Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

A former employee filed a labor claim against her employer and the employer’s business, seeking unpaid overtime and other compensation. The Labor Commissioner awarded her over $74,000. The decision was served by mail, triggering a 15-day deadline for the employer to appeal to the superior court and to either post an undertaking or seek a waiver of that requirement. The employer retained a third-party filing service, which attempted to file the appeal and waiver motion electronically on the last permissible day. The filing was rejected by the court clerk, and the documents were filed in person the following day, one day late.The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco determined that the employer’s appeal and waiver motion were untimely. The court found that the statutory deadline for appealing a Labor Commissioner decision is mandatory and jurisdictional, and that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the late filings. The employer argued that the deadline should be equitably tolled due to the filing service’s error, but the trial court rejected this argument.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that the statutory deadline for appealing a Labor Commissioner decision and for seeking a waiver of the undertaking requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional, and cannot be extended for reasons such as mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. The only exception is for fraud, which was not alleged. The court also held that the tolling provision in Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6 does not apply to notices of appeal from Labor Commissioner decisions. The court affirmed the superior court’s order dismissing the appeal as untimely. View "Dobarro v. Kim" on Justia Law

A resident of Madison County, Mississippi, received medical treatment at a hospital in Hinds County and later filed a claim with her health insurer, a foreign corporation doing business in the state. The insurer partially paid the claim but later, through its third-party administrator, asserted the hospital was out of network before eventually admitting it was in network. Despite repeated efforts by the insured to resolve the dispute, the insurer failed to pay the remaining balance or provide an explanation, ultimately stating the claim was untimely. The insured then sued the insurer and the administrator in Hinds County, seeking damages for breach of contract and related claims.The Circuit Court of Hinds County denied the insurer’s motion to dismiss or transfer venue to Madison County. Only the insurer sought and was granted an interlocutory appeal from this order. The administrator did not join the appeal.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case, applying de novo review to the interpretation of the venue statute and abuse of discretion to the trial court’s venue ruling. The Court held that, under Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3(1)(a)(i), venue is proper where a substantial act or omission by the defendant caused the injury for which the plaintiff seeks redress. The Court found that the medical treatment in Hinds County was not a substantial event caused by the insurer that resulted in the alleged injury; rather, the alleged injury arose from the insurer’s acts or omissions related to the insurance contract, which were not tied to Hinds County. The Court overruled prior precedent to the extent it conflicted with this interpretation and concluded that venue was proper in Madison County. The judgment of the Hinds County Circuit Court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings in Madison County. View "National Health Insurance Company v. Lever" on Justia Law

A patient underwent a laparoscopic bilateral tubal ligation and endometrial ablation performed by a physician at a women’s clinic. About a week after the procedure, she experienced severe abdominal pain and was hospitalized for sepsis. An exploratory surgery revealed a perforated small bowel, which was surgically repaired. The patient subsequently recovered.The patient filed a medical negligence lawsuit in the Hinds County Circuit Court against the clinic and the physician, attaching the required certificate of expert consultation to her complaint. The defendants moved for summary judgment, supporting their motion with an expert affidavit. The plaintiff did not timely file an expert affidavit or testimony in response. On the day before the scheduled summary judgment hearing, she filed a response without any expert affidavit. The circuit court denied the summary judgment motion and granted her an additional thirty days to obtain an expert affidavit. After she submitted an expert affidavit and a second hearing was held, the circuit court again denied summary judgment, finding that the competing expert affidavits created a genuine issue of material fact.On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the circuit court’s denial of summary judgment de novo and its grant of additional time for abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court held that, in medical malpractice cases, a plaintiff must produce sworn expert testimony to survive summary judgment. The court found that the plaintiff failed to provide such testimony before the initial hearing and that the circuit court abused its discretion by granting additional time without a specific finding of diligence or good faith. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment and rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Lakeland Premier Women's Clinic, PLLC v. Jackson" on Justia Law

A woman with COVID-19 and multiple underlying health conditions was admitted to a hospital and then transferred to a skilled nursing facility for ongoing treatment. During her stay at the facility, she was under the care of a physician who prescribed various treatments for her COVID-19 infection. Despite these interventions, her condition deteriorated, and she developed additional complications, including pressure wounds and dehydration. After being discharged from the facility without hospice or home health arrangements, she was readmitted to the hospital, where her condition continued to decline. She was eventually discharged home under hospice care and died shortly thereafter. Her surviving spouse filed a wrongful death lawsuit, alleging that the facility and physician were negligent in her care.The District Court of Garfield County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that they were immune from liability under both the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparation (PREP) Act and Oklahoma’s COVID-19 Public Health Emergency Limited Liability Act. The district court reasoned that the acts and omissions in question were incident to the provision of care for a COVID-19 patient and thus fell within the scope of the immunity statutes. The plaintiff appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case de novo. It held that the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of immunity. The court found that the defendants failed to provide evidence establishing a causal relationship between the administration or use of covered countermeasures and the plaintiff’s injuries, as required for PREP Act immunity. Additionally, the court determined that the defendants did not meet the evidentiary burden to show the requisite impact under the state COVID-19 Act, and that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding gross negligence. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "AUSTBO v. GREENBRIAR" on Justia Law

Two private-citizen members of a federally created commission, along with several federal officials, were involved in planning the United States’ 250th anniversary celebrations. The commission was established by Congress and included both federal officials and private citizens appointed by congressional leaders. After a dispute over leadership and the selection of an administrative secretariat, three commission members made public statements criticizing the commission’s Chairperson and Executive Director, alleging mismanagement and other misconduct. The Chairperson and Executive Director claimed these statements damaged their reputations and led to their removal, prompting them to file a tort action—including defamation and related claims—against the three members in Pennsylvania state court.After the complaint was filed, the Attorney General certified that the defendants were acting within the scope of their federal employment, removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and substituted the United States as the defendant under the Westfall Act. The District Court determined that the commission members qualified as federal employees, that their statements were made within the scope of their employment, and that discovery was unnecessary. The court granted the government’s motion to dismiss, as the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) does not waive sovereign immunity for defamation claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The Third Circuit held that the commission is a federal agency under the FTCA and Westfall Act, and that its private-citizen members are “employees of the government” for purposes of those statutes. The court further held that the defendants’ statements were made within the scope of their employment and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying discovery. The dismissal was affirmed because sovereign immunity barred the plaintiffs’ claims. View "Giordano v. Hohns" on Justia Law

Residents of Jackson, Mississippi, brought a class action lawsuit alleging that the city knowingly contaminated their drinking water with lead, failed to treat the water to prevent lead leaching, and misled the public about the water’s safety. The complaint details how city officials ignored warnings about the water system’s vulnerabilities, failed to repair critical treatment equipment, switched water sources in a way that worsened contamination, and delayed notifying residents of dangerous lead levels. Plaintiffs claim they and their families suffered significant health effects, including lead poisoning and related medical and developmental issues, as a result of consuming the contaminated water.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi granted the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to state a substantive due process claim against the city and that the individual city officials were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims, dismissing them without prejudice.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily integrity by claiming the city affirmatively introduced toxins into the water supply, misrepresented the water’s safety, and thereby deprived residents of the ability to make informed decisions about their health. The court also formally adopted the state-created danger doctrine as a viable theory in the circuit. The court reversed the dismissal of the due process claims against the city and vacated the dismissal of the state-law claims, remanding for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of claims against the individual city officials on qualified immunity grounds, finding the relevant rights were not clearly established at the time. View "Sterling v. City of Jackson" on Justia Law

In August 2019, a company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, with its only assets being three properties occupied by its sole member and two affiliates. Arrowhead Capital Finance, Ltd. obtained judgments against these affiliates and initiated an adversary proceeding against the debtor, seeking to hold it liable for the affiliates’ obligations. During this process, the bankruptcy trustee filed a separate adversary proceeding to recover unpaid rent from one affiliate. A settlement was reached in which Arrowhead received assignment of claims against the affiliates in exchange for releasing its own claims. The bankruptcy court approved this settlement, retaining jurisdiction over the assigned claims. Arrowhead then intervened and obtained a final judgment against the affiliates, including Royal Street Bistro, LLC (RSB).After the bankruptcy court entered judgment, RSB and another affiliate filed a notice of appeal but failed to attach a copy of the judgment as required by the bankruptcy rules. The bankruptcy court clerk issued a deficiency notice, and the corrected notice was filed ten days after the deadline. Arrowhead moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the failure to timely attach the judgment deprived the district court of jurisdiction. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana dismissed the appeal, holding that the defect was jurisdictional and, alternatively, that dismissal was warranted as a discretionary sanction for noncompliance.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that failure to attach the judgment to the notice of appeal is not a jurisdictional defect under the bankruptcy rules, and that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the appeal without considering lesser sanctions or the absence of prejudice. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Royal Street Bistro v. Arrowhead Capital" on Justia Law

After a fatal car accident involving a 2008 Lexus ES350, the driver, whose wife died in the crash, sued Toyota, alleging the vehicle was defective due to unintended acceleration. His case was added to a coordinated group of California state court proceedings (JCCP) involving similar claims against Toyota. The coordinated proceedings had established a Common Benefit Fund, requiring all plaintiffs whose cases resolved after a certain date to pay an 8 percent assessment from their recoveries. This fund compensated lead counsel for work that benefited all plaintiffs, such as shared discovery and expert work.The plaintiff’s case was coordinated with the JCCP in 2018. After settling with Toyota, he moved in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County to exempt his case from the 8 percent assessment, arguing he did not use or benefit from the shared work product and that his case was factually distinct. The Committee overseeing the fund opposed, submitting evidence that the plaintiff’s original attorney had relied on common benefit materials and that the issues in his case overlapped with those in the coordinated proceedings. The trial court found the plaintiff had not met his burden to show he was entitled to an exemption and denied his motion for relief from the assessment.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, held that the order denying relief was appealable as a collateral order. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, concluding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate as a matter of law that neither he nor his counsel benefited from the common work product. The court found the assessment applied, as the plaintiff’s case fell within the scope of the coordination order and he did not prove entitlement to an exemption. The order requiring the 8 percent assessment was affirmed. View "Pruchnik v. JCCP4621 Common Benefit Committee" on Justia Law

Two inmates at Smith State Prison in Georgia, Miguel Jackson and Kelvin Stevenson, were involved in a prison riot on December 31, 2010, after officers discovered contraband in Jackson’s cell. The officers alleged that Jackson and Stevenson assaulted them, leading to both inmates being handcuffed and escorted away. Jackson and Stevenson claimed that, after being restrained, they were severely beaten by correctional officers. They filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia against thirty-nine officers, asserting claims of excessive force and failure to intervene under the Eighth Amendment.Over the course of more than a decade, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed many defendants, and the district court granted partial summary judgment, leaving nine officers as defendants by the time of trial. Just before jury selection, plaintiffs moved to dismiss seven more defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), which the district court granted, entering judgment in favor of those defendants and reserving the issue of costs and sanctions. The case proceeded to trial against Officers Catanzariti and Harrison. The jury found for Catanzariti on Jackson’s excessive force claim but found he failed to intervene when other officers used excessive force, awarding Jackson $1.00 in damages. Stevenson’s claims against both officers were rejected.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the plaintiffs challenged the district court’s grant of their Rule 41 motion and several evidentiary rulings. The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the partial dismissal and entering judgment for the seven defendants, nor in admitting the challenged evidence. The court affirmed the district court’s final judgments. View "Jackson v. Catanzariti" on Justia Law

Lauren Woods was injured in a car accident involving an underinsured motorist and sought benefits from her insurer, Progressive American Insurance Company, under her policy’s underinsured motorist provision. Progressive declined to pay the full policy limit. Woods then sued Progressive for breach of contract and statutory bad faith under Florida law, alleging that Progressive failed to settle her claim in good faith. After serving civil remedy notices, Woods’s case was removed to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida first held a jury trial on Woods’s underinsured motorist claim, resulting in a verdict and final judgment in her favor that exceeded the policy limit. Woods then proceeded with her statutory bad faith claim before the same court. Prior to the bad faith trial, the parties stipulated to certain facts, including the existence and amount of the prior verdict and judgment. They also agreed that the magistrate judge would determine damages, and the jury would decide only liability. At the start of the bad faith trial, Woods limited her theory to Progressive’s conduct before the underinsured motorist trial, and the court excluded evidence and instructions regarding the prior verdict and excess judgment. The jury found for Progressive on the bad faith claim, and the court denied Woods’s motion for a new trial.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the prior verdict and excess judgment from the bad faith trial. The court found that, given Woods’s stipulation limiting the scope of her claim and the parties’ agreement that damages would be determined by the judge, the excluded evidence was irrelevant to the jury’s determination of liability. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Progressive. View "Woods v. Progressive American Insurance Company" on Justia Law