Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant Jim Little, the Executive Director of Employee Relations at the District, alleging sex discrimination for acts that had occurred in 2008. The district court dismissed the suit with prejudice based on lack of personal jurisdiction and untimeliness. Plaintiff later filed suit in 2013 against Little and the District, alleging sex discrimination claims, under state and federal law, stemming in part from her termination in 2010. The district court held that the earlier dismissal was res judicata and barred this action. The court held - consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Judgments and at least three sister circuits - that an earlier dismissal on alternative grounds, where one ground is a lack of jurisdiction, is not res judicata. Therefore, the court concluded that res judicata does not bar this action. The court reversed the dismissal in part. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's federal claim because plaintiff's lawyer clearly and expressly abandoned the claim. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's state-law claims to the extent that they rely solely on events that occurred more than three years before the filing of the complaint in this case. For purposes of the motion to dismiss, at least two claims are timely: (1) plaintiff's claim alleging discriminatory firing in 2010; and (2) a hostile work environment claim founded in part on actions occurring within the limitations period. The court remanded. View "Ruiz v. Snohomish County PUD" on Justia Law

Guards (Madigan and Ross) undertook to move Blake, a Maryland inmate, to the prison’s segregation unit. Madigan assaulted Blake, punching him in the face. The prison system’s Internal Investigative Unit (IIU), issued a report condemning Madigan’s actions. Blake sued both guards under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force and failure to take protective action. A jury found Madigan liable. Ross raised the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requirement that an inmate exhaust “such administrative remedies as are available” before bringing suit. Blake argued that the IIU investigation was a substitute for those procedures. The Fourth Circuit reversed dismissal of the suit, holding that “special circumstances” can excuse a failure to comply with administrative procedural requirements, particularly where the inmate reasonably, although mistakenly, believed he had sufficiently exhausted his remedies. The Supreme Court vacated: “The Fourth Circuit’s unwritten ‘special circumstances’ exception is inconsistent with the text and history of the PLRA.” Mandatory exhaustion statutes like the PLRA foreclose judicial discretion. There are, however, circumstances in which an administrative remedy, although officially on the books, is not available. An administrative procedure is unavailable when it operates as a dead end, with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide relief. An administrative scheme might be so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use. Finally, a grievance process is rendered unavailable when prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of it through misrepresentation, or intimidation. The record raised questions about whether Blake had an “available” administrative remedy to exhaust. View "Ross v. Blake" on Justia Law

Himmelreich, a federal prisoner, sued the United States, alleging that he was severely beaten by a fellow inmate as the result of negligence by prison officials. The government treated the suit as a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b). The court granted the defendants summary judgment on the ground that the claim fell into the exception for “[a]ny claim based upon . . . the exercise or performance . . . [of] a discretionary function,” namely, deciding where to house inmates. While the motion was pending, Himmelreich filed a second suit: a constitutional tort suit against individual Bureau of Prison employees, again alleging that his beating was the result of officials’ negligence. After the dismissal of Himmelreich’s first suit, the court dismissed the second suit as foreclosed by the FTCA’s judgment bar provision. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed. The FTCA “Exceptions” section’s plain text dictates that the judgment bar does “not apply” to cases that, like Himmelreich’s first suit, are based on the performance of a discretionary function. Had the court dismissed Himmelreich’s first suit because, e.g., the employees were not negligent, it would make sense that the judgment bar provision would prevent a second suit against the employees. Where an FTCA claim is dismissed because it falls within one of the “Exceptions,” the dismissal signals merely that the United States cannot be held liable for the claim; it has no logical bearing on whether an employee can be liable instead. View "Simmons v. Himmelreich" on Justia Law

In cases consolidated for this appeal, defendants were found guilty but not criminally responsible at the time of the commission of the offense and were committed to the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. The court granted conditional releases on various occasions but each conditional release was subsequently revoked, resulting in recommitment to DHMH for treatment. The Maryland Court of Appeal held that the Circuit Court erred in determining that the statutory scheme, Criminal Procedure Article 3-114, for granting or revocation of the conditional release of a committed person violated the separation of powers provision found in Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The court also erred in revoking defendant’s conditional release and ordering his continued commitment for institutional inpatient care and treatment after the ALJ had found that defendant was eligible for conditional release and had recommended the same. The court held that under CP 3-114 the substantial evidence standard applies to a circuit court’s review of an ALJ’s findings of facts and recommendations. View "Stoddard v. State" on Justia Law

Green complained to his employer, the U.S. Postal Service, that he was denied a promotion because he was black. His supervisors then accused him of the crime of intentionally delaying the mail. In a 2009 agreement, USPS agreed not to pursue criminal charges. Green agreed either to retire or to accept another position in a remote location. Green chose to retire. In 2010, 41 days after resigning and 96 days after signing the agreement, Green reported an unlawful constructive discharge to the EEOC under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act., 42 U.S.C. 2000e Green eventually filed suit, which was dismissed as untimely because he had not contacted EEOC within 45 days of the “matter alleged to be discriminatory.” The Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated. Because part of the “matter alleged to be discriminatory” in a constructive-discharge claim is an employee’s resignation, the 45-day limitations period begins running after an employee resigns. Resignation is part of the “complete and present cause of action” in a constructive-discharge claim, which requires: discriminatory conduct such that a reasonable employee would have felt compelled to resign and actual resignation. Nothing in Title VII or the regulation suggests an exception to the rule. Starting the clock before a plaintiff can file suit would not further the limitations period’s goals and would negate Title VII’s remedial structure. View "Green v. Brennan" on Justia Law

After plaintiffs filed suit against Miami-Dade under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721–2725, the district court dismissed the claims as time-barred. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that their claims were not barred and the district court erred by not applying the discovery rule to 28 U.S.C. 1658(a). In regard to this issue of first impression, the court adopted the reasoning and conclusion of the Eighth Circuit in McDonough v. Anoka Cnty and concluded that a DPPA claim accrues under section 1658(b) when the violation occurs. In this case, the only alleged DPPA violations that implicate Miami-Dade occurred on January 10, 2008 and May 26, 2005. Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint against Miami-Dade on March 7, 2014, well beyond the four-year statute of limitations for DPPA claims. Because the district court properly applied the occurrence rule to section 1658(a), the court affirmed the judgment. View "Foudy v. Miami-Dade Cnty." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted murder and two counts of assault in the first degree. Defendant, who was fifteen years old at the time of the crime, challenged the judgment of conviction on direct appeal, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by withholding information from an expert in child and adolescent psychiatry. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) Defendant received meaningful and effective representation; and (2) Defendant failed to demonstrate the absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations for counsel’s alleged shortcomings. View "People v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Appellants GeorgiaCarry.org and Phillip Evans appeal the dismissal of their petition for declaratory and injunctive relief as to the Atlanta Botanical Garden’s prohibition of weapons on the Garden’s premises. Evans, who holds a Georgia weapons carry license, visited the Garden twice in October 2014 and wore a handgun in a waistband holster each time. After gaining admission to the Garden on his second visit, Evans was stopped by an employee of the Garden and advised that he could not carry the weapon at the Garden; a security officer detained Evans, and Evans was eventually escorted from the Garden by an officer with the Atlanta Police Department. The Supreme Court agreed with appellants that the trial court erred in dismissing their case. "Appellants request for declaratory relief was not impermissible, and it was error to dismiss Appellants’ declaratory judgment action on the basis that it improperly called for the interpretation and application of a criminal statute." Accordingly, the trial court’s order was reversed in this respect. The trial court also dismissed Appellants’ request for injunctive relief; the Supreme Court concluded this was proper in part. The portion of Appellants’ requested injunctive relief (enjoining the arrest or prosecution of Appellants) squarely implicated the administration of criminal law and, thus, was improper. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "GeorgiaCarry.org v. Atlanta Botanical Garden, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with two counts of first degree sexual abuse. Appellant filed a motion to suppress statements he made to police during a custodial interrogation in the absence of his appointed counsel. The trial court initially granted Appellant’s motion to suppress. The trial court reversed itself, however, and denied the motion after the United States Supreme Court rendered its opinion in Montejo v. Louisiana, which overturned long-standing Sixth Amendment precedent. Appellant entered a conditional Alford plea to two counts of first-degree sexual abuse. Appellant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed after declining to apply the Montejo rationale in the context of state right-to-counsel law, holding that the rationale of Linehan v. Commonwealth is the correct manifestation of the right to counsel under Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution. View "Keysor v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc. is an international media company that produces news and entertainment programming through a proprietary mobile software application (the “App”). Plaintiff downloaded and installed the App on his Android mobile device. Every time Plaintiff watched a video clip on the App, Gannett shared information about Plaintiff with Adobe Systems Incorporated. Plaintiff brought this putative class-action lawsuit against Gannett for allegedly disclosing information about him to a third party in violation of the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA). The district court dismissed the action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), concluding that that information disclosed by Gannett was “personally identifiable information” (PII) under the VPPA but that Plaintiff was not a “consumer” protected by the VPPA. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the complaint adequately alleged that Plaintiff was a “consumer” under the VPPA. Remanded. View "Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc." on Justia Law