Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

In 2004, McKinney was convicted of five counts arising from a single event: robbery, aggravated theft, receiving stolen property, and two counts of failing to comply with a police officer’s order. He was sentenced to consecutive prison terms totaling 20.5 years. The Third District rejected arguments that the robbery and theft counts and the two failing-to-comply counts were allied offenses of similar import but reversed his conviction for receiving stolen property and remanded for resentencing. He was resentenced to consecutive prison terms totaling 18.5 years. Ten years later, McKinney moved to “Correct Void Allied Convictions/Sentences” and for a resentencing hearing, then filed a mandamus petition, seeking to compel the trial judge to merge the convictions that he claimed were for allied offenses and arguing that until the judge does so, there is no final, appealable order. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Third District’s dismissal of the petition. McKinney has unsuccessfully litigated whether he was improperly convicted of duplicative charges, so his effort to collaterally attack his convictions as allied offenses is barred by res judicata. When “a plain and adequate remedy at law has been unsuccessfully invoked, a writ of mandamus will not lie to relitigate the same issue.” View "McKinney v. Schmenk" on Justia Law

Inmates, sentenced to indeterminate prison terms for crimes committed before 1996 sentencing reforms, alleged that the parole board has an unwritten policy of denying parole to old-law offenders, noting statements by board members that all inmates likely to be paroled following the reforms have been released. The complaint alleged that the board wastes $119 million annually by failing to give inmates meaningful parole consideration. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the Tenth District's dismissal of their mandamus petition. Prior denials do not equate to failure to give meaningful consideration. The Adult Parole Authority has “wide-ranging discretion in parole matters,” subject to an inherent expectation “that a criminal offender will receive meaningful consideration for parole.” The inmates did not establish that officials have already predetermined that the seriousness of their offenses outweighs all other factors. They committed aggravated murder in the course of a robbery, first-degree murder, complicity to commit aggravated murder, attempted aggravated murder, and crimes involving a minor. The board has not held them to account for offenses more serious than they actually committed nor based its decision on factually inaccurate information. Weighing the seriousness of the crimes, as compared to whatever evidence of rehabilitation the inmates presented is the point at which the parole board exercises its discretion. The court also rejected requests for a declaration that the parole board members were guilty of public corruption and for sanctions for alleged “public corruption” and “dereliction of duty.” View "Bailey v. Parole Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint in district court, alleging sex, race, and age discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The Eighth Circuit found that plaintiff likely adequately exhausted her remedies, and her pleadings indicated this prerequisite, especially on a motion to dismiss. Even if the lack of an initial verified charge would have indicated lack of exhaustion, the documents plaintiff supplied with her objections, including a copy of the verified charge mailed on July 28 and received by the EEOC, plus the Notice of Right to Sue, indicated she had cured any deficiency in the exhaustion requirements. Finally, the district court's failure to conduct a de novo review after plaintiff filed timely and specific objections was reversible error. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with directions to allow plaintiff to amend her pleadings. View "Rush v. Arkansas DWS" on Justia Law

After being found unfit to stand trial on a charge of domestic battery against his mother, Benny was admitted involuntarily to the Elgin Mental Health Center. He was medicated involuntarily and later found fit to stand trial. Benny was transferred to the jail, stopped taking his psychotropic medication, was again found unfit to stand trial and returned to Elgin. The state sought to administer psychotropic medication involuntarily. During one day of a two-day hearing, Benny was physically restrained. His attorney asked for the shackles to be removed. The security officer stated that he was “listed as high elopement risk” and submitted a “patient transport checklist.” The judge spoke to Benny, but denied the request. Benny interrupted testimony and indicated that the restraints caused him pain. The court granted the petition allowing involuntary administration of psychotropic medication, not to exceed 90 days. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated that ruling, holding that the appeal fell within the mootness exception for issues capable of repetition yet evading review. Courts may order physical restraints in involuntary treatment proceedings only upon a finding of manifest necessity; they must give the patient’s attorney an opportunity to be heard and must state on the record the reasons for allowing shackles. Benny’s attorney did not object to the court's procedures, ask for any additional opportunity to be heard, or request findings or an explicit statement of reasons. A specific objection was required to preserve procedural arguments, given that the procedure for allowing restraints in involuntary treatment proceedings was not established at the time of Benny's hearing. View "In re Benny M." on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted discretionary review to determine whether the General Assembly abrogated high public official immunity when it enacted Section 6111(i) of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act (UFA), 18 Pa.C.S. sections 6101-6187. Appellees John Doe 1, John Doe 2, John Doe 3 and Jane Doe 1 were adult individuals residing in Franklin County who each applied for a license to carry a firearm (LTCF) by submitting an application to the Franklin County Sheriff’s Department. Subsequently, appellees filed the underlying eight-count class action complaint against Franklin County officials, pertinent here, Sheriff Dane Anthony (Sheriff Anthony, collectively, appellants), claiming, inter alia, violations of the confidentiality provision of Section 6111(i) and seeking damages. Appellees alleged they and several other applicants received notification of the approval, renewal, denial or revocation of their LTCF applications from appellants via postcards sent through the United States Postal Service (USPS), and the postcards were not sealed in an envelope. Appellees alleged, inter alia, appellants’ use of postcards to notify LTCF applicants of the status of their applications resulted in the notices being “visible [to] all individuals processing, mailing and serving the mail, as well as, [to] any individual receiving the postcard at the address, who may or may not be the applicant or license holder.” Appellees claimed these actions constituted “public disclosure” in violation of Section 6111(i). Central to this appeal is Count III of the Complaint, in which appellees specifically alleged Sheriff Anthony, in his management and leadership of the Sheriff’s Office, “instituted and directed the disclosure of confidential LTCF application information to the public, employees of the County and Sheriff’s Office not authorized under the UFA, [USPS] employees and other third parties at the same address who use the same mailbox as the LTCF applicant in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. §6111(i).” With regard to Count III, appellants sought dismissal of all claims against Sheriff Anthony on the basis that he was immune from suit as a high public official for any actions he took in his official capacity as Sheriff of Franklin County. The trial court sustained most of the preliminary objections and dismissed the entire complaint. Relevant here, the court concluded Sheriff Anthony qualified as a high public official, and was therefore immune from liability for any acts performed in his official capacity as sheriff. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the General Assembly did not abrogate high public official immunity through Section 6111(i), and thus reversed the Commonwealth Court on this issue. View "John Doe v. Franklin Co. Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Mary Anna Whitehall worked as a social worker for the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS or the County). She sought legal advice pertaining to any liability she might have for submitting misleading information and doctored photographs to the juvenile court at the direction of her superiors. Her counsel prepared a filing; subsequently plaintiff was immediately placed on administrative leave for disclosing confidential information to an unauthorized person. Upon being informed she would be terminated for the breach, plaintiff resigned her position and filed a whistle blower action against the County. The County filed a special motion to strike the complaint as an Anti-SLAPP action, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, which was denied by the trial court. The County appealed. On appeal, the County argued the trial court erred in determining plaintiff had established the second prong of the criteria to overcome a special motion to strike an Anti-SLAPP lawsuit by finding a likelihood she would prevail because the County’s actions were not privileged or covered by governmental immunity. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Whitehall v. County of San Bernardino" on Justia Law

A question of Washington law was certified to the Washington Supreme Court on whether prospective employers are free to engage in retaliatory discrimination in the hiring process. Waterville School District No. 209 hired Jin Zhu as a math teacher in 2006. In 2010, Waterville issued a notice of probable cause for Zhu's discharge, which he appealed. The hearing officer determined that there was not probable cause for discharge and restored Zhu to his position. Zhu then sued Waterville in federal district court, alleging that Waterville had subjected him to racially motivated disparate treatment, a hostile work environment, and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. sections 1983, 2000e-2, and 2000e-3. His complaint alleged that he filed multiple grievances with Waterville regarding hostile and abusive actions by his students; instead of attempting to remedy the situation, Zhu alleged Waterville took retaliatory actions against him for filing the grievances, including attempting to discharge him without probable cause. After the district court denied Waterville's motion for summary judgment dismissal, the parties settled and Zhu resigned from Waterville in March 2012. Three months after resigning from Waterville, Zhu applied for a position as a "Math-Science Specialist" with ESD 171. Zhu was one of three candidates interviewed, but ESD 171 ultimately hired a different candidate, whom Zhu claims was far less qualified for the position. Zhu sued ESD 171 in federal district court, alleging that it refused to hire him in retaliation for his prior lawsuit against Waterville, thereby violating WLAD's antiretaliation statute, RCW 49.60.210(1), as well as other state and federal laws. The Washington Supreme Court held that in accordance with the plain language of the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), chapter 49.60 RCW, retaliatory discrimination against job applicants by prospective employers was prohibited. Therefore, plaintiff Jin Zhu's claim that defendant North Central Educational Service District - ESD 171 (ESD 171) refused to hire him because of his opposition to his former employer's racial discrimination stated a valid cause of action. View "Zhu v. N. Cent. Educ. Serv. District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant’s appeal from the denial of multiple pro se motions he filed in connection with a pro se civil-rights action he filed in the circuit court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, which rendered his two petitions for writ of certiorari, two amended petitions for certiorari, and multiple motions connected with the appeal moot.Appellant filed a complaint alleging that Appellees violated his civil rights. In addition to his civil complaint, Appellant filed multiple motions. The circuit court denied the motions and other pleadings on the basis that Appellant had failed to provide proof of service with respect to the complaint and the related pleadings. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant’s appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction because there was no final order on the merits. View "Nooner v. Kelley" on Justia Law

In this case filed by a Massachusetts-based company (“LevelUp”) against a California-based company (“Punchh”), alleging defamation and related causes of action connected with Punchh’s allegedly false statements about LevelUp to LevelUp’s prospective clients, the superior court allowed Punchh’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that it would not comport with due process to hale Punchh into a Massachusetts court. The Supreme Judicial Court remanded this matter to the superior court for further proceedings, holding (1) prior to exercising personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, a judge must determine that doing so comports with both the forum’s long-arm statute and the requirements of the United States Constitution; and (2) the requisite statutory analysis did not occur in this case. View "SCVNGR, Inc. v. Punchh, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the dean of the University of Iowa College of Law had rejected her applications to teach legal analysis and writing at the law school due to political discrimination in violation of the First Amendment. After two remands and a jury trial, plaintiff challenged the denial of her motion for a new trial. The Eighth Circuit noted the routine failure of plaintiff's main brief to cite the parts of the record on which she relied and rejected some of her arguments on that basis. The court denied plaintiff's claim that she was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on her discrimination claim based on lack of jurisdiction. Finally, any claims of error regarding the district court's decision not to instruct the jury on punitive damages was moot in light of the jury's verdict. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Manning v. Jones" on Justia Law