Justia Civil Procedure Opinion Summaries

Minor Doe, Father Doe, and Mother Doe filed a lawsuit against the Western Dubuque Community School District and several school officials after Minor Doe was assaulted by another student during class. The plaintiffs claimed negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and loss of consortium. The school did not contact medical personnel or the parents after the incident, and Minor Doe was later diagnosed with a concussion.The Iowa District Court for Dubuque County dismissed the case on four grounds: failure to meet the heightened pleading requirements of the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act (IMTCA), improper use of pseudonyms, failure of the breach of fiduciary duty claim as a matter of law, and the consortium claim failing without the underlying causes of action. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the case based on the IMTCA’s qualified immunity provision and the use of pseudonyms. The court held that the IMTCA’s qualified immunity provision does not apply to common law claims and that pseudonymous petitions are generally disfavored but may be allowed in certain circumstances. The court found that the plaintiffs should have been given an opportunity to amend their petition to use their real names. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the breach of fiduciary duty claim, stating that schools and their officials do not generally have fiduciary relationships with students.The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the negligence and consortium claims and remanded the case for further proceedings, while affirming the dismissal of the breach of fiduciary duty claim. View "Doe v. Western Dubuque Community School District" on Justia Law

In February 2014, Clint Shalla entered into a debt settlement agreement with Greg and Heather Koch to prevent a foreclosure on his farm. The Kochs agreed to purchase the farm and give Clint an exclusive option to repurchase it by August 15, 2015, with written notice and financing commitment. Clint's wife, Michelle, was not a party to the agreement but conveyed her marital interest in the property. Clint sought financing from Christopher Goerdt, then president of Peoples Trust and Savings Bank, who allegedly agreed to secure financing. Clint missed the option deadline, and the Kochs later agreed to sell the farm for a higher price. Goerdt, who had moved to County Bank, secured financing for the Shallas, but was later found to be involved in fraudulent activities.The Iowa District Court for Washington County granted partial summary judgment in favor of Peoples Bank, dismissing Michelle's fraudulent misrepresentation claim. The court later reconsidered and dismissed the Shallas' negligence and fraudulent misrepresentation claims, citing Iowa Code section 535.17. The court ruled in favor of County Bank in the foreclosure action and found Goerdt liable for conversion. The Shallas appealed, and the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment, with a dissent on the application of the statute of frauds.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that Iowa Code section 535.17, the credit agreement statute of frauds, barred the Shallas' claims for negligence and fraudulent misrepresentation. The court concluded that the statute applies to all actions related to unwritten credit agreements, regardless of whether the claims are framed in contract or tort. The case was remanded to the district court for a determination of County Bank's attorney fees, including appellate attorney fees. View "County Bank v. Shalla" on Justia Law

Daniel Flickinger, a full-time litigator at Wainwright, Pope & McMeekin, P.C. (WPM), posted conservative political commentary on his personal social media. In June 2020, he posted a controversial message about George Floyd's death. Lawrence Tracy King, a partner at King Simmons Ford & Spree, P.C. (the King law firm), sent this post to Flickinger's supervising attorney, Lonnie Wainwright, expressing concern. Wainwright and other WPM partners, who were not familiar with social media, reviewed Flickinger's posts and asked him to resign, which he did.Flickinger sued King and the King law firm for defamation, invasion of privacy, and tortious interference with a business relationship. The Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed his claims, but the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the dismissal of the tortious interference claim and remanded the case. The King defendants then moved for summary judgment, arguing there was no substantial evidence that their actions caused Flickinger's damages. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the King defendants, concluding that the WPM partners' decision to terminate Flickinger was based on their independent review of his social media posts.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and affirmed the summary judgment for the King law firm, finding that King's actions were not within the scope of his employment and did not benefit the firm. However, the court reversed the summary judgment for King, holding that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether King's actions were a substantial factor in Flickinger's termination and whether King was justified in sending the post. The case was remanded for further proceedings. The court also upheld the denial of Flickinger's motion to compel King's cellular-telephone records and his motion to continue the summary-judgment hearing. View "Flickinger v. King" on Justia Law

In February 2017, Lily T. Ojano-Bracco, Mountain West IRA, Inc., Angelina M. Sharman, and James R. Sharman sued Bradley C. Lewis, Birmingham Income Property, LLC (BIP), MAC, LLC, and Bryan Conwill, alleging fraud by BIP, which Lewis and Conwill owned. A process server delivered a summons and complaint to Lewis's stepson, Xavier Young, at Lewis's marital home. Despite evidence linking Lewis to this address, he did not respond to the complaint or subsequent court documents. In May 2021, the trial court entered a default judgment against Lewis, BIP, and Conwill. Lewis did not respond until April 2023, when he was personally served with a contempt order.The Jefferson Circuit Court denied Lewis's Rule 60(b)(4) motion to set aside the default judgment, which he based on claims of improper service. Lewis appealed, arguing he was unaware of the case and not properly served.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo. The court found that the Letson Farms address was Lewis's "usual place of abode" as he listed it on tax returns, a bankruptcy filing, and with the Alabama Secretary of State. Additionally, Young, who accepted the summons, resided at the Letson Farms address, as evidenced by his own official documents and previous acceptance of service on Lewis's behalf.The court held that service of process was valid under Rule 4, Ala. R. Civ. P., as it was performed at Lewis's usual place of abode with a person of suitable age and discretion residing there. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court's denial of Lewis's Rule 60(b)(4) motion. View "Lewis v. Ojano-Bracco" on Justia Law

Teresa Williams and Barney's Childcare and Learning Center, Inc., doing business as Pooh Bear Academy, filed a complaint against various officials and employees of the Alabama Department of Human Resources (ADHR) and the Elmore County Department of Human Resources (EDHR). The complaint included tort claims related to the suspension and revocation of the day-care provider's operating license and the denial of its license renewal application.The Montgomery Circuit Court dismissed the complaint on April 25, 2024. Williams and the day-care provider filed a postjudgment motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment on May 23, 2024. The court set a hearing for July 1, 2024, but it did not occur. A hearing was eventually held on September 5, 2024, where both parties' counsel stated on record that they had agreed to extend the time for the court to rule on the postjudgment motion beyond the 90-day limit. However, the court did not enter an order denying the postjudgment motion until September 12, 2024.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the appeal was untimely. The court noted that under Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P., the trial court had 90 days to rule on the postjudgment motion, which expired on August 21, 2024. Since the parties' consent to extend the time was not placed on the record before the 90-day period expired, the postjudgment motion was denied by operation of law on August 21, 2024. Consequently, Williams and the day-care provider had until October 2, 2024, to file their notice of appeal, but they did not do so until October 17, 2024. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Williams v. Dodd" on Justia Law

Charlene Carter, a flight attendant for Southwest Airlines, was terminated after sending graphic anti-abortion messages to the president of the flight attendants' union, Audrey Stone. Carter, a pro-life Christian, opposed the union's leadership and its participation in the Women's March, which she viewed as supporting abortion. After an arbitrator found that Southwest had cause to terminate Carter under its corporate policies, Carter sued Southwest and the union, claiming her termination violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Railway Labor Act (RLA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas ruled in favor of Carter, finding that Southwest and the union had discriminated against her based on her religious beliefs and practices. The court permanently enjoined Southwest and the union from interfering with the religious expression of any Southwest flight attendant and held Southwest in contempt for failing to comply with its judgment. Both Southwest and the union appealed, and Carter cross-appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's denial of Southwest's motion for judgment as a matter of law on Carter's belief-based Title VII claim and RLA retaliation claim, remanding with instructions to enter judgment for Southwest. The court affirmed the judgment against Southwest on Carter's practice-based Title VII claims and the dismissal of Carter's RLA interference claim. The court also affirmed the judgment against the union on all claims but vacated the permanent injunction and remanded for additional proceedings. Additionally, the court vacated the contempt order against Southwest. View "Carter v. Southwest Airlines Company" on Justia Law

In June 2020, the North Dakota Department of Health inspected ND Indoor RV Park, LLC and found several health, safety, and fire code violations. The Park was informed that its 2020 operating license would be revoked unless the violations were corrected. The Park did not address the violations, leading to the initiation of the license revocation process. The Park also requested a renewal of its license for 2021, which was denied due to the existing violations. The Park was allowed to operate until the hearing proceedings were final. The Park later withdrew its request for a hearing, and the Department of Health dismissed the renewal application and closed the case. Subsequently, the Park sold its property.The Park filed a complaint against the State of North Dakota, alleging regulatory taking, deprivation of substantive and procedural due process, inverse condemnation, unlawful interference with business relationships, systemic violation of due process, and estoppel. The State moved for judgment on the pleadings, claiming qualified immunity for individual defendants and lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the takings claims. The district court denied the State’s motion for summary judgment on the takings and due process claims but granted summary judgment on the unlawful interference claim. The remaining claims were dismissed by stipulation.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court granted a writ of supervision, directing the district court to dismiss counts II and III because the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The court also directed the dismissal of counts I and IV for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the Park failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The court concluded that the Park could not prevail on its substantive and procedural due process claims and that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the takings claims. View "ND Indoor RV Park v. State" on Justia Law

Travis Robinson petitioned to change his last name from "Robinson" to "Monigold," stating that "Monigold" was his and his father's original last name. He included a criminal background check with his petition but did not request a hearing. The district court denied the petition, citing Robinson's failure to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the name change was not intended to defraud or mislead, was made in good faith, would not cause injury to an individual, and would not compromise public safety. The court was particularly concerned with Robinson's extensive criminal history, including convictions for gross sexual imposition and failing to register as a sexual offender. Additionally, Robinson failed to provide notice through newspaper publication as required by statute.Robinson appealed, arguing that his name change request was made in good faith, not to defraud, and did not pose a public safety risk. He emphasized the familial and personal significance of the "Monigold" name and his transparency with the court regarding his criminal history. The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the district court's decision for an abuse of discretion.The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that Robinson failed to overcome the presumption that his name change request was made in bad faith, to defraud or mislead, to cause injury to an individual, or to compromise public safety. The court noted Robinson's extensive criminal history and his record of evading sex offender registration requirements. The court found that Robinson did not provide sufficient evidence to prove his request was made in good faith and would not compromise public safety. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the name change petition. View "In re Robinson" on Justia Law

ICON HD, LLC filed a lawsuit against National Sports Opportunity Partners, LLC (NSOP) and Michael Kuntz. Kuntz, the sole owner of NSOP, was previously a founding member of ICON HD. Kuntz had earlier sued ICON HD and its members, leading to a settlement agreement that included a release of claims. ICON HD later alleged that Kuntz, through NSOP, engaged in actions that harmed ICON HD, including failing to pay for contractor services provided by ICON HD.The District Court of Grand Forks County granted summary judgment in favor of Kuntz and NSOP, concluding that ICON HD’s claims were barred by the settlement agreement and by res judicata. The court found that the settlement agreement’s release terms covered the claims against Kuntz and NSOP, and that the claims were essentially variations of those resolved in the prior litigation.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. It determined that the district court erred in applying res judicata because NSOP and Kuntz did not raise it as an affirmative defense in their answer. The Supreme Court also found that the settlement agreement unambiguously released Kuntz from the claims but was ambiguous regarding the release of claims against NSOP. The ambiguity arose from whether NSOP was considered an "unnamed third party" under the settlement agreement’s exception clause.The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the summary judgment dismissing the claims against Kuntz, as the settlement agreement clearly released him from such claims. However, it reversed the summary judgment dismissing the claims against NSOP, finding that the ambiguity in the settlement agreement regarding NSOP’s status as an "unnamed third party" required further factual determination. View "ICON HD v. National Sports Opportunity Partners" on Justia Law

Mesabi Metallics Company LLC (Mesabi) filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2016 and emerged successfully in 2017. During the bankruptcy proceedings, Mesabi initiated an adversary proceeding against Cleveland-Cliffs, Inc. (Cliffs), alleging tortious interference, antitrust violations, and other claims. Mesabi sought to unseal certain documents obtained from Cliffs during discovery, which had been filed under seal pursuant to a protective order. Cliffs opposed the motion, arguing that the documents should remain sealed under Bankruptcy Code § 107, not the common law right of access.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware applied the common law standard from In re Avandia Marketing, Sales Practices & Products Liability Litigation, concluding that Cliffs had not met the burden to keep the documents sealed. The court recognized the potential for a different interpretation and certified the question for direct appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.The Third Circuit held that the sealing of documents in bankruptcy cases is governed by § 107 of the Bankruptcy Code, not the common law right of access. The court clarified that § 107 imposes a distinct burden for sealing documents, requiring protection of trade secrets or confidential commercial information if disclosure would cause competitive harm. The court vacated the Bankruptcy Court's order and remanded for application of the correct standard.Additionally, the Third Circuit addressed a separate motion by Greg Heyblom to intervene and unseal the documents. The court concluded that the Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction to grant Heyblom's motions while the appeal was pending, as it would interfere with the appellate court's jurisdiction. The orders granting Heyblom's motions were vacated. View "In re: ESML Holdings Inc v. Mesabi Metallics Company LLC" on Justia Law