Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Under the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) Housing Choice Voucher Program, 42 U.S.C. 1437f, housing agencies use HUD funds to issue housing subsidy vouchers based on family size. The Montgomery County, Maryland Housing determined, based on a medical form, that Angelene has a disability and requires a live-in aide. HUD regulations mandate that any approved live-in aide must be counted in determining family size. The Commission issued Angelene a two-bedroom voucher. Angelene’s sister was Angelene’s live-in aide. Angelene decided to move to the District of Columbia. Program vouchers are portable. Angelene obtained a two-bedroom voucher from the D.C. Housing Authority. The sisters moved into a two-bedroom District apartment. Within weeks, they received a letter revoking Angelene’s right to a live-in aide and her legal entitlement to a two-bedroom voucher. They sued, citing the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132, Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794, and Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3604(f)(1). The court denied motions for a temporary restraining order and to seal their complaint, medical records, and “nondispositive materials.” While the case was pending, the Authority sent another letter reaffirming that Angelene’s request for a live-in aide was denied, but stating that the decision did not reverse the two-bedroom voucher. The court dismissed, finding no allegation of injury-in-fact. The D.C. Circuit reversed with respect to the motion to seal and the dismissal. At the pleadings stage, plaintiff’s allegation that the government denied or revoked a benefit suffices to show injury-in-fact. Angelene’s loss of a statutory entitlement traces directly to the Authority’s letter and would be redressed by a court order to approve her aide request. View "Hardaway v. District of Columbia Housing Authority" on Justia Law

A preliminary injunction required the Highland School District Board to treat an 11-year old transgender special-needs student as a female and permit her to use the girls’ restroom. Highland moved to stay the injunction pending appeal and to file an appendix under seal. The Sixth Circuit granted the motion to file under seal only with respect to four exhibits that were filed under seal in the trial court. In denying a stay, the court noted the girl’s personal circumstances—her young age, mental health history, and unique vulnerabilities—and that her use of the girls’ restroom for over six weeks has greatly alleviated her distress. Maintaining the status quo in this case will protect the girl from the harm that would befall her if the injunction is stayed. Public interest weights strongly against a stay of the injunction; the protection of constitutional and civil rights is always in the public interest. View "Board of Education of Highland School v. Doe" on Justia Law

A group of Houston-area pastors and a council representing the interests of Houston-area pastors challenged the dismissal of their claims against Annise Parker, the former mayor of Houston. This case stemmed from a heated dispute surrounding the Houston Equal Rights Ordinance ("HERO"), enacted by the city council in 2014. HERO was controversial; its supporters claimed it was a garden-variety non-discrimination ordinance mainly designed to prohibit discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered ("LGBT") persons, while its opponents maintained that it granted LGBT individuals special privileges and that, to avoid rejection, it was rammed through the council instead of being put to referendum. The district court found, variously, that plaintiffs lacked standing, that they failed to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), that they failed to show Parker was not immune from suit, and that res judicata barred their claims. Because the claims are non-justiciable, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. View "Williams v. Parker" on Justia Law

While incarcerated at the Topeka Correctional Facility (TCF - an all-female state prison), Plaintiff-Appellant Tracy Keith was raped by a prison maintenance employee. Plaintiff filed a section 1983 suit alleging that prison officials, including Warden Richard Koerner, violated her Eighth Amendment rights by creating an environment in which sexual misconduct was likely to occur. The Warden defended primarily on qualified immunity grounds. The district court granted summary judgment to Warden Koerner on qualified immunity. Plaintiff appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit found that a reasonable jury could have concluded that Warden Koerner created an atmosphere where “policies were honored only in the breach, and, as a result, he failed to take reasonable measures to ensure inmates were safe from the risk of sexual misconduct by TCF employees.” Because plaintiff possessed “a clearly established constitutional right” and presented evidence of a constitutional violation by Warden Koerner, the Tenth Circuit concluded summary judgment was inappropriate on qualified-immunity grounds. The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Keith v. Koerner" on Justia Law

In 2009, Luna County Deputy Sheriff Gabriel Maynes attempted to pull over plaintiff Anna Gutierrez for running a stop sign. Instead of pulling over, Gutierrez sped up, driving to an apartment complex where her mother, plaintiff Patsy Flores, lived. The deputy managed to taser Gutierrez as she exited her vehicle. When the deputy caught up with her, a scuffle ensued. Flores came out of her apartment and pleaded for the deputy to stop hitting her daughter, but she too was tasered. The State of New Mexico would later charge Gutierrez with several offenses, but those charges were dismissed. Because of the traffic stop and later scuffle, Gutierrez suffered multiple injuries, including two fractured ribs. Plaintiffs Gutierrez and Flores appealed a district court’s grant of summary judgment (based on qualified immunity) to Deputy Maynes on three of their 42 U.S.C. 1982 claims: excessive force, unlawful entry, and unlawful seizure. The district court concluded plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to overcome the qualified immunity defense. They appealed the district court’s judgment, but after careful consideration of the arguments the parties made at trial and on appeal, the Tenth Circuit agreed plaintiffs failed to meet their burden, and affirmed judgment in favor of the deputy. View "Gutierrez v. Luna County" on Justia Law

Whitaker is a transgender boy whose high school will not permit him to use the boys’ bathroom. He sued, alleging violation of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681, and the Equal Protection Clause. The defendants appealed denial of a motion to dismiss, arguing that appellate jurisdiction was proper under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b). The district court subsequently vacated its certification and the Seventh Circuit denied permission to appeal. The district court’s decision to withdraw certification destroyed jurisdiction to consider the petition under section 1292(b). View "Kenosha Unified School District v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the State Defendants, alleging state and federal claims arising out his discharge from the Hospital and subsequent transportation to Sacramento. The district court dismissed the federal statutory claims with prejudice as a sanction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), and the supplemental state law claims without prejudice. The court held that plaintiff waived the argument that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing his federal claims under Rule 41(b). The court explained that, in the absence of a showing that the district court abused its discretion, because the prior interlocutory order of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is not reviewable, there would be no basis to appeal. Therefore, the court concluded that, because plaintiff failed to make in his opening brief the abuse of discretion argument as to Rule 41(b), he has waived it. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal. View "Brown v. Rawson-Neal Psychiatric Hospital" on Justia Law

Plaintiff prevailed in a jury trial on her claim of pregnancy discrimination. On appeal, plaintiff challenges the district court's decision denying plaintiff's request to provide a jury instruction on punitive damages under the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL), N.Y.C. Admin. Code 8‐502. The court certified the following question to the New York Court of Appeals: What is the standard for finding a defendant liable for punitive damages under the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. Admin. Code 8‐502? View "Chauca v. Abraham" on Justia Law

On March 8, 2012, as high school students were being released from school, Officer Church received a call for back-up and arrived to find juveniles running through the streets. Officer Jackson was struggling to arrest one of them. Smith was standing outside of her car with her phone up as if videotaping. Officer Church, over 50 feet away, yelled, “Ma’am, pull your car to the side or keep on going.” Smith replied, “I’m not going to let you hurt that young boy. I ain’t moving.” Church moved closer, told her this was a traffic stop, and asked for her license. Smith “ran back into her car.” A struggle ensued. The parties disagree about the details. Church arrested Smith. The charges were eventually dropped. Smith sued the police department and officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983. At trial, the court allowed defense counsel to elicit testimony that Smith had been arrested three times before. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the officers on all counts. The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding Smith’s prior arrests not relevant to her claim for damages, which was the sole reason the court admitted them, and that any probative value of those arrests was far outweighed by prejudice to Smith, in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). View "Smith v. Baltimore City Police Department" on Justia Law

Marshall was sentenced to death in Pennsylvania in 1984 and has been pursuing a federal habeas petition since 2003. Marshall initially filed his petition through the Federal Community Defender; years later, on Marshall’s motion, the district court appointed new attorneys to represent Marshall. Marshall soon became dissatisfied with them because they would not withdraw the habeas petition filed by the Community Defender and assert different claims. Marshall eventually filed pro se a document, requesting an order: removing his new counsel; striking the habeas petition and other documents filed by the Community Defender; allowing the filing of a new habeas petition “nunc pro tunc”; and remanding for a new hearing “nunc pro tunc” in state court. In 2015, the court dismissed Marshall’s last three requests without prejudice. Counsel sought a determination of Marshall’s mental competence. The court held three hearings before Marshall consented to a psychiatric evaluation, which concluded that Marshall is not competent to assist his counsel or to proceed pro se. Eight days after a fourth hearing, before the court had announced any decision, Marshall filed a pro se notice of appeal. The district court subsequently found Marshall mentally incompetent and denied his request for removal of counsel. Marshall’s 30-day deadline to appeal that ruling expired without any filings. The Seventh Circuit dismissed. Marshall’s premature notice of appeal did not ripen when the district court issued its decision. View "Marshall v. Commissioner, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections" on Justia Law