Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, who worked as a truck driver for the defendants for approximately nine months in 2018, brought claims alleging that the defendants failed to provide required meal and rest breaks, failed to reimburse necessary work-related expenses, and violated California’s unfair competition law. The plaintiff also filed a representative claim for civil penalties under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA), all arising from his employment as a driver.The Superior Court of Sutter County denied the plaintiff’s motion for class certification on the meal break, rest break, expense reimbursement, and unfair competition claims. In particular, the court found that the plaintiff failed to present substantial evidence of a common policy of discouraging breaks or of a community of interest among the proposed class members. The court relied on declarations from other drivers indicating they were not discouraged from taking breaks and noting variability in their experiences. The court also granted the defendants’ motion to strike the PAGA claim on manageability grounds, reasoning that adjudicating the claim would require individual testimony from 75 drivers and would be unmanageable.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed in part and reversed in part. It affirmed the denial of class certification for the rest break and expense reimbursement claims, finding insufficient evidence of commonality. However, it reversed the denial of class certification for the meal break and derivative unfair competition claims, holding that the trial court failed to apply the burden-shifting framework required by Donohue v. AMN Services, LLC when time records show missed or unrecorded meal breaks. Additionally, the appellate court reversed the order striking the PAGA claim, holding that trial courts lack inherent authority to strike PAGA claims solely based on manageability concerns, as clarified in Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc. The case was remanded for further proceedings, including consideration of whether the PAGA claim is preempted by federal law. View "Dieves v. Butte Sand Trucking Co." on Justia Law

Epic Games, a developer and operator of the Epic Games Store, sued Apple over its App Store practices, alleging violations of federal and California competition law. The dispute centered on Apple’s rules requiring developers to use Apple’s in-app payment system, which imposed a 30% commission, and its prohibition of developers directing users to other purchasing options outside the App Store. After a bench trial, the district court found Apple’s anti-steering provisions violated California’s Unfair Competition Law by preventing informed consumer choice but upheld Apple’s in-app payment system requirement for digital goods. The court issued an injunction barring Apple from restricting developers from including in their apps buttons, links, or other calls to action that direct users to alternative purchasing mechanisms.Following the injunction, Apple implemented a compliance plan involving a 27% commission on linked-out purchases and a series of restrictions on how developers could present external payment options, including limitations on button design, link placement, and user flow. Epic contested Apple’s compliance, arguing these measures still effectively prohibited alternative purchases. After holding multiple evidentiary hearings, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California found Apple in civil contempt for failing to comply with the injunction, citing Apple’s bad faith and pretextual justifications. The district court imposed broad sanctions, including prohibiting any commission on linked-out purchases, restricting Apple’s ability to limit external links, and referring Apple for criminal investigation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s contempt findings and most of the resulting sanctions but found portions of the sanctions—particularly the blanket ban on commissions—overbroad and more punitive than coercive. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded those parts for further tailoring, clarified the scope of permissible developer link prominence, and declined to vacate the injunction or reassign the case. The court otherwise affirmed the district court’s orders. View "EPIC GAMES, INC. V. APPLE INC." on Justia Law

Russ and Debi Ropken hired a construction company to build a custom home based on an oral agreement. The contractor began work and sent invoices for services and materials, which the Ropkens paid until May 2022, after which they stopped making payments. In July 2022, the Ropkens removed the contractor from the site. The contractor then sent a demand letter for three unpaid invoices totaling $276,169, but the Ropkens refused to pay. The contractor sued to recover the unpaid amount.In the District Court of Park County, the Ropkens admitted owing at least $176,870.21. At the conclusion of a jury trial, the jury found there was a valid contract, the Ropkens had breached it, and awarded the contractor $258,587.70 in damages. The district court entered judgment for that amount and permitted the contractor to request prejudgment interest. The contractor timely filed for prejudgment interest, and the Ropkens objected. The district court found for the contractor, awarding $33,473.25 in prejudgment interest at a statutory rate, and calculated interest from the date of the demand letter. The Ropkens paid the judgment but appealed the prejudgment interest award.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed whether the district court erred in awarding prejudgment interest and whether due process was violated by granting interest without an evidentiary hearing. The court held that a district court may award prejudgment interest even when it is not the trier of fact, as prejudgment interest is a matter of law and not fact. The court found the claim was liquidated and the Ropkens had notice. The court also held that the Ropkens received adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, satisfying due process. The Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the award of prejudgment interest. View "Ropken v. Yj Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Two individuals brought their dogs to a veterinary clinic for treatment. Dissatisfied with the care provided, both posted negative reviews on social media, detailing their experiences and criticizing the clinic’s practices. These posts were shared on multiple community Facebook pages and received significant engagement from the local community, including comments from others about the clinic. After the posters refused the clinic’s request to remove the reviews, the clinic filed a lawsuit for defamation per se against both individuals, alleging numerous defamatory statements.In the District Court for El Paso County, the defendants filed a special motion to dismiss under Colorado’s anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that their posts were protected as speech on a public issue. The district court denied the motion, finding that the statements concerned a private business dispute and did not address matters of public interest. The court also found that, even if the statute applied, the clinic had shown a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on its claims. On appeal, a division of the Colorado Court of Appeals agreed that the posts provided consumer information relevant to the public but concluded they did not contribute to a broader public discussion, largely because they were motivated by personal animosity and aimed to harm the clinic’s business.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and determined that the lower courts had applied the wrong legal standard. The Supreme Court held that courts must use a two-step test to determine if speech is protected under the anti-SLAPP statute: first, whether an objective observer could reasonably understand the speech, in context, to be made in connection with a public issue or interest; and second, whether the speech contributed to public discussion of that issue. The court further held that the speaker’s motive is irrelevant to this analysis. The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the matter was remanded for application of the correct standard. View "Lind-Barnett v. Tender Care Veterinary Ctr." on Justia Law

After the birth of G.W., he resided with his mother at her parents’ home, and the father was frequently present. DCYF investigated an earlier incident involving the child rolling off a couch and closed it as unfounded. When the child was approximately five weeks old, he was seen by his pediatrician after his parents reported bleeding in his mouth, but no cause was identified. Later that day, following an argument, the mother witnessed the father throw the child onto a bed but left him in the father’s care overnight. The next day, the mother noticed the child’s left arm was immobile; she delayed seeking medical care despite advice from a pediatric nurse, only taking the child to the emergency room after further prompting. Medical examination revealed a broken left humerus, healed oral injuries, and a minor eye hemorrhage, with no medical explanation other than trauma.The New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF) filed petitions alleging abuse and neglect against both parents. At the 9th Circuit Court-Goffstown Family Division, a hearing was held on these petitions. The mother moved to suppress her statements to child protective service workers, arguing statutory violations during the investigation. The trial court denied the motion and, after hearing testimony from both parents, medical experts, and other witnesses, found by a preponderance of the evidence that the mother had both abused and neglected the child.On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed whether there was sufficient evidence for both findings and whether the statutory violations by DCYF required exclusion of certain evidence. The court held that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the mother committed an abusive act under circumstances indicating harm or threatened harm to the child’s life, health, or welfare, and reversed the abuse finding. However, it found sufficient evidence of neglect and determined that any statutory violations by DCYF were harmless error. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire thus affirmed the neglect finding and reversed the abuse finding. View "In re G.W." on Justia Law

Michelle Evans attended a debate at the Texas Capitol in May 2023 regarding gender reassignment treatments for children. While at the Capitol, Evans encountered a transgender politician in the women’s restroom. A photo of this individual washing their hands was posted to Facebook by someone in Evans’s group, and Evans subsequently tweeted the same photo with a caption expressing her belief that the politician should not have used the women’s restroom. The tweet led to controversy and an investigation by the Department of Public Safety, prompted by Travis County District Attorney José Garza, to determine if Evans’s actions violated Texas Penal Code § 21.15(b), which prohibits transmitting images of individuals in bathrooms or changing rooms without consent and with intent to invade privacy.Evans sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, aiming to prevent Garza from investigating or prosecuting her for disseminating the photograph. She argued that the statute was unconstitutional both facially and as applied to her conduct, citing First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. The district court denied her requests for injunctive relief, reasoning that the equities weighed against granting the injunction, and that the values underlying abstention doctrines informed its decision. The court found no ongoing state judicial proceeding that would trigger abstention and did not make explicit findings on the likelihood of success on the merits.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that Evans had standing but agreed that she failed to meet her burden to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits or that the balance of harms justified injunctive relief. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the statute was not facially unconstitutional and that Evans had not shown it was unconstitutional as applied to her situation. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Evans v. Garza" on Justia Law

A former hourly employee brought a class action lawsuit against his former employer, a large wood products company, alleging various wage and hour violations under California law. The proposed classes included both employees who had signed arbitration agreements and those who had not. While some nonexempt employees had signed arbitration agreements requiring individual arbitration and waiving class actions, the named plaintiffs had not. The employer did not initially assert arbitration as a defense and, when ordered by the court to produce copies of signed arbitration agreements for putative class members, failed to do so for several years.During the course of discovery in the Superior Court of Shasta County, the employer repeatedly resisted requests to identify or produce arbitration agreements for employees who had signed them, leading to multiple discovery sanctions. The employer participated in extensive discovery and mediation involving employees who had signed arbitration agreements, without distinguishing them from other putative class members. Only after class certification did the employer finally produce thousands of signed arbitration agreements and immediately moved to compel arbitration for those employees. Plaintiffs opposed, arguing the employer had waived its right to arbitrate by years of litigation conduct inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate, and sought evidentiary and issue sanctions for delayed production.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. Applying the California Supreme Court’s standard from Quach v. California Commerce Club, Inc., the appellate court held that the employer waived its right to compel arbitration by clear and convincing evidence. The employer’s prolonged failure to produce arbitration agreements and its conduct throughout litigation was inconsistent with an intention to enforce arbitration. The order denying the motion to compel arbitration was affirmed, and the appeal from the order granting evidentiary and issue sanctions was dismissed as nonappealable. View "Sierra Pacific Industries Wage and Hour Cases" on Justia Law

An 18-year-old named Elijah Henry was driving with friends in Pleasanton, California, when a police officer, Officer Harvey, entered a parking lot to check for vehicle break-ins. Seeing the officer, Henry and his friends got into their car and left. Officer Harvey, suspecting a burglary, began to follow Henry’s car without activating lights or siren, intending to perform a traffic stop but not initiating a formal pursuit as defined by Pleasanton’s police policy. Henry, fearful of police attention, accelerated and ran a red light, colliding with Melanie Gilliland’s car and causing her serious injuries. Henry was later convicted of felony DUI, but no evidence connected him or his friends to the suspected burglary.Gilliland sued both Henry and the City of Pleasanton for negligence. In Alameda County Superior Court, the City moved for summary judgment, arguing it was immune from liability under California Vehicle Code section 17004.7, which protects public entities from damages caused by suspects fleeing police if the entity has a compliant vehicular pursuit policy and provides regular training. The first judge denied summary judgment, finding neither an actual nor perceived pursuit occurred under the City’s policy. At a later bench trial before a different judge, the court found the City immune, reasoning Henry believed he was being “pursued” in the ordinary sense, even though no formal pursuit was initiated.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and held the trial court applied the wrong legal standard for immunity under section 17004.7. The appellate court determined that “pursued” must be defined according to the public entity’s vehicular pursuit policy, not by its ordinary meaning. Because the lower court failed to consider evidence that Henry did not believe he was pursued within the meaning of the policy, the judgment in favor of the City was reversed and remanded for application of the correct standard. View "Gilliland v. City of Pleasanton" on Justia Law

A woman filed for dissolution of her marriage after six months, seeking a permanent domestic violence restraining order against her husband. The parties share a young daughter, S.R., and the wife has two other daughters, K.R. and D.R., from a prior relationship. The wife alleged that K.R., age 13, had disclosed incidents of sexual abuse by the husband. K.R. described being touched inappropriately by the husband on two occasions, one occurring recently and one two years prior. These allegations were relayed to law enforcement and a school counselor, and the wife filed a declaration detailing K.R.’s statements as part of her restraining order request.The Superior Court of Orange County held an evidentiary hearing in which the wife testified about K.R.’s statements. The trial court admitted these statements over the husband’s hearsay objections, found the wife credible, and granted a restraining order protecting the wife, K.R., D.R., and S.R. The order included sole legal and physical custody of S.R. to the wife, with the husband permitted professional monitored visitation with S.R. once a month, citing concerns that the monitor could not understand Spanish, S.R.’s primary language. The trial court also took judicial notice of pending criminal charges against the husband, and subsequently entered judgment dissolving the marriage.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that K.R.’s out-of-court statements were admissible for their truth under the child dependency hearsay exception recognized in In re Cindy L., and clarified that this exception applies in domestic violence restraining order proceedings involving sexual abuse of a minor. The court found error in the trial court’s reliance on pending criminal charges as substantive evidence, but determined the error was not prejudicial. The appellate court reversed the part of the restraining order limiting visitation with S.R., concluding the trial court misapplied the law regarding professional monitors’ language requirements, and remanded for reconsideration of visitation. The restraining order was otherwise affirmed. View "Marriage of M.P. and M.C." on Justia Law

A minor child was injured in 2018 while playing on a piece of playground equipment called “Rocks and Ropes” at Meadowlark Elementary School in Cheyenne, Wyoming. The child’s parents, Scott and Heather Hunter, alleged that the equipment was defective and that the school failed in its supervision and medical care following the incident, as their daughter was diagnosed weeks later with a crushed vertebra. The Hunters sued Universal Precast Concrete, Miracle Recreation Equipment, Churchich Recreation Equipment, and Laramie County School District #1, alleging strict product liability, negligence, breach of warranty, and failure to warn.The case proceeded before the District Court of Laramie County. Due to extensive delays—including those caused by the COVID-19 pandemic—there were multiple changes to scheduling orders. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the business defendants after excluding several of the Hunters’ expert witnesses under the Daubert standard, finding their testimony unreliable or irrelevant. The court denied summary judgment to the School District. After a mistrial was declared due to repeated improper conduct by the Hunters’ counsel during voir dire and opening statements, the district court dismissed the remaining claims against the School District with prejudice as a sanction for counsel’s actions and various procedural violations.The Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s exclusion of the Hunters’ experts and the grant of summary judgment in favor of the business defendants, holding that the lower court properly performed its gatekeeping function and the Hunters failed to offer admissible evidence of a defect. However, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s dismissal with prejudice, concluding that, while counsel’s conduct warranted sanctions, the extreme sanction of dismissal was not justified without prior warning or full consideration of lesser sanctions. The case was remanded for imposition of a lesser sanction. View "Hunter v. Universal Precast Concrete, Inc." on Justia Law