Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Williams captioned his case as a state habeas action against a prison warden. He alleged claims about the conditions of his confinement, specifically Eighth Amendment claims about the lack of medical care. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action, noting that his claims did not challenge to the fact or duration of his imprisonment, which is the essential purpose of the writ of habeas corpus. Williams’s claims would properly be brought in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, not a habeas petition. When the challenge is to a condition of confinement such that a finding in plaintiff's favor would not alter his sentence or undo his conviction, a civil rights action is appropriate. The court noted that Williams already has a civil rights action pending relating to the same or similar claims and deliberately filed a different type of action. View "Williams v. Warden, Lackawanna County Prison" on Justia Law

Giles was convicted of second-degree manslaughter in 2007. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed his conviction in an opinion dated October 21, 2010. Under Kentucky Rule 76.30(2)(a), the opinion was considered final 21 days later (November 12, 2010), as reflected by a docket notation labeled “finality.” Giles did not seek certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, but filed a state post-conviction petition on February 23, 2011, 34 days into the one-year limitations period for his federal habeas petition. That limitations period was tolled while Giles’s state petition was pending, leaving 331 days. The state Supreme Court denied discretionary review on May 15, 2013. On May 16, the limitations period began to run, Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a); Giles had until Monday, April 14, 2014, to file. On May 1, 2014, Giles filed his federal habeas petition, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The court found Giles’s petition untimely and that equitable tolling was not appropriate. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the limitations period begins to run from the latest of four dates—in this case “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review,” 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(A). Delayed finality under Kentucky’s procedure did not entitle Giles to an additional 21 days. View "Giles v. Beckstrom" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants alleging that they prevented him from collecting on a California state court legal malpractice judgment. The district court granted Defendant Hummer's motion to strike plaintiff's claims under California’s anti-SLAPP statute. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the district court's order is not a "final decision" over which the court may exercise appellate jurisdiction. Under the Erie doctrine, it is long since settled that federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law. Rule 54(b), which the court must apply, clearly states that the order on appeal here is not final. The court also concluded that the grant of an anti-SLAPP motion to strike is not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. View "Hyan v. Hummer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant Jim Little, the Executive Director of Employee Relations at the District, alleging sex discrimination for acts that had occurred in 2008. The district court dismissed the suit with prejudice based on lack of personal jurisdiction and untimeliness. Plaintiff later filed suit in 2013 against Little and the District, alleging sex discrimination claims, under state and federal law, stemming in part from her termination in 2010. The district court held that the earlier dismissal was res judicata and barred this action. The court held - consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Judgments and at least three sister circuits - that an earlier dismissal on alternative grounds, where one ground is a lack of jurisdiction, is not res judicata. Therefore, the court concluded that res judicata does not bar this action. The court reversed the dismissal in part. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's federal claim because plaintiff's lawyer clearly and expressly abandoned the claim. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's state-law claims to the extent that they rely solely on events that occurred more than three years before the filing of the complaint in this case. For purposes of the motion to dismiss, at least two claims are timely: (1) plaintiff's claim alleging discriminatory firing in 2010; and (2) a hostile work environment claim founded in part on actions occurring within the limitations period. The court remanded. View "Ruiz v. Snohomish County PUD" on Justia Law

Guards (Madigan and Ross) undertook to move Blake, a Maryland inmate, to the prison’s segregation unit. Madigan assaulted Blake, punching him in the face. The prison system’s Internal Investigative Unit (IIU), issued a report condemning Madigan’s actions. Blake sued both guards under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force and failure to take protective action. A jury found Madigan liable. Ross raised the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requirement that an inmate exhaust “such administrative remedies as are available” before bringing suit. Blake argued that the IIU investigation was a substitute for those procedures. The Fourth Circuit reversed dismissal of the suit, holding that “special circumstances” can excuse a failure to comply with administrative procedural requirements, particularly where the inmate reasonably, although mistakenly, believed he had sufficiently exhausted his remedies. The Supreme Court vacated: “The Fourth Circuit’s unwritten ‘special circumstances’ exception is inconsistent with the text and history of the PLRA.” Mandatory exhaustion statutes like the PLRA foreclose judicial discretion. There are, however, circumstances in which an administrative remedy, although officially on the books, is not available. An administrative procedure is unavailable when it operates as a dead end, with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide relief. An administrative scheme might be so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use. Finally, a grievance process is rendered unavailable when prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of it through misrepresentation, or intimidation. The record raised questions about whether Blake had an “available” administrative remedy to exhaust. View "Ross v. Blake" on Justia Law

Himmelreich, a federal prisoner, sued the United States, alleging that he was severely beaten by a fellow inmate as the result of negligence by prison officials. The government treated the suit as a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b). The court granted the defendants summary judgment on the ground that the claim fell into the exception for “[a]ny claim based upon . . . the exercise or performance . . . [of] a discretionary function,” namely, deciding where to house inmates. While the motion was pending, Himmelreich filed a second suit: a constitutional tort suit against individual Bureau of Prison employees, again alleging that his beating was the result of officials’ negligence. After the dismissal of Himmelreich’s first suit, the court dismissed the second suit as foreclosed by the FTCA’s judgment bar provision. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed. The FTCA “Exceptions” section’s plain text dictates that the judgment bar does “not apply” to cases that, like Himmelreich’s first suit, are based on the performance of a discretionary function. Had the court dismissed Himmelreich’s first suit because, e.g., the employees were not negligent, it would make sense that the judgment bar provision would prevent a second suit against the employees. Where an FTCA claim is dismissed because it falls within one of the “Exceptions,” the dismissal signals merely that the United States cannot be held liable for the claim; it has no logical bearing on whether an employee can be liable instead. View "Simmons v. Himmelreich" on Justia Law

In cases consolidated for this appeal, defendants were found guilty but not criminally responsible at the time of the commission of the offense and were committed to the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. The court granted conditional releases on various occasions but each conditional release was subsequently revoked, resulting in recommitment to DHMH for treatment. The Maryland Court of Appeal held that the Circuit Court erred in determining that the statutory scheme, Criminal Procedure Article 3-114, for granting or revocation of the conditional release of a committed person violated the separation of powers provision found in Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The court also erred in revoking defendant’s conditional release and ordering his continued commitment for institutional inpatient care and treatment after the ALJ had found that defendant was eligible for conditional release and had recommended the same. The court held that under CP 3-114 the substantial evidence standard applies to a circuit court’s review of an ALJ’s findings of facts and recommendations. View "Stoddard v. State" on Justia Law

Green complained to his employer, the U.S. Postal Service, that he was denied a promotion because he was black. His supervisors then accused him of the crime of intentionally delaying the mail. In a 2009 agreement, USPS agreed not to pursue criminal charges. Green agreed either to retire or to accept another position in a remote location. Green chose to retire. In 2010, 41 days after resigning and 96 days after signing the agreement, Green reported an unlawful constructive discharge to the EEOC under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act., 42 U.S.C. 2000e Green eventually filed suit, which was dismissed as untimely because he had not contacted EEOC within 45 days of the “matter alleged to be discriminatory.” The Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated. Because part of the “matter alleged to be discriminatory” in a constructive-discharge claim is an employee’s resignation, the 45-day limitations period begins running after an employee resigns. Resignation is part of the “complete and present cause of action” in a constructive-discharge claim, which requires: discriminatory conduct such that a reasonable employee would have felt compelled to resign and actual resignation. Nothing in Title VII or the regulation suggests an exception to the rule. Starting the clock before a plaintiff can file suit would not further the limitations period’s goals and would negate Title VII’s remedial structure. View "Green v. Brennan" on Justia Law

After plaintiffs filed suit against Miami-Dade under the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), 18 U.S.C. 2721–2725, the district court dismissed the claims as time-barred. On appeal, plaintiffs argued that their claims were not barred and the district court erred by not applying the discovery rule to 28 U.S.C. 1658(a). In regard to this issue of first impression, the court adopted the reasoning and conclusion of the Eighth Circuit in McDonough v. Anoka Cnty and concluded that a DPPA claim accrues under section 1658(b) when the violation occurs. In this case, the only alleged DPPA violations that implicate Miami-Dade occurred on January 10, 2008 and May 26, 2005. Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint against Miami-Dade on March 7, 2014, well beyond the four-year statute of limitations for DPPA claims. Because the district court properly applied the occurrence rule to section 1658(a), the court affirmed the judgment. View "Foudy v. Miami-Dade Cnty." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted murder and two counts of assault in the first degree. Defendant, who was fifteen years old at the time of the crime, challenged the judgment of conviction on direct appeal, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by withholding information from an expert in child and adolescent psychiatry. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) Defendant received meaningful and effective representation; and (2) Defendant failed to demonstrate the absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations for counsel’s alleged shortcomings. View "People v. Henderson" on Justia Law