Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Inmate Troche alleges that in 2001 he was severely beaten by Officer Crabtree and that after he received treatment for his injuries, he was placed in isolation and deprived of food. Troche alleges he submitted an Informal Complaint Resolution, initiating a three-step grievance procedure. Troche never received a response and submitted a notification of grievance form to the inspector of institutional services. Receiving no response, he sent, via internal prison mail, correspondence to prison personnel to inquire about the status of his grievance. After receiving no response, he filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. Crabtree submitted declarations that Troche had filed complaints days after the incident, but did not submit an informal complaint to Crabtree’s direct supervisor or the staff member most directly responsible for the incident, as required, and that an investigation had determined that his complaints were without merit. The court dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The Administrative Code authorizes an inmate to proceed to step two of Ohio’s grievance procedure if he does not receive a response to his informal complaint within a “reasonable time.” Such authorization is not granted to inmates who fail to receive a response to a notification of grievance form at step two of the process. Troche was not required to proceed to a step-three appeal. View "Troche v. Crabtree" on Justia Law

These two consolidated appeals stem from suits between Donald Cuba and Julia Pylant where Julia accused Cuba of rape and Cuba was later acquitted of the charge. In No. 15-10212, Cuba sued Julia and her parents (collectively “the Pylants”) for malicious prosecution, defamation, and tortious interference with contractual relations. In No. 15-10213, Julia sued Cuba for assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), and Cuba counterclaimed with causes of action substantially identical to those in his suit. The Pylants moved, in both suits, to dismiss Cuba's claims under the Texas Citizens' Participation Act (Texas's anti-SLAPP statute), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 27.004. The district court eventually held that the TCPA motions were moot because they had already been denied by operation of law. The court agreed with the Pylants that, under the TCPA framework, the 30-day deadline before a motion is deemed denied by operation of law runs only from the date of the hearing on the motion. But, because no such hearing was held in these cases, the TCPA motion was not denied by operation of law. In this case, the appeals are timely where the operative date from which the 30-day clock under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure ran was March 6, 2015, the date of the order denying the motion. On the merits, the court concluded that the TCPA applies in this case where, as Cuba concedes, all of the acts that the Pylants are being sued for are exercises of the right to petition as defined under the statute. The court further concluded that Cuba's claims of malicious prosecution and defamation are pleaded in sufficient detail. However, as to the defamation claim, the Pylants have established an affirmative defense as to certain of the communications at issue. Finally, Cuba’s tortious interference claim does not survive the motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the court vacated the orders from which these interlocutory appeals are taken, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cuba v. Pylant" on Justia Law

This case stems from a feud over local governance matters. The threshold issue is whether the court has appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s order passing on the merits of defendants’ special motions to strike under Vermont’s anti‐SLAPP statute, 12 V.S.A. 1041. The court concluded that interlocutory appeals of such orders do not fall within the collateral order doctrine, and accordingly dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "Ernst v. Carrigan" on Justia Law

Officers signaled for Brown to pull over. They claim that Brown was driving without headlights on, though eyewitnesses dispute this. Before Brown retrieved his license and registration, they ordered him out of the car. Brown complied. During a pat-down, Officer Chapman hit Brown in the neck and pushed Brown onto the vehicle. Brown wrestled free. The officers claim that Brown was resisting arrest, but eyewitnesses say that Brown was trying to protect himself. Chapman tasered Brown’s chest. Brown ran. The officers caught and wrestled him down, tasering him. The officers handcuffed Brown at 8:52 P.M., seven minutes after pulling Brown over. Brown repeatedly stated he was having trouble breathing and went limp before reaching the squad car. Officers request EMS at 8:55 P.M., stating that Brown was conscious and breathing. EMS was notified at 9:00 P.M., arrived at 9:07 P.M., found Brown “propped up,” with no pulse, and was unable to resuscitate him. Brown’s mother filed suit. The Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment to the officers on plaintiff’s claim that the officers stopped Brown’s vehicle without probable cause, holding that the city is not liable on that claim; reversed summary judgment to Chapman on plaintiff’s claim that use of a taser constituted excessive force, stating that the city is liable on that claim; and reversed summary judgment to an officer on plaintiff’s deliberate-indifference claim. View "Brown v. Chapman" on Justia Law

Officers signaled for Brown to pull over. They claim that Brown was driving without headlights on, though eyewitnesses dispute this, They walked to Brown’s vehicle and asked for his license and registration. Before Brown could retrieve the documents, they ordered him out of the car, unsettled by his slow speech. Brown complied. While the officers were patting him down, one hit Brown in the back of his neck and pushed Brown onto the vehicle. Brown wrestled free. The officers claim that Brown was resisting arrest, but eyewitnesses say that Brown was trying to protect himself. An officer tasered Brown’s chest. Brown ran. The officers caught Brown and wrestled him to the ground, tasering him. The officers notified dispatch that they handcuffed Brown at 8:52 P.M., seven minutes after pulling Brown over. Brown repeatedly stated he was having trouble breathing and went limp before he reached the squad car. Officers request EMS at 8:55 P.M., stating that Brown was conscious and breathing. EMS was notified at 9:00 P.M. EMS arrived at 9:07 P.M., and found Brown “propped up,” with no pulse. EMS was unable to resuscitate him. Brown’s mother filed suit. The Sixth Circuit upheld allowing plaintiff to amend her complaint and application of the deliberate-indifference standard, and dismissed the remainder of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction over appeals from denial of summary judgment. View "Brown v. Chapman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jeffrey Sarver filed suit against defendants, contending that Will James, the main character in the Oscar-winning film "The Hurt Locker," is based on his life and experiences and that he did not consent to such use and that several scenes in the film falsely portray him in a way that has harmed his reputation. The district court dismissed all of Sarver’s claims. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that it had little basis to conclude that New Jersey is Sarver's legal domicile at the time the film was released. Even assuming arguendo that New Jersey was Sarver’s domicile, the court concluded that California contacts predominate, and the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts section 145 factors weigh in favor of the application of California's anti-SLAPP law, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.16. Under section 6 Second Restatement principles, California had the most significant relationship to this litigation, which was sufficient to overcome any presumption of Sarver's domicile. The court also concluded that defendants' anti-SLAPP motions were timely filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. On the merits, the court concluded that the film and the narrative of its central character Will James speak directly to issues of a public nature, and Sarver has failed to state and substantiate a legally sufficient claim. The film is speech that is fully protected by the First Amendment, which safeguards the storytellers and artists who take the raw materials of life - including the stories of real individuals, ordinary or extraordinary - and transform them into art. Therefore, the district court did not err in granting defendants’ anti-SLAPP motions. Finally, the court concluded that Sarver’s false light invasion of privacy, defamation, breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and constructive fraud/negligent misrepresentation claims were properly dismissed. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Sarver v. Chartier" on Justia Law

Defendant and others in New York City sought to build an Islamic community center and mosque in lower Manhattan, a few blocks from the site of the World Trade Center attacks of September 11, 2001. Plaintiff, a former New York firefighter filed suit, against defendant alleging that the plan to build a mosque and community center near the World Trade Center site constituted a nuisance, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and assault. Larry Klayman represented plaintiff in that lawsuit. Defendant, through his attorney Adam Bailey, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which was granted. Then plaintiff and his his counsel, Klayman, filed suit against Bailey, alleging infliction of emotional distress caused by the statements Bailey made in dismissal papers filed in New York Supreme Court and the reporting of one of those statements in the New York Post. Klayman and plaintiff voluntarily dismissed that suit and then filed the present action against Bailey. Bailey filed a motion to dismiss on multiple grounds. The court concluded that, under controlling circuit precedent, the complaint makes no plausible allegation of personal jurisdiction over Bailey, and the district court should have promptly dismissed the case on that basis. However, because the district court dismissed the case, the court can affirm the district court’s judgment on the alternative ground that it lacked jurisdiction. View "Forras v. Rauf" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging employment discrimination and retaliation in violation of federal laws. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff's failure to disclose her claims in her Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings judicially estopped her from pursuing them. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Van Horn v. Martin" on Justia Law

Under federal law, a court has discretion to “allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee” in a civil rights lawsuit filed under 42 U.S.C. 1983 or 42 U.S.C. 1988. The Supreme Court has interpreted section 1988 to permit a prevailing defendant to recover fees only if “the plaintiff ’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” The Idaho Supreme Court concluded that it was not bound by that interpretation and awarded attorney’s fees under section 1988 to a prevailing defendant without first determining that “the plaintiff ’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” The fee award rested solely on that court's interpretation of federal law; the court explicitly refused to award fees under state law. The Supreme Court reversed. Section 1988 is a federal statute; once the Supreme Court has spoken, it is the duty of other courts to respect that understanding of the governing rule of law. If state courts were permitted to disregard the Court’s rulings on federal law, “the laws, the treaties, and the constitution of the United States would be different in different states, and might, perhaps, never have precisely the same construction, obligation, or efficacy, in any two states." View "James v. Boise" on Justia Law

Nelson was driving home one night when, he claims four Chicago police officers in two squad cars pulled him over, pointed a gun in his face, threatened to kill him, handcuffed him, and searched his car for no apparent reason. The officers have no recollection of the stop; squad car​ computers confirm that they ran Nelson’s name through the law-enforcement database at the time of the stop and turned up nothing that would justify stopping him and searching his car. Nelson sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. A jury found for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit ordered a new trial. The judge should not have admitted evidence of Nelson’s arrest record, nor allowed the defense attorney to cross-examine Nelson about other civil suits he had filed against the city. The judge also improperly allowed one of the officers to offer generalized testimony about when the police might be justified in using firearms and handcuffs during a traffic stop. The errors were not harmless. View "Nelson v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law