Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Guerrero came from Mexico to the U.S. with his parents in 1990 at age 11. In 1995, he created a false Social Security number (SSN) to get a job. He secured a legitimate SSN in 2007. He became a U.S. citizen in 2011. He applied to become a correctional officer with the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). He passed written and physical exams and was placed on the eligibility list. CDCR’s background questionnaire asked, “Have you ever had or used a social security number other than the one you used on this questionnaire?” Guerrero answered “yes” and explained. Based on that answer, CDCR informed Guerrero he was no longer eligible to become a correctional officer. The State Personnel Board upheld the decision. Guerro filed a federal suit, citing title VII; California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (Government Code, 12940); national origin discrimination in a state-conducted program (Government Code 11135); 42 U.S.C. 1983; and state equal protection and due process violations. The federal court dismissed the state law claims on Eleventh Amendment grounds, effectively limiting potential money recovery to backpay. To recoup damages, Guerrero filed suit in state court. After Guerrero won judgment in the federal action, the superior court dismissed his state claims under California claim preclusion principles. The court of appeal reversed, reasoning that federal law, not California law, governs the preclusive effect of the federal judgment, and provides an exception to claim preclusion where jurisdictional limitations in a prior suit blocked a request for complete relief. View "Guerrero v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation" on Justia Law

Tony Gunter injured his shoulder on the job. After Gunter had surgery to repair the injury, his doctor imposed work restrictions. Thinking the restrictions prevented him from performing his job, his employer, Bemis Company, fired Gunter. Gunter sued, alleging Bemis violated the Americans with Disabilities Act. A jury ruled in favor of Gunter and awarded him damages, some of which the district court reduced. The parties cross-appealed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The Sixth Circuit determined the district court erred in giving the jury the option of awarding front pay rather than reinstating Gunter, and vacated the front-pay award. The Court affirmed the district court's judgment in all other respects. View "Gunter v. Bemis Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Evendale property owners who wanted to rent their properties had to obtain a permit by allowing the building commissioner to inspect the property or sign a sworn affirmation that the property complied with the code. The commissioner also could inspect structures if he suspected a violation. If the building was occupied, the commissioner was to present credentials and request entry. For unoccupied structures, the commissioner was to make a reasonable effort to locate the owner and ask to inspect. Should someone refuse entry, the commissioner could use “remedies provided by law.” Vonderhaar owns 13 rental properties, over half of Evendale's rental homes. Vonderhaar filed a purported class action under the Fourth Amendment, claiming the code authorized warrantless searches, and the Fifth Amendment, claiming the code required permit applicants to attest to compliance. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, concluding that the inspection procedures facially violated the Fourth Amendment. Evendale subsequently amended its code to allow owners applying for rental permits to “[p]rovide a written certification” from an architect or engineer attesting that a building meets Village standards and adding that when a commissioner suspects a violation, the commissioner may “seek a search warrant based on probable cause.” The Sixth Circuit vacated the injunction for lack of standing. The Village never relied on the code to conduct a warrantless search and the plaintiffs have no risk of impending injury. View "Vonderhaar v. Village of Evendale" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the order of the circuit court dismissing with prejudice Appellant’s civil rights case in which he challenged the conditions of his confinement in the Arkansas Department of Correction, holding that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order of dismissal with prejudice.Although Appellant’s complaint asserting a civil rights claim was electronically stamped with the date and time, no filing fee was paid. The circuit court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure to prosecute. On appeal, Appellant argued that the order of dismissal should be vacated for lack of jurisdiction because he never paid a filing fee, and therefore, the complaint was never filed and no action was commenced. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that because Appellant never paid a filing fee and that fee was not waived, Appellant’s case was never filed, and therefore, the circuit court never acquired jurisdiction. View "Ward v. Hutchinson" on Justia Law

Ryan Lee sued four Sheriff’s Deputies, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights. On July 4, 2014, Lee and his wife, Tamila Lee, attended a barbecue where they consumed alcohol. After the couple returned home, an altercation broke out over a set of car keys. Tamila, in an attempt to keep her husband from driving, blocked him from exiting their home, and a physical struggle ensued. Deputies Mark O’Harold and Todd Tucker arrived first and entered the home with Tamila’s consent. Shortly afterward, Deputies Amanda Weiss and Chad Walker also arrived at the Lees’ home and separated the Lees for questioning. Lee was largely uncooperative. Tucker attempted to detain him, and another struggle broke out. O’Harold and Weiss, hearing a commotion, reentered the home. O’Harold applied an arm bar hold to Lee. Lee collided with the kitchen cabinets and refrigerator, and Weiss then struck him twice in the shoulder in an effort to force him to let go of the refrigerator. O’Harold also struck Lee twice in the neck. Tucker drew his Taser and applied it three to five times to Lee’s back, with each application lasting approximately three, five, and eight seconds respectively. Lee then lost consciousness. Throughout the incident, Walker observed but did not intervene. Weiss then handcuffed Lee and escorted him to Weiss’ squad car. Lee subsequently pled guilty to misdemeanor domestic violence. The district court granted the motion as to Lee’s First Amendment retaliation claim and the portion of his excessive force claim based on handcuffing, but denied it as to the remainder of his excessive force claim. The district court concluded that the facts remaining in dispute, when viewed in the light most favorable to Lee, precluded a grant of qualified immunity. Defendants appealed. The Tenth Circuit determined it lacked interlocutory appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s determination of evidentiary sufficiency at the summary judgment stage. As to the purely legal challenge defendants raised on appeal, the Court concluded the district court correctly held that defendants used excessive force and did so in violation of clearly established law. The appeal was dismissed as to the factual challenges, and affirmed in all other respects. View "Lee v. Tucker" on Justia Law

In September 2016, the Governor of Tennessee convened a special session of the Tennessee General Assembly, concerning federal highway funding. During the session, a member of the House of Representatives moved to expel Durham. The House approved the motion 70 votes to two. It immediately expelled Durham. Durham may have qualified for lifetime health insurance if he had retired but because the House expelled him, the administrators stated that his government-health insurance would expire at the end of September. He also lost certain state-pension benefits. Durham sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging procedural due process violations, and requesting an order that the administrators pay his alleged benefits. The district court dismissed for lack of standing because the complaint alleged that the denial of his benefits was caused by the legislature’s expelling him, rather than by any act by the administrators. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Durham’s injury is fairly traceable to the administrators’ conduct: Durham alleges that he is not receiving benefits that the administrators should pay. That is sufficient to show standing. View "Durham v. Martin" on Justia Law

Brown, a federal prisoner. filed his “Kemmerer” complaint, alleging that prison officials had injured him by placing him in restraints; he successfully moved to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which waives fees if the prisoner demonstrates that he cannot afford the fees. Under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), the “three strikes rule,” a prisoner cannot proceed IFP if he has on three or more prior occasions, brought an action that was dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim. Brown later filed his “Sage” complaint, alleging that prison employees were deliberately indifferent to his serious mental health issues. Brown again sought to proceed IFP. Brown subsequently filed an explanation that he had been informed that he had three strikes and would invoke section 1915(g)’s “imminent danger” exception. The court denied Brown’s motion in Sage, concluding that he did not qualify for the exception, and vacated its Kemmerer IFP decision. Brown then filed his third Bivens action, claiming that a prison physician assistant denied him treatment for burns after he spilled hot water on himself. The court again held he did not meet the exception and dismissed the case. In consolidated appeals, the Third Circuit reversed, concluding that it must use its own precedent to evaluate whether prior cases are strikes, rather than that of the Circuit from which the potential strikes emanated. Brown's third "strike" did not qualify because the case was closed for failure to state a claim without having actually been filed in the district court. View "Brown v. Sage" on Justia Law

Unbeknownst to Burton, her license was suspended. Zion Officer Meyers spotted her driving, verified that there was an active warrant for her arrest, and activated his emergency lights. Burton saw his lights but claims she was afraid to pull over because, in 2008, Officer Richardt pulled Burton over, and, while she was handcuffed, used a taser on her. The Department sustained Burton's allegations of unnecessary force. Burton sued, obtaining a settlement. Instead of stopping, Burton drove toward her home, following all traffic laws, wanting friendly witnesses. The officers knew that Burton was heading home. Richardt, the officer involved in the 2008 incident, joined the pursuit. Burton stopped near her friend, with his pit bull. Meyers approached Burton’s driver’s side door. Burton exited through the passenger door because, she alleged, the other door was not functioning. Richardt ran and brought Burton to the ground by incorrectly executing a “straight-arm take-down.” The dog bit Richardt's leg but immediately released without causing damage. Sergeant Arrington placed his knee on Burton’s back as he handcuffed her then dragged her away.Burton sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983,. The court excluded evidence regarding the 2008 incident. The jury found in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The fact that Burton had been previously subjected to excessive force was not propensity evidence and could not be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 404. The court must weigh the probative value against the potential prejudice, considering ways in which prejudice can be mitigated. Excessive force amounts to whether the officers’ force, given the facts and circumstances known to them at the time, was reasonable. View "Burton v. City of Zion" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a pro se 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against prison officials, alleging that he was denied access to rehabilitative programs and services, including sex offender treatment. The district court dismissed the suit and plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration. The magistrate judge then sua sponte deemed plaintiff's motion withdrawn, and plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's dismissal of the suit.The Fifth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case and thus could not reach the merits. The court considered defendant's motion for reconsideration still pending before the district court because the magistrate judge's withdrawal of the motion was ultra vires and without legal consequence. Therefore, plaintiff's motion for reconsideration remained pending in the district court. The panel held the appeal in abbeyance and issued a limited remand to allow the district court to rule on plaintiff's motion. View "Lawson v. Stephens" on Justia Law

Wexford provides medical care to Illinois inmates. Beard experienced chronic ankle pain. In 2010 he consulted with his prison’s doctors, wanting surgery. The doctors ordered conservative treatment. When Beard’s pain persisted, the doctors considered referring Beard for surgical evaluation, which required Wexford’s approval. Wexford rejected requests for surgical evaluation but authorized Beard to see a podiatrist in 2012 and an orthopedist in 2015. Beard sued Wexford in 2011, claiming deliberate indifference to his serious medical need. A jury awarded Beard $10,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. The judge concluded that the punitive-damages award violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive or arbitrary punishment and reduced the award to $50,000. The Seventh Circuit vacated. While the Supreme Court has cautioned that “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages ... will satisfy due process,” the district court had nine single digits from which to choose and decided that the Seventh Amendment did not require it to offer Beard the option of a new trial before it entered judgment on the reduced award. The decision was arbitrary and constituted a procedural misstep. The court remanded to give Beard the choice between a reduced punitive-damages award and a new trial limited to damages. View "Beard v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law