Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Elsa M. Tronsrue filed for dissolution of marriage from George M. Tronsrue III, and George filed a counterpetition. In 1992, the Du Page County circuit court entered a judgment for dissolution of marriage, incorporating a marital settlement agreement that required George to pay Elsa one-half of the marital portion of his federal veterans’ disability payments. In 2019, George sought to terminate these payments, arguing that the division of his benefits was void under federal law. Elsa moved to dismiss George’s petition, and the circuit court granted her motion, found George in contempt for non-payment, and ordered him to pay Elsa’s attorney fees.The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, holding that the marital settlement agreement was not void despite potentially violating federal law, as the circuit court had jurisdiction over the dissolution proceedings. The dissenting justice argued that federal law preempted the agreement, rendering it void. In a related order, the appellate court also affirmed the contempt finding, reasoning that George was required to make the payments because the judgment was not void. The dissenting justice again argued that the provision was void, providing George with a compelling justification for non-compliance.The Supreme Court of Illinois reviewed the case and affirmed the appellate court’s judgments. The court held that federal law did not preempt the state law authorizing the marital settlement agreement, as George voluntarily agreed to use his disability benefits to pay Elsa after receiving them. The court also found that the circuit court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the judgment of dissolution, and thus, the judgment was not void. Consequently, the court upheld the award of attorney fees to Elsa for George’s failure to comply with the agreement. View "In re Marriage of Tronsrue" on Justia Law

Peter Farina has lived at the Victor Howell House, a group home for low-income individuals, since 1989. In 2000, the Janet Keenan Housing Corporation (JKHC), a non-profit, purchased the property to maintain it as affordable housing. Recently, JKHC attempted to sell the house to a private third party, leading to two tracks of litigation. The District of Columbia sued JKHC to halt the sale, arguing it violated JKHC’s charitable purposes. As the District and JKHC neared a settlement allowing the sale, Farina sought to intervene but was denied. Farina then filed his own lawsuit, claiming his rights under the Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act (TOPA) and the Uniform Trust Code (UTC) were being violated.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia denied Farina’s motion to intervene in the District’s case, citing untimeliness and lack of standing. The court approved the settlement between the District and JKHC, which allowed the sale to proceed. In Farina’s separate lawsuit, the court ruled against him, stating his TOPA rights were extinguished by the court-approved settlement and that he lacked standing to bring his UTC claim.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court held that Farina’s TOPA rights were not extinguished by the settlement, as the sale was an arm’s-length transaction and not exempt under TOPA. Farina must be given the opportunity to purchase the property under TOPA. However, the court agreed with the lower court that Farina lacked standing to bring his UTC claim, as he was neither a settlor nor a special interest beneficiary of JKHC. The court affirmed the judgment in the District’s case but vacated the judgment in Farina’s case, remanding it for further proceedings to afford Farina his TOPA rights. View "Farina v. Janet Keenan Housing Corporation" on Justia Law

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) granted the State of Louisiana primary enforcement authority over a class of underground carbon sequestration wells. Three environmental organizations, Deep South Center for Environmental Justice, Healthy Gulf, and Alliance for Affordable Energy, petitioned for review of the final rule granting that authorization, arguing that the rule would harm their interests.The petitioners claimed that the EPA's approval would force them to reallocate resources from their usual activities to oppose the Class VI well program. They also argued that the program would lead to increased energy costs, health risks, and environmental damage. The organizations asserted both organizational and associational standing, with Deep South claiming direct injury to its operations and Healthy Gulf and Alliance for Affordable Energy claiming injury on behalf of their members.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and dismissed the petition, finding that all three organizations lacked standing. The court held that Deep South's claimed injuries were not cognizable under Article III because they were self-inflicted and amounted to a setback to abstract social interests. The court also found that Healthy Gulf and Alliance for Affordable Energy's alleged injuries were too speculative and attenuated to meet the requirements of imminence and traceability. The court emphasized that the petitioners' theories of injury relied on a chain of speculative events that were not certainly impending.Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the petitioners failed to demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury that was fairly traceable to the EPA's action and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Therefore, the petitions for review were dismissed. View "Deep South Center for Environmental Justice v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

A.M. and R.Y. were married in April 2019, had a daughter in August 2019, and separated in April 2023. A.M. filed for divorce and they signed a marital settlement agreement (MSA) in December 2023, which was incorporated into a judgment of dissolution in February 2024. The MSA gave A.M. sole legal and primary physical custody of their daughter, with R.Y. having supervised visitation. In May 2024, A.M. filed for a domestic violence temporary restraining order (DVTRO) against R.Y., alleging psychological, verbal, and emotional abuse, as well as coercive control.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied A.M.'s request for a DVTRO on the same day it was filed, citing insufficient evidence of past abuse and lack of detail about recent incidents. The court scheduled an evidentiary hearing for June 6, 2024, which was later continued to August 2025. A.M. appealed the denial of the DVTRO and requested a stay of further proceedings pending the appeal, which was denied.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court found that A.M. made a prima facie showing of abuse based on her declaration and supporting evidence. The court held that the trial court erred in finding A.M.'s evidence insufficient and in denying the DVTRO based on the context of dissolution and custody disputes. The appellate court concluded that the trial court has discretion to deny a DVTRO if it reasonably concludes that it is not necessary to protect the petitioner pending a noticed hearing, but this must be explicitly stated.The appellate court reversed the order denying the DVTRO and remanded the case for further consideration based on the totality of circumstances, including any events since the original ruling. The court expressed no view on how the trial court should exercise its discretion on remand. View "In re Marriage of A.M. & R.Y." on Justia Law

Hanan Elatr Khashoggi brought a lawsuit following the assassination of her husband, Jamal Khashoggi, alleging that her cell phone was unlawfully surveilled using spyware developed by NSO Group Technologies. She claimed that this surveillance, conducted by agents of Saudi Arabia and the UAE using NSO's Pegasus spyware, led to her husband's death. NSO, an Israeli company, moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over it.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted NSO's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court found that Khashoggi had not sufficiently alleged that NSO had directed any conduct at Virginia. The court noted that Khashoggi's claims did not establish a significant connection between NSO's actions and the state of Virginia, as the alleged surveillance was directed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, not NSO itself.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit agreed that NSO had not purposefully availed itself of the privileges of conducting activities in Virginia. The court found that Khashoggi's allegations did not demonstrate that NSO had directed any conduct at Virginia, as the surveillance was carried out by third parties. Consequently, the court held that the district court correctly dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "Khashoggi v. NSO Group Technologies Limited" on Justia Law

In 2007, Osman Yunus Guracar took out a private student loan from Bank of America but stopped making payments in 2009. In 2017, Student Loan Solutions, LLC (SLS) purchased the loan and sued Guracar for non-payment in 2022. Guracar filed cross-claims against SLS and others, alleging violations of state and federal debt collection statutes. The cross-defendants moved to strike the cross-claims under California's anti-SLAPP statute, which the trial court granted.The Santa Clara County Superior Court ruled that Guracar's cross-claims arose from protected conduct and triggered the anti-SLAPP statute. The court also found that Guracar failed to show a probability of prevailing on his claims, holding that the loan was an installment debt and that SLS had timely accelerated the loan in June 2022. The court did not address Guracar's argument that the loan had been accelerated in February 2010.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Guracar had standing to assert his claims under the Debt Buyers Act, the PSLCRA, the Rosenthal Act, and the FDCPA without showing concrete harm. On the merits, the court found that Guracar established a probability of prevailing on his cross-claims for suing to collect a time-barred debt, making false and misleading representations, and failing to comply with certain PSLCRA requirements. The court reversed the trial court's judgment, reinstating these cross-claims but affirmed the striking of Guracar’s other cross-claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "Guracar v. Student Loan Solutions" on Justia Law

J.H. participated in an employee welfare-benefit plan insured by Anthem Blue Cross Life and Health Insurance Company, with her son, A.H., as a beneficiary. After seeking benefits for A.H.'s yearlong stay at a mental-health treatment center, Anthem denied coverage, and Plaintiffs' appeal to Anthem was unsuccessful. Over a year after their final appeal through Anthem was decided, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit to recover benefits under § 502(a)(1)(B) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).The United States District Court for the District of Utah dismissed the action, concluding it was time-barred under a provision of the Plan that required civil actions under ERISA § 502(a) to be brought within one year of the grievance or appeal decision. Plaintiffs argued that another sentence in the Plan set a three-year limitations period, creating an ambiguity that should be interpreted in their favor.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the two provisions were not inconsistent and both applied. The court explained that the one-year limitations period for § 502(a) actions and the three-year limitations period for other actions were distinct and could both be applicable. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal, concluding that Plaintiffs' action was time-barred as it was filed beyond the one-year limitations period specified in the Plan. View "J.H. v. Anthem Blue Cross Life and Health Insurance" on Justia Law

Melvin G. Welch died in 2023 from mesothelioma caused by asbestos exposure. His widow, Donna B. Welch, sued Atlas Turner, Inc. and other defendants, alleging their products caused his death. Atlas Turner, a Canadian company, produced and sold asbestos insulation, which was shipped to South Carolina. Welch was likely exposed to these products while working in Greenwood, South Carolina. The case was brought in Richland County and assigned to Judge Jean H. Toal, who oversees the South Carolina asbestos docket.Atlas Turner moved to dismiss the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction, but the trial court denied the motion and ordered Atlas Turner to participate in discovery. Atlas Turner ignored deposition notices and refused to comply with discovery orders, claiming it had no knowledgeable witnesses and that the Québec Business Concerns Records Act (QBCRA) prohibited it from disclosing information. The trial court held Atlas Turner in contempt, struck its answer, and placed it in default. The court also appointed a Receiver over Atlas Turner's Insurance Assets.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's sanctions and the appointment of the Receiver over Atlas Turner's Insurance Assets. The court found that Atlas Turner's refusal to comply with discovery was willful and that the QBCRA did not excuse its non-compliance. The court also held that the trial court had the authority to appoint a Receiver before judgment due to Atlas Turner's conduct, which indicated an intent to evade responsibility. However, the Supreme Court reversed the portion of the Receivership order that granted the Receiver authority beyond investigating and collecting Atlas Turner's Insurance Assets. View "Welch v. Atlas Turner, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2017, the Commissioner of Children and Families obtained an order of temporary custody for a minor child, Andrew, and placed him with foster parents. Years later, the foster parents filed a motion to intervene in response to the biological father's motion to revoke Andrew's commitment, which was granted in 2020. In 2021, the court denied the father's motion to revoke commitment, granted the foster parents' motion to transfer guardianship of Andrew to them, and rendered judgment accordingly.In 2023, the Appellate Court decided In re Ryan C., holding that nonrelative foster parents are prohibited by statute from intervening in neglect proceedings. Following this decision, the biological father filed a motion to open and vacate the 2021 judgment transferring guardianship of Andrew to the foster parents, arguing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the foster parents' motion to transfer guardianship. The trial court agreed, vacating the order granting the foster parents' motion to intervene and the judgment transferring guardianship.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and reversed the Appellate Court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that the Appellate Court improperly upheld the trial court’s decision to grant the father's motion to open and vacate the 2021 judgment. The Supreme Court determined that the trial court had jurisdiction to grant the foster parents' motion to intervene and their motion to transfer guardianship in 2021. Consequently, the trial court lacked authority to open the 2021 judgment more than four months after notice of that judgment was sent. The Supreme Court directed the Appellate Court to reverse the trial court’s decision and to reinstate the earlier order granting the foster parents’ motion to intervene and the 2021 judgment transferring guardianship of Andrew to the foster parents. View "In re Andrew C." on Justia Law

Professor James Wetherbe, known for his anti-tenure views, claimed he faced retaliation from Lance Nail, the then-dean of the business school at Texas Tech University (TTU), for his public criticisms of tenure. Wetherbe alleged that Nail's retaliatory actions included removing him from teaching assignments, falsely accusing him of misconduct, and revoking his emeritus status, among other adverse actions. Wetherbe sued Nail under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violating his First Amendment rights and sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the current dean, Margaret Williams.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied the defendants' second amended Rule 12(c) motion, holding that Wetherbe sufficiently alleged a constitutional violation and that Nail’s actions were objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law. The defendants appealed the denial of qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the contours of First Amendment law regarding retaliation were not clearly established at the time the events occurred. Specifically, the court found that it was not clearly established that Wetherbe’s speech regarding tenure was on a matter of public concern. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s order and rendered judgment in favor of the defendants, granting Nail qualified immunity from Wetherbe’s First Amendment retaliation claims. The court did not address Wetherbe’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against Williams, as the district court had not ruled on those claims. View "Wetherbe v. Texas Tech University" on Justia Law