Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In 2011, city officials of West Valley City terminated Plaintiff Karen Bird from her position as manager of the city’s Animal Shelter. During the latter half of Plaintiff’s employment, the environment of the Animal Shelter was toxic. Plaintiff was one of the biggest contributors to this tumultuous environment. During the high point of what staffers at the shelter dubbed "the little war," the Salt Lake Tribune published an article about a cat that had survived two euthanization attempts in the Animal Shelter’s gas chamber. A reporter called a West Valley City official and informed the official that he (the reporter) had received an anonymous telephone call alleging that the shelter had ordered a mass execution of animals due to overpopulation. Other shelter managers were under the impression that Plaintiff, who was notoriously against using the gas chamber to euthanize animals and who was one of the few individuals privy to the meeting discussing the shelter’s overpopulation, was the source of these leaks. Around the same time as the anonymous phone call to the press, Plaintiff finally decided she "had enough" and filed the formal complaint that belied this lawsuit before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Tenth Circuit could not find that Plaintiff had been fired because of her gender, any hostile work environment she experienced, and West Valley City did not form any contract with her that mandated it would protect her from workplace violence or prevent her from being retaliated against. The Court did find, however, that the district court did not determine whether Plaintiff raised a genuine issue of material fact that this belief substantially motivated West Valley City officials’ decision to terminate Plaintiff. Nor did it determine whether the leaks to the press qualified as “constitutionally protected activity.” The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bird v. West Valley City" on Justia Law

In 2014, the Bozeman City Commission adopted the Nondiscrimination Ordinance 1890, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender expression by landlords, providers of public accommodations, and parties engaged in residential real estate transactions. Petitioners, certain Bozeman residents, filed suit against the City of Bozeman, the Commission, and the City Commissioners (collectively, Respondents) seeking a declaration that the Ordinance is invalid as a matter of law. The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that Petitioners did not present a justiciable case or controversy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in denying Petitioners’ motion for summary judgment and dismissing their complaint based on the conclusion that Petitioners were requesting an advisory opinion; and (2) did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and to amend. View "Arnone v. City of Bozeman" on Justia Law

A Wisconsin state prison inmate filed suit, in forma pauperis (28 U.S.C. 1915(a)), against prison doctors, alleging deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s medical needs, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983, and medical malpractice. The defendants learned that in seeking permission to litigate in forma pauperis the plaintiff had failed to disclose that he had approximately $1400 in a trust account outside the prison. The district court dismissed, with prejudice on that basis. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that, on appeal, the plaintiff had not argued that the dismissal should have been without prejudice and that such a dismissal would have had a different impact because the statute of limitations for section 1983 claims in Wisconsin is six years, not three. The decision to dismiss with prejudice was proper, however, and sends a strong message to all litigants, particularly to the prison population, that dishonesty to the court will not be tolerated. View "Kennedy v. Huibregtse" on Justia Law

Defendant, National Heritage Academies, Inc., was a company that owned and operated a number of public, independently operated schools, including Linden Charter Academy (LCA) located in Flint, Michigan. Plaintiff, Craig Hecht, was a white teacher who had been employed by defendant at LCA for approximately eight years, most recently serving as a third-grade teacher. The student body at LCA was predominantly black. This race discrimination case came about over the color of a computer table: an aide returned a brown table to plaintiff's classroom. Upon noticing her mistake, the aide asked plaintiff whether he'd prefer to have the brown table she brought, or the white table that had previously been in the room. Whether or not plaintiff's next statement in response to the computer table question was a "tasteless joke" with no racial animas ultimately lead to plaintiff's termination with defendant. Plaintiff sued under Michigan's Civil Rights Act (CRA), claiming that the employer's reason for firing him was racially motivated. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). After review, the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals did not err by affirming the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for JNOV on plaintiff’s claim of discrimination under the Civil Rights Act (CRA), "[t]his case turned on circumstantial evidence, on the credibility of plaintiff’s proofs that suggested there were racial reasons for his treatment and on the credibility of defendant’s nonracial justifications for firing him." The Court concluded based on the evidence presented and all the inferences that could be reasonably drawn from that evidence in favor of the jury’s liability verdict, that a reasonable jury could have concluded that defendant violated the CRA. The Court found error in the calculation of future damages and reversed the trial court on that ground. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hecht v. National Heritage Academies, Inc." on Justia Law

Eugene Foster appeals from a district-court order granting summary judgment in favor of Mountain Coal Company, LLC (Mountain Coal) on his retaliation claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Foster injured his neck while working for Mountain Coal. Mountain Coal terminated Foster several months after the injury, citing that Foster “gave false information as to a credible Return To Work Slip.” After Mountain Coal terminated his employment, Foster filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Colorado Civil Rights Division. Ultimately, the EEOC issued Foster a right-to-sue notice; armed with the notice, Foster filed a complaint against Mountain Coal, seeking relief under the ADA and Colorado law. On the briefs, the district court entered summary judgment for Mountain Coal on Foster’s ADA and state-law discrimination claims and on Foster’s ADA retaliation claims. Foster appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that the district court erred in granting Mountain Coal’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Foster’s ADA retaliation claims. "We conclude that a reasonable jury could find that Foster established a prima facie case of retaliation with respect to both his April 3 and April 11 purported requests for accommodation." The Court further concluded that a reasonable jury could find that Mountain Coal’s asserted basis for terminating Foster’s employment was pretext. Therefore the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting Mountain Coal’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Foster’s ADA retaliation claims and remanded for further proceedings. View "Foster v. Mountain Coal Company" on Justia Law

In 2011 UJC private jet charter services hired Plaintiff as a co-pilot. After altercations between Plaintiff, a woman, and male pilots, which Plaintiff perceived to constitute sexual harassment, Plaintiff wrote an email to UJC management. About three weeks later, Plaintiff’s employment was terminated. Plaintiff sued, alleging retaliation. Defendants’ answer stated that UJC had converted from a corporation to an LLC. Plaintiff did not amend her complaint. Defendants’ subsequent motions failed did not raise the issue of UJC’s identity. UJC’s CEO testified that he had received reports that Plaintiff had used her cell phone below 10,000 feet; that once Plaintiff became intoxicated and danced inappropriately at a bar while in Atlantic City for work; that Plaintiff had once dangerously performed a turning maneuver; and that Plaintiff had a habit of unnecessarily executing “max performance” climbs. There was testimony that UJC’s male pilots often engaged the same behavior. The jury awarded her $70,250.00 in compensatory and $100,000.00 in punitive damages. When Plaintiff attempted to collect on her judgment, she was told that the corporation was out of business without assets, but was offered a settlement of $125,000.00. The court entered a new judgment listing the LLC as the defendant, noting that UJC’s filings and witnesses substantially added to confusion regarding UJC’s corporate form and that the LLC defended the lawsuit as though it were the real party in interest. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating it was unlikely that UJC would have offered a generous settlement had it genuinely believed itself to be a victim of circumstance, or that it would be deprived of due process by an amendment to the judgment; the response indicated a litigation strategy based on “roll[ing] the dice at trial and then hid[ing] behind a change in corporate structure when it comes time to collect.” View "Braun v. Ultimate Jetcharters, LLC" on Justia Law

Mohamed Tawid Al-Saffy, an Egyptian-American Muslim employed by the Foreign Agricultural Service, filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., alleging that the Agriculture and State Departments each discriminated against him based on religion and national origin, and retaliated against him for filing an EEO complaint. The district court granted summary judgment to the government. The court concluded that, because Title VII requires final agency action to notify the employee of his right to appeal and the governing time limitation, the order dismissing the 2012 Complaint did not trigger the ninety-day deadline for Al-Saffy to file suit. Instead, given the lack of timely final action by the agency, Al-Saffy could have and did file a civil action more than 180 days after the filing of the 2012 Complaint with the agency. Therefore, Al-Saffy’s October 10, 2013 filing in district court thus preserved his claims from the 2012 Complaint. The court also concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the government on Al-Saffy's claims against the State Department because there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Al-Saffy had an employment relationship with the State Department within the meaning of Title VII, and whether Al-Saffy knew about the State Department’s alleged role in discrimination against him prior to 2013. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Al-Saffy v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

Williams captioned his case as a state habeas action against a prison warden. He alleged claims about the conditions of his confinement, specifically Eighth Amendment claims about the lack of medical care. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action, noting that his claims did not challenge to the fact or duration of his imprisonment, which is the essential purpose of the writ of habeas corpus. Williams’s claims would properly be brought in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, not a habeas petition. When the challenge is to a condition of confinement such that a finding in plaintiff's favor would not alter his sentence or undo his conviction, a civil rights action is appropriate. The court noted that Williams already has a civil rights action pending relating to the same or similar claims and deliberately filed a different type of action. View "Williams v. Warden, Lackawanna County Prison" on Justia Law

Giles was convicted of second-degree manslaughter in 2007. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed his conviction in an opinion dated October 21, 2010. Under Kentucky Rule 76.30(2)(a), the opinion was considered final 21 days later (November 12, 2010), as reflected by a docket notation labeled “finality.” Giles did not seek certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, but filed a state post-conviction petition on February 23, 2011, 34 days into the one-year limitations period for his federal habeas petition. That limitations period was tolled while Giles’s state petition was pending, leaving 331 days. The state Supreme Court denied discretionary review on May 15, 2013. On May 16, the limitations period began to run, Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a); Giles had until Monday, April 14, 2014, to file. On May 1, 2014, Giles filed his federal habeas petition, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found Giles’s petition untimely and that equitable tolling was not appropriate. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the limitations period begins to run from the latest of four dates—in this case “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review,” 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A). Delayed finality under Kentucky’s procedure did not entitle Giles to an additional 21 days. View "Giles v. Beckstrom" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants alleging that they prevented him from collecting on a California state court legal malpractice judgment. The district court granted Defendant Hummer's motion to strike plaintiff's claims under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the district court's order is not a "final decision" over which the court may exercise appellate jurisdiction. Under the Erie doctrine, it is long since settled that federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law. Rule 54(b), which the court must apply, clearly states that the order on appeal here is not final. The court also concluded that the grant of an anti-SLAPP motion to strike is not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. View "Hyan v. Hummer" on Justia Law