorney, and it could find “no attorneys in the area willing or able to take the case pro bono.” Then the district court entered summary judgment against plaintiff. The court vacated and demanded, concluding that federal courts have inherent power to order counsel to accept an uncompensated appointment under the limited factual circumstances here. On remand, the district court must consider whether a compulsory appointment is warranted. View "Naranjo v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Three movants appealed the denial of their motion to intervene in State of Texas v. United States, where 26 states seek injunctive relief against the United States and several officials of DHS to prevent them from implementing a program entitled “Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents” (DAPA). Movants are aliens who have lived in the United States for more than ten years, currently live in the Rio Grande Valley, and have minor children who are United States citizens. Movants believe that they are likely to receive grants of deferred action if DAPA goes into effect. The court reversed the district court's order denying intervention because movants satisfy the requirements for intervention by right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2). The court remanded to the district court. View "State of Texas v. United States" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of intentional child abuse that resulted in the death of an infant in her care. Defendant was sentenced to seventy years to life. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that evidence of the infant’s prior injuries while in her care should have been excluded as prior bad acts under Neb. R. Evid. 404. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for mistrial on the basis of allowing the admission of the prior injuries, as the prior injuries were inextricably intertwined with the charged crime; (2) there was no misconduct by the prosecutor during closing argument; (3) Defendant’s sentence was not an abuse of discretion; and (4) Defendant’s counsel did not provide ineffective assistance. View "State v. Cullen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the landlord, filed an unlawful detainer action against Coolwaters, the commercial lessee. On appeal, Coolwaters challenged the trial court's order denying its special motion to strike the complaint and awarding plaintiff attorney fees as sanctions for the expenses of responding to the special motion to strike. The court concluded that a nonpaying tenant should not be permitted to frustrate an unlawful detainer proceeding by initiating litigation against the landlord in order to bring a special motion to strike the landlord’s subsequently filed unlawful detainer complaint, on the asserted ground that the unlawful detainer action arose out of the tenant’s protected activity in filing the initial lawsuit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order denying the special motion to strike and imposing monetary sanctions against Coolwaters. View "Olive Properties v. Coolwater Enter." on Justia Law

Plaintiff has a neurological disorder, tardive dyskinesia. Plaintiff’s involuntary movements include tongue thrusting, pursing of the lips, choking, and side-to-side chewing of the jaw. She becomes mute, screams or makes non-verbal sounds, particularly under stress. She also suffers post-traumatic stress disorder and bipolar disorder, with severe anxiety. Shortly after plaintiff was diagnosed with TD, a personal injury suit that she had filed went to trial. She had no lawyer. Before trial, she sought accommodations of her medical problems, and was permitted to have a friend and a family member take notes, was given a podium, and was allowed to take occasional recesses. She was denied other requested help—a microphone, an interpreter, and a jury instruction explaining her disorder, lest the jurors think she was just acting up. She was hectored by the judge, who told the jury that the plaintiff has a “speech impediment.” She suffered other embarrassments in front of the jury, which returned a verdict for the defendant. Plaintiff unsuccessfully moved for a new trial on the ground that she was disabled within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act yet had been denied reasonable accommodations. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that plaintiff was denied a full and fair opportunity to vindicate her claims. View "Reed v. State of Illinois" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sell technology that permits computers to identify license-plate numbers in digital photographs taken by cameras mounted on vehicles. The cameras automatically photograph everything the vehicles encounter, with GPS coordinates; software provides notice if a photographed vehicle is subject to repossession. The information is sold to clients, including automobile finance and insurance companies and law enforcement. Arkansas’s Automatic License Plate Reader System Act prohibits use of automatic license plate reader systems and permits any person claiming harm from a violation to seek damages from the violator. Vigilant and its affiliates sued, arguing that “use of [automatic license plate reader] systems to collect and create information” and dissemination of the information constitutes speech and that the Act impermissibly restricts this speech based on content—license-plate data—and on the identity of the speaker, because it exempts some entities, such as law enforcement agencies. The district court dismissed, ruling that state officials were immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed on the ground that the plaintiffs lack standing, so there is no Article III case or controversy. State officials do not have authority to enforce the Act, so they do not cause injury; the Act provides for enforcement only through private actions for damages. View "Digital Recognition Network, Inc. v. Hutchinson" on Justia Law

Kitchen filed a pro se lawsuit against 22 Michigan Corrections Officers, alleging constitutional violations at two different prisons. Because Civil Rule 20(a)(2) does not allow such joinder, the district court dismissed (without prejudice) 15 defendants, invoking Civil Rule 21, which allows the court to correct the improper joinder of parties. The Sixth CIrcuit dismissed, stating that appellate jurisdiction does not exist over an appeal from a Civil Rule 21 order dismissing some but not all of the defendants in a lawsuit. The district court dropped defendants. It did not sever the claims and enter final judgment. It idid not enter judgment at all as to any of the defendants. View "Kitchen v. Heyns" on Justia Law

Sunrise operates group homes, places children in foster care, and provides related services for the State of Kentucky, which provides 65% of Sunrise’s revenue. Sunrise describes its mission as “to extend the grace and hope of our loving God to the young people in our care by meeting their physical, emotional and spiritual needs.” Some young people alleged that Sunrise pressured them to become practicing Christians. In 2000, plaintiffs sued, alleging that Kentucky had violated the Establishment Clause by paying Sunrise for services provided to children in state custody. In 2013, the plaintiffs and Kentucky—but not Sunrise—agreed to a settlement that singled out Sunrise for monitoring by the ACLU and the Americans United for Separation of Church and State. Sunrise objected, arguing that it was entitled to a merits adjudication. Over Sunrise’s objection, the district court dismissed the Establishment Clause claim, incorporated the settlement into its dismissal order, and retained jurisdiction to enforce that order. The court held that its dismissal was not a consent decree, notwithstanding its incorporation of the settlement agreement, so that Sunrise could not object to the entry. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for consideration of whether the settlement agreement is fair to Sunrise. View "Pedreira v. Sunrise Children's Servs., Inc." on Justia Law