Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
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Odyssey Logistics & Technology Corp. filed a patent application for a web service interface for transit time calculation in 2007. The application was rejected by a patent examiner in 2015, and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) affirmed the rejection in 2018. Odyssey appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which affirmed the PTAB's decision in 2020. Odyssey did not raise an Appointments Clause challenge during this appeal.After the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Arthrex, Inc. in 2021, which held that PTAB administrative judges' unreviewable authority violated the Appointments Clause, Odyssey requested Director review of the PTAB's 2018 decision. The United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) denied this request, stating that it did not accept requests for Director review of ex parte appeal decisions. Odyssey then filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, seeking to compel the Director to consider its request. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal, but on different grounds. The Federal Circuit concluded that the PTO did not abuse its discretion in denying Odyssey's request for Director review, noting that Odyssey had forfeited its Appointments Clause challenge by not raising it during the initial appeal. The court held that the PTO's decision to deny the request for review was reasonable given the significant delay and lack of justification for Odyssey's failure to raise the issue earlier. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's decision for failure to state a claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6). View "ODYSSEY LOGISTICS & TECHNOLOGY CORP. v. STEWART" on Justia Law

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Kaufman Lynn Construction was hired to build a corporate campus for JM Family Enterprises in South Florida. Kaufman obtained a commercial general liability policy from Liberty Surplus Insurance to cover itself and its subcontractors. After completing several buildings, Tropical Storm Eta caused significant water damage to the completed structures. Kaufman sought indemnification from Liberty, which denied the claim based on the policy's Course of Construction Exclusion (COCE), stating that coverage did not apply until the entire project was completed. Kaufman disputed this and filed a lawsuit against its subcontractors and initiated a claims process with Liberty.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted Liberty's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the COCE excluded coverage for the water damage because the entire project was not completed. The court also dismissed Kaufman's counterclaim for declaratory relief as duplicative and ruled that Kaufman's breach of contract counterclaim was moot. Additionally, the court dismissed Kaufman's reformation counterclaim for lack of standing, reasoning that Kaufman had not demonstrated a cognizable injury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and determined that Kaufman had Article III standing to seek reformation of the policy, as it suffered a cognizable injury by receiving a policy different from what was bargained for. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that the COCE precluded coverage for the water damage, as the entire project was not completed. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of Liberty's motion for attorney's fees, as Liberty's settlement proposal did not comply with the requirements of Florida's offer of judgment statute and Rule 1.442(c)(2)(B). The case was remanded for further proceedings on the reformation counterclaim. View "Liberty Surplus Insurance Corp. v. Kaufman Lynn Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

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Michael and Elizabeth Dailey filed an appeal with the Environmental Court of the First Circuit in July 2022, challenging a 2022 decision by the Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR). The decision involved a seawall allegedly constructed within the conservation district. The BLNR raised jurisdictional issues, citing Act 48 of 2016, which mandates that such appeals be filed directly with the Supreme Court of Hawaii. The Daileys argued that their case involved shoreline setback issues under HRS Chapter 205A, which would allow the environmental court to have jurisdiction.The environmental court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, stating it did not have the authority to transfer the case to the Supreme Court. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed this decision, agreeing that the appeal arose under HRS Chapter 183C and not HRS Chapter 205A Part III, and thus should have been filed directly with the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of Hawaii reviewed the case and determined that the Daileys' appeal did not involve the HRS Chapter 205A shoreline setback exception. Therefore, the Supreme Court had exclusive appellate jurisdiction. The court also held that the environmental court had the inherent and statutory power to transfer the appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ordered the environmental court to transfer the appeal nunc pro tunc to the date it was originally filed, allowing the appeal to proceed in the Supreme Court under the Hawaii Rules of Appellate Procedure. View "Dailey v. Department of Land and Natural Resources" on Justia Law

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Jason Wayne Gowen, a pretrial detainee at the Lynchburg Adult Detention Center, was placed in solitary confinement for 125 days after complaining about hot conditions in his cell and encouraging other inmates to do the same. Gowen filed a lawsuit against several correctional officers, alleging violations of his First Amendment rights due to retaliation for his grievances and his Fourteenth Amendment rights for being placed in solitary confinement without due process.The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia dismissed Gowen’s First Amendment retaliation claim, stating that he failed to show a causal connection between his grievances and the adverse actions taken against him. The court later granted summary judgment to the officers on Gowen’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, concluding that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Gowen adequately alleged a First Amendment retaliation claim by showing that he engaged in protected activity, faced adverse action, and established a causal connection through temporal proximity and the officers' awareness of his grievances. The court also determined that Gowen did not forfeit his argument regarding the exhaustion of administrative remedies, as his verified complaint contained sufficient evidence of his attempts to use the grievance process and the officers' failure to respond.The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Gowen’s First Amendment retaliation claim and vacated the summary judgment on his Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court’s findings. View "Gowen v. Winfield" on Justia Law

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Several property management companies advertised their apartment buildings on Facebook, targeting users who are 50 years old or younger. Neuhtah Opiotennione, who is older than 50, did not see these advertisements and claimed that the companies discriminated against her based on her age. She filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment, a permanent injunction, and damages.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed Opiotennione’s complaint, ruling that she lacked standing to sue because she had not suffered a concrete and particularized injury in fact. The court found that Opiotennione had not demonstrated how the alleged discrimination personally affected her.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Fourth Circuit held that Opiotennione failed to allege a concrete and particularized injury in fact. The court noted that merely being a member of the disfavored age group did not constitute a particularized injury. Additionally, the court found that Opiotennione did not allege that she was personally denied information or housing opportunities by the defendants, as she had not actively sought information from them. The court also rejected her claims of informational and stigmatic injuries, concluding that she had not demonstrated a personal denial of information or a concrete stigmatic injury. Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case for lack of standing. View "Opiotennione v. Bozzuto Management Co." on Justia Law

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Grant Phillip Poppinga filed a paternity petition seeking custody, visitation, and support for his daughter with Arrianna Monet Wallace. Unable to locate Wallace, Poppinga attempted service by publication. When Wallace did not appear, Poppinga moved for a default judgment, which the district court granted, establishing his paternity and awarding him sole custody. Wallace later sought to vacate the judgment, citing errors in the service by publication and the default judgment. The district court denied her motion, and she appealed.The Oklahoma Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on the sufficiency of the service by publication and the district court's denial of Wallace's motion to vacate. The court found multiple errors in the service by publication, including misspellings, incorrect nature of the suit, and untimely publication. These errors were deemed fatal to the court's jurisdiction over Wallace. Additionally, the court noted that the trial court failed to conduct a proper judicial inquiry into the due diligence of Poppinga's search for Wallace.The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the district court abused its discretion in finding the service by publication sufficient and in denying Wallace's motion to vacate the default judgment. The court emphasized the importance of due process, particularly in cases involving fundamental parental rights. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the trial court to reconsider Wallace's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and insufficiency of service of process, and to conduct further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "POPPINGA v. WALLACE" on Justia Law

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John McKnight filed a lawsuit against Anthony Love seeking damages from a vehicular accident. On November 13, 2019, both parties were driving on I-20 in DeKalb County when traffic slowed, and McKnight stopped his vehicle. Love, driving behind McKnight, failed to stop in time and collided with McKnight's vehicle. McKnight sustained injuries and his truck was damaged. Love was cited for following too closely and pleaded guilty to the offense. McKnight sought compensatory and punitive damages, as well as litigation expenses under OCGA § 13-6-11, alleging that Love acted in bad faith by being distracted, possibly using his cell phone at the time of the accident.The trial court denied Love's motion for partial summary judgment on the claim for litigation expenses, finding sufficient evidence to create a jury question regarding bad faith. The evidence included Love's cell phone records and McKnight's testimony suggesting Love was distracted. The trial court also denied Love's motion for summary judgment on claims of negligence per se but granted it on claims for punitive damages and stubborn litigiousness. Love did not challenge the negligence per se rulings, and McKnight's appeal on punitive damages and stubborn litigiousness was rejected by the Court of Appeals.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and determined that the Court of Appeals erred in its analysis. The Court held that mere violations of traffic laws do not constitute bad faith under OCGA § 13-6-11. Bad faith requires intentional wrongdoing or reckless disregard of known harmful consequences, which is more than mere negligence. The Court found insufficient evidence of bad faith to support a claim for litigation expenses and reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment affirming the trial court's denial of Love's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of bad faith litigation expenses. View "LOVE v. MCKNIGHT" on Justia Law

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In 2020, Georgia ratified an amendment to its Constitution waiving sovereign immunity for actions seeking declaratory relief from unlawful acts by the State or local governments. This amendment included a procedural requirement that such actions must be brought against and in the name of only the State or the relevant local government, or they would be dismissed. The case at hand questions whether a complaint that does not comply with this naming requirement can be cured by dropping or adding parties to avoid dismissal.Warbler Investments, LLC sued the City of Social Circle, its mayor, and three City Council members in their individual capacities, alleging unlawful rezoning of Warbler's property and violations of the Open Records Act. The defendants moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that the complaint violated the naming requirement of the Georgia Constitution. Warbler then moved to amend the complaint to drop the individual defendants, which the trial court allowed. However, after the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in State v. SASS Group, LLC, which mandated dismissal of cases not complying with the naming requirement, the City renewed its motion to dismiss. The trial court granted the motion, dismissing the case despite the amendment.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and concluded that the procedural defect of not complying with the naming requirement could be cured by amending the complaint to drop or add parties. The court held that the waiver of sovereign immunity was not affected by the initial failure to comply with the naming requirement, and the amended complaint, which complied with the requirement, should not be dismissed. The judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded. View "WARBLER INVESTMENTS, LLC v. CITY OF SOCIAL CIRCLE" on Justia Law

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Attorney Steven C. Kim took a lien against his client’s real property to secure his attorney fee. The trial court ordered Kim’s client to convey that property to fulfill a sales contract. Kim’s lien obstructed the sale, and the trial court expunged Kim’s lien. Kim’s client appealed, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, no one sought review in the Supreme Court, and the judgment became final in 2018. Three days later, Kim brought a new suit against the same buyer of the same property, seeking a declaration that his expunged lien was valid and the result in the earlier suit was wrong. The buyer successfully invoked issue preclusion, and Kim now appeals this new defeat.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted the buyer’s motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend, reasoning that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred Kim’s effort to relitigate the lien question. The court later also ruled for the buyer on its cross-complaint, and Kim alone appealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the judgment. The court held that the earlier litigation precluded relitigation of the lien question. The lien issue was actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit, and Kim was in privity with his client Central Korean. The court found that Kim had a financial interest in the lien question and controlled the litigation in cooperation with his client. The court dismissed Kim’s new arguments about section 1908 of the Code of Civil Procedure as they were raised for the first time in his reply brief. The trial court’s analysis of issue preclusion was deemed correct, and the judgment was affirmed, awarding costs to the respondents. View "Kim v. New Life Oasis Church" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Barbara Politsch obtained a default judgment of approximately $175,000 against Metroplaza Partners, LLC in a premises liability case. However, Metroplaza had sold the property in 2005, over a year before Politsch's injury, and was not served with the summons and complaint. Metroplaza learned of the default judgment in January 2014 but did not act on it based on their counsel's advice. In February 2022, Politsch, with new counsel, renewed the judgment and sought to enforce it. Metroplaza then moved to set aside the default judgment, which the trial court granted under its equitable powers.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Metroplaza's motion to set aside the default judgment, finding that Metroplaza had a meritorious defense, was never properly served, and had an excuse for not acting sooner due to reliance on their attorney's lack of advice. The court also noted the strong preference for cases to be decided on their merits and concerns about potential injustice.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling. It agreed that Metroplaza demonstrated a meritorious defense, a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense initially, and due diligence in seeking to set aside the default judgment once it was discovered. The appellate court emphasized the policy favoring decisions on the merits and the exceptional circumstances of the case, including the fact that Metroplaza was not the correct party to be sued. View "Politsch v. Metroplaza Partners, LLC" on Justia Law