Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Drew Bowers (Ward) sustained a traumatic brain injury in 1981. As a result of the injury, he required 24-hour care. His mother, Patricia Bowers Edwards (Guardian) was appointed guardian of her son's person and property in 2004. As guardian, she was responsible for hiring approximately ten caretakers for Drew in his private residence. Two of the ten caretakers contracted to provide services for Drew were domestic workers, Deborah Sizemore and Brad Garrett. In 2013, Sizemore filed a "charge of discrimination" pursuant to the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act, with the Attorney General's Office of Civil Rights Enforcement, claiming that her hours were dramatically reduced when she told the guardian she suffered from narcolepsy. Sizemore also claimed that she was sexually harassed at work by a male co-worker. She identified co-worker Garrett as a supporting witness in her complaint. The Guardian terminated the employment of both Sizemore and Garrett when she received the complaint from the Attorney General. The Guardian admitted she discharged Sizemore and Garrett from employment because the complaint was "the straw that broke the camel's back." Guardian moved for summary judgment arguing that Drew was the actual employer and that under section 1301 of the Act, a natural person did not meet the definition of "employer." Guardian further argued that under section 1302(B) of the Act, the prohibition of discriminatory practices did not apply to " . . .employment in the domestic service of the employer." The trial court denied Guardian's motion for summary judgment and Guardian brought this original action asserting immunity under the Act. Finding that indeed, Guardian was immune from suit under the Act, and that the trial court erred by not dismissing this case, the Supreme Court remanded the matter for the trial court to vacate its judgment and dismiss the case. View "Edwards v. Andrews" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former employees of the County, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, after they were reassigned, and later terminated, from their positions allegedly because they failed to support the sheriff's reelection. Plaintiffs also filed grievances with the Nueces County Civil Service Commission, alleging only that they were subjected to adverse employment actions in violation of county rules prohibiting such actions on grounds of participating or failing to participate in political activity. The state court affirmed the Commission's decision against plaintiffs. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on claim-preclusion grounds. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the district court applied the law of res judicata incorrectly, and that res judicata was inappropriate because plaintiffs had deliberately abstained from litigating their federal claims in state court. The court rejected plaintiffs' arguments and concluded that, because plaintiffs could and should have brought these claims in their state suit, their stated reasons for not doing so are inadequate to prevent res judicata. The court also rejected plaintiffs' claim of abstention. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cox v. Nueces County, TX" on Justia Law

As a result of criminal convictions Immigration and Customs Enforcement sought removal of lawful U.S. permanent residents. Pending removal proceedings, each was detained under 8 U.S.C. 1226(c), which provides that if ICE has “reason to believe” that an alien is “deportable” or “inadmissible” by virtue of having committed a specified crime, that alien “shall” be taken into custody when released from detention for that crime, "without regard to whether the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense.” In a purported class action, the district court dismissed in part, holding that section 1226(c) did not violate substantive due process with respect to aliens who assert a substantial challenge to their removability. The court later held that the form giving aliens notice of their right to seek a hearing does not provide constitutionally adequate notice, that the government was required to revise the form, and that procedures for that hearing violate due process by not placing the initial burden on the government. The court then denied a motion to certify the class, stating that certification was “unnecessary” because “all aliens who are subjected to mandatory detention would benefit from the injunctive relief and remedies.” Stating that the district court “put the cart before the horse a,” the Third Circuit vacated. Once petitioners were released from detention, their individual claims became moot so the court retained jurisdiction only to rule on the motion for class certification—not to decide the merits issues. View "Gayle v. Warden Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of first degree murder and related crimes. After the penalty phase of the trial, the jury returned a verdict of death. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of death, remanded the matter for a new penalty determination and reconsideration of the question of a restitution fine under the currently applicable statute, and affirmed the judgment in all other respects, holding (1) no prejudicial error occurred during the guilt phase of trial; (2) the trial court erred in excusing a prospective juror for cause under Witt based solely on written questionnaire responses regarding his views on capital punishment, and therefore, the penalty judgment must be reversed for error under Wainwright v. Witt and Witherspoon v. Illinois; and (3) the question of Defendant’s restitution fine must be remanded for reconsideration because Defendant’s restitution fine was imposed pursuant to a statute that was subsequently repealed in its entirety and replaced by a statute lessening punishment. View "People v. Covarrubias" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit denied petitions for initial hearing en banc in appeals concerning Wisconsin’s law requiring voters to have qualifying photo identification. The court noted that Wisconsin will start printing absentee ballots this month and that it is unlikely that qualified electors will be unable to vote under Wisconsin’s current procedures. The state had assured the court that temporary credentials will be available to all qualified persons who seek them. Wisconsin has enacted a rule that requires the Division of Motor Vehicles to mail automatically a free photo ID to anyone who comes to DMV one time and initiates the free ID process. No one must present documents, that, for some, have proved challenging to acquire; no one must show a birth certificate, or proof of citizenship, so the urgency needed to justify an initial en banc hearing has not been shown. The state adequately informed the general public of the plan and the district court​ has the authority to monitor compliance. View "One Wis. Inst., Inc. v. Thomsen" on Justia Law

Armstrong filed suit under 42 U.S.C.1983, claiming that Belleville police needlessly used a Taser against him. Armstrong did not reply to defendants’ summary judgment motion. The court entered judgment. Armstrong did not appeal within 30 days or request an extension. In September 2014 he requested a docket sheet, which showed the case as closed in May. In January 2015, Armstrong moved to reopen, claiming that he had not received defendants’ motion or the order. The motion cited FRCP 59(e), but the judge deemed it to be under Rule 60(b), because it had not been filed within 28 days, then denied the motion. Armstrong had notified the clerk of his address change, but did not include the caption or docket number of either of two suits he had pending. The clerk found one case, but apparently was unaware of the other. In March, Armstrong filed another unsuccessful motion; 38 days later, a notice of appeal appeared in the electronic filing system, from a state prison library. Armstrong stated that he gave the notice to staff, who delayed filing. The Seventh Circuit deemed the appeal timely under the mailbox rule, FRAP 4(c)(1), but nonetheless affirmed the dismissal. Armstrong did not appeal until after denial of multiple post-judgment motions. Successive post-judgment motions do not extend the time to appeal the denial of the initial motion, nor from the original judgment. Armstrong learned of the judgment within 180 days, but waited to seek relief. Armstrong missed deadlines that a court cannot extend, so the characterization of his papers is irrelevant. View "Armstrong v. City of Belleville" on Justia Law

Raab filed a civil complaint (42 U.S.C. 1983) against police officer Ruch and his employer, Ocean. Ruch had stopped his patrol car outside of Raab’s residence to investigate a trailer that had been parked on the street for a month and had no license plate. Ruch requested that it be towed. Shortly thereafter, Raab went outside and told Ruch that the trailer belonged to her brother-in-law and that she would move the trailer into her driveway. Ruch told her not to move the trailer, but she still tried. With the help of a passerby, the trailer was moved into the driveway. The parties dispute what happened next. Raab claims that Ruch grabbed her arm, handcuffed her, and threw her to the ground, then repeatedly pulled and twisted the handcuffs. Ruch claims that Raab fell to the ground while attacking him. Ruch called his supervisor, who arrived, called an ambulance, and told Ruch to remove the handcuffs. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ocean City. Raab and Ruch settled all outstanding claims for $150,000, exclusive of attorney’s fees and costs. The court denied both parties attorney’s fees. The Third Circuit reversed in part. A settling plaintiff in a civil rights action can be a “prevailing party” where the district court sua sponte entered a dismissal order incorporating and retaining jurisdiction over the settlement agreement. The court upheld the denial of Ocean City’s motion for attorney’s fees. View "Raab v. City of Ocean City" on Justia Law

In several cases, including this one, plaintiffs have asserted that medical care at the Cook County Jail falls below constitutional standards as a matter of official policy, custom, or practice. The 2008 findings from a U.S. Department of Justice investigation of health care at the Jail found systemic flaws in the Jail’s scheduling, record‐keeping, and grievance procedures that produced health care below the minimal requirements of the U.S. Constitution. In this case, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s refusal to allow admission of the report as evidence toward meeting a plaintiff’s burden of proving an unconstitutional custom, policy, or practice under the Supreme Court’s holding in Monell v. Department of Social Services. The district court held that the report was hearsay and was not admissible to prove the truth of its findings. The Seventh Circuit concluded that it should be admitted under the hearsay exception for civil cases in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(A)(iii) for factual findings from legally authorized investigations. View "Daniel v. Cook County" on Justia Law

Five months after Chicago police arrested Janusz, a court found that the officers’ stated reasons for approaching and arresting Janusz at a gas station were implausible. Janusz had lost his job because of the charges. Janusz sued in Illinois state court, alleging breach of employment contract, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and separately sued the city and officers in federal court, alleging violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. The state court jury awarded Janusz $3,177,500. While appeals were pending, the parties executed a settlement. Janusz executed a release in exchange for $3 million; the parties stipulated that the defendants “ha[d] paid [Janusz] all monies due and owing him as the result of the Judgment previously entered.". In the federal suit, the city defendants sought summary judgment as to damages, arguing that Illinois’s single‐recovery rule prevented Janusz from recovering any damages relating to lost wages and emotional injuries for which the state settlement had compensated him. The district court granted the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Both lawsuits involve a single, indivisible set of injuries for which Janusz has already received compensation. Janusz is judicially estopped from arguing that the judgment in the state action was not fully satisfied. View "Janusz v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Chicago Police officers pulled over a car driven by Rosado for failing to use a turn signal. After stopping the car, the officers “claimed to have seen” a badge, handcuffs, and a handgun in plain view “between the brake lever and center console.” They arrested Rosado for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon and for violating the armed habitual criminal statute. Another officer approved the report as establishing probable cause. Rosado spent about 18 months in jail before receiving a copy of the dash cam video recorded when he was arrested, which, contrary to the officers’ accounts, showed that Rosado had used an operable turn signal. The state court dismissed the charges. Rosado filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court dismissed Rosado’s false‐arrest claim as barred by the two‐year statute of limitations. Because his claims of conspiracy and failure to intervene arose from the false‐arrest claim, those were also dismissed. The court dismissed Rosado’s due‐process and respondeat‐superior claims on the merits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rosado did not promptly file. He knew the officers had fabricated probable cause by February 2014, when he received the video, and still had seven months to timely file suit. Rosado’s unexplained failure to timely file precluded equitable tolling. View "Rosado v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law