Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant’s appeal from the circuit court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration of an order that set a partial filing fee of twenty dollars with respect to Appellant’s pro se civil complaint in tort against four persons, holding that the circuit court did not err when it denied the motion for reconsideration.The circuit court denied Appellant’s request for reconsideration because it was not timely filed pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 60(a). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Appellant did not ask for reconsideration of the circuit court’s order until 155 days after the order had been entered, Appellant’s motion was untimely, and therefore, the circuit court did not err in denying it. View "Whitney v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded the instant appeal of the circuit court’s order denying Appellant’s pro se petition for leave to proceed in forma pauperis in which Appellant sought to proceed with a civil-rights complaint against certain Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) employees, holding that the order was not sufficient for review, and therefore, the case must be remanded for findings of fact.The order at issue found that Appellant was not indigent and must pay the statutory filing fee for the action. The Supreme Court held (1) contrary to the assertion of Appellee, the director of the ADC, the order was appealable; and (2) the cause must be remanded for a supplemental order on the in forma pauperis petition that contains adequate findings of fact on the issue of whether Appellant was indigent. View "Berger v. Kelley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s order dismissing Appellant’s counterclaim for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS), holding that the Court was unable to address the sole issue raised by Appellant on appeal.On appeal, Appellant argued that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider her counterclaim because DHS was entitled to sovereign immunity and that her case should be dismissed without prejudice due to lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to preserve her sovereign-immunity argument, and therefore, the circuit court properly dismissed the counterclaim. View "Wilson v. Arkansas Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

In this case against members of the Rhode Island Board of Bar Examiners the First Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of attorneys’ fees in favor of Plaintiff and affirmed the court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s amended complaint, holding that Plaintiff’s supposed “prevailing party” status was not justified.Plaintiff, an individual with attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder and anxiety, filed suit against members of the Board challenging the Board’s denial of his request for certain accommodations to assist him in taking the Rhode Island bar exam. The district court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) requiring the Board to permit Plaintiff the requested accommodations, dismissed Plaintiff’s amended complaint, and allowed Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees. On review, the First Circuit held (1) Plaintiff’s success in gaining a TRO did not warrant an award of attorneys’ fees; and (2) the district court’s decision to allow the Board’s motion to dismiss the damage claim in the complaint was correct. View "Sinapi v. Rhode Island Board of Bar Examiners" on Justia Law

Petitioner Kyle Guillemette challenged a determination by the Administrative Appeals Unit (AAU) of the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) that the notice requirements set forth in RSA 171-A:8, III (2014) and New Hampshire Administrative Rules, He-M 310.07 did not apply when Monadnock Worksource notified Monadnock Developmental Services of its intent to discontinue providing services to petitioner because that act did not constitute a “termination” of services within the meaning of the applicable rules. Petitioner received developmental disability services funded by the developmental disability Medicaid waiver program. MDS was the “area agency,” which coordinated and developed petitioner’s individual service plan. Worksource provides services to disabled individuals pursuant to a “Master Agreement” with MDS. Worksource began providing day services to the petitioner in August 2012. On March 31, 2017, Worksource notified MDS, in writing, that Worksource was terminating services to petitioner “as of midnight on April 30.” The letter to MDS stated that “[t]he Board of Directors and administration of . . . Worksource feel this action is in the best interest of [the petitioner] and of [Worksource].” Petitioner’s mother, who served as his guardian, was informed by MDS of Worksource’s decision on April 3. The mother asked for reconsideration, but the Board declined, writing that because the mother “repeatedly and recently expressed such deep dissatisfaction with our services to your son, the Board and I feel that you and [petitioner] would be better served by another agency . . . .” Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint with the Office of Client and Legal Services alleging that his services had been terminated improperly and requesting that they remain in place pending the outcome of the investigation of his complaint. Because the New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the AAU’s ruling was not erroneous, it affirmed. View "Petition of Kyle Guillemette" on Justia Law

In 1988, Huber pleaded guilty to making fraudulent credit card charges of $800. He spent the next 25 years either on probation or in prison for violating his probation, although Wisconsin had no lawful basis for extending his sentence beyond November 1995. It took the state until 2014 to recognize this problem and to vacate his ongoing sentence. Huber filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, ruling that Huber had failed to bring most claims within six years of their accrual, as required under Wisconsin’s statute of limitations. Some of Huber’s claims were timely, but the court granted the defendants summary judgment on the merits. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Huber’s claims were timely and summary judgment was premature on those claims that the district court reached. Huber’s claim did not accrue until the court invalidated his sentence. Huber filed this action in 2016, within Wisconsin’s six-year statute of limitations. He did not sit on his rights under the Heck doctrine, which ensures that civil litigation does not undermine the basis of criminal convictions and sentences. A reasonable jury could find deliberate indifference here. Construing facts and inferences in Huber’s favor, Huber’s Eighth Amendment claims are not suitable for summary judgment. View "Huber v. Anderson" on Justia Law

In 2014, Wife was married to Andres Marin (the victim). Wife and the victim shared four children: Andres, Jazmyn, Christal, and Julyan. On March 1, 2014, at approximately 6:30 a.m., the victim left the Family’s residence in Corona to ride his mountain bike up Santiago Peak in the Cleveland National Forest. The bike ride would be approximately 55 miles. The victim was scheduled to arrive back home at 2:00 p.m. When he did not, his Wife called police. Wife was able to speak to her husband on the trail: he had been injured, and she was concerned about falling temperatures the later it took him to come home. Riverside County Sheriff’s Lieutenant Zachary Hall was the “Incident Commander” for the case. Lieutenant Hall was not trained in search and rescue techniques, and dismissed Wife’s concerns for her husband’s safety, particularly overnight when the temperatures dropped. The victim ultimately was found by volunteers trained to respond to wilderness emergencies; he died of hypothermia. The victim’s family sued the County of Riverside (the County) for: (1) wrongful death; (2) negligence; (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (4) a deprivation of constitutional rights (42 U.S.C. 1983). The trial court sustained the County’s demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend. The Family contended on appeal the trial court erred. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed as to the causes of action for wrongful death, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. View "Arista v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

Guerrero came from Mexico to the U.S. with his parents in 1990 at age 11. In 1995, he created a false Social Security number (SSN) to get a job. He secured a legitimate SSN in 2007. He became a U.S. citizen in 2011. He applied to become a correctional officer with the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). He passed written and physical exams and was placed on the eligibility list. CDCR’s background questionnaire asked, “Have you ever had or used a social security number other than the one you used on this questionnaire?” Guerrero answered “yes” and explained. Based on that answer, CDCR informed Guerrero he was no longer eligible to become a correctional officer. The State Personnel Board upheld the decision. Guerro filed a federal suit, citing title VII; California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (Government Code, 12940); national origin discrimination in a state-conducted program (Government Code 11135); 42 U.S.C. 1983; and state equal protection and due process violations. The federal court dismissed the state law claims on Eleventh Amendment grounds, effectively limiting potential money recovery to backpay. To recoup damages, Guerrero filed suit in state court. After Guerrero won judgment in the federal action, the superior court dismissed his state claims under California claim preclusion principles. The court of appeal reversed, reasoning that federal law, not California law, governs the preclusive effect of the federal judgment, and provides an exception to claim preclusion where jurisdictional limitations in a prior suit blocked a request for complete relief. View "Guerrero v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation" on Justia Law

Tony Gunter injured his shoulder on the job. After Gunter had surgery to repair the injury, his doctor imposed work restrictions. Thinking the restrictions prevented him from performing his job, his employer, Bemis Company, fired Gunter. Gunter sued, alleging Bemis violated the Americans with Disabilities Act. A jury ruled in favor of Gunter and awarded him damages, some of which the district court reduced. The parties cross-appealed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The Sixth Circuit determined the district court erred in giving the jury the option of awarding front pay rather than reinstating Gunter, and vacated the front-pay award. The Court affirmed the district court's judgment in all other respects. View "Gunter v. Bemis Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Evendale property owners who wanted to rent their properties had to obtain a permit by allowing the building commissioner to inspect the property or sign a sworn affirmation that the property complied with the code. The commissioner also could inspect structures if he suspected a violation. If the building was occupied, the commissioner was to present credentials and request entry. For unoccupied structures, the commissioner was to make a reasonable effort to locate the owner and ask to inspect. Should someone refuse entry, the commissioner could use “remedies provided by law.” Vonderhaar owns 13 rental properties, over half of Evendale's rental homes. Vonderhaar filed a purported class action under the Fourth Amendment, claiming the code authorized warrantless searches, and the Fifth Amendment, claiming the code required permit applicants to attest to compliance. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, concluding that the inspection procedures facially violated the Fourth Amendment. Evendale subsequently amended its code to allow owners applying for rental permits to “[p]rovide a written certification” from an architect or engineer attesting that a building meets Village standards and adding that when a commissioner suspects a violation, the commissioner may “seek a search warrant based on probable cause.” The Sixth Circuit vacated the injunction for lack of standing. The Village never relied on the code to conduct a warrantless search and the plaintiffs have no risk of impending injury. View "Vonderhaar v. Village of Evendale" on Justia Law