Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The Energy and Policy Institute made three separate requests to Indiana House Representative Eric Koch under the Indiana Access to Public Records Act (APRA) seeking copies of Koch’s correspondence with various business organizations in relation to specific legislation. The Chief Counsel of the Republic Caucus denied each of these requests. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint against Koch and the Indiana House Republic Caucus seeking a declaratory judgment that APRA was applicable to Defendants and that Defendants violated APRA by denying some or all of Plaintiffs’ requests. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of justiciability and, alternatively, for failure to state claim, arguing that Plaintiffs’ requests would interfere with the internal workings of the legislature and should be found non-justiciable on those grounds. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the question of whether the APRA is generally applicable to the legislature is justiciable, and the APRA does apply to the General Assembly; but (2) the question of whether the APRA requests at issue in this case are exempt from disclosure as legislative “work product” is non-justiciable. View "Citizens Action Coalition of Ind. v. Koch" on Justia Law

Seeing an internet advertisement for a 1997 FLTHTC Harley‐Davidson motorcycle, Hahn visited City Limits dealership, test‐drove a 2004 motorcycle, took pictures, and made a downpayment. Days later, Hahn returned, paid the balance, and drove the 2004 motorcycle home. The bill of sale listed the VIN, year, and mileage for the 1997 motorcycle. The newer model had half that mileage. The next day, Hahn tried to purchase insurance and discovered the discrepancy. Hahn thought this was a scrivener’s error and called City Limits, which demanded more money and eventually called the police. After being contacted by an officer, Hahn took the motorcycle to the police station. Hahn claims that City Limits has not returned the $7,626.66. He filed suit, alleging that the police violated the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving him of property without due process and that the business violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. There is no allegation that the officer violated any state law by making telephone calls or by facilitating the return of the motorcycle; even with such an allegation, the federal constitution is not automatically violated every time the police fail to follow state or local rules. The court correctly declined jurisdiction over the state law claims. View "Zappa v. Smith" on Justia Law

Nettles-Bey travels to assist African-American youths. El-Bey invited Nettles-Bey to South Holland, offered accommodations at “his house," and gave Nettles-Bey a garage-door opener. Nettles-Bey entered the house;. El-Bey, however, was a squatter, with no lawful interest in the house. The property owner arrived while Nettles-Bey was present and called the police, reporting a trespass. On arriving, officers discovered literature referring to Moorish Science. The officers contend that they take into custody anyone who is the subject of a trespass complaint, so they arrested Nettles-Bey as a matter of routine. Nettles-Bey says that the officers remarked on his status as a Moor and congratulated themselves on detaining another member of that troublesome sect. Nettles-Bey sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers assumed from his name that he is a Moor and would not have arrested a Christian or an atheist. The court denied the officers’ motion for summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. When the argument concerns facts, rather than legal uncertainty, an appeal must await a final decision. The district judge had no doubt about the law, deeming it clearly established that an officer may not arrest someone believed to hold certain religious beliefs, when in otherwise-identical circumstances the officer would not arrest a person holding different beliefs. The judge denied the motion because of doubt about what reasonable jurors would infer about why the officers arrested Nettles-Bey. View "Nettles-Bey v. Williams" on Justia Law

In 2014, Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to operating under the influence (OUI), elevated to a Class C felony by two prior convictions for operating under the influence. Defendant appealed, asserting that his 2013 OUI conviction - one of the two convictions that enhanced his 2014 charge - was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and therefore, the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike that conviction from the indictment. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to meet his burden on collateral attack of demonstrating that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. View "State v. Kennedy" on Justia Law

In 2009, Tolliver agreed to deliver drugs for Tyson. Tolliver left Tyson's house with cocaine. A confidential informant had described Tolliver’s car and a drug packaging operation at Tyson’s house. Two officers, in plain clothes, stopped Tolliver, exited their unmarked car, and pointed a gun at Tolliver. According to Tolliver, he backed up about a car length. Tolliver, who was unarmed, then realized that he was dealing with police. He claims that he did not want the officer to think that he was reaching for a gun, so he sat motionless, with his hands on the steering wheel, and his foot on the brake. He claims that the officer shot him while he was in that position and that he became unable to control the car, which rolled toward the officers. The officers fired 14 times and Tolliver was struck by seven bullets. He pled guilty to aggravated battery of a peace officer and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, but then sued for excessive force. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the officers. A convicted criminal may not bring a civil suit questioning his conviction until the conviction has been set aside. Tolliver’s suit rests on a version of the event that completely negates the basis for his conviction. View "Tolliver v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Two individuals made false statements to a Village of Deerfield police officer, which resulted in Doe’s arrest. The Village prosecuted Doe for ordinance violations. Although the Village became aware of the falsity of the statements during the prosecution, it nevertheless proceeded and refused to dismiss the charges. The criminal case “resolved in [Doe’s] favor,” and he obtained an order expunging his related arrest and prosecution records. Doe asserts that his arrest and prosecution were conducted in retaliation for his previous lawsuit against a Deerfield police officer. Doe filed an equal protection claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and a malicious prosecution claim under Illinois law. The defendants moved to dismiss, citing Doe’s failure to comply with FRCP 10(a) requiring him to provide his true name in his complaint’s caption. The court denied Doe’s motion to proceed anonymously, finding Doe did not show exceptional circumstances. Doe argued that having to reveal his true identity would thwart the purpose of the expungement of his criminal records and would embarrass him. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first holding that an order denying leave to proceed anonymously falls within the collateral order doctrine and is immediately appealable, but Doe failed to show exceptional circumstances justifying anonymity. View "Doe v. Village of Deerfield" on Justia Law

Chicago Officer Jung, patrolling with his partner, approached “Maxwell Street Hot Dog Stand” and saw a woman run into traffic waving her hands, her face covered in blood. She stated that her husband had struck her and pointed toward Hall, to identify her husband. Jung parked, and walked toward Hall. Hall did not comply with Jung’s commands to “stop, put his hands behind his back, calm down, [and] stop screaming.” Jones grabbed Hall. who attempted to twist away; his momentum caused him to fall. After he was in handcuffs, Hall continued to resist and again fell to the ground. Hall did not complain of pain or indicate that his arm was injured. Hours later at the police station, Hall complained of pain; he was taken to the hospital, where doctors discovered his arm was fractured. The entire arrest was captured on video. Hall pleaded guilty to resisting arrest, but filed suit, claiming excessive force, assault, and battery. During discovery, the magistrate set a deadline for Hall to disclose his expert witness (FRCP 26(a)(2)). Hall failed to provide the expert’s report and did not respond to Jung’s motion to strike. The magistrate barred Hall from presenting the expert. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a verdict in Jung’s favor, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings because Hall failed to provide transcripts memorializing proceedings regarding three rulings. Hall’s fourth challenge did not warrant reversal. View "Hall v. Jung" on Justia Law

Kody Brown, Meri Brown, Janelle Brown, Christine Brown, and Robyn Sullivan (“the Browns”) form a “plural family.” Kody Brown is legally married to Meri Brown and “spiritually married” to the other three women, whom he calls “sister wives.” When the family became the subject of a TLC reality television show in 2010, the Lehi Police Department opened an investigation of the Browns for violating Utah’s bigamy statute, Utah Code Annotated section 76-7-101. The Browns then filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action in federal district court against the Governor and Attorney General of the State of Utah and the Utah County Attorney. Claiming the Statute infringed their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, the Browns sought declaratory relief and a permanent injunction enjoining enforcement of the Statute against them. The Tenth Circuit concluded after review of this matter that the district court erred by proceeding to the merits: "[f]ollowing adoption of the [Utah County Attorney’s Office] UCAO Policy, the Browns’ suit ceased to qualify as an Article III case or controversy. Their suit was moot before the district court awarded them relief, and the court therefore lacked jurisdiction to decide the Browns’ claims." View "Brown v. Buhman" on Justia Law

After plaintiff's son, Anthony Hudson, died from a gunshot wound, plaintiff filed suit against the Lancaster police and fire departments, law enforcement officers, and a hospital and its medical personnel. The district court dismissed without prejudice. The court concluded that there was federal-question jurisdiction and the wrongful death claims should not have been dismissed; it was error for the district court - ruling without benefit of the court's decision on this issue of first impression - to dismiss Rodgers’s survival action solely because she was proceeding pro se on behalf of the estate; a person with capacity under state law to represent an estate in a survival action may proceed pro se if that person is the only beneficiary and the estate has no creditors; the court remanded for further determination as to whether Rodgers is the sole beneficiary; and the court expressed no view on the merits of Rodgers's claims. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Rodgers v. Lancaster Police & Fire Dept." on Justia Law

Parents of a severely disabled child (T.R.) prevailed in a suit against the school district where the child was abused by his special education teacher. A jury awarded a substantial verdict and the school district challenged the verdict, alleging that the parents are not the proper parties to file suit. In this case, the victim was a minor when the challenged conduct occurred but turned 18 by the time of trial; his disability rendered him incompetent even after he reached majority; a bank had been appointed to serve as his guardian; and that same bank oversaw a trust that paid for the minor’s medical bills. The court concluded that the parents have Article III standing to directly seek past medical expenses and to seek future home care expenses on behalf of T.R.; the Bank, as guardian, should have filed suit to recover the claims T.R. would otherwise possess - those for future home care expenses, physical pain and anguish, and impairment - by suing in their name on his behalf; the Bank owed a fiduciary duty to T.R., and absent a showing of conflict, the parents could not circumvent the Bank by filing suit on T.R.'s behalf; the court found that the district court's refusal to allow ratification of the parents' actions was an abuse of discretion because nothing in the text of Federal Rule 17(a)(3) or the court's decisions applying it supports the district court's decision; and federal statutes at issue do not authorize recovery for the parents' mental anguish based on the mistreatment of their son. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rideau v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law