Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The South Orange County Community College District (the District) dismissed Carol Wassmann from employment as a tenured librarian at Irvine Valley College (IVC) in April 2011. Several years later, Wassmann obtained a right to sue notice from the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) and brought this lawsuit against the District, Karima Feldhus, Robert Brumucci, Glenn Roquemore, Lewis Long, and Katherine Schmeidler. Wassmann, who is African-American, alleged causes of action for racial discrimination, age discrimination, and harassment in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), intentional infliction of emotional distress, and two other causes of action (not relevant here). The trial court granted two motions for summary judgment: one brought by the District Defendants and the other brought by Long and Schmeidler, on the ground the FEHA claims were barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, or failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action was barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the statute of limitations. Wassmann appealed, but finding no reversible error in the grant of summary judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Wassmann v. South Orange County Community College Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Natasha Meeks contended that she suffered sexual harassment on the job. She brought suit against her employer, defendant-appellant AutoZone, Inc. (AutoZone), and the alleged harasser, defendant-appellant Juan Fajardo, raising claims of sexual harassment, failure to prevent sexual harassment, and retaliation in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The trial court granted summary adjudication in favor of AutoZone on Meeks’s retaliation claim. A jury returned defense verdicts on her remaining claims. On appeal, Meeks argued that certain evidentiary rulings at trial were prejudicial errors, requiring reversal. She also claimed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to AutoZone on her retaliation claim was erroneous. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary adjudication on the retaliation claim. However, the Court found several erroneous evidentiary rulings required reversal of the judgment and remand for new trial on the remaining claims. View "Meeks v. AutoZone, Inc." on Justia Law

1997 Wisconsin Act 292, designed to address the effects of prenatal substance abuse, brings unborn children and their mothers within the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts if the mothers exhibit a habitual lack of self‐control with respect to alcohol or drugs that raises a substantial health risk for their unborn children. Loertscher sought treatment at a county health facility. Her caregivers determined that she was pregnant and that she had tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamines, and tetrahydrocannabinol. The court ordered Loertscher to report to an alcohol and drug abuse treatment center for assessment and possible treatment. When she failed to comply, the court found her in contempt and placed her in county detention. She eventually agreed to participate in the program. Loertscher filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983 challenging the constitutionality of Act 292, then moved out of Wisconsin. The district court denied a motion to dismiss, concluded that Act 292 was void for vagueness and granted injunctive relief against the state defendants but determined that the county defendants were not personally liable. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Loertscher’s case is moot. She has moved out of Wisconsin and has no plans to return. It is not reasonably likely that she will again be subject to the Act. View "Loertscher v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Republican voters alleged that Maryland’s Sixth Congressional District was gerrymandered in 2011 in retaliation for their political views. Six years after the General Assembly redrew the District, plaintiffs sought to enjoin election officials from holding congressional elections under the 2011 map. The district court denied the motion and stayed further proceedings pending the Supreme Court’s disposition of partisan gerrymandering claims in Gill v. Whitford. The Supreme Court affirmed. In granting a preliminary injunction a court must consider whether the movant has shown “that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Plaintiffs made no such showing. They did not move for a preliminary injunction until six years, and three general elections, after the 2011 map was adopted, and three years after their first complaint was filed. The delay largely arose from a circumstance within plaintiffs’ control. In considering the balance of equities, that unnecessary, years-long delay weighed against their request. The public interest in orderly elections also supported the decision. Plaintiffs represented to the court that any injunctive relief would have to be granted by August 18, 2017, to ensure the timely completion of a new districting scheme in advance of the 2018 election season. Despite the court’s undisputedly diligent efforts, that date had passed by the time the court ruled. There was also legal uncertainty surrounding any potential remedy for the asserted injury; the court reasonably could have concluded that a preliminary injunction would have been against the public interest and might have had a needlessly disruptive effect on the electoral process. View "Besinek v. Lamone" on Justia Law

The equitable tolling doctrines of the discovery rule and equitable estoppel are available with respect to the 300-day filing limitation in the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA).Plaintiff, an applicant for the position of Deputy Workers’ Compensation Commissioner at Iowa Workforce Development (IWD), brought a failure-to-hire claim against the IWD. The district court dismissed the claim, concluding that Plaintiff could not escape the 300-day filing requirement in the ICRA through application of the discovery rule or equitable estoppel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the discovery rule and equitable estoppel apply to the 300-day filing limitation in the ICRA; but (2) Plaintiff was not entitled to toll the filing limitation through application of either the discovery rule or equitable estoppel. View "Mormann v. Iowa Workforce Development" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-respondent Dawn Turnbull sued defendants-appellants the Lucerne Valley Unified School District (LVUSD), Tom Courtney, Suzette Davis, John Buchanan, and Keri Gasper. Turnbull brought causes of action for: (1) disclosing her private medical information; (2) invading her privacy; (3) interfering with her constitutional rights; (4) violating her civil rights; and (5) conspiring to deprive her of her right of privacy or right of free speech. Davis was the superintendent of LVUSD. Turnbull and Courtney were members of the LVUSD board. Although not explicit, it was inferred from the complaint that Buchanan was also a member of the LVUSD board. Gasper was an LVUSD volunteer. Turnbull opposed Davis’s alleged misappropriation of LVUSD funds. In retaliation for Turnbull’s opposition, Davis: (1) obtained confidential medical information about Turnbull from Turnbull’s employer; (2) generated false reports from the California Longitudinal Pupil Achievement Data System (CALPADS), concerning school lunch program eligibility; and (3) on July 8, 2015, falsely told LVUSD board members that evidence strongly suggested Turnbull illegally accessed CALPADS. Shortly after a LVUSD board meeting, Courtney and Buchanan, as private citizens, called Turnbull’s employer to report Turnbull’s allegedly unlawful access of CALPADS. Turnbull had legally accessed CALPADS to obtain a report concerning her stepchild. Courtney used his position as a LVUSD board member to obtain access to Turnbull’s private medical information. Courtney, as a private citizen, caused Turnbull’s private medical information to be published on social media or gave the information to people who published it on social media. Courtney intended to intimidate Turnbull to stop her from opposing Davis’s acts of misappropriation. Gasper received Turnbull’s private medical information from Courtney, Davis, or Buchanan. Gasper published the information on social media. LVUSD, Courtney, and Davis brought an anti-SLAPP motion, which the trial court denied. LVUSD, Courtney, and Davis contended the trial court erred by denying their motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order denying the anti-SLAPP motion; defendants failed to establish that the allegations in the complaint arose from protected activities. View "Turnbull v. Lucerne Valley Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Taunya Perry was arrested and booked into the Ottawa County Jail on December 28, 2012. According to Perry, detention officer Daniel Clements raped her approximately two months later, on February 25, 2013. As a result of the alleged rape, Perry brought suit against the Ottawa County Sheriff, defendant Terry Durborow, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting that Durborow was responsible for the alleged rape under a theory of supervisory liability. In response, Durborow moved for summary judgment, arguing that he was entitled to qualified immunity. Durborow appealed the district court’s order denying his motion, arguing only that - even assuming he violated the Constitution - the district court erred in finding that the contours of the constitutional right at issue were clearly established. The Tenth Circuit agreed: “the clearly established law must be ‘particularized’ to the facts of the case. ... In reaching this conclusion, we do not mean to suggest that “[a] prior case” must have “identical facts” before it will put reasonable officials on notice that their specific conduct is unconstitutional." Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded with directions to enter summary judgment in Durborow’s favor. View "Perry v. Durborow" on Justia Law

Exercising jurisdiction over Defendant-insurer under the circumstances of this case was permitted by Connectictut’s corporate long arm statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. 33-929(f)(1), and comported with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.Defendant issued an automobile insurance policy covering a vehicle driven by Insured. The policy was written in New York at Defendant’s principal place of business, and Defendant did not direct or participate in any business transactions in Connecticut at the time. The coverage territory of the policy included Connecticut. Insured’s vehicle later collided with a vehicle occupied by Plaintiffs. A judgment was rendered against Insured in favor of Plaintiffs. Defendant failed to defend Insured or to indemnify him for the judgment rendered against him. Plaintiffs then brought this action against Defendant. Defendant moved to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant’s agreement to defend and indemnify Insured established personal jurisdiction under the long arm statute and that subjecting Defendant to the jurisdiction of this state comported with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. View "Samelko v. Kingstone Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Adrian Camacho appealed after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant Target Corporation (Target) on Camacho's causes of action for discrimination based on sexual orientation, harassment causing a hostile work environment, failure to prevent harassment and discrimination, retaliation, constructive termination in violation of public policy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, and a violation of the Bane Act (Civ. Code sec. 52.1). The trial court concluded that language included in an addendum to a preprinted compromise and release form utilized to settle Camacho's workers' compensation action against Target constituted a broad release of any and all potential claims that Camacho may have had against Target, including claims falling outside the workers' compensation system. After reviewing the relevant language in the addendum and considering that language in the context of the entire settlement agreement, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court erred in determining that the language at issue contained in the addendum to the settlement agreement executed by the parties in Camacho's workers' compensation case constituted a general release of all of Camacho's civil claims. The Court therefore reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Camacho v. Target Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court granting a motion brought by Defendant, the State Public Defender’s Office, for judgment on the pleadings regarding Plaintiff’s employment discrimination claims.Plaintiff in this case filed two complaints. In Nugent I, Plaintiff appealed an arbitration decision concluding that the Public Defender’s Office acted wth just cause when it terminated Plaintiff’s employment. Judgment entered in favor of Defendant on the basis that Plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the arbitration decision in court. In Nugent II, Plaintiff alleged unlawful employment discrimination. Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that res judicata barred Plaintiff’s discrimination claims. The hearing justice granted the motion, and final judgment entered in favor of Defendant on all claims. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in Nugent II, holding that Nugent I was not a final judgment for purposes of res judicata because the consideration of Nugent’s standing did not reach the merits of Nugent I, and therefore, Plaintiff was not barred from seeking redress for her discrimination claims raised in Nugent II. View "Nugent v. State" on Justia Law